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A Chronology ofJLebellion
1983 to August 1984
The first one and half years in the life of the UDF were largely reactive. The
Front was formed in a reaction to government reforms. High-profïle cam-
paigns against the tricameral parliament dominated. This focus on the tri-
cameral elections meant that colored and Indian organizations within the
UDF were in the forefront of activity.
September 1984 to July 1985
Beginning with the uprising in the townships of the Vaal Triangle, this period
was marked by a groundswell from below. The focus shifted from the tricam-
eral parliament to the African townships, where initially localized protests
around schools and rents gradually evolved into a challenge of the authority
of the local and central state. In many cases, this escalation was provoked by
the violent intervention of the security forces. While the state perceived the
UDF as the agitating force behind the civic protests, the impact of the UDF
on the townships was mostly indirect. Most action was spontaneous rather
than orchestrated.
July 1985 to June 1986
By proclaiming a partial State of Emergency, the government attempted to act
against the threat of "ungovernability:" In reaction to heavy-handed repression,
new forms of organization and Opposition emerged, such as street commit-
tees and consumer boycotts. The period of "people's power" is characterized
by a peak in violence and messianic expectations of impending liberation.
June 1986 to 1988
The second State of Emergency was marked by intensified rebellion and
repression, with townships coming under virtual military rule. After some
months of euphoria when liberation seemed imminent, the Opposition
became fragmented and demoralized. By early 1987, black resistance appeared
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to be at an end, with the UDF m danger of losing authority over their con-
stituencies, most notably in the case of youth.
1989 to 1991
January 1989 was marked by a revival of a spirit of resistance, beginning with
a hunger strike by politica! detainees that acquired increasing momentum. The
mass release of detainees helped to restore confidence. The UDF regrouped
with the new umbrella federation of trade unions, COSATU, to form a broad
alliance, the Mass Democratie Movement. The MDM proved successful in
reconstructing a populär protest movement. After the unbanning of the
African National Congress and the return of the ANC leadership from prison
and exile, the UDF lapsed into inactivity, uncertam about its role. The Front
was finally disbanded in 1991.
"Beyond Our Wüdest Dreams"
Introduction
To create a new country, you have to go beyond the
boundaries of the mind.
Tmnsnet advertisement
IN A BOOKLET wiTH BASIC FACTS on South Africa presented to Dutch
tourists in the mid-ipSos, the prospective visitot is ofFered a brief introduction
to the African population. Squeezed in between entries on steam locomotives
and wine routes, die tourist guidebook provides die following information on
die "Life of die Natives": "The life of die natives is not so easily accessible, as
it is located in remote areas of die country. One can get a glimpse of dus native
life in die form of tribal dances, which are held regularly in some parts of
Natal, at die Goldmine Museum in Johannesburg and in certain holiday
resorts. In some rural areas the local black population can be seen in charac-
teristic costumes."1 In die early 19905, a more solid-looking guidebook
informed die traveler about government policy vis-ä-vis die African popula-
tion: "When the Union of South Africa was founded in 1910 die total popu-
lation included 10 black ethnic groups who by the late 19605 respectively
ranged in numbers from a few hundred thousand to four million. Each had—
and still has—a territorial base reasonably well-defmed by history over more
than a Century, as well as a cultural identity, including language, and a dis-
tinctive socio-poh'tical System. The central question confronting South African
governments since 1910 has been the manner in which these 10 black ethnic
groups should be democratically fused into the political system."2
Bodi contentions, of course, are equally absurd. Far from being an exotic
backdrop in a country otherwise characterized by modern amenities and nos-
talgie trains, South African blacks in the 19805 acted on the center stage of
society. From the moment of landing at the airport, the visitor would have
been aware that diese supposedly "third-world peoples" were indispensable
for the functioning of what has been wrongly labeled a "first-world economy."
Whatever newspaper die visitor bought on die streets of Johannesburg, Cape
Town, or Durban, the front page would inevitably relate information about
new outbursts of black anger, coupled with dire warnings from white author-
ities. And far from being concerned with the democratie participation of
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blacks, South African governments during most of this Century were obsessed
with the question of how to exclude blacks from the political system.
This, however, is the significant point when comparing the official hand-
outs of 1985 and 1992: state publications had shifted from the language of
exclusion to a discourse of incorporation. To be fair, the tourist guide lagged
somewhat behind government policy. State attempts at redrawing the map of
apartheid society had begun in the late 19705 and continued throughout the
19805. But during the 19805, the "natives" made sure that this time the blue-
print of a new society would not be drawn without them. Even in 1992, the
state's infbrmation service had not come to terms with the events that had led
to the much hailed new partnership. The historical survey in the 1992 guide-
book conveniently skips the 1984-86 revolt, the most turbulent period in
South African history since the Anglo-Boer War.
In the past decade, South Africa's political and socioeconomic landscape
has been profoundly reshaped. The new cycle of revolt was triggered by the
state's reform policy, which in turn was a response to the changing nature of
the South African economy. A key actor during the crucial years of reform and
rebellion in the 19805 was the United Democratie Front (UDF), an umbrella
for a great variety of organizations that shared a total rejection of apartheid
and a willingness to take to the streets in a public demonstration. The UDF
played a vital role in bringing the banned African National Congress (ANC)
back on the center stage of South African politics, thus paving the way for its
unbanning and for the subsequent stage of negotiating and power sharing.
It is always tempting to read history backwards, taking the outcome as
point of departure and assuming that preceding developments were the step-
ping stones in the process that led, more or less inevitably, to the now known
results. Moreover, if the actual outcome correlates largely with the desired
results, the actors in the process are naturally tempted to claim their due cred-
its. With the wisdom of hindsight, the UDF can be depicted as a transitional
front, having prepared the ground for the leaders of the "audiëntie" liberation
movement to come home from exile and from prison and to take over power.
Once the ANC had taken its rightful position, the UDF ceded its political
role. After some deliberations, the Front decided in 1991 to disband. But the
founding fathers of the UDF initially had much more modest ambitions: they
were cementing an ad hoc alliance to combat the new constitutional dispen-
sation that the government had promulgated in 1982. As Azhar Cachalia, one
of the UDF's core activists, later explained: "Look, when we founded the
UDF, we had never in our wildest dreams expected that events would take
off in the way they did. What happened was beyond everybody's expecta-
tions."3 This assettion was echoed in interviews with many other leading per-
sonalities in the UDF.
iïntroduction 3
The UDF years have been a crucial episode in the transformation of South
; African society. Many of the old boundaries of the apartheid state have been
wiped out, at least from the Statute books if not always in real life. The process
of partial incorporation began in 1979 with trade union reforms, intended to
draw the black labor force into the industrial bargaining system, in the hope
of creating a stabilized labor aristocracy whose political aspirations could be
bought off with the promise of modest prosperity. With the center of gravity
shifting from mining and agriculture to manufacturing, the economy expressed
agrowing demand for skilied, semiskilled, clerical, and managerial staff. In the
words of Anglo-American director Harry Oppenheimer, the South African
economy was moving from a "labour-intensive, low-wage, low-productivity
economie system—typical of industrial development in its earliest stage—to
the capital-intensive, high-wage, high-productivity system which characterises
the advanced industrialised countries."4
Fulfilling these demands implied the acceptance of a permanent black urban
population and raising educational levels for blacks. The educational system
was restructured in order to better attune the curriculum to the increasingly
differentiated needs of the economy. Recommendations to work toward equal
quality of education for all racial groups under one single education ministry
were rejected. However, racial restrictions on admission to private schools and
to universities were allo wed to lapse.5
Having dropped the illusion that African workers could be considered life-
long migrants who would exercise their political rights in "their" homelands,
the state had to come to terms with the fact that millions of Africans were
regarded now as permanent residents of "white" South Africa. To this end, the
state differentiated between "urban blacks" and "rural blacks." State policy in
this respect was largely based on the recommendations of the Riekert Com-
mission on Manpower (1979). Riekert abandoned one of the central fictions
of apartheid, namely that there would eventually be no black citizens of
"white" South Africa because all blacks would exercise their political rights in
the Bantustans. Urban blacks were henceforth to be treated as permanent resi-
dents, not as temporary sojourners in "white" South Africa. But more security
for urban blacks was to be achieved at the expense of rural Africans, notably in
the homelands. Riekert favored a strict system of influx control from the rural
areas to the urban centers, with labor bureaus ensuring that labor would be
released from the homelands only in response to demand in the white areas.
While the boundaries around the Bantustans were tightened, a solution was
devised for the political incorporation of the "urban insiders." The 1982 Black
Local Authorities Act granted limited powers of local government to elected
town councils in the urban townships. It was hoped that increased opportu-
nities for local political competition and patronage would draw attention and
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energy away from the battle for state power. President P. W. Botha envisaged
an archipelago of semi-autonomous black city-states, scattered around the
white industrial centers: if Luxemburg could be an independent state, then
why not Soweto? The combined set of bills that were drawn up to implement
Riekert's recommendations became known as the Koornhof Bills, after Minis-
ter of Co-operation and Development Piet Koornhof.6
Having thus disposed of rural blacks and having accommodated urban
blacks, the government devised policies aimed at the co-optation of rwo other
population groups, situated in an intermediary position in the racial stratifi-
cation: coloreds and Indians. The exclusively white parliament was trans-
formed into a tricameral parliament, with separate chambers and cabinets for
whites, coloreds, and Indians. The 1983 constitution had sufficient built-in
guarantees to ensure that final control remained firmly in white hands. The
African majority remained excluded from political power at a national level.
This unilateral restructuring of the political landscape provided the impetus
for the formation of the United Democratie Front, under the slogan "Apartheid
divides, UDF unites."
In contrast to the exclusivist nationalism of the Afrikaners, the UDF advo-
cated the inclusive nationalism of the Freedom Charter: South Africa belongs
to all who live in it, black and white. In contrast to the long-term policy goal
of replacing the racial stratification of the apartheid state with the social strat-
ification of a modern market economy, the UDF proposed its own Utopia of
an egalitarian society, governed by a participatory democracy, strongly rooted
in grassroots structures. However, in the process of contesting this unilater-
ally imposed change in the terms of exclusion and incorporation, the UDF was
drawing its own boundaries, though these were certainly less rigid than those
of the apartheid state. The UDF's Programme of Action announced the inten-
tion "to establish the United Democratie Front as the only representative front
representing all sections of our people."7
The UDF leadership frequently spoke on behalf of "our people" or "the
people." Although the UDF could safely claim to be the most representative
movement in South African history, it was clear that not all inhabitants of
South Africa were deemed to belong to "the people." While the apartheid state
drew geographic borderlines around Bantustans and racially defined Group
Areas, the UDF demarcated its constituency along more symbolic lines. "Who
are the people?" asked one of the speakers at a UDF conference. "We have
stated in the past that the people consist of all those classes, parts of classes,
organisations, groups and individuals who form part of or support the strug-
gle against apartheid. The people, therefore, do not consist of one class or race.
Indeed, they consist of persons from all racial groups who have an interest in
|$truggle to destroy apartheid.... On the other hand, the forces of apartheid
t all those classes, sections of classes, organisations, groups and individuals
' form part of or support the machinery of apartheid. This category
prludes Blacks as well as whites."8
P? Here, "the people" are all those actively opposed to apartheid. But often
e people" were more narrowly defined, with political loyalties as the deci-
: criterion. In another widely held interpretation of "the people," the term
>>*»rs exclusively to ANC adherents. Steve Tshwete, president of the UDF's
f. Border region and simultaneously a cadre in the ANC underground, recalled
tfae discussions on Robben Island, where hè was imprisoned for fifteen years
for activities in Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ANC's armed wing: "You
LOW, the word 'people,' it pervades the whole Charter: The people shall gov-
n' and 'land to the people.' We had to engage in intensive politicisation,
j p c a u s e 'people' as far as we were concerned, are all those classes, those social
|; groups, irrespective of race, colour, or creed, who rallied around the banner
of the ANC for a non-racial, united, democratie South Africa."9
Similarly, at a meeting of student activists from UDF- and ANC-aligned
{". Organizations in a rural village in the Northern Transvaal, the term "the peo-
T
 ple" referred exclusively to people and organizations in the ANC camp. The
j * "Zimzims," students belonging to rival organizations aligned to the Pan
, Africanist Congress (PAC), were not seen as belonging to "the people." They
f were just "persons."10 The terms "the people" and another UDF favorite, "the
Community," were frequently employed to demarcate the borderlines in a
dichotomy between "us and them," between good and evil.
Race, Class, and Evil
The conflict in South Africa has been depicted as a clash between two nation-
alisms, the exclusivist nationalism of the Afrikaners versus the inclusive nation-
alism of the Freedom Charter, which represents the mainstream ideology in
African resistance. Alternatively, the focus is not on Afrikaner ideology but
more generally on white prejudice and privilege. In much of the more recent
academie literature, the factor of race is seen as subordinate to another fac-
tor: class interest. For this revisionist school, the central fact in South African
history is not archaic Afrikaner ideology or white prejudice but "the super-
exploitation of black labour by a racially structured capitalism."11 The rigid
either/or character of this "race-class debate," requiring a hierarchical ranking
of the categories of race and class, has been criticized by participants on both
sides of the debate.12 In recent years, the focus has shifted toward the dual
structure of racial oppression and class exploitation, allowing for a more
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nuanced discussion. The race-class debate and its implications in terms of
Opposition politics are explored in somewhat more detail in the section on the
historiography of the conflict in South Africa.
A consequence of these theoretical paradigms is a rather one-dimensional
portrayal of the main protagonist«. They tend to be reduced to either greedy
capitalists versus downtrodden proletarians or white supremacists versus black
freedom fïghters. The more balanced approach, which recognizes the valid-
ity of concepts of race and ethnicity as well as the insights provided by a class
analysis, has the virtue of restoring at least two dimensions to the protagonists.
But in order to do justice to South Africans of all colors and classes, more
dimensions are needed. Fortunately, just like people elsewhere, real-life peo-
ple in South Africa are not one- or two-dimensional actors; they are multi-
dimensional human beings.
The struggle in South Africa was not only about redefining the political and
the social order. It was also about competing concepts of the desired moral
order. In his speech at the 1983 conference where the idea of a United Front
was discussed, Allan Boesak condemned the constitutional proposals not only
as politically untenable but also as "morally wrong and unacceptable." He
exhorted his audience to join forces, as "co-workers with God," against an evil
government.13 At a UDF meeting in Kroonvale, the colored township of
Graaff Reinet, a resolution was passed stating that the people were against
apartheid because it was immoral and sinful.14 When a delegation of church
leaders went to meet government ministers to discuss an upsurge of violence
in the Vaal Triangle, they claimed to act on divine instructions. Bishop Desmond
Tutu said the church leaders came as Christians with no political axe to grind.
"We went on the mandate of the Gospel."15
The stakes in the contest included material resources, political rights, and
human values, but the competition was equally about access to and control
over spiritual resources. Both sides claimed to be fighting the forces of evil and
darkness, and both sides laid claim to having "God on our side." The conflict
over South Africa has indeed been characterized as "fïrst and foremost... a
type of spiritual warfare."16 The God of the National Party and the South
African Police was locked in battle with the God of the oppressed. The highly
controversial 1983 constitution declares that "The people of the Republic of
South Africa acknowledge the sovereignty and guidance of Almighty God."17
This is the God of the Afrikaner people, the God who "gathered our forebears
together from many lands and gave them this their own, who has guided them
from generation to generation, who has wondrously delivered them from the
dangers that beset them."18 This is also the God of the Christian National edu-
cation imposed by the National Party on South African schools. In his auto-
biography, Frank Chikane, vice-president of the UDF Transvaal and later
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' general of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), gives a
l description of this competition for divine backing. In South African text-
s, God is on the side of the settlers who dispossess the indigenous peo-
. The whites came and took the land and the freedom of the blacks in
age for the Bible. On whose side was God, if the whites claimed to have
L helped by God to subdue the blacks? "Did they defeat our forefathers
"%ecause God was on their side?"19
Calvinist doctrine was also used to provide supernatural legitimacy for the
Police force. A manual used at the police colleges explained that "the State has
received its authority from God, and has, in his turn, given authority to the
police."20 Both the South African Police (SAP) and the South African Defence
Force (SADF) frequently invoked religieus backing for their mission. "When
the men in uniform defy the Marxist danger with arms, they are assisted by the
Chaplain with the weapon of the Gospel."21
On the other side of the front line, the combatants were equally on a
divinely ordained mission. An article entitled "Christianity and Revolution: A
Battle Fought on Many Fronts," published in the ANC magazine Sechaba,
explained how national liberation and spiritual salvation went hand in hand
in "taking up the cross to follow Jesus, who voluntarily chose the dangerous
path of confronting violence himself to open the way for a new society."22
Calvinist doctrine was invoked by Allan Boesak when he wrote an open let-
ter to the minister of justice, pointing out that the Bible teaches that "where
justice is lacking . . . the government's authority is no longer derived from
God, but it is in conflict with God. In such a case, resistance against such a
government is justifïed and becomes a duty."23 The Kairos document, pub-
lished in 1985 by leading South African adherents of liberation theology, pro-
vided legitimacy on biblical grounds for resistance against tyranny. The Kairos
document asserts that "God sides with the Oppressed" and recommends
reshaping church rituals "to promote the liberating mission of God in our
present crisis. The evil forces we speak of in baptism, for example, must be
named. We know what these evil forces are in South Africa today."24
The contest about spiritual resources, of course, was not limited to the dis-
course of Christianity. Various Christian denominations branded apartheid as
heresy. Hindu organizations asserted that "Hinduism believes that all people
are equal."25 Numerous Moslem leaders proclaimed similar verdicts, declaring
participation in the government's new dispensation hamam, unlawful by reli-
gious law. The Dutch Reformed Church did not watch in idleness while the
enemy appropriated God. Following a proposal of Dominee Stoffel Colyn,
chaplain general of the South African Police, the general synod resolved that
Islam was a false religion and that "the gospel of Jesus Christ [is] the only
answer to the onslaught of Islam."26
"Beyond Our Wildert ureum?'
On the ideological as well as on the actual battlefield, control over super-
natural resources was hody contested. Describing the battles in Natal between
Inkatha warriors and UDF-aligned youdi, one of die "comrades" on the UDF
side explained how both sides prepared themselves for die fight. "They take
muti. They have wizards to weaken us. We take muti. We sing: 'kill the wiz-
ards'.... It is difficult to find strong muti if you are a comrade."27 Speaking at
a cultural conference, Thabo Mbeki (then die ANC director of information)
exhorted his audience to remember what the Zulu king Dingaan had said
when hè faced the enemy: "Bulala abathakathi—Kill the Sorcerers."28 In
these battles between "us and them," die other side was portrayed as the forces
of evil, as die Antichrist, as witches and sorcerers, who had to be removed
from society.
The autobiography of Ronnie Kasrils, die head of military intelligence for
the ANC armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), provides an interesting
glimpse of discussions among MK recruits. Having watched a volleybal! com-
petition between two MK teams in which one side invoked muti powers
(African medicine with supposedly magie qualities), hè proceeded to discuss
the subject in the classroom. He told his students about an incident during
Zimbabwe's liberation war, where die ANC had fought alongside Zimbab-
wean guerrillas against lan Smith's white minority regime. A group of guer-
rillas had sought sanctuary in die hüls near a village, where they were advised
that a famous sangoma. (a traditional healer) would be visiting die village. The
guerrillas were divided on what to do: go and meet the sangoma in order to
show respect for traditional custom and to benefit from the spiritual powers
of the sangoma; or let security considerations prevail and avoid contact. This
last argument was underpinned witii the assertion that there was no power
in muti anyway. The outcome was diat some of the guerrillas indeed went to
meet die sangoma, who performed a ritual to make them invisible to dieir ene-
mies and subsequendy betrayed them to the Rhodesian army. The lesson, as
Kasrils spelled out for his students, was that magie could not bring safety.
"There was no muti that could make you invincible. Victory depended not
on muti, but on skill, preparation, and the fact that we were waging a just
war."29 If the issue, as Kasrils explained to the director of the training center
in the German Democratie Republic, centered on a debate between the pro-
tagonists of dialectal materialism and of idealism, then Kasrils after all placed
himself in the camp of die idealists, along widi the adherents of the sangoma.
A moral legitimation, the conviction of fighting a just war, would guarantee
ultimate victory.
In order to build a new society, a new moral order, the forces of evil had to
be driven out. Not only white audiorities, capitalist bosses, black town coun-
cillors and policemen, and Bantustan leaders were excluded from the defïni-
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tion of "die people." Those who controlled the forces of evil magie, witches
and sorcerers, were equally excluded. Purging die forces of evil from the body
of society could take various forms: ostracizing black policemen, boycotting
the shops of town councillors, and burning government property, impimpis
(suspected informers), and, indeed, witches. Allan Boesak proposed to exor-
cize die forces of evil with prayer. "If the rulers will not hear the cries of die
people, if tiiey will not change, if diey continue to prevent justice, let us pray
them out of existence. . . . We do not believe in the power of violence, but
we do believe in die power of prayer."30 Some, however, chose violent meth-
ods of exorcism. Persons suspected of having acted as informers were publicly
eliminated with die notorious "necklace"—they were burned to death with a
gasoline-doused car tire around the neck. Odier cleansing rituals were less dra-
matic. During die peak of the period of "people's power" in 1985-86, the few
feverish months when liberation seemed around die corner, frequent refer-
ences were made to various cleanup activities. One of the duties of die street
committees in Alexandra township was "to look to the cleanliness, to clean the
yard of dirt and crime."31 People's courts, aspiring to eliminate crime and to
restore harmony within die family or between neighbors, were instrumental
in mosdy short-lived attempts at building botii a political and a moral com-
munity in the townships. People's parks—open spaces cleared of rubbish and
crudely decorated witii flowers and symbols of liberation—were the signals of
a new order, until the police moved in to root out what to them appeared as
die symbols of evil.
Macro and Micro Perspectives
At stake in the battles of die 19805 was the contest about changing die bor-
derlines in the racial and social stratification of South Africa. In this contest,
participants developed dieir own visions of a future society, of a new politi-
cal and social order as well as a new moral order. In the birth process of a new
society, symbolic borderlines were drawn and redrawn by rituals of exclusion
and incorporation.
This book is an attempt to contribute to our understanding of a dramatic
period in Soudi African history by looking at these processes at a local level.
I have chosen to focus on the UDF as a social movement from below, taking
three local organizations as my vantage point. Part 2, the main body of this
book (chapters 3-5), consists of three case studies, which look in detail at locally
based attempts at shaping a new society. I have selected diree different settings
and diree different phenomena: a youth movement in Sekhukhuneland, a
rural part of Lebowa, one of the former Bantustans in the Northern Transvaal;
a civic association (a residents organization) in Kagiso, a township adjacent to
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Redrawing the Boundaries: Changing the Terms
of Exclusion and Incorporation
CHAPTER ONE
UDF and South Africa
In the 1980$:
The Events
We remember only too well the township Situation during the penod described
as a "penod of people's power." Community councillors left their jobs, and a
huge vacuüm was formed. We did not know what to do with the authonty, the
power, that had already come mto the hands of the people. Perhaps history is on
our side in that liberation did not come then. It has given us another chance . . .
to reflect and develop our posmon to strenger heights.
Murphy Morobe
Getting off the Ground: 1983-1984
XHE CONVENTIONAL STORY of the United Democratie Front traces the ori-
gins of the Front to a call made by Allan Boesak at a congress held by the
Anti-South African Indian Conncil Committee (anti-SAIC) on 22 and 23 Jan-
uary 1983 in Johannesburg. The anti-SAIC had been established in 1981 with
the limited goal of opposing the elections for the South African Indian Coun-
cil (SAIC), an advisory body that the government had devised as a platform
for Indian politics. After a successful boycott campaign by this ad hoc alliance
of Indian organizations, the turnout in the 1981 poll stood at a dismal 10 per-
cent. This campaign marked the revival of Charterist politics inside South
Africa: the boycott was supported by a coalition of 110 organizations that
adopted die Charter for Change, a document strongly reminiscent of the Free-
dom Charter, die basic policy document of the Congress Alliance.1
The meeting in Johannesburg was convened in early 1983 to consolidate the
"victory and the gains" of the boycott campaign with die establishment of a
more permanent political organization.2 The Indian delegates decided to
revive the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC), which had existed in die 19505
as part of the Congress Alliance, binding the ANC in a partnership with
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organizations of progressive Indians, coloreds, and whites. More importandy,
at least in retrospect, it responded to a call by a colored church minister,
Dr. Allan Boesak, president of die World Alliance of Reformed Churches, to
form a broad front of organizations all over the country to respond to the con-
stitutional proposals and the Koornhof Bills. In die same month, exiled ANC
president Oliver Tambo had called for the formation of "strong mass demo-
cratie Organisation" inside South Africa, mentioning the examples of trade
unions, youth, students, women, and civics, or civic associations. Declaring
1983 "The Year of United Action," Tambo urged bis listeners "to organise all
democratie forces into one front for national liberation."3
When Allan Boesak accepted the invitation to be a guest speaker at the anti-
SAIC congress, he was not aware of Tambo's call.4 In his speech, hè advocated
"die politics of refusal,. . . the only dignified response that blacks can give in
diis Situation. In order to succeed we need a united front. . . . There is no rea-
son why churches, civic associations, trade unions, student organizations, and
sports bodies should not unite on this issue, pool our resources, inform the
people of the fraud that is about to be perpetrated in its name, and on the day
of the election exposé these plans for what they are."5 Allan Boesak is a talented
orator, whose fiery rhetoric held mass audiences spellbound, whether in
church halls or at UDF rallies. For this reason, perhaps, Boesak's speech is
remembered as marking the birth of the UDF, but hè was by no means the
only one who exhorted anti-apartheid groupings to join forces. Already in
1981-82, the idea of a United Front was much debated in black political circles.
Only with hindsight did the anti-SAIC congress gain its momentous sig-
nificance. The UDF was initially conceived as an ad hoc alliance, wirh the lim-
ited goal of fighting the constitutional proposals and the Koornhof Bills.
Although the UDF declaration is clearly inspired by ANC heritage, die UDF
decided against adopting the Freedom Charter. Two reasons were given: advo-
cating the Freedom Charter would most likely invite state repression and
would limit the opportunities of the Front to broaden out to include a wide
political spectrum, reaching out beyond the known Charterist organizations.
The core organizations were clearly Charterist oriented, but the Front aspired
to unite "all our people, wherever they may be in the cities and die country-
side, the factories and mines, schools, colleges, and universities, houses and
sport fields, churches, mosques and temples, to fight for our freedom."6 Only
in August 1987, after many of its constituent organizations and the largest
trade union federation had decided to adopt the Freedom Charter, did the
UDF follow suit.
The Front's Charterist credentials were equally obvious in the choice of its
three presidents: Albertina Sisulu, the wife of the imprisoned ANC leader
Waker Sisulu, from the Transvaal, and two other ANC veterans from the
19505, Archie Gumede, a lawyer from Natal, and Oscar Mpetha, a trade union-
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ist from die Western Cape. The geographical spread is indicative of die lack of
national cohesion at die time. Regional chauvinism was still so strong that the
regions could not have agreed on one national president.
The extent of direct ANC involvement in the launch of die UDF remains
ambiguous. For years, the ANC had been trying to move back into main-
stream black politics inside Soudi Africa. One early venture, which hoped to
exploit new space opened by die creation of self-governing Bantustans, was
die formation of Inkatha in 1975, initially actively supported by die ANC.7 A
populär front radier than a new political organization had obvious advantages.
A new political organization could be tempted to supplant die liberation
movement, as the example of Inkadia had demonstrated. The UDF's working
principles state diat the Front "does not and will not purport to be a substi-
tute movement to accredited people's liberation movements."8 All UDF
activists whom I interviewed were adamant that the initiative came from
inside, while acknowledging diat known ANC adherents inside South Africa
played an active part in the formation of the UDF and diat consultations had
taken place with die ANC in exile.
Between May and July 1983, regional United Democratie Front committees
were set up in the Transvaal, Natal, and the Western Cape, while provisional
structures were formed in die Eastern Cape and die Orange Free State. The
national launch took place on 20 August in Mitchell's Plain, a colored area
near Cape Town. The conference, which officially marked the formation of
the UDF, was attended by about a diousand delegates, representing some 575
Community organizations, trade unions, sporting bodies, and women's and
youth organizations. As more organizations joined in die course of the year,
UDF spokespeople usually measured die strength of the Front in a conven-
ient shorthand: 600 organizations representing two million people. On closer
inspection, it is impossible to estimate the constituency of diese organizations.
Of die 575 organizations represented at the launch, 235 were branches of die
Western Cape Inter Church Youth, a recendy founded organization of which
not much was heard in subsequent years. For media consumption, however,
die original formula was eminendy digestible. The UDF would stick in pop-
ulär memory as a front representing some 600 organizations and two million
people.
The conference adopted a declaration stating that die UDF's aim was die
creation of a united democratie South Africa, free of Bantustans and Group
Areas and based on die will of die people. Apart from electing the three pres-
idents, die delegates also approved a pantheon of "patrons" to illustrate diat
die UDF could build on wide-ranging support. The patrons included famous
ANC names and many religieus leaders, a combination that served to demon-
strate both political and moral legitimacy. In addition to die official confer-
ence, over twelve thousand people attended a mass rally diat gave a standing
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ovation to the defiant reading of messages of greetings from Nelson Mandela
and other ANC leaders in prison.
The Revival of Charterist Politics
The launch of the UDF was the best orgamzed display of support for the ANC
in alrnost a quarter Century. After the banning of the ANC in 1960, Black Con-
sciousness (BC) had emerged as the dominant force in black Opposition. Black
Consciousness was a movement rather than an organization. Having origi-
nated on black university campuses, it was a movement of psychological self-
liberation that mainly attracted intellectuals, such as students, teachers,
ministers of religion, and journalists. BC widened the defimtion of black to
include not only Africans but also the other oppressed population groups: col-
oreds and Indians. The comeback of Charterist organizations, which would
domrnate black politics during the 19805, occurred from 1980 to 1981. Unlike
the African National Congress, the Indian Congresses had never been banned.
But the Transvaal branch had withered away, and the Natal Indian Congress
(NIC) had shrunk to a narrow core of intellectuals and professionals. In the
late 19705, the NIC was revived by an infusion of young student activists who
set out to build a mass base for the organization by focusing on local concerns
such as housing, rents, and transportation. In the same period, civic organi-
zations were being formed in other parts of the country.
When the Black People's Convention (BPC) was banned in October 1977,
the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) was launched m 1978 as its suc-
cessor organization. The BPC had focused on race, aspiring to give a positive
content to black identity in the belief that psychological self-liberation was a
necessary prerequisite for politica! liberation. AZAPO moved away from the
exclusive focus on race toward a class analysis. In theory, that would have
opened the way for cooperation with the white left. But AZAPO held that, in
South African conditions, race and class coincided.
In the discussions on the formation of a broad front, problems arose in
respect to nonracial organizations that included a white membership, such as
the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the recently formed Fed-
eration of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). The Black Consciousness
position was that white people had a role to play in advancing the process of
change in the white Community. AZAPO did not want white people in
"organisataons of the oppressed"; nor did it want to participate in joint pro-
grams with organizations that had white members. Ideologically, the Black
Consciousness Movement (BCM) and AZAPO were more closely related to
the Africamst position of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) than to the mul-
tiracial or nonracial prmciples of the ANC.
UDF and South Africa, in the 19805
i. UDF launch m Mitchell's Plain, 20 August 1983. Joe Marks, vice-president of the
UDF Western Cape, brings the Amandla salute, flanked by Popo Molefe and Trevor
Manuel. Photograph courtesy of Paul Weinberg.
Divisions within BC organizations between orthodox adherents of BC and
people who increasingly leaned toward the ANC led to an exodus of activists
such as AZAPO president Curtis Nkondo and Popo Molefe, chair of AZAPO's
Soweto branch, who found a new politica! home in the UDF. Nkondo clearly
demarcated the unes between BC and Charterism, leaving no room for com-
promise. Raising the issue of the Freedom Charter, Nkondo now asserted that
"anybody who deviates from the demands of the 'Charter3 is a traitor, and a
fraud, or a downright quisling."9
Moves toward regional coordination were underway in various areas of the
country. Apart from the churches, the only organizations that could truly
claim a nationwide following were the emerging independent trade unions
and the student organizations, which—like apartheid education—were struc-
tured along racial Unes. The National Union of South African Students
(NUSAS) organized on the campuses of white liberal, English-language uni-
versities, the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO) organized black stu-
dents at postsecondary institutions, and the Congress of South African
Students (COSAS) provided a politica! home for black high school students.
All three joined the UDF, but COSAS was to play the most crucial role,
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notably in the Formation of a wide range of youth organizations. Student
organizations proved important as recruiting and training grounds for
activists. More than most UDF affiliates, student organizations had access to
a range of resources and facilities, ranging from printing equipment and pho-
tocopiers to meeting halls. They not only had the means to collect and dis-
seminate information, but they were also in a position to work as nearly
full-time activists. Lastly, although school grounds and university campuses
became major battlefields during the 19805, during at least the first half of the
decade they were preserves of relative freedom.
COSAS, formed in 1979, initially aimed to draw students into Community
issues and wider anti-apartheid struggles. A reappraisal of strategy around 198?
led to COSAS focusing on school and student matters and consequently lim-
itmg its membership to high school students. The exodus of experienced,
older leaders led to temporary disruption but also to a wider range of youth
organizations. The excluded former students were instrumental in the forma-
tion of Charterist youth congresses, which took off in mid-1983-10 Although
the Soweto uprising of 1976 had been an isolated student revolt, since 1979
student activists actively sought to link up with Community and worker
protests. School boycotts, rent and bus boycotts, the anti-SAIC campaign,
the Release Mandela Campaign, the anti-Republic Day campaign of 1981,
and the campaign against the imposed "independence" of the Ciskei all con-
tributed to a sense of optimism about the renewed phenomenon of mass
mobilization.
The need to link up student organizations, trade unions, and women's
groups, and to link local issues to national politics, was widely discussed in stu-
dent circles. Protest politics was shifting from uncompromising noncollabo-
rationism to a more pragmatic result-oriented approach. The advantage of the
new focus on bread-and-butter issues was that ordinary people could be
involved in building local organizations and that activists were restrained from
marching too far ahead of the mainstream. The drawback was the danger of
concentrating on winning limited gains, becoming reformist in the process.
As student leader Auret van Heerden pointed out in an influential address in
1982: "we need organisations making demands which cannot be met within
the framework of an oppressive and exploitative society."11
How Brood a. Front?
The participants at the anti-SAIC congress believed that the Front could be
broad enough to accommodate Black Consciousness groupings. But although
the UDF provided a new political home for many individuals with a history
in BC organizations, the major organizations in the BC tradition remained
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outside the Front. The question whether Inkatha would be eligible to join the
UDF was initially left open for future deliberation.12 Like the UDF and
AZAPO, Inkatha leader Gatsha Buthelezi had reacted sharply to the new con-
stitution. He even invited the ANC and the PAC to join him in what hè called
a marriage of convenience. But by the end of 1983, a bitter enmity had grown
between the UDF and Inkatha. Planned talks were scuttled by clashes at the
University of Zululand, which left five students dead. In January 1984, the
UDF National Executive Committee (NEC) decided that there would be no
meeting with Inkatha.
The criteria for inclusion and exclusion were spelled out in a memorandum
by die newly formed UDF secretariat in early August 1983.13 The emphasis
again was on tne broad character: "There is a place for everyone." But the need
for a "consistent approach" necessitated some guidelines. A requirement for
affiliation was the unqualified acceptance of the whole UDF declaration. The
criteria for exclusion were more detailed. Organizations working within the
framework of the homelands were not eligible for membership, as this was
contrary to the UDF's stated belief in a unitary South Africa. Organizations
operating within the state machinery at die central, provincial, or local level
were equally unacceptable.
A rapprochement with AZAPO was pursued for some time. But from 1984,
relations deteriorated to the point of violent clashes, although it later tran-
spired that some of the clashes, notably in the Eastern Cape, had been insti-
gated by agents provocateurs employed by the security services. In spite of
its adherence to a class analysis, AZAPO stood committed "to the fact that the
struggle will continue to be manifested in terms of colour, of black and
white."14 Two issues—the role of progressive whites and the compatibility of
nonracial democratie principles with the existence of racially based organiza-
tions such as the Indian Congresses—became the major points of division
between the UDF and AZAPO.15
AZAPO's attempts at building a broader platform resulted in the launch of
the National Forum on n and 12 June, where about two hundred organiza-
tions adopted a "Manifesto of the Azanian People." It declared that the peo-
ple's struggle was directed against "the system of racial capitalism which holds
the people of Azania in bondage for the benefit of the small minority of white
capitalists and their allies, the white workers and the reactionary sections of
the black middle class." The black working class was identified as the "driving
force of the struggle."16
In the Western Cape, known for its ideological factionalism, the inclusion
of organizations such as the white student organization NUSAS ("The sons
and daughters of the ruling class") and colored and Indian traders was the
issue that caused a split in the shaky local coalition of anti-apartheid group-
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ings. Trotskyites and other ultraleft elements criticized the proposed UDF as
a populär alliance that would inevitably end up in a betrayal of the working
class. Notwithstanding the rhetoric about the leading role of the working
class, AZAPO, the Cape Trotskyites, and other independent socialist groups
were dominated by middle-class intellectuals. What was the position of the
major organizations of the black working class, the independent trade unions?
They were not nearly as hostile as the ideological puritans, but for the next few
years the most influential grouping of unions preferred to go it alone.
The most important independent trade unions were grouped in two fed-
erations: the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), founded
in 1979, and the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), founded in 1980.
The CUSA unions tended toward BC positions, emphasizing the need for
black leadership. The FOSATU leadership took both a nonracial and a militant
pro-worker position, advocating die need for worker leadership. Although
recognizing the leading role of the ANC as the major liberation movement on
the international scène, the FOSATU leadership strove toward building an
independent workers party internally. The ANC had a legitimate role to play
in the struggle against the apartheid regime, but it was "essential that workers
must strive to build their own powerful and effective Organisation even whilst
they are part of a wider populär struggle."17 General Secretary Joe Poster
warned against the danger of workers being swamped by die powerful tradi-
tion of populist politics and against the confusion caused by the introduction
into the political debate of "an empty and misleading political category called
the Community."18 The United Front formula, so ran Foster's argument, poses
the danger of focusing on protest politics and the risk of worker leadership
being wasted by adventurist actions.
The UDF obviously was such a front. FOSATU decided against affiliation,
although it was prepared to enter into ad hoc alliances, as in the boycott cam-
paign against the tricameral parliament. CUSA affüiated with both the UDF
and the National Forum but ceased active participation in 1985, giving prior-
ity to the unity talks with FOSATU on the merger of both federations.
Another source of trade union support was die so-called community unions.
Unlike FOSATU unions, the community unions were genera! unions, not
organized along the lines of die industry. They held the view that workplace
issues were inseparable from community interests. General unions like the
South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) and the General and Allied
Workers Union (GAWU) did affiliate with die UDF. A single all-embracing
federation of unions proved an elusive ideal, but in November 1985 FOSATU
unions and the major CUSA unions merged into a new federation, the Con-
gress of Soudi African Trade Unions (COSATU). COSATU became an overdy
Charterist trade union federation, far more inclined to work with the UDF
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dian its predecessors. Non-Charterist unions formed into two smaller feder-
ations. During the 19805, union membership tripled from 808,000 in 1980
to 2.46 million in 1990.19
The UDF and the unions shared platforms in the campaigns against die
Koornhof Bills and die elections for the tricameral parliament. They advocated
a boycott of the municipal elections under the Black Local Authorities Act,
held during the last months of 1983. Only 21 percent of the potential electorate
voted in this series of elections for the new councils. But die real test of the
UDF's strength was die campaign against the 1984 tricameral elections. From
this tour de force the UDF emerged as the major force in extra-parliamen-
tary Opposition, but it first had to overcome serious internal controversy.
Before die year 1983 was over, die UDF had almost fallen apart on an issue
diat has proved divisive in the history of black politics: to participate or not to
participate. The government had submitted its constitutional proposals to a
referendum for die white electorate, which approved die constitution with a
comfortable majority of 65 percent. Next, the constitution bill would be the
subject of referenda among the prospective Indian and colored voters. To dis-
cuss its position, the UDF in December called a National General Conference
in Port Elizabeth. Three options were considered: to boycott die referendum,
to participate in the referendum and campaign for a "no" vote, or to allow
each region freedom of choice. The debate became particularly vicious as it
unfolded partially along racial lines, with Indian delegates making eloquent
pleas in favor of participation. It was argued that the UDF would make a show
of strength by deh'vering a massive "no." African delegates from the Transvaal
feit betrayed: calling for a racial referendum would amount to a negation of
the nonracial principles of the UDF. In the end, it was decided to leave the
decision to die UDF National Executive Committee.20
The discussions revealed not only a difference in preparation among dele-
gations but also vastiy differing levels of education and ideological sophisti-
cation. The Indian Congresses argued their case invoking Gandhi, Lenin, and
Gramsci. And had die example of die trade unions not demonstrated that one
could operate within the system without becoming a collaborator? Opponents
of participation also used some ideological ammunition. They retorted that
Lenin favored participation because political consciousness among the masses
had been low, while in South Africa people were more politicized. If they were
as yet insufFiciently politicized, then one should go out and politicize die
masses. The UDF ought to follow Mao's recipe: guerrillas of Umkhonto we
Sizwe (MK) should be able to find support bases among the people; they
should be like fish in water. This again brought a racial dimension in focus:
some of die Indian and colored delegates privately made it clear that diey pre-
ferred to wage batde from the benches of parliament, not from the trenches
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of the struggle. The armed struggle was better left to Africans. Illustrative of
lingering tensions and prejudice is a "struggle joke" diat circulated some years
later. Widiin die struggle, it was said, there is a certain division of labor: the
whites will do the thinking, the Indians will take care of die money, the
Africans will do die fighting and die dying, and when it is all over, the coloreds
will celebrate.
At its meeting in late January in Pretoria, the NEC decided to call for a
nonracial referendum while sirnultaneously allowing flexibility for affiliates "to
oppose the constitution on the basis determined by local conditions."21 The
UDF was finally saved by the government, which—equally uncertain of die
outcome—decided against holding a referendum among Indians and col-
oreds. The failure to formulate a common position raised the question of die
nature of die UDF as a front: Did affiliation mean that affiliated organizations
were bound to UDF decisions?
The Organization of the UDF
The Front had three levels of leadership: national, regional, and local. The
National Executive Committee consisted of three presidents, a secretary, a
publicity secretary, a treasurer, and representatives from the regions. Initially
only die secretary (Popo Molefe) and die publicity secretary (Terror Lekota)
were paid, full-time officials. Mohammed Valli Moosa was added in October
1983 as assistant secretary. Later die list of officials on die UDF's payroll grew
to about eighty. The NEC met periodically to make administrative decisions
and plan national campaigns. The supreme policymaking forum was the
National General Council, which was required to meet every two years but in
fact met only twice, in 1985 and 1991. Convening large conferences became
impossible under die State of Emergency. To speed up die process of decision
making, in 1985 it was decided to set up a National Working Committee,
which in practice became die highest policymaking body. The Working Com-
mittee consisted of the entire NEC plus two members from each region.
Decision-making powers rested largely with the regions, which grew in num-
ber from six in 1983 to ten in later years. Regional executive committees
(RECs) were elected at regional council meetings, where all local organiza-
tions carried equal voting powers, irrespective of strengdi. The Western Cape
was an exception to this rule, allowing two votes for organizations with a
"mass base." Decision making involved a complex process of mandates.22 To
a large extent, local UDF affiliates maintained their autonomy, but as the UDF
developed into a more cohesive political movement, more organizational dis-
cipline was urged.
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 After die paralyzing participation debate, diere remained die more practi-
l job of building the UDF. The challenge here was to reach beyond die lim-
l circle of activists, to involve ordinary people, to "politicize the masses." In
Eillion Signature Campaign, held during the first half of 1984, Soutiias from all walks of life were invited to make their mark againsteid by signing a statement. The intention of the campaign was twofold:
lÉsmobilize large numbers of people in die UDF and to build cores of activists
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tflrith organizing and mobilizing skills. The campaign proved successful in col-
ï*Ored and Indian areas, but for the African townships, where people lived
IJïnder harsher repression, it was at the same time too bold and too tarne. For
those widi vivid memories of repression, it seemed risky to sign a document
that might fall into the wrong hands. Those eager to fight the System dis-
missed tiiis petition-type activity as "a waste of time and reformist."23 Elabo-
rate handbooks were produced, exhorting the volunteers to be models of
good behavior. First of all, the UDF needed to become respectable among
apolitical people. "Dress neady, be polite, do not argue, do not impress peo-
ple with big words."24 Although less dian one third of die target number was
reached, die campaign proved useful as a training ground for activists who
could dien move on to the central issue in UDF campaigns in 1984: die elec-
tion boycott.
Culminating in a series of nationwide protest meetings in die middle of
August 1984, the boycott campaign against the tricameral elections was a
resounding success. In the elections for the (colored) House of Representa-
tives the voter turnout was 30.9 percent of registered voters and 19 percent
of potential voters (the total number of people qualified to vote). A week later,
die boycott of the (Indian) House of Delegates fared even better, with only
20.2 percent of registered voters and 16.2 percent of potential voters going to
die polls.
As part of the protests, widespread school boycotts were held in colored
and African schools, and on a much smaller scale in some Indian and white
schools. African schools had experienced sporadic boycotts since die begin-
ning of die year. Witii some local variations, grievances followed a similar pat-
tern. Upholding an age limit criterion of twenty years for re-admission to high
schools, schools at die beginning of die year had excluded over diree hundred
students because they were over twenty. In numerous cases, students feit that
die age limit was being used to victimize older, more experienced, and more
outspoken student leaders. Odier key issues were an end to corpora! punish-
ment and sexual harassment, free textbooks and stationery, die demand for
elected student representative councils, and complaints about poor teacher
qualifïcations. Student protests began widi school-specific issues and only
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gradually moved on to the phase of more overt politica] protest, initially tar-
geting "Bantu Education" and the Department of Education and Training
but subsequently chaUenging local and central state power.25 On the grounds
of a school in Atteridgeville near Pretoria, a fifteen-year-old schoolgirl was run
over by a police vehicle. The death of Emma Sathekga became a symbolic
marker: she was the first "unrest victim" in the statistics on casualties of polit-
ica! violence, which would exceed five thousand before the decade was over.
Next to election boycotts and school protests, a third source of "unrest" was
developing: local cornmunity-based protests against rising bus fares and rent
increases.
A Groundswell of Anger: September 1984-July 1985
The first major eruption of civil unrest occurred on 3 September 1984 in die
townships of the Vaal Triangle, a heavily industrialized and economically
depressed region south of Johannesburg. After the announcement of a rent
increase, the recently formed Vaal Civic Association held protest meetings
where it was decided that residents would pay what they considered an
"affordable" rent (i.e., 30 Rand a month). There was no Suggestion of a rent
boycott.26 The call for a two-day stay-away from work was massively heeded.
The events sparking the Vaal uprising took place in Sharpeville, a name that
already stood as a day of remembrance on the resistance calendar. In the early
morning of 3 September, groups gathered in the streets to march to the
administration office where the rents were paid. On their way, stones were
thrown at the house of deputy mayor Kuzwayo Jacob Diamini. The belea-
guered Diamini opened fïre and injured at least one person. The incensed
crowd responded with firebombs. Diamini fled his burning house, feil down,
and lay unconscious. He was dragged to his already burning car and set afire.
When police arrived, Diamini was dead.27 Before the day was over, riots had
spread throughout the Vaal Triangle. The events of 3 September were to
become a familiär pattern over the next few years. Hostility to councillors con-
stituted the pivot around which township politics were radicalized and the
transition to confrontation occurred.28
This outburst of populär anger coincided with the installation of die tri-
cameral parliament in Cape Town, but the residents of Sebokeng, Evaton, and
Sharpeville who took to the streets were mostly unaware of the coincidence.
Widespread rioting coursed through this dense cluster of bleak townships.
In Sharpeville, the deputy major and a councillor were killed, while homes of
council officials were gutted; the chair of the Lekoa Council was killed by an
angry crowd; in Sebokeng a councillor was stoned to death. Shopping cen-
ters, gas stations, a bus depot, administration buildings, beer halls, and schools
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were destroyed. Large contingents of police and the army moved in to quell
the rebellion, leaving twenty-six people dead and more than three hundred
injured. This swoop through the Vaal marked the first use of army troops on
a large scale in the African townships. At least ten councils agreed to suspend
rent and service increases. The Vaal uprising was to play a central role in the
Delmas treason trial, named after a rural Transvaal town where most of the
proceedings of diis longest treason trial since the 19505 took place. Leading
members of the UDF, along with activists from the Vaal Civic Association
(VCA), were charged with treason and conspiring with the ANC. The state
held that the UDF and indirectly the ANC had inspired the Vaal uprising. In
fact, the UDF leadership had been overtaken by events and was largely unable
to provide direction.
These disparate Strands of protest were pulled together in a major stay-away
from school and work in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging(PWV)
area on 5 and 6 November.29 One significant aspect of this stay-away was the
participation of the major trade union federations FOSATU and CUSA,
which for the first time took an active part in an overtly politica! protest action.
Student activists from COSAS were instrumental in the distribution of hun-
dreds of thousands of pamphlets in the townships, calling on residents to
observe the stay-away. This joint effort of unions and student organizations
provided the basis for optimistic speculations about the newly emerging
student-worker alliance. About half a million workers stayed away from work,
which amounted to about 60 percent of the black workforce in the PWV
By the end of 1984 it was becoming clear that South Africa had entered a
phase of unrest that would be more serious than the disturbances of 1976.
Alarming footage appeared on television screens in European and American
living rooms, showing white policemen whipping and shooting black school-
children. Western governments came under increasing pressure from broad
anti-aparrheid coalitions to move beyond rhetorical condemnation to more
effective pressure. During 1985, Pretoria continued its piecemeal reform ini-
tiatives, but measures such as the repeal of the acts prohibiting mixed mar-
riages and interracial sex were insufficient to restore confidence abroad that
Pretoria was indeed moving in the right direction. The failure by President
P. W. Botha to live up to expectations that hè would announce significant
reforms in his 15 August "Rubicon" speech in Durban led to increased dissat-
isfaction with the government internationally and in business and Opposition
circles in South Africa. The refusal by Chase Manhattan Bank to rol! over the
loans of the South African state was an indication of faltering confidence on
the part of the international business community. Under increasing congres-
sional pressure, in September 1985 the Reagan administration imposed limited
sanctions against South Africa. Similar pressures were building up in Europe,
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but it took the European Community until September 1986 to follow suit.
At the beginning of October 1986, the American Congress overrode a presi-
dential veto and imposed further sanctions.
The UDF made effective use of mounting international indignation. What-
ever the effectiveness of the sanctions, international support and solidarity had
psychological and material significance. Such support offered some measure
of protection against repression, although this was largely limited to persons
with international fame. It shored up the conviction that South Africans were
fighting for a just cause; and it provided resources. Most of the UDF's fïnances
came from abroad. UDF spokespeople displayed considerable skills in han-
dling the media, both at home and abroad. While becoming versed in public
relations, in addressing overseas audiences, and in capturing media attention
with high-profile activities such as a long sit-in by UDF activists in the British
consulate in Durban, the UDF was struggling to find a new role with the rank
and file.
Finding a New Role for the Front
After the tricameral elections, a sense of malaise set in as the immediate raison
d'être of the Front had now disappeared. From an ad hoc alliance, the UDF
was transforming itself into a more permanent movement, concerned with a
broad range of issues. It would take the UDF about half a year to pull itself
together. The organizational structure of the UDF lacked a backup system.
Detention of key leaders paralyzed the Front. In various discussion papers the
UDF's performance was evaluated and its future role discussed. Among the
shortcomings were a lack of participation by workers, a weak presence in the
African areas, failure to draw in the major trade unions, a cumbersome process
of decision making, and weak organization in rural areas.30
Searching for a new role and a more appropriate organizational formula,
the UDF again had to confront the issue of the nature of the Front: What
exactly was the relationship between the Front and its affüiates? Complaints
that the UDF drained the affüiates by absorbing the most capable activists and
by diverting attention from the organizations' own concerns, whether town-
ship rents or liberation theology, were widespread.
In defining its new role, die UDF needed to strike a balance between a nar-
row focus on national politics and the risk of dissipating its energies in all
directions by taking on more tasks than it could hope to handle. The prob-
lematic aspects of the Front's strategie formula, which aimed to link local con-
cerns to the national liberation struggle, can be seen most clearly in its
relationship with civic organizations.
The rediscovery of die mobilizing potential of bread-and-butter issues was
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one of die innovations of social movements in South Africa in die 19805. Civic
associations, dealing widi everyday concerns such as rents, electricity, water,
and public transportation, had die potential to mobilize large numbers of not
very politically minded township residents. But political activists were needed
to bring out die political content of diese basic struggles and to make certain
that diese struggles were coordinated into an assault on die state, bodi at the
local and national levels.
A paper prepared for a 1984 workshop establishes a clear link between
struggles engaging die local state, the central state, and capitalism. The high
cost of living is blamed on market mechanisms: housing, electricity, and water
are so expensive because they are produced and sold for profit. "Our struggle
at local level is both a fight against the Black Local Authorities and huge
profits made by Employers at the expense of residents. It is a fïght against
Apartheid and Capitalism at local level."31
Like the UDF itself, civics were presented in the image of progress and
modernity. The UDF was not inclined to reach out to conservative or tradi-
tionalist sectors of society, such as die African independent churches or tradi-
tional healers. Similarly, civics made litde effort to link up witii apolitical
groupings in township life such as stokvds (mutual benefit societies) and bur-
ial societies. Populär participation in civic organizations fluctuated strongly.
By early 1985, die UDF attempted to develop a more coherent strategy toward
civics. While die Front had only a tenuous grip on township activity, the state
saw the UDF as the agitating force behind civic protests. According to the
charge sheet in die Delmas trial, die UDF had used civics "to condition and
incite the masses regarding emotional issues in the black communities . . .
which are identified as so-called 'day-to-day issues.'"32 However, die UDF was
largely uninvolved in the growing township crisis during 1984. The UDF did
not take up die issue of rents and only briefly was involved witii die education
issue. The focus was on Opposition to die tricameral parliament.
While die South African state feared die revolutionary potential of civics,
die ANC worried about tiieir reformist character. In 1985, ANC voices in pol-
icy statements and polemics were critical of local-level negotiations diat were
occurring between civic organizations and state bodies.33 But widiout local
deals, civics could not deliver die goods. Populär support for Community
organizations was precisely predicated on dieir capacity to stop a rent increase
or to negotiate an improved bus service. The pendulum between reform and
revolution, between die perspective of a negotiated setdement or an insurrec-
tionary seizure of power, would keep swinging back and fodh for die rest of
die decade.
The recognition diat die UDF's campaigns and structures were generally
reactive and insensitive to grassroots issues and militancy led to a strategie shift
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at the UDF's April 1985 National General Council, held under the slogan
"from protest to challenge, from mobilisation to Organisation."34 State harass-
ment hampered organizational efforts, but part of the blame lay with the UDF
itself. It had not managed to effectively harness local forms of resistance.35 The
UDF's remoteness from the African townships can in part be explained by the
composition of its national leadership. Formed with the primary goal of com-
bating the tricameral elections, the UDF National Executive Committee was
dominated by Indians and coloreds. The twenty-five members of the first
NEC included twelve Africans, five coloreds, and eight Indians.36 The UDF
emerged from its 1985 conference with a newly elected leadership that had
closer links with the African townships.
Forcing Black Local Authorities out of office confronted the UDF with a
new challenge. The Front or its affiliates now had to set up alternative struc-
tures. Civics were being thrust into a new role, for which they were hardly
equipped: they had to be transformed from watchdog bodies into embryonic
forms of local government.
The UDF had proved that it could fill stadiums. Could it also take on the
state in a direct challenge? That would require a coherent strategy and unity
within the UDF's own ranks, overcoming regional divisions and factionalism.
Black resistance had escalated to a state of rebellion during the first half of 1985.
Massive school boycotts continued in the Eastern Cape, and rent boycotts
spread through the Vaal Triangle. Violence intensified when the security forces
moved into the townships with a massive show of strength. People associated
with "the System" found themselves increasingly under attack. Acts of insur-
gency escalated, and conflict within the black Community reached new levels
of intensity with clashes between the UDF and Inkatha in Natal and between
the UDF and AZAPO in the Eastern Cape.37
On 2i March 1985, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the massacre in Sharpe-
ville, police in the Eastern Cape opened fire on a crowd in Langa, killing nine-
teen people. Intense rioting erupted in Langa and the other Uitenhage town-
ship, KwaNobuhle, leaving ten people dead. On ^ July, the bodies of three
civic leaders from Cradock, a small town in the Eastern Cape, were found.
Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, and Michael Mkhonto had mysteriously dis-
appeared a couple of days before. Schoolmaster Goniwe had acquired national
fame as the driving force behind youth and civic organizations in rural parts
of the Eastern Cape, where hè was the UDF's rural Organizer. Cradock was
reputed to have a strong civic based on street committees, thus weiding a
strong political Community in a previously sleepy rural town. The murder
sparked widespread violent protest. The funeral of the assassinated Cradock
activists drew a crowd of forty thousand, with a massive display of flags of the
ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP).38
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z. Mass funeral, Lingelihle, Cradock, Eastern Cape, July 1985.
Photograph courtesy of Gille de Vlieg.
On 2i July 1985, the government declared a partial State of Emergency that
covered the Witwatersrand, the Eastern Cape, and was later extended to
include the Western Cape. Police and army were given extensive powers to
search and arrest, to restrict access, to impose curfews, and to counter school
boycotts. The media were subjected to severe restrictions. Between July 1985
and March 1986 nearly eight thousand people were detained under emergency
regulations. Thousands more were detained under various laws, including the
notorious Internal Security Act, which allowed for detention without trial.
UDF activists and trade unionists were the major targets of these sweepmg
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3. High visibility was one of the charactenstics of the new social movements in the
19805. Here the Mass Democratie Movement takes to the streets in Durban, 22 Sep-
tember 1989. Photograph courtesy of Rafs Mayet.
detention powers. In August 1985, COSAS became the first UDF affiliate to
be declared an unlawful organization. COSAS, the largest UDF affiliate, was
also particularly hard hit by detentions, for the security forces believed that
student leaders were among the main instigators of unrest.
Two major treason trials ensured that a sizable part of the UDF leadership
was taken out of circulation. In the Pietermaritzburg Treason Trial, eight
UDF executive members, including Albeitina Sisulu, Cassim Salojee, Ismail
Mohamed, and Frank Chikane, stood trial together with trade unionists on
charges of conspiring with a "revolutionary alliance" that included the ANC
and the SACP. Although no acts of violence were charged, the state intended
to prove that they had employed "means which envisaged violence."39 In
December 1985, the state withdrew charges against twelve of the accused, and
in June 1986, charges were dropped against the remainder. Meanwhile, how-
ever, another treason trial had robbed the UDF of some its most capable and
dynamic leadership. In April 1986, Terror Lekota, Popo Molefe, and Moss
Chikane were detained by the security police. These three UDF leaders were
joined in court by mneteen other members of the UDF and of the Vaal Civic
Association. Central to the indictment was the allegation that the UDF formed
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part of a conspiracy with the ANC to overthrow the state by violence. The trial,
which drew intense national and international attention, dragged on until
November 1988. Lekota was sentenced to twelve years and Molefe and Chikane
to ten years, with lighter sentences for two other accused. The five Delmas trea-
son trial defendants were freed in December 1989 after the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court overturned their convictions and sentences.
Ungovernability and the First State of Emergency: July ipSs-June 1986
The first State of Emergency did not crash the rebellion but, rather, inspired
new tactics and new forms of politica! organization. Consumer boycotts were
introduced as a new political weapon. As mass gatherings were outlawed,
Street committees proliferated, after the model of local organization that
Matthew Goniwe had tested in Cradock. In mid-July a two-month consumer
boycott against white-owned shops was launched in Port Elizabeth and Uiten-
hage to demand the withdrawal of the pohce and the army from the townships
and to force attention on a series of local grievances. From the Eastern Cape,
the boycott movement had spread by August to the Western Cape and the
Transvaal. The new weapon was initially greeted with euphoria. Shopkeepers,
expenencing a sharp drop in turnover, were brought to the negotiating table.
The Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce began working with the Port Eliz-
abeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO).
But it soon became apparent that these victories were of a limited scope.
Local and regional negotiations failed because of the lack of commitment of
the central government. Moreover, conditions in other parts of the country
were less conducive to boycotts than those in the Eastern Cape. Boycott mon-
itors had an easier job in the compact townships of the Eastern Cape than in
the sprawling settlements of the Western Cape or the huge conglomerates of
the Witwatersrand. In addition, the Eastern Cape townships were politically
and economically more homogeneous. Successful boycott campaigns that
were upheld by broad-based township organizations relying on participatory
structures of decision making served to reinforce the political and moral
authority of the emerging "organs of people's power." Conversely, coercion,
intimidation, and abuse by undisciplined youth would often weaken support
for the boycott. Bad organization, as in Soweto, also produced disastrous
results. Without consultations and monitoring of black shopkeepers, profi-
teering was likely as township shops exploited their monopoly position to
impose stiffprice increases. If white shops were to be boycotted, it was essen-
tial for township stores to be well stocked. But delivery vans became favorite
targets for youth roaming the streets in search of offenders. If the civic was
unable to set up a tightly controlled Operation, consumer boycotts could alien-
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ate resident« rather than galvanize mass support. If delivery trucks were stoned
and plundered and buses set alight, the drivers were naturally not inclined to
sympathize with the boycotters. And the drivers were usually black workers,
living in townships. The Transvaal bus Company PUTCO, which served the
township routes in the Johannesburg area, reported 4 drivers killed and 232
injured between October 1984 and April ipSó.40 Boycott campaigns could set
youth against adults, residents against migrants, and UDF adherents against
supporters of other political tendencies. The boycotts not only tested the stay-
ing power of white business and white authorities; they also tested the author-
ity of the UDF and the ANC.
At the end of 1985, students in many black schools were writing their exams
under armed guard. With school boycotts becoming a chronic rather than
intermittent means of protest, the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee was
formed in September 1985 with the aim of getting students to return to school.
It approached the ANC to lend support to a "back to school" campaign. Now
the ANC found itself in a dilemma. If masses of black youdi failed to heed the
ANC's call, it would be a terrible blow to the ANC's prestige. Eventually, in
December 1985, the ANC gave its blessing to the parents' initiative, which later
widened into a nationwide campaign under the banner of the National Edu-
carion Crisis Committee (NECC). Transforming the student slogan "no edu-
cation before liberation" into "People's Education for People's Power," the
NECC called on students to return to school, while supporting their demands
for a rescheduling of exams, reinstatement of all teachers who had been dis-
missed because of the school crisis, repair of damaged school buildings, wirh-
drawal of the army from the townships, lifting of the State of Emergency,
unbanning of COSAS, and allowing student representative councils (SRCs)
in the high schools.41 The parents' initiative had some success in getting chil-
dren back to school, but this partial success was undermined by cabinet min-
isters' reneging on deals and by the detention of NECC leaders. In other cases,
police action prompted students to resumé the boycott, as is described in
chapter 4 on Kagiso.
Boycotts gave ordinary people a sense of power, but actors and observers
alike could become intoxicated with a false sense of power that underestimated
the tenacity of the adversary. Many activists believed that a phase of "dual
power" had arrived, as in the days preceding the storming of the Winter Palace
in St. Petersburg. But the pattern of resistance was uneven, and coordination
was lacking. It was not the UDF itself but local affiliates and people loosely
associated with the UDF that wielded power. Although the South African
state experienced a crisis of authority and legitimacy as never before, it was not
on the verge of collapse, as was suggested by slogans such as "liberation is
around the corner."
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Boycotts were hailed as essentially peaceful Gandhian tactics of passive
resistance, but the enforcement of boycotts could frequently entail the use of
physical force and harsh punishments. The UDF did not formally support
actions of this kind, but it was reluctant to condemn excesses and to enforce
* discipline within its own ranks. Fear of alienating militant followers and
doubts about its capacity to exercise some control combined to make the UDF
reticent in condemning certain methods of struggle, such as the use of the
"necklace" to liquidate suspected informers. Officially, the UDF stuck to non-
violent mediods, but in numerous speeches and funeral orations, local leaders
called on the people to hit back.
The first instance of necklacing occurred in March 1985 in the Eastern Cape
township of KwaNobuhle. The victim was Tamsanqa Kinikini, the only coun-
cillor who had not resigned. He had wielded a reign of terror with a vigilante
group. This highly symbolic method of purging evil forces from the commu-
nity spread rapidly throughout South Africa. A year later, the necklace was used
as a method of execution in remote parts of the Northern Transvaal Bantustans.
The most outspoken Opposition to necklacing came from church leaders
such as Bishop Tutu and Allan Boesak. They expressed the same concern as
horrified parents, who feared that the necklace would brutalize the executors
as much as their victims. From 1985 on, church leaders came under pressure to
condone certain forms of violence. Frank Chikane conceded that the question
of violence was not important to the people in the townships and that peo-
ple had no other Option but to defend themselves.42
The role of the ANC was equally ambivalent. The ANC's call to make the
townships ungovernable served as a legitimation for all sorts of violent behav-
ior, from necklacing town councillors to hijacking the cars of the "bour-
geoisie." This is not to say that violence erupted in response to ANC calls.
When the ANC exhorted its followers to make the townships ungovernable,
that process was already in füll swing. Neither the UDF nor the ANC were
able to harness township revolt into a coordinated offensive. Nor was the lib-
eration movement able to stop practices such as necklacing, which were cer-
tainly harmful to the ANC's international image, to its standing among South
African whites, and most likely also to its reputation among a majority of
blacks. The renouncing of necklace executions by ANC president Tambo in
1986 had no visible effect inside South Africa.
More durable perhaps than the fledgling structures of people's power was
the workers' power that was now manifested in a new giant federation of
trade unions, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). On
i December 1985, over ten thousand people attended the launch of COSATU
in Durban, uniting thirty-three trade unions. In contrast to the focus of the
Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) on the shop floor,
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COSATU held that unions ought to be involved in community struggles and
the wider political arena, if only to secure that worker interests would be para-
mount in the liberation struggle. The UDF's union affiliates had to leave the
Front in order to join the new federation, but dus loss was easily compensated
by a much better working relationship between the UDF and the major trade
union movement.
COSATU played a parricularly active role in the unfolding conflict in Natal,
where the UDF was plagued by several weaknesses, including a lack of African
leadership. Up to mid-ipSs, Natal had been fairly quiet, but in the second half
of the decade the Natal Midlands and the Durban townships became major
flash points. The core of the UDF was formed by the Natal Indian Congress
(NIC) and by youth and student organizations in the townships. The UDF in
Natal was a loose alliance of small and large organizations with different agen-
das, lacking political and organizational coherence. Civics were virtually absent
in the townships located within KwaZulu and in the area around Pietermaritz-
burg. In the Durban townships, civics had developed during rent and trans-
portation struggles in the early 19805. These civic activists were an important
source of African leadership in the early days of the UDF, but their organiza-
tion collapsed when it overextended its limited capacities, leaving a vacuüm of
African leadership. The dominant position of the NIC proved a mixed bless-
ing. The Indian Congress made a significant contribution in terms of talented
activists and resources, but Indian Organizers were not familiär with the
dynamics of township life. Some aspects of the furore caused by a suppos-
edly Indian-led cabal are examined in chapter 2. Here it suffïces to state that
NIC dominance and the lack of senior African leadership exacerbated the cri-
sis in Natal. Regional COSATU leadership was drawn in to fill the vacuüm,
but with only modest success. Amidst clear signs of collusion between Inkatha
and the police, detentions and the assassination of union members hampered
COSATU's effectiveness in trying to mediate the crisis. Union leadership
could exert little control over school students and unemployed youth. Partic-
ularly in rural areas, the generational gap was pronounced, with the older gen-
era tion resentful of impatient youth who tried to undermine the authority of
the chieftaincy and to force revolution on a basically conservative rural popu-
lation.43 The UDF leadership almost abdicated responsibility for the conduct
of its youthful constituency. Speaking about the violence in the Pietermar-
itzburg area, Archie Gumede, the most prominent UDF leader in Natal,
claimed that "the UDF itself does not have the machinery to supervise the
activities of its affiliates. . . . I am not able to control 10 year-olds . . . the only
people we believe can make a meaningful agreement are these men, the ones
in jail—Mandela, Sisulu."44
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l March 1986, the State of Emergency was lifted. During seven months of
icy rule, about 600 unrest-related deaths were recorded, bringing the
Itbtal number of fatalities over the eighteen months of unrest to 1,237. With
[pebellion spreading into remote corners of South Africa, boycotts flaring up,
mounting international solidarity campaigns, and increasing signs of nerv-
..Onsness in the South African business community, the UDF feit confident that
Soon "the people' would be empowered to shape their destiny. "The strength
land sacrifice of our people, their will to be free, cannot be crushed," stated the
UDF's secretarial report in February 1986: "Now, there can be no turning
back." Listing the victories, the report recalled that of thirty-four town and
village councils set up in 1983 under the Black Local Authorities Act, only
five were still in Operation after two years of resistance; 240 councillors had
resigned, most of them in the Eastern Cape.45 But the report also spelled out
that a heavy price was being paid in terms of detentions, deaths, and disap-
pearances.
This period is the high-water mark of people's power, of the belief that rep-
resentatives of the people, or even "the people themselves" were marching
ahead to take control over certain "liberated areas." These areas were defined
in geographical terms, as with townships that became no-go areas. But the
term could equally apply to spheres of life where "the people" were taking
over, as in schools, community media, or organs of populär justice. People's
courts signified perhaps the most fundamental challenge of state authority, for
they exposed the lack of legitimacy of the criminal justice system of the
apartheid state. In some townships people's courts were widely appreciated
for their role in curbing crime, disciplining unruly youth, and solving domes-
tic conflicts. These courts enforced "a new morality, a people's morality that
conformed to the political ideals of their liberatory projects," thus prefigur-
ing a new moral order.46 But elsewhere these populär courts were resented for
harsh and arbitrary punishments. Particularly if run by youth, the courts lacked
legitimacy in the eyes of older residents.
In response to the uprising in the townships, the ANC military strategy
switched from "armed propaganda" to the stage of "people's war." Debated at
the ANC's consultative conference in Kabwe, Zambia, in June 1985, the con-
cept of people's war meant the expansion of the social base of guerrilla oper-
ations inside South Africa. Emotional sentiment had to be converted into
disciplined support, spontaneous outbursts of rebellion needed to get a sense
of direction, military activities had to be linked to action on the political ter-
rain.47 Following the Kabwe conference, the activity of the ANC armed wing
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Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) increased significantly, but the toll in terms of
guerrillas killed or captured was heavy. In reality, MK never posed a substan-
tial military threat to its formidable opponent. But although its military effec-
tiveness was limited, Umkhonto's psychological impact was important: MK
fighters provided role models for the young street fighters.
Under the combined pressures of repression, impatient youth, and the mil-
lenarian belief in the advent of people's power, the UDF was becoming more
and more intolerant of those who refused to join forces under its wide
umbrella. By early 1986, the UDF had excluded its Africanist rivals from "the
people's camp" and was identifying them as enemy forces. The National Work-
ing Committee, meeting in May, resolved that AZAPO, AZANYU (Azanian
Youth Organisation), the Azanian Youth Congress, and AZASM (Azanian
Students Movement) had "wittingly or unwittingly become agents of Preto-
ria." The UDF called on members of these organizations "to publicly disas-
sociate themselves from these reactionary activities and join the forces of
progress."48 The UDF's attempts to impose hegemonie control were largely
limited to black South Africa. The Front was more accommodating toward
whites who had rejected apartheid but who were as yet uncertain about their
organizational alignment.
The Rise and Fall of People's Power: June 1986-1988
This episode marks the transition from euphoria to despair. The second State
of Emergency, imposed nationwide on 12 June 1986 and lifted only in 1990,
amounted to virtual military rule. Some of the UDF leadership were by now
prepared for a semi-underground existence, but most of the rank and file were
taken by surprise when police and army moved into the townships in the early
morning of 12 June. In the first six months of the emergency, nearly twenty-
fïve thousand people were arrested and isolated from contact with families and
lawyers. Although many were released within weeks, thousands remained
imprisoned, with the prospect of indefinite detention without trial. The waves
of detentions swept through all layers of the Front: by August 1986 fifry
national and regional UDF leaders had been arrested.49 About eight thousand
detainees were under the age of eighteen; some were even under ten. Stories
of torture, abuse, and intimidation horrified public opinion, not only in South
Africa but also in the wider world. The exposure of South Africa's 'Var against
children" led to increased international pressure on Pretoria.50 Inside South
Africa, most of these expositions were banned. Press censorship was tightened,
with further restrictions introduced in December 1986. Newspapers were
reduced to printing the bland "unrest reports" from the state's Bureau of
Information, soon nicknamed the Ministry of Truth.
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. I*aradoxically, as repression mounted, a remarkable series of "meet the
IC" encounters gained momentum. Delegations of white South African
janessmen, clergy, journalists, students, and academies traveled to meetings
t African and European capitals and returned home favorably impressed,
ling the word that these diabolical terrorists were, after all, fellow South
Hcans, burdened perhaps with unlikely socialist visions but not with anti-
sentiments. To the surprise of a delegation of visiting South African
sinessmen, Oh'ver Tambo said prayers before lunch.51 The UDF leadership
F had its firsi publicly known encounter with the ANC during a visit to
Sweden in January I986.52
The first years of the second State of Emergency were characterized by the
nilitarization of township administration. In addition to the army, the regu-
r police force, and a notorious new corps of assistant policemen, nicknamed
• Htskonstabds (instant police) because they were deployed after only three
, Weeks' training, extra-state repression was also on the increase. UDF activists
feecame targets of faceless death squads and vigilantes.53 Vigilantes often oper-
!
 ated at the behest of beleaguered town councillors and African businessmen.
Sometimes gangs of heavies were formed by men who had reason to resent
the attempts of youthful comrades to impose their rule, as in the case of mem-
bers of the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) in the Northern Transvaal or the
adult men in the Crossroads squatter camp near Cape Town. In KwaNdebele,
ministers in the homeland government unleashed vigilantes on residents
opposed to "independence."
At times, the vigilantes operated in connivance with the police. Crossroads
and its satellite camps, where youth activists were driven out after days of sus-
tained battle, became one of the most notorious examples of such open collu-
sion. Vigilantes proved more efiective and more selective than the police. Police
confronted protest manifestations with indiscriminate violence, but vigilante
terror was more specifically aimed at the leaders of populär organizations.
Unofficial repression combined with a sophisticated network of state
repression and surveillance. Policy shifted to the counterinsurgency tactic
known as WHAM: Winning Hearts and Minds. WHAM had a two-pronged
approach: elimination of all "troublemakers" combined with addressing
"genuine" grievances of the township population. Upgrading the townships
entailed refuse removal, sewage disposal, improvement of the living environ-
ment, recreational facilities, and new housing schemes. Models of people's
power like Alexandra, the township in Johannesburg that had become a no-go
area, off-limits to the police, and Cradock's township of Lingelihle were tar-
geted for upgrading.
WFLAM ideologues ignored that grievances were somehow linked to gov-
ernment policies. Moreover, upgrading the living environment could also
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backfire, as these improvements raised expectations.54 If an aspiring middle-
class black saw that protests yielded improvements, would not more protests
yield more improvements?
Upgrading posed a problem for the UDF because the Front had never
developed a strategy of how to deal with concessions. The politics of refusal
had resulted in a rejectionist stance: concessions were rejected as "sham
reforms," as attempts to make apartheid livable, rather than claimed as victo-
ries. When sympathetic service organizations later attempted to plan and \
implement improvements in the township living environment, they often
encountered disinterest or hostility: "reformist" initiatives were rejected
because these would blunt the impetus for revolution.
In October 1986, the UDF was declared an affected organization and was
thereby prohibited from receiving funds from abroad. According to the
UDF's national treasurer, "a lot more than half" of the Front's income came }
from abroad.55 But the formula of a front again proved suitable to South •
Afncan conditions: many of its six to seven hundred affiliates were still able to
raise funds on their own, while money could also be channeled through sym-
pathetic churches, human rights organizations, educational institutions, and
service organizations. Foreign funding became essential to keep some kind
of organization going. According to the treasurer, overseas money came in
without strings attached, but there was nevertheless a drawback. When the
need to raise internal funds became less urgent, local fund-raising campaigns
fizzled out.
In defense of its harsh emergency rule, the government cited lower death i
tolls. But a declining death rate did not result in a restoration of confidence in
South Africa's future. The year 1986 witnessed the highest number of strikes
in a decade. For the first time since 1978, more people emigrated from South
Africa than immigrated to the country. Disinvestment by overseas companies i
and the international sanctions campaign gathered momentum.
A Cbcmging Pattern of Violence
The bare statistics obscure the changing pattern of violence. In the first years
of revolt, until 1985, most fatalities were caused by actions of the security
forces. The second leading cause of death was a category ranked "black on
black" violence, a convenient but very imprecise blanket term that could
include political feuding between UDF and Inkatha, between UDF and
AZAPO, vigilante activity, killings of black town councillors, policemen or
suspected informers, or the settling of other scores.
But starting in 1986, the tendency was toward a proliferation of indirect
conflicts in which more and more groupings were drawn into internecine vio-
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£e.56 This trend would continue and progressively worsen in the first half
|ihe I99os. However, it does not follow that the state was always absent in
"äckon black" violence. Vigilantes, which in Natal could include Inkatha
ups, sometimes acted at the behest of the security forces. In the Western
:, the involvement of the security forces in the squatter struggles in Cross-
s was blatantly visible even at the time, but elsewhere the role of the state
lid be revealed only in later years.
jf Although the UDF was badly hit during the second State of Emergency,
state did not succeed in a normalization of the townships. Rent boycotts
^Rtinued and provided a key rallying point for township activists. Street com-
Ite&ttees organized youth brigades to prevent the eviction of rent defaulters or
JÈÖ forcibly evict people who had moved into houses from which rent boy-
feötters had been expelled by the municipal police. Where electricity had been
(bit off, volunteers moved in to reconnect township houses. Once rent boy-
ffcotts had taken off, they acquired their own momentum. Even without the
|toiitical message, a boycott of rents and service charges had obvious advan-
tages for heads of households since it augmented family income. Moreover,
\ since town councils generally insisted on payment of all arrears as a condi-
| tion for the resumption of services, ending the boycott became virtually
ï' impossible. Rent boycotts continued beyond 1990 and even beyond the 1994
elections, posing a problematic legacy for the new government.
Consumer and bus boycotts flared up intermittently, but township resi-
dents began to show signs of exhaustion and a loss of patience with the "rule
of the comrades," which was frequently characterized by lack of consultation
and coercive methods. The comrades had initially gained popularity with their
anticrime campaigns and cleanup activities, but at times the dividing line
between political and criminal activity became rather blurred. The rise of the
comtsotsis (a confluence of comrades and tsotsis, or township gang members)
can be traced to the period of the second emergency. Most likely, many of the
abuses were perpetrated by unorganized youth, rather than by members of
UDF organizations. But the distinction was not always evident. The omni-
present UDF T-shirts were, of course, also used by nonmembers, and the
slogans and Symbols of UDF, ANC, and SACP had become part of populär
culture in the townships.
The first State of Emergency had left the UDF largely intact and had actu-
ally made the leadership more confident that the Front could withstand stormy
weather. The few buoyant months between the two States of Emergency
boosted confidence as resistance once more could be openly displayed. But the
second State of Emergency was far more comprehensive and ferocious. This
time the Front was badly hit, and to many it seemed like a mortal blow. The
ruling National Party was returned to power with an overwhelming majority
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in a whites-only general election in May 1987, and the right-wing Conserva-
tive Party replaced the Progressive Federal Party as the official Opposition.
The years 1987-88 have gone down in activist memory as marking the depth
of despair. But out of this state of hopelessness grew a new realism. The forced
period of lying low and the abandoning of high-profile politics afforded the
opportunity to reflect on past performance and future strategies. Activists
emerged from detention with a more sober mind, no longer intoxicated with
the belief in imminent liberation but prepared to set out on the inglorious task
of painstakingly rebuilding the organizations.
Prolonged school boycotts and detentions of student leaders meant the loss
of an organizing base, which initially had been provided by the schools and by
the now banned student organization COSAS. With tens of thousands of
youth, both those in school and those who had completed school or prema-
turely dropped out, roaming the streets, it was vital to provide them with a
sense of direction and some organizational discipline.
In order to make its organization less unwieldy, the UDF began restruc-
turing its constituency along sectoral lines. The first steps toward consolida-
tion were taken in 1987, with the formation of an umbrella organization for
youth, the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO). SAYCO was launched at
a clandestine meeting of 150 delegates in March 1987 in Cape Town, after the
venue had been changed repeatedly to shake off the security police. Attempts
to form a UDF Women's Congress faltered, as did attempts to form a national
civic movement. SAYCO, boasting more than half a million members, was
easily the largest UDF affiliate. SAYCO's cadres were gearing themselves for
a protracted battle. They attempted to bridge the generational gap through
close contacts with COSATU and the acknowledgrnent that student repre-
sentative councils could not run schools on their own. Schools ought to be
run by "the Community," which meant the involvement of parents, students,
and teachers. Now that liberation was no longer around the corner, students
ought to go back to school to préparé themselves for a future in a liberated
South Africa. The "back to school" campaign would also bring more coher-
ence in the student movement. The school was seen as a more suitable basis
for organization than the street.57
With the formation of another sectoral organization, the Congress of Tra-
ditional Leaders (CONTRALESA), the UDF moved into uncharted waters.
Chiefs in the Bantustans were widely portrayed as the rural equivalent of the
town councillors: collaborators of "puppet structures." The change came in the
wake of the revolt in KwaNdebele, where several members of the Royal House
played a prominent role in the campaign against independence. Royal princes
sought the advice of the UDF. With the support of the ANC, which had seen
the disastrous consequences of FRELIMO's (Frente de Libertacao de Mo9am-
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lïe) alienation of traditional authorities in Mozambique, the chiefs were
l to organize their own sector within the Democratie Movement, under
s banner of CONTRALESA.
The eclipse of the Front seemed sealed when, in February 1988, it was effec-
r banned. Along with seventeen other organizations, the UDF received a
riction order outlawing all forms of organized activity. By 1988, P. W. Bodia
[ withdrawn into the laager, and his envoys were telling the world to "do
i damnedest." Also restricted were the NECC and AZAPO. Unrest contin-
at a lower prtch, without dying down completely. While national and
ISgional structures survived, the links with local organizations became tenu-
t NSJUS and participation in grassroots structures dropped sharply. Youth organi-
zations could adapt to a semi-underground existence, but civics by their very
mture could hardly function under severe repression. One year after the impo-
sition of the second State of Emergency, nearly all civics had collapsed.
The Revival of Populär Protest: 1989-1990
A new spirit of defiance was manifested by the same people who were locked
up in order to silence dissent. By January 1989, a hunger strike begun by defi-
ant women in the Northern Trans vaal had been joined by political detainees
in prisons and detention centers all over the country. By April 1989, their
protest had succeeded in persuading the minister of law and order to release
nine hundred detainees, including a sizable number of the UDF leadership.
The hunger strikers were probably greatly helped by a stroke of luck. The
gradual palace coup by which F. W. de Klerk took over from P. W. Botha
opened the way toward a liberalization of the political climate. The emergency
restrictions remained in place but were less strictly implemented. After the
elections for the white parliament in September 1989, De Klerk was sworn in
as state president. With unexpected vigor, hè set the country on a breathtak-
ing course of genuine change. A first sign of things to come was the release of
the ANC leaders who had been sentenced with Nelson Mandela in the 1964
Rivonia trial. Rallies to welcome Walter Sisulu and the other veterans when
released from the prison on Robben Island gave an impetus to regional UDF
leaders to piek up the pieces and rebuild their organizations.
The first signs of the resurgence of populär protest movements had already
emerged in the early months of 1989, this time without public launches, press
conferences, and lists of affiliated organizations. The Mass Democratie Move-
ment (MDM) had no constitution, no policy guidelines, no elected leader-
ship, no members, and no address. The MDM asserted itself on the streets
with such vigor that it ousted the political wrangling for the white elections
from the front pages. The core of the MDM consisted of the UDF, COSATU,
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and a number of prominent clergy. COSATU had abandoned its reluctance to
enter into a more or less formal alliance with the UDF. The trade union fed-
eration could now be confident that it was the strongest partner in the alliance.
COSATU had been hit as well by the successive States of Emergency, but its
organization had remained intact. COSATU "locals" (horizontal, township-
based networks of shop stewards from various COSATU unions) were instru-
mental in rebuilding the civic structures.
The MDM, in fact, was a flexible alliance, drawing in new partners as the
occasion required. It revived populär protest with a series of "defiance cam-
paigns" against segregation, reminiscent of the ANC in the 19505. In August,
thousands of black patients demanded treatment in white hospitals. "Open the
beaches" was a populär and low-risk campaign as the holiday season came
near, allowing for protest picnics on the beaches of Durban and Cape Town,
under the slogan "The People Shall Swim." Repression had not all of a sudden
come to an end, but overall the state—no doubt emboldened by the demise
of communism—allowed Opposition forces space to regroup.
MDM strategy was not limited to scoring largely symbolic victories but
was gearing itself toward negotiations. In the context of a changing interna-
tional environment and the series of peace talks on Namibia, Angola, and
Mozambique, a negotiated solution was becommg a realistic prospect. Lead-
ership and followers of the liberation movement were grappling to come to
terms with causes and effects of the fall of the Berlin Wall, but they were not
paralyzed by the resulting ideological confusion. The ANC in effect unbanned
itself before the government followed suit in February 1990. ANC T-shirts and
publications and Mandela pictures appeared on the streets, with police—for
the most part—standing by as impassive onlookers. By formulating a set of
constitutional principles, the ANC gave its allies inside South Africa a new
sense of direction.
The Harare Declaration, published in August 1989, stated that South Africa
would be a unitary state under one central legislature and that the constitution
would include a Bill of Rights. With this move, the ANC gained a strategie
advantage. The constitutional principles were subsequently adopted by the
Organisation of African Unity and favorably received in circles of the United
Nations. With the end of the Gold War, both the ANC and Pretoria came
under increasing pressure from their allies to work toward a negotiated set-
tlement. Because the Harare Declaration was moderate in tone and content,
it also served to some extent to allay white fears. An essential part of MDM
strategy was the broadening of the movement for change. With talks coming
near, it became vital to lure as many groupings as possible away from the
"enemy camp" toward the "people's camp." Hegemonie control over the broad
Opposition took on a new urgency. Speaking on the possibility of a negotiated
?
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sent, the UDF's acting publicity secretary Murphy Morobe stated:
r all is said and done there can only be two parties at the negotiating table
aders of the present minority government, the NP, and those of the dem-
|tc majority led by the ANC."58 Contacts were intensified with big busi-
; white liberals, black entrepreneurs, Bantustan leaders, chiefs, and even
itled members of the despised police and prison service.
JJBroadening out was to culminate in a huge "Conference for a Democratie
are" meant to cement a united position vis-a-vis the government. As
e, the issue of alliance politics was sure to generate ideological heat.
yeral COSATU unions expressed fears that middle-class groupings and
rgeois leadership" could hijack the struggle for their own benefit. The
tice for a Democratie Future finally took place in December 1989, con-
l by the MDM and the Black Consciousness Movement and attended by
delegates representing 2,138 organizations. Much of its momentum,
rever, was lost in disputes about the criteria for inclusion and exclusion.
invitation to homeland leaders and parties was particularly controver-
Among the absentees were Inkatha and organizations aligned to the Pan
ricanist Congress (PAC). The conference resolved to adopt the Harare Dec-
Jllttation and to call for a nonracial constituent assembly representing all the
Beople of South Africa, which would draw up a new constitution.
jft This year of transition from semi-legality toward füll legalization of the
I^ÄNC, SACP, and PAC was characterized by a new mood of pragmatism. UDF
^leaders sat down with the ANC leadership to make an assessment of the bal-
I ance of forces. While acknowledging the military strength of the government,
> they exploited its lack of legitimacy and the widening rifts within the "ruling
camp." A series of local negotiations prepared the way for talks about the cen-
tral issue of state power.
Disbanding or Transforming the UDF? 1990-1991
With the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela in Feb-
ruary 1990, the UDF was once again forced to redefine its role. The mood was
one of expectation, mixed with distrust of the government's real intentions
and suspicion that the ANC leadership might be tempted to compromise the
revolution. Only years later was it revealed that Nelson Mandela had for some
years already been engaged in private meetings with government officials.59
In spite of the genera! veneration for Mandela, in the polarized atmosphere of
1990 such a series of meetings would easily have been interpreted as an attempt
by "the old man" to conclude a secret deal behind the back of "the people."
Although the unbanning of the ANC had been anticipated for some time,
the actual announcement caught the UDF leadership by surprise. It had not
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given much thought to the future role of the Front. For several reasons, a sim-
ple merger of the UDF with the ANC was not in the cards. As long as the tran-
sition process toward majority rule was not irreversible, it would be imprudent
to disband the UDF. Moreover, the ANC—a liberation movement in the
process of becoming a political party—would be based on individual mem-
bership, while the UDF constituents were organizations of which not all
members would be joining the ANC. Two sectors of the UDF, however, were
absorbed into the ANC: women's organizations and SAYCO both disbanded
and formed the reconstituted ANC Women's League and the ANC Youth
League. Because of an increasing awareness of the importance of a vibrant and
autonomous civil society, it was ruled out that civics or student organizations
should be simply subsumed in the ANC.
Within the UDF, three options were discussed: to disband, to transform
itself into a coordinating structure for the organizations of civil society, or to
wait and decide later.60 The argument for disbanding the UDF was that the
Front had served its purpose, and now the unbanned liberation movement
could resumé its legitimate place. The UDF's continued existence would only
cause duplication and confusion. The second Option was to transform the
UDF into a coordinating structure for civics, student organizations, religieus
bodies, and those youth and women's organizations that decided against
merging with the ANC's Youth League or Women's League. This position was
favored both by activists, who argued that an umbrella structure was needed
to exercise hegemonie control, and by the proponents of "civil society," who
stressed the need to promote an independent social movement to keep an eye
on the present as well as on a future government. The discussion on the future
role of civics also vacillated betvveen these two poles of Charterist hegemony
versus an autonomous civil society. One position was that civic structures
should fold since the ANC would now address the needs of the people. But
the dominant position held that civics ought to be rebuilt as independent
watchdog bodies to ensure democracy and accountability on a local level, rep-
resenting all residents, regardless of political affiliation.61 The third Option was
to postpone making a decision since the UDF presently had a role to play in
areas where the ANC was weak. If the Front became irrelevant, it could dis-
band at a later stage. This last option prevailed during 1990, but in 1991 the
UDF decided to disband.
Frictions between ANC and UDF and between ANC and COSATU oc-
curred occasionally as the top-down commandist style of the ANC leadership
clashed with the culture of grassroots participation that had characterized
black Opposition inside South Africa. Complaints about lack of consultation
were heard frequently when the ANC leadership flew into Bantustans to woo
discredited homeland politicians without Consulting the regional UDF lead-
3Ïp, or when leaders appointed regional ANC Organizers without consult-
JÜDF structures. When ANC national Organizer Steve Tshwete went to
t a Chamber of Commerce in the Venda homeland in the Northern Trans-
, a joint rally with Venda's military ruler Brigadier Gabriel Ramushwana
\ boycotted by the local youth congress.
:By early 1991, the dissolution of the UDF had become a foregone conclu-
3, lts most capable activists were absorbed into the ANC. For those miss-
5 out on coveted positions in the ANC, the civic movement provided an
aative platform. Paradoxically, the unbanning of the ANC had a demobi-
ttg effect: many people believed that they could now rely on the ANC to
ve their problems. It was decided that the UDF would officially disband on
^iö August 1991, exactly eight years after its launch in MitchelTs Plain. What-
gever movements or forums would emerge after the UDF's dissolution was left
ttdecided. A dissenting voice came from Allan Boesak, who objected to dis-
i solving the UDF. He believed that colored people in the Western Cape were
Pleft without a political home now that ANC exiles and former prisoners
t "with little feeling for local dynamics" had taken over the region. Coloreds
Psaw the ANC as an African-dominated movement. Boesak believed that the
: ANC should have made better use of the UDF to bring coloreds on board. He
feit the UDF should have been dissolved gradually as the need for it disap-
peared, not abruptly.62 This position, however, was linked to the specific con-
ditions of the Western Cape and was not shared in other regions. Allan
Boesak, the star speaker at the birth of the Front, was not invited for the
UDF's final conference.
In spite of its numerous shortcomings, the United Democratie Front
played a vital role during the crucial years of the 19805. The Front provided a
sense of direction, some ideological cohesion, and a sense of legitimacy by
virtue of its identification with the African National Congress. It gave its
broad following access to resources, to media and publicity, and to know-how,
ranging from legal advice to workshops for printing T-shirts. Through infor-
mal networks, which could include non-UDF people, ideas and people cir-
culated throughout South Africa. It paved the way for the return of the ANC
as the dominant force in black politics. It boosted the confidence of many
thousands of ordinary people to believe that they were capable of changing
their living conditions and that organization was the key to change. One of
the UDF's vital contributions was the forging of a broad South African
national identity. Regional and ethnic chauvinism, so prominent at the begin-
ning of the decade, had dwindled into insignificance—or so it seemed in the
exuberant mood in the first months of 1990. Soon the fault unes—some old
and some new—would cause cracks in the "new South Africa."
CHAPTER TWO
Making Sense of Events:
Interfretinß
Aside from civic leaders and activists, there were four groups who learned
lessons from die 1986 upnsing. . . . First were the academies, whose
fashionably cynical analyses we must scrutmize very carefuily.
Mzwcmele Mayekiso
AN INTERESTING DIMENSION of the historiography of the South African
liberation struggle is the interaction between actors and authors. It is rare fbr
the recorders of history to have an immediate impact on the makers of history
and, vice versa, for the actors to have an input in the portrayal of their strug-
gles. Dissatisfied over the portrayal of civic struggles in Alexandra in the media
and in the academie literature, civic activist Mzwanele Mayekiso wrote his
own account of the battle for the township, engaging in a vivid debate with
his academie critics.1 This survey of literature is therefore not limited to aca-
demie debates but includes the perspectives of contemporary actors and
observers. In practice, the categories of academies, journalists, other profes-
sional observers, and activists were to some extent overlapping. In the unfbld-
ing of the South African drama, there were few dispassionate observers.
Turning to various interpretations of the South African story in the 19805,
we first look at the causes: Why did it all happen? And in what type of soci-
ety did it happen? In the literature on the nature of the South African con-
flict some fundamental questions are asked: Was apartheid policy motivated
primarily by economie or by ideological factors? Are we to regard race or eth-
nicity as in itself an explanation of apartheid, or should it be seen as subordi-
nate to another factor, class interest? How unique was (and is) South Africa?2
This debate on the primacy of race or class was of some practical relevance for
the actors in the 19805. If the apartheid state was defined as the main enemy,
then the opponent could be engaged by a broad front of anti-apartheid forces.
If capital was seen as the prime mover, it followed that there were obvious lim-
itations to alliance politics.
Next we turn to the mode of events: How did it happen? Then we sum-
marize some divergent views on the constituency of the UDF, its leadership,
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ms rank and file: Who made it happen? Under this heading, a discussion
|(Ws on the politics of alliances. Finally, we examine the contents of the
'les of the 19805: What was it all about?3
-i discussion of these themes is meant to provide a unifying perspective
||liethree case studies, which are otherwise highly differentiated. The ques-
|$ raised in this chapter are mostly concerned with the UDF on a national
ä, In die case studies, we descend from the macro to the micro level, pur-
the same themes in the local context of Sekhukhuneland, Kagiso, and
p; Western Cap^,.
r
 Did It Happen? Causes and Conditions
,—> and conditions sometimes tend to get conflated. Authors commonly
E conditions conducive to rebellion, such as an economie crisis with soaring
tnployment or the oppressive condition of apartheid itself. The mere pres-
: of these conditions, however, is insufficient to induce support for a lib-
^_,ion movement or to cause a revolt by a process of self-ignition. What
large numbers of South Africans to rise up in protest during the 19805?
•ftthough much of the literature focuses on material conditions conducive to
Jitebellion, both the ANC and the South African state were inclined to attach
weight to human agency than to structural conditions as the cause of
l Revolution.
_ Both the state and the liberation movement had a vested interest in pro-
|3|ecting an image of a planned and organized offensive: the revolt occurred
| because strategists had been plotting to strike at the heart of the state. From
l about 1975, staffat the Ministry of Defense were referring to a "total onslaught"
_ jSgainst the South African state. The ANC was seen as either the conscious or
U the inadvertent agent of international communism. The total onslaught was
{to be countered by a "total strategy," involving not just military and policing
operations but also counteroffensives on the political, diplomatic, religious,
psychological, cultural, economie, and social fronts.
The "total onslaught" thesis was perfectly suitable to ANC strategists. If the
State wanted to see the ANC's hidden hand behind each and every riot, bomb
blast, or pamphlet, the ANC was willing to oblige. The image of omnipres-
ence was obviously in the interest of an exiled liberation movement trying to
make a domestic impact with modest military resources. Claiming all acts of
resistance as ANC-inspired acts boosted the image of the exiled movement,
but it did not always suit the internal UDF leadership, which had to face the
consequences. There was no question of remote control from Lusaka, although
the movement in exile certainly was influential in a more symbolic sense, while
cadres in the ANC underground actively participated in the UDF. As the UDF
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came to be perceived äs die interna! wing of the ANC, by numerous adherents
and the state alike, it was seen äs playing its part in this grand design. If South
Africa was in a state of insurrection, this had happened because the ANC and
the UDF made it happen.
Most accounts of the 19805 start out with a description of various kinds of
crises besetting South Africa, which then serve as the explanatory context for
subsequent events. The focus is on the economy, the education crisis, die legit-
imacy crisis of the state, the urban crisis, and—infrequendy—the rural crisis.
Subsuming all these crises is the notion of an organic crisis.
The economie crisis, with rising unemployment and declining Standards of
living as its most notable features, is frequendy mentioned as one of die main
causes of the rebellion. Real wages suffered their sharpest decline in a decade
during 1985. By mid-1985, officially registered unemployment was increasing
at the alarming rate of about ten thousand people a month. By mid-1986, it
was estimated that 80 percent of blacks between eighteen and twenty-six years
of age were unemployed.4
The consequences of the recession were unevenly feit. Rather than an over-
all decline in living Standards, a pattern emerges of increasing socioeconomic
differentiation in the African townships. Although sections of the black pop-
ulation were affected by increasing marginalization, sizable numbers enjoyed
modest prosperity. In terms of economie power, blacks constituted not only
the largest part of the workforce but also came to occupy a large chunk of the
consumer market.
The economie crisis, characterized by widespread unemployment and
growing insecurity, and coinciding widi the growth of an urban middle class,
compounded the structural flaws in the state's urbanization policies. Salient
aspects of the urban crisis are the shortage of housing, the issue of rents, and
the role of local government. The housing backlog is related to the migrant
labor system. Since early 1970, policymakers had concentrated on creating
peri-urban high-density living areas—or dormitory towns—in the homelands,
from which commuters could travel to their places of work. This coincided
with the drastic curtailment of all new housing in black townships within com-
muting distance of the homelands. While the state attempted to limit the
number of "permanent urban blacks," diere was a dramatic upturn in migrant
labor. The state could not cope with the pace and scale of black urbanization.
In the context of its reform policy, the government aimed at providing
more extensive public housing and public services for a more differentiated
labor force. The state's urban policy, however, was fatally flawed. Although it
was now accepted that Africans were no longer temporary sojourners in
"white" South Africa but permanent urban residents, no viable means of
financing township expansion and improvement were made available. Town-
ships were expected to become financially self-supporting. Lack of revenue
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5 iocal government totally inadequate, accumulating colossal deficits with-
P>eing able to deliver proper services.5 The problem was compounded by
|1ack of populär legitimacy of the township administration. But only in the
I did rent struggles lead directiy to confrontation. Elsewhere it was student
t school protests that provided die link between limited rent struggles and
ader confrontation.
|The education system was not able to cope with the massive influx of
ican schoolchildren, nor was the labor market able to absorb graduates and
|>outs from the understaffed and overcrowded black high schools. In the
Öos and 19705, secondary education had been the privilege of a lucky few.
between 1980 and 1984, African secondary school enrollment doubled
om 577,000 to over a million, while the student population at universities
sore than tripled, from 10,564 to 36,6o4.6
The rapid expansion of secondary education was followed by a sharp
J||ecline in the pass rate for the final exam, known as matriculation or "matric."
fin 1978, 76.2 percent of high school students passed their exam. In 1983 this
[Agure was down to 48.2 percent.7 Students' fear of repeatedly failing their
lexams contributed to dieir sense of frustration and at times to their enthusi-
* asm for exam boycotts. Simultaneous with the rapid expansion of African sec-
j ondary and postsecondary education, the economy began slowing down,
l leading to spiraling black unemployment. For many teenagers, the experience
of secondary education turned into a bottleneck of frustration radier than a
window of opportunity.
The generation that produced the student movement of the 19805 had
some characteristics likely to contribute to their militancy. Demographically,
the age distribution within the black population was changing, producing an
overwhelming preponderance of young people. According to the 1980 census,
the majority of the African population was under twenty-one. The new gen-
eration of students demonstrated a strong generational consciousness and a
"distinctively urban youth culture" that was "relatively educated, totally urban-
ized, sympathetic to statements of black politica! identity."8 Militant youth
action was certainly not limited to school students: dropouts and unemployed
youth also provided troops for street batties.
Student protest began in 1984 around limited educational and school-specific
issues. Radicalization only happened in the process. One major difference with
earlier student struggles was the role of student organization. Through
COSAS (Congress of South African Students), high school students had a
nationwide organization that could make calls to action evoking a national
response. lts leadership had a clear strategy of using short-term demands on
education as a basis for mobilizing students and then using the level of organ-
ization thus achieved as a platform for action on national political issues.9
Ideological cleavages within die ruling elite contributed to a sense of moral
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crisis. When the government shifted from old-style apartheid based on ideo-
logical justifications specific to Afrikanerdom toward technocratie rule invok-
ing a free market ideology, it did not manage to manufacture a new legitimacy.
The Afrikaner's own belief in the God-given right of the Afrikaner nation to
rule over disenfranchised blacks was unraveling. It was this crisis of will and
the attempted transformation from ideological apartheid to a technocratie,
market-related System of preserving white privilege that opened up the space
for the Opposition to organize and expand, thus in turn exacerbating the polit-
ical crisis.
Race or Class?
What was the fundamental cause of South Africa's woes? Opinions differed
regarding the nature of the problem: Was it a crisis caused by apartheid, to be
overcome by the political incorporation of blacks and the abolition of irra-
tional restrictions on the mobility of capital and labor? Could South Africa
revert to "normal" by abandoning racial restrictions and simply allowing mar-
ket forces to operate? Or was this a crisis of the peculiar South African vari-
ant of capitalism, racial capitalism? Or even a crisis of world capitalism, which
now manifested itself in one of the outposts of monopoly capitalism (in which
case the recipes pointed respectively to a socialist revolution in South Africa
or a global revolution)? Diagnosis and prescriptions depended, of course, on
one's analysis of the nature of the conflict in South Africa.
Liberals see capitalism and apartheid as being essentially dysfunctional vis-
ä-vis each other. The unfettered expansion of industrial capitalism would in
itself result in the dismantling of apartheid. Industry's increasing demand for
skilled labor and labor mobility (as opposed to the mining and agricultural
sectors, with their demand for a massive, cheap, largely unskilled or semi-
skilled labor force) increasingly made apartheid a bürden to a rational Opera-
tion of the South African economy. Freeing market forces would gradually
result not only in economie progress for blacks but also, through economie
empowerment, in their political incorporation.
Revisionists present a diametrically opposed argument: the relationship
between capitalism and apartheid is entirely functional. Characteristic for
South Africa is a racially structured capitalism in which whites have monop-
olized state power to achieve economie domination. From the mid-ipyos, the
revisionist school has been ascendant in the academie debate. This debate ran
out of steam in the mid-ipSos. Class analysis was not abandoned, but aca-
demies widened their horizon. A new interest in "history from below" sensi-
tized academies to other dimensions of the human experience.
The race-class debate was not limited to scholarly publications. From the
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J19705, Marxist and neo-Marxist thought became increasingly influential
Jfhe syllabi of the "liberal" white universities. Through student publications
| Student (and ex-student) networks, Marxism-Leninism fütered from the
ttpos into the trade union movement, nonstudent youth organizations, and
dei of township activists. As shown in the case studies, youth proved a par-
sniterly receptive audience.
The debate on the nature of the South African state had some obvious prac-
l implications in terms of strategy and tactics. Should resistance be mobi-
[ along the lines of race or class? Could only the oppressed blacks bring
„,,n the bastion of white privilege? Could apartheid be defeated by a broad
liance of all anti-apartheid forces? But if apartheid was just a smoke screen
* capitalist exploitation, then the leading role in the struggle ought to be
„ayed by the African working class. The issue of alliance politics in turn raises
hequestion of the ultimate objective of the struggle: national liberation or
jcialist transformation.
., The cumulative effect of the various crises, it was argued, amounted to a
~ Crisis of a qualitatively different nature: an organic crisis. An organic crisis
^tequires formative Intervention: constructing a new balance of forces, new
, political configurations and philosophies, a profound restructuring of the state
and the ideological discourse.10
How Did It Happen? Strategy and Tactics
The UDF spent a great deal of energy on mobilizing massive numbers of peo-
ple. Less attention was paid to the need to sustain the movement by building
organizational structures that were less susceptible to the barometer of pop-
ulär moods. By the time organization building figured more prominently on
the agenda, state repression made progress virtually impossible. Populär
protest developed its own momentum, moving far ahead of the strategists and
far beyond their "wildest dreams." This ground swell of anger from below
thrust the UDF into further prominence and greatly enhanced the stature of
the ANC, but it does not follow that movements or persons who reaped the
benefits of revolt are therefore also its architects. Although the UDF was often
not the actual instigator of these protests, it became the vehicle that trans-
formed protest into a challenge to the state. In a very real way, the UDF made
sense of events. In giving meaning to a great variety of struggles, the UDF car-
ried multiple meanings, which ranged from a human rights discourse to class
struggle. The UDF meant different things to different people. One key to
understanding the UDF's success lays in its adroit use of a wide range of media.
Focusing on bread-and-butter issues of immediate relevance to ordinary
people proved an effective mobilizing technique. But by themselves, localized
S4
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protests did not amount to a challenge to the state. School boycotts, rent
protests, bus boycotts, strikes, and stay-aways came to be perceived as part of
the liberation struggle only because these protests occurred in a context of
generalized political mobilization. By linking local issues to national politics
and the central question of state power, the UDF infused bread-and-butter
struggles widi a new meaning. By boycotting rent increases or school classes,
people not only demonstrated their anger about inadequate incomes, housing
conditions, or lack of textbooks; they were also taking part in the liberation
struggle.
The binding element in this variety of struggles was a common allegiance
to the ANC. The UDF's high-profile campaign style was in part inspired by
the example set by the ANC in the 19505 with its civil disobedience campaigns.
After its banning, the ANC had become skeptical about the possibilities for
mass political organization. The exile Community concentrated its efforts on
the armed struggle, with political activity relegated to an auxiliary role. The
perspective of the ANC strategists was that of a "future all-out war which will
eventually lead to the conquest of power."11
As a consequence of this strong focus on military action, the ANC was slow
to recognize the new potential for political organization. A strategie review,
undertaken in 1978-79 after the Black Consciousness Movement and the
reemergence of the black trade union movement had indicated new space for
organization, ostensibly shifted the emphasis from the military to the politi-
cal as detonator for a mass uprising. After a visit to Vietnam, an ANC delega-
tion concluded that the main means for developing a populär revolutionary
base inside South Africa should be the building of a broad populär political
front on issues of immediate and material relevance to the ANC's potential
constituency inside South Africa.12
If this reads like a recipe for the United Democratie Front, it does not fol-
low that the UDF was therefore conceived by the ANC. Members of the ANC
underground had been actively involved in preparing the foundation for the
UDF, but the ANC in exile had not. The discussion of how to strengthen
political organization was essentially an internal one. Only after the UDF had
demonstrated the potential for populär mass mobilization did the ANC begin
to act on the recommendations of the 1979 review.
The UDF explicitly acknowledged the primacy of the ANC. Nearly all
UDF activists identified with the ANC: even though they were not acting on
ANC instructions, they were doing what they thought the ANC wanted
them to do. For the ANC, the UDF provided a rnuch needed internal sup-
port base. The survival rate of ANC guerrilla fighters increased gradually in
the years after 1983 due to the more favorable political climate and greater
number of people willing to help.13 The years after 1984 witnessed an unprece-
1 growth of MK inside South Africa and a marked increase in the num-
„rofMKattacks.
& vfThe populär uprising in South Africa presented not only new opportuni-
&t>ut also new problems: How would the ANC control a populär insur-
1? Only after 1986, with Operation Vula, did the ANC attempt to set up
Jied command center inside the country staffed by senior officials who
__; charged with the coordination of both political work and military activ-
f.14 Operation Vula was set up to provide internal leadership to both overt
l covert structures, including the Mass Democratie Movement. The irony
Fthis slow movement was that the ANC and MK began strengthening and
ordinating command structures inside South Africa only when the main
ist of the populär uprising was subsiding and the government was regain-
^ control.
The existence of the UDF as an aboveground mass movement changed the
arrain of struggle, away from the strong emphasis on military operations and
f toward a political contest. At the height of the euphoria of people's power,
ffeading activists believed that spontaneous mass action would succeed in mak-
. log the Situation intractable for the government. Reflecting later with a more
j rational mind on the events of the 19805, UDF leaders had lost their idyllic
l ideas about the virtues of spontaneity. Anarchy posed a threat not only to the
National Party government but also to the new government-in-waiting. The
UDF's reluctance to impose control was not caused by just romantic notions
of populär spontaneity. The UDF leadership doubted whether it would be
able to enforce discipline; if not, it would have been exposed as impotent.
In the international arena, the UDF could operate more flexibly than the
ANC. The liberation movement was tainted by its ties with the communist
countries, which served as its main suppliers of weapons and military training
as well as its ideological beacons. But the Front was successful in tapping
material and moral support from the West, where public opinion was gener-
ally sympathetic to the UDF, which was perceived as a nonviolent anti-
apartheid alliance. By 1987, the UDF itself had a budget of over 2 million
Rand, with over 200 million Rand donated to Charterist organizations
aligned with the Front.15 The majority of these funds came from European
donors. The UDF's church leaders and some other public figures proved par-
ticularly successful in soliciting funds. Money channeled through the South
African Council of Churches and the Kagiso Trust to various service organi-
zations, media, and educational and human rights projects also benefited the
Charterist cause.16 Overseas funding was also essential to sustain the UDF's
massive output of media and its publicity campaigns. International solidarity
was important for activists inside the country for its material benefits and
because it also bolstered the belief that one was fighting for a just cause.
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Targeting Audiences: Movements and Media
Both the South African state and its opponents were engaged in a massive
propaganda battle, on the home front as well as in the international arena.
From its inception the UDF was acutely aware of the importance of media and
propaganda. Over the years, the Front produced a massive outpouring of
newspapers, pamphlets, periodicals, T-shirts, banners, buttons, posters, songs.
It arranged workshops and seminars, engaging the services of sympathetic
journalists and academies for training in both a theoretical understanding of
die role of the media and in the practical art of producing press statements or
newsletters. An interesting phenomenon of the 19805 was the proliferation
of alternative newspapers, most of which were not formally aligned to the
UDF, but nearly all of which were supportive of the UDF and the ANC.
A conscious decision was made to spend a major portion of UDF resources
on media in order to create a public presence for the Front.17 UDF activists
could bank on considerable experience and resources, drawing from the stu-
dent press, service organizations, the trade union movement, and professional
journalists. Some of the most capable activists were assigned posts as public-
ity secretaries. Leading activists such as Terror Lekota, Murphy Morobe,
Mohammed Valli, and Jonathan de Vries had no background in public rela-
tions but proved natural talents. They were accessible, articulate, easygoing,
and sensitive to the needs of the mass media. In targeting vastly different audi-
ences such as white business, township youth, trade unionists, and interna-
tional diplomacy, the UDF performed much better than the ANC.
In the anticapitalist rhetoric typical of die struggle jargon and much of the
left-wing academie discourse as well, die main newspapers—dubbed "the
commercial press"—were routinely depicted as servants of die establishment,
faithfully reproducing the "master's voice." Ideological purists would thus be
inclined to give up on the commercial media, but the pragmatic instincts of
the UDF leadership made sure that enemy terrain was not left to the oppo-
nents. In its dealings widi the mainstream media, both domestic and inter-
national, die UDF was definitely much more successful than the Soudi African
government. In spite of all the diatribes about the lackeys of big business,
most English language newspapers gave sympathetic coverage to the UDF.
This is a fact often ignored or denied in die more crude propaganda during
the 19805, but later it was readily admitted by the UDF's leading publicity offi-
cials. "By and large, die UDF had a favorable press," acknowledged Murphy
Morobe. "Not only because we possessed diese charming personalities, but
also because we had some common ground. The UDF saw the press as an ally
in die struggle for freedom of expression. The press was also gagged, so we
had a common cause."18
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The UDF Western Cape region was particularly reputed for its strong
media presentation. Here the UDF leadership benefited from the advice of
some professional journalists. As Western Cape secretary Trevor Manuel
recalled: "Two days before die big launch in Cape Town we rehearsed the press
conference widi journalists and a video crew. When we watched die video, we
saw that this could not go on. We laughed for about one hour, and then we
set out to put our act together. To begin with, we went out to purchase ties."19
This image of respectability proved most useful in media contacts. Far from
being hostile, tae major newspapers were delighted widi this new bunch of
respectable and articulate blacks, recalled Jonadian de Vries, publicity secre-
tary of the UDF Western Cape. In retrospect, hè identifïed two elements that
made die publicity efforts of the Western Cape region highly successful. First,
tiiis region was dominated by a few charismatic leadership figures, such as
Trevor Manuel, Cheryl Carolus, and Allan Boesak. The second element was
his own input:
Initially, I did put a lot of effort in my publicity job. I organized press confer-
ences, I put flowers on the table, I bought myself a suit and tie, and at that time
I was quite good at my job. I had the gift to come up with the right clichés at
the right moment. I could deliver what the media wanted. We also had a good
budget for media.... I cultivated contacts at the newspapers, I took journalists
out to lunch, I made them feel special. I gave them the Impression that they were
getting special treatment, being the first to get Information. The liberal media
were anyway against apartheid, and we got quite sympathetic coverage. Liberal
media are always in search of respectable darkies to interview, to invite to par-
ties. The commercial press was by and large sympathetic; they played the role we
wanted them to play.20
The UDF publicity managers had every reason to look back widi satisfaction
on media performance in the 19805. The propaganda effort was effective,
agreed Mohammed Valli, one of the UDF's strategie brains: "Most of the
time, die UDF was barking louder dian it could bite."21 The UDF won die
propaganda battle.
It was precisely die high-visibility profile of die UDF and its massive prop-
aganda campaign that were cited as reasons for the 1986 government deci-
sion to declare die UDF an affected organization, thus banning die receipt
of foreign funding. New restrictions against die media, mainly aimed at die
alternative press, were announced in August 1987. Elements of die media, said
Stoffel Bofha, die minister of home affairs, "are generating support for die rev-
olutionary organisations through idolising and propagating their symbols . . .
and dieir symbols are tiiose of revolution."22 This was, of course, quite cor-
rect. When Botha referred to the media activists of the alternative press as
"media terrorists" the insulted party could not agree more. "We glowed with
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pride. We even printed it on T-shirts and went into the townships spreading
the legend: 'I am a media terrorist.'"23
Adli Jacobs, who worked for one of Grassroot/s offshoots, the rather dog-
matic leftist magazine New Era, later wrote a critical assessment: "In our
attempts to hang apartheid and its perpetrators we became infected by the very
methods—and perhaps values—that we found abhorrent." Fighting back from
a cornered position, the media activists employed the weapons nearest at
hand: stereotyped images and clichéd rhetoric, "charismatic revolutionary
leaders, clenched fists, toyi-toying crowds, rabid police, casspirs, barricades
and flaming townships with the echoes of 'we the people' and 'Forward to
this, forward to that.'" Support for progressive organizations was given with-
out asking questions. In the process, the populär support for these organiza-
tions was often overestimated. As Jacobs frankly acknowledged, the ANC and
the Mass Democratie Movement were falsely presented as being interchange-
able with "the people." "We need to acknowledge that we are not 'the peo-
ple,' nor is any single political Organisation, or all of them put together."24 But
this sober assessment could only be aired m the post-February 1990 period.
During the 19805, the alternative media did not question their position on the
side of the people, truth, and history.
Who Made It Happen? The Actors
Commenting on the outbreak of violence in the Vaal Triangle, the Citizen
newspaper described the actors as an irrational mob on the rampage. "When
Blacks riot, they turn on other Blacks, razing their homes, looting shops, rob-
bing, maiming and killing other Blacks."25 From a different perspective, UDF
general secretary Popo Molefe gave credit to the actors in the 19805 for having
won their own liberation: "The masses are the makers of history."26 These dif-
ferent perceptions have nevertheless one element in common: the actors are
perceived as an undifferentiated mass of anonymous faces. These broad cate-
gories of "the masses," "blacks," "the oppressed," the "underclass," "the peo-
ple," "workers," and "youth," are typical of the discourse of the 19805. Who
actually were the people who helped to transform the political landscape in
the 19805?
Were the agents of change located within the ruling elite or among the sub-
ject population? Reform initiatives by the ruling elite created the space for the
extra-institutional Opposition to regroup forces and mobilize a protest move-
ment that mounted a fundamental challenge to the apartheid state.
Several authors have focused on the class composition of the UDF in order
to gauge its revolutionary potential. Apart from its academie interest, this issue
$ evidently of vital importance to those who wanted to carry the struggle
yond national liberation to a socialist transformation. In these analyses,
_me basic questions are raised: How divisible is the black working class?
_J{ow co-optable is the petty bourgeoisie? Would the class base of todays
pBiances determine which class would rule a post-apartheid society? From a
l radical perspective, the pivotal role in the revolt is attributed to the proletariat,
f which had nothing to lose but its chains. Authors with non-Marxist creden-
tials tend to look elsewhere: to the aspiring middle class, which saw its ambi-
I dons frustrated.
Allowing for some regional differentiation, it has been argued that, while
'the UDF was largely a movement of the poor, a disproportionate share of the
original UDF leadership came from a radicalized middle-class intelligentsia
who spoke a language removed from working-class experience and culture.27
Another argument defends the UDF against allegations of "petty bourgeois"
leadership and demonstrates that the working class was strongly represented
in the regional executives.28 The UDF leadership in six regions reflected the
existence of both a working class and an intellectual/professional leadership.
Saul and Gelb's analysis of the class map of South Africa and the social com-
position of the liberation movement is typical of numerous publications in
which the petty bourgeoisie is cast in the role of potential traitor, ready to
betray the revolutionary cause and to abandon their working-class allies in
favor of a reformed, nonracial capitalism.29 With such an evil image, it is small
wonder that the UDF and its advocates hastened to reject the dreaded label
"petty bourgeois." Other authors, to whom social revolution is a less entic-
ing project, take a more positive view of the role of the petty bourgeoisie. Not
the proletariat, but the aspiring middle class is here perceived as the driving
force.30 The revolutionary potential is mostly concentrated among the youth
and the intelligentsia.
Anthony Marx asserts that recessions have a radicalizing effect on paupers
and on the working class but less of an effect on the black middle class, which
is careful not to lose its advantages. He sees the urban poor as the most mili-
tant section, citing as examples the 1976-77 unrest and the 1984-87 revolt.31
This, as shown later in the book, is doubtful. The more vulnerable groups are
precisely the ones less inclined to exposé themselves to the risks of collective
action and confrontational politics. Migrant workers proved a fertile recruit-
ing ground for conservative forces, both in 1976 and in the 19808. Squatters at
times have been led to direct their frustrations against their better-offtown-
ship neighbors, rather than against the forces of the state. Nor is it clear why
the working class is lumped together with the marginalized poor. Workers
with permanent jobs also stood to lose a lot in times of recession.
6o
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Race and Class: WhoAre "the People"?
In ANC ideology, the principle of nonracialism had to be reconciled with two
more doctrines: African leadership and working-class leadership. African lead-
ership was not mentioned in the Declaration or the Working Principles of the
UDE However, after some frictions caused by the dominance of Indian and
colored activists in the early years of the batde against the tricameral parliament,
the 1985 National General Council of the UDF adopted the principle of African
leadership in addition to the earlier proclaimed principle of nonracialism.
UDF publications gave different connotations to "the people." In much
of the UDF's discourse, "the people" are those on "our side," with political loy-
alties as the decisive test. But the term is also frequently used with a racial
implication: "the people" are "blacks" or "oppressed South Africans." Defend-
ing the UDF against accusations of populism, the UDF's theoretical Journal
Isizwe gave the following justifïcation: "It is important to understand how
WE use the term 'the people.' We use this term to distinguish between the two
major camps in our society—the enemy camp and üiepeople's camp. The peo-
ple's camp is made up of the overwhelming majority of South Africans—the
black working class, the rural masses, the black petty bourgeoisie (traders), and
black middle strata (clerks, teachers, nurses, intellectuals). The people's camp
also includes several thousand whites who stand shoulder to shoulder in
struggle with the majority."32 The article then goes on to explain that the UDF
aspires to a broad populär alliance, which ought not to be confused with a
populist movement. The UDF has identifïed the working class as the leading
class, as the "key to victory for the whole people's camp." Because of its "sci-
entifïc understanding" of different class interests within this broad alliance,
the UDF ought not to be accused of populism, which is "an ideology that
obscures class and other differences within the broad ranks of the people."33
As with "petty bourgeoisie," "populism" was a notion from which pro-
gressive intellectuals sought to distance themselves, reserving these labels for
n val movements. Left-wing critics of the UDF and the ANC aimed their cri-
tique at their populist rhetoric, which invokes "the will of the people" as a
source of legitimacy. They rightly point out that "the people" are far from
homogeneous. But it is not helpful to simply substitute "the working class"
for "the people." The uncritical use of the notion of a working class obscures
the fact that the working class was not homogeneous either. Nor was it always
clear what was meant by "the working class." Sometimes it seemed to include
only the trade union membership, whüe on other occasions "black" was used
as synonymous with "working class."
Similar to "the people" or "our people," "the community" was another term
used by the UDF to appropriate support and to claim an exclusive legitimacy.
R*,imany instances, self-appointed "community leaders" articulated the sup-
Jpased needs of "the people." Analysts have distinguished between a bottom-
|llp process of slow politicization, resulting in well-organized structures of
gsidents with a community of purpose and action such as in the small towns
lCradock and Port Alfred, and a top-down approach of mass actions imposed
i ,jy national or regional leaders on local residents without adequate consulta-
plion and organizations, as exemplified by some consumer boycotts. The
boundaries of communities are symbolic and exist by virtue of people's belief
in them. CoirLnunities are not static, but dynamic. Certain events, such as an
^external threat, might engender a community spirit, but this is mostly a pass-
ing phenomenon.34
Although the UDF was conceived as an inclusive front, it was not a polit-
ical home for all South Africans opposed to apartheid. As we have seen, some
Opposition groupings preferred to stay outside the UDF ambit. The main
trade unions jealously guarded their autonomy, although a better working
relationship developed in the second half of the decade. Liberal whites were
mostly reluctant to fully associate themselves with this increasingly radical
social movement but found common platforms on anti-apartheid and human
rights issues. Big business could not be an ally, for "the UDF believes that
there is an international conspiracy among the South African government, cer-
tain foreign governments, foreign and local big business to continue the
oppression and exploitation of the majority in South Africa in one form or
another."35 Big business was not a potential ally, but it could be lured away
from Botha's cul-de-sac policies. The UDF approached business with appeals
to denounce government policies and solicited support for its positions. The
Front also benefited from some material support from business circles.
Big business was by defmition white business. What about black—and
mostly small—business? With very few exceptions, such as the Western Cape
Traders' A^sociation, organizations of businesspeople did not join the UDF.
At the local level, working relationships often developed between community
organizations and associations of traders, taverners, and taxi owners. The
UDF cannot be said to have had a business component, although it did main-
tain contacts at various levels. By the late 19805, the UDF was reaching out
to black business associations in order to further broaden its base.
Some sections of South African society were notably absent, both from the
UDF structures and from the discussions on organizational strategy. For
example, hovering on the margins of the UDF are the African independent
churches, domestic workers, farm laborers, migrant workers, and squatters.
Although the rapid growth of trade unions brought substantial improvements
for migrant workers along with changes in the balance of power in the
migrant hostels, the migrants by and large remained marginal to the concerns
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of civic associations and the UDF. Most Community mobilization concerned
issues of little interest to migrants, with some exceprions, such as transporta-
tion. Migrants feit that their interests were properly represented by trade
unions that operated with democratie elections and mandates from the mem-
bership, but migrants were often distrustful of Community organizations.
There was a widespread feeling that many urban residents were profiteering
from the disadvantages of the migrants. Residents were seen as relatively priv-
ileged and uncaring about issues of pressing concern to the migrants, such as
influx control and the contract System, which did not allow them to seek jobs
other than at their allocated places of work.
During the outbreak of violence between residents and hostel dwellers in
1990, ethnicity came to the fore as a powerful force. Home-based allegiances
often proved stronger than the communality of working-class interests. Eth-
nic identities provided the link with the rural home base. Community organ-
izations in the 19805 were urban centered, focusing on issues concerning
permanent urban residents. Hostel dwellers became more marginalized as
organizations hardly attempted, let alone succeeded, to translate rural and
migrant experiences into the national politica! program. This marginalization
was reinforced by the populär strategies of stay-aways and rent boycotts. Hos-
tel dwellers feit that they had not been consulted and that their interests were
not represented in the civic. Many saw the civic as an organ of the ANC, not
as a neutral body accommodating the interests of all people. They disapproved
of township lifestyle and culture and particularly of the cheeky comrades who
showed such disrespect for elders. Zulu hostel dwellers interviewed in a sur-
vey on the East Rand categorically placed the youth at the center of their alien-
ation from the township: the role of youth in enforcing stay-aways and
boycotts was seen as particularly obnoxious.36
Unlike migrants, squatters see themselves as permanent dwellers in urban
areas and in peri-urban areas, where vast dormitory towns existed in the midst
of rural settings. Most squatters in the 19805 were not recent arrivals from
rural areas but were long-settled inhabitants of the PWV New waves of rural
migrants began arriving in substantial numbers only at the end of the 19805.
Like migrant labor, squatting is not a marginal affair but involves milüons of
South Africans. Until 1989, squatters were less overtly confrontational toward
the state than township residents. Many were illegal dwellers and therefore
vulnerable. The visible, confrontational politics of civics and youth organiza-
tions had little appeal for squatters. Their extreme vulnerability helps to
explain why they did not flock in large numbers toward township-based com-
munity organizations. In the course of the 19805, new associations sprang up
for hostel dwellers and squatters that did not seek affiliation with the UDF or
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feasting umbrella bodies for civic organizations. Occasionally, isolated voices
Jprew attention to the millions of South Africans who were left in the cold.
iCOSATU secretary general Jay Naidoo acknowledged a major weakness of the
t struggle was being urban based, with very few resources to be channeled to
rural areas to build organizations there.
f By 1990, UDF leaders had become more sensible about all-encompassing
f'aotions such as "the people" and "the Community." A UDF official then
i acknowledged the problematic aspects of the increase in mass activity. Violent
conflict had erupted between migrant workers on the one side and youth and
township dwellers on the other. Various conflicts were raging between resi-
dents and taxi owners, between youth and traditional leaders, and between
youth and parents. Vigilantes associated with Bantustan governments had
unleashed violent campaigns.37 Significant sections of South African society
apparently feit excluded from the UDF's defmition of "the people."
Race Is Class: The Cabal
In studying social movements such as the UDF, class obviously is a relevant
category. But the obsession with class tended to obscure other fissures in the
UDF, such as the strained relationship between coloreds and Africans in the
Western Cape and the suspicions between Africans and Indians, which were
articulated particularly in Natal in numerous allegations about a power-hungry
Indian cabal in the UDF. The doctrine of nonracialism did not permit conflicts
to be expressed in racial terms. Allegations about "petty bourgeois elements
and interests" became code words for complaints about the dominant posi-
tion of Indians and coloreds. The stories about the Indian cabal clearly illus-
trate the conflation of race and class.
Rumors about a cabal in the UDF began spreading around 1985. The gist
of the allegations was that a nucleus of highly ambitious Indians had amassed
an extraordinary amount of power by establishing control over the purse
strings and by hatching policy decisions in secret caucuses. It was pointed out
that the treasurers in the UDF National Executive were invariably Indians and
that fund-raising on behalf of the UDF was controlled by Indians.38 The
cabal's power base was deemed to be in Natal, but its network allegedly
extended to the Transvaal and the Western Cape. The accusations emanated
from African nationalists and militant youth within the UDF, but they also
came from within the Indian Community, notably from some of the old guard
politica! activists who feit sidelined by the young Turks taking the front stage
in the 19805. From the cabal stories, a picture emerges of a smal! group of
determined and highly ambitious Indian activists, who were building their
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own power base by establishing control over the flow of funding, creating
their own network of patronage, infïltrating tiieir agents into other progres-
sive organizations, and setting up front organizations.
Donors were particularly generous in providing funds for the defense in
political trials. The cabal had supposedly established control over the assign-
ment of legal cases, with the most attractive cases—in terms of money and
prestige—being given to their friends and allies. Accusations and resentment
kept building up, culminating at the ANC's first regional conference in Natal
in November 1990. All activists supposedly associated with the cabal were
purged from the ANC structures in southern Natal. The conference, which
should have been a memorable occasion, was an uncomfortable experience for
Indian activists, who sensed a clear feeling of resentment among African del-
egates against "Indian cliquism."39
Fact and fiction are not easily distinguished in these cabal stories. Critics
held the cabal pardy responsible for the disastrous Situation that had devel-
oped in Natal. The spiraling violence in the province was to some extent
blamed on die absence of strong, locally rooted UDF organizations. The UDF
leadership in Natal was dominated by Indian professionals who were not
familiär with the African areas. Organizational structures in die African town-
ships, even those outside KwaZulu, were weak. Apart from the Natal Indian
Congress (NIC), the UDF in Natal consisted basically of youth congresses.
Indian Organizers stood accused of highly irresponsible behavior, inciting mil-
itant township youth whom they were subsequently unable to control.
Although African education in the townships was in a state of near collapse,
education in the Indian areas continued relatively unhindered. The UDF's
Indian leadership, so die charges went, were using the youth as shock troops
of the revolution, and they were using not their own children but the children
of the Africans. The absence of African leadership in the UDF in Natal was
deemed to be bodi die cause and die effect of die cabal. By virtue of their supe-
rior resources, the Indians had been able to take control, effectively prevent-
ing an authoritative African leadership to emerge in the UDF in Natal. As
several informants summed up die charges against the cabal, "what they can-
not control, they want to destroy."
What was the cabal's presumed political agenda? While the critics broadly
agreed on the charge sheet against the cabal, the motives attributed to the
alleged conspirators varied gready. Three scenarios can be distinguished: die
cabal as a reformist bourgeois plot, as a communist plot, and as an Indian plot.
In die first scenario, the cabal's political agenda favored the establishment of a
nonracial democracy tfirough negotiations, avoiding a violent seizure of power
and preserving the socioeconomic status quo. Within the Indian Community,
the cabal was sometimes perceived in class terms. It was pointed out diat die
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ÏC executive was dominated by Moslem Indians, who were mainly profes-
ttials and businessmen. Hindu Indians, the descendants of indentured labor-
5 brought over in the nineteenth century to work on die sugar plantations,
We generally identified as working class.40
u Proponents of the communist scenario believed diat die cabal had the back-
of die SACP in London, which had supposedly given die cabalists a blank
ffc.eck to take control of Natal. Attention was also drawn to die considerable
[iverlap between the cabal and the personnel involved in Operation Vula,
j^hich was portrayed by some as a red plot in the ANC aimed at sabotaging
jtfac negotiation process. One accusation against the cabal was its stance in
Ifitvor of participation. This could be interpreted as a bourgeois position, mov-
lïng into reformist politics. But it could equally be explained as a typical com-
fmunist strategy of entrance into established state institutions with the aim of
Isubverting them, as Lenin had done with the Duma.
l In the third scenario, the cabal was perceived as an Indian plot without a
r' particular political line; the cabal was intent on building its own power base,
(l a kind of Broederbond in the UDF. The alleged core members of this power-
! hungry clique believed the anti-cabal campaign to be inspired by anti-
Indianism.41 To the cabal's detractors, die issue appeared precisely in reverse.
The tradition of nonracialism had resulted in taboos: one could not raise the
issue of die cabal for fear of being branded anti-Indian.
The cabal stories may not teil us what actually happened, but they do teil
us what people believed to be happening. These tales can be used to illustrate
several aspects of the UDF. There was an element of generational tension, with
the respectable gentiemen of the old guard in the NIC resenting the takeover
by young rebels who showed insufficient respect for seniority. On a different
level, there were clear signs of antagonism between Natal and the Transvaal.
Delegations from Natal, comprising a fair number of Indian intellectuals, used
to arrive with prepared papers and cogent arguments, which allowed them to
steer the meeting. With these demonstrations of their advanced politicization
and superior organization, the Natal UDF leadership caused botii admiration
and irritation. But the overriding sentiment in die cabal stories is indeed one
of tensions between Indians and Africans, between the relatively well-off, edu-
cated, sophisticated Indian activists with considerable resources and the
African activists. Feeling direatened by Inkatiia and the state on die one hand
and overshadowed by die Indians on die other, Africans resented their mar-
ginalization. In the Charterist tradition of nonracialism, it was taboo to criti-
cize Indians for building dieir own power base. Because of this taboo on the
discourse of race and ethnicity, criticism was expressed in class terms: Indi-
ans are bourgeois, Africans are working class.
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The Politics ofAllicmces
Debates on alliance politics tended to be highly ideological, for the proposed
type of alliance depended on one's analysis of the nature of the apartheid state,
the preferred characteristics of post-apartheid society, and the perceived way
of achieving these changes. If one envisaged a two-stage strategy—as formu-
lated by the SACP and adopted by many in the ANC—then each phase called
for a different type of alliance: a broad populär alliance in the struggle for
national liberation, to be followed by a movement under the direction of the
working class (or its vanguard) in order to proceed to a socialist transforma-
tion of South African society.
Within the left, the two-stage strategy was contested: Would joining forces
for the national democratie revolution not preempt the socialist revolution?
If today one would allow the petty bourgeoisie to grab the initiative, the
prospects of a socialist transformation tomorrow would become dim. Con-
versely, if liberals today allowed themselves to be used as useful idiots in order
to gain legitimacy with the Mass Democratie Movement, they were digging
the grave for the cause of liberalism in South Africa.42
The debate on the nature of front politics, of course, was far from new. But
between the 19505 and the 19805, the interpretation of the nature of the
apartheid state had changed. In the 19505, both liberal and Marxist orthodoxy
held that economie expansion and apartheid were essentially in contradiction
with one another. In the 19805, liberals mostly continued to espouse this posi-
tion, but Marxists now regarded apartheid and capitalism as complementary
radier than contradictory. In the 19505 as well as the 19808, the relationship
between trade unions and nationalist movements was a subject of fïerce
debate. The debate on the role of the South African Congress of Trade Unions
(SACTU) in the Congress Alliance in the 19505 was carried over into the
19805: Was SACTU's demise to be blamed on the use of trade unionists as foot
soldiers in ill-considered populist campaigns? Or was SACTU to be credited
with bringing much more of a working-class perspective into an essentially
petty bourgeois nationalist movement?43
Similar arguments resurfaced in the discussions on the relationship between
the UDF and the trade union movement. As discussed previously, the lead-
ership of FOSATU (Federation of South African Trade Unions) held that the
existence of an independent working-class movement was necessary if the
working class as a social force was to have influence within the liberation
movement.44 The achievement of majority rule without addressing the issue
of economie transformation would leave the exploitative economie structures
intact. With the formation of COSATU, which placed political goals at the top
of its agenda, the debates subsided somewhat.
Jt pamphlets and speeches, student leaders paid lip service to the "leading
6 Of the working class" while simultaneously claiming for themselves the
lard role in the liberation struggle. This apparent paradox could be
._ned away as students proclaimed themselves part of the working class by
ne of being the children of workers. The "student-worker alliance" is a
jhword in many UDF publications and sympathetic accounts, with the
.vember 1984. stay-away being celebrated as a particularly successful exam-
,e of student-worker alliances being forged in concrete action.
; The vanguard role of youth was not just self-proclaimed. The ANC had
de a conscious decision to use youth as the vanguard of the liberation strug-
, encouraging the "young lions" to take up a position in the most forward
jiches. The need for student-worker alliances was indeed a recurrent theme
r the statements of youth organizations affiliated with the UDF. Time and
jain it was stressed that this was the lesson learned by the youth from the
76 revolt by high school students in Soweto: the leading role in the strug-
: belongs to the workers. While these statements adequately reflect the les-
5 learned in political education courses, they do not necessarily reflect the
„ 7ailing strand in youth consciousness. The mood is perhaps more accu-
ptateiy captured in another recurrent phrase: "The future is in the hands of the
; youth."45 Student and youth conferences and publications reflect the domi-
nant official position of the intellectual leadership of youth organizations.
Many less sophisticated youth had no patience with theoretical and strategiz-
iïlg sessions: they wanted action. In spite of the lessons of 1976, frictions
between township youth and migrants were again a recurrent feature of town-
ship protest in the 19805. Th^prominent role of youth, challenging not only
the apartheid state but parental authority as well, produced a generational
backlash. Adult men sometimes resorted to violent means, individually or col-
lectively as vigilantes, to reassert their authority as elders and heads of families.
When resistance and conflict broadened during the 19805, the street fighter
joined the articulate activist. OfHcially workers were still identified as the pil-
lars of the struggle, but it was the youth on the township streets who were
actually liberating the country.46
The generational dimension was without doubt a central feature of the
revolt in the 19805. But the undifferentiated concept of youth is not much
more helpful than sweeping generalizations about workers or blacks when try-
ing to make sense of the events in the decade. Only with the benefit of hind-
sight were some attempts made to fill in the rough outlines by asking more
specific questions: Who was involved, in which protests or events, and at
which times?47 Youth in this context cannot be equated wtthyoungpeople—
a category that would include the vast majority of South Africans—but is
clearly linked to political activism. As a consequence of interrupted school-
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ing and long bouts of unemployment, yotith could be a long-term career. The
median age of African schoolchildren in the higher forms of secondary schools
is relatively high. School graduates, engaging in youth activities, could also be
considered as youth as long as they had not established a family. The consti-
tution of the Alexandra Youth Congress, for example, stated that membership
was open to "all who fall within the accepted definition of youth," without
further elaboration. Some activists took this to mean everybody between
twelve and thirty-six years of age, whether or not they were student«.48
Youth was differentiated by race and gender, by class and occupation, by
religion and language, by the distinction between students and nonstudents,
and between workers and unemployed. Between the formation of COSAS in
1979 and the launch of SAYCO (South African Youth Congress) in 1987, South
Afnca experienced a massive growth in youth orgamzation. The formal lead-
ership of youth organi/ations was usually dominated by young workers and
university and high school students. Unemployed youth were also involved,
but these unemployed were a different category from the unemployed and
often unemployable lumpen youth. They were frequently former students
who had not yet managed to find a job or politicized workers who had been
dismissed. The student leaders were relatively well educated: they were the
successes rather than the failures of the school system.
There were regional differences, of course. In the colored areas of the West-
ern Cape, political youth movements were a relatively new phenomenon, if
one excludes the highly intellectual fringe of the Unity Movement. Before the
formation of the Cape Youth Congress (CAYCO), "youth in coloured areas
had two options: street gangs and church groups. CAYCO became a third
option."49 But CAYCO was not successful in organizing working youth or
unemployed youth.
As violent confrontation unfolded, a more informal, less educated leader-
ship emerged. Motives for joining could be manifold, ranging from political
idealism to group conformity, the search for affirmation, an experience of
adventure and excitement, a feeling of mtoxication with toyi-toyi (a militant
dance, expressing deflance and preparedness for battle) and freedom songs,
and a sense of identity provided by a culture of militaristic camaraderie.50
Rising levels of violence encouraged people to behave in unusual ways: nor-
mally nonviolent people acted violently.
In discussing the gender composition of youth organizations, Jeremy Seek-
ings contends that the leadership of youth organizations was almost entirely
male, but that young women formed a sizable portion of the membership.
Women members were generally younger than male members, and most were
attending school.51 Why were women rarely prominent in the youth organi-
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jfons during the violent confrontations of the mid-i98os? In looking for
nations, Seekings points to the prevailing conservatism with regard to
er roles in township politics and the macho culture that became more
ounced as violent confrontations escalated.
lat Was It All About?
:eptions of the UDF's role changed in the course of the 19805. From its
dest beginnkxgs as an hoc alliance with limited goals, the Front was thrust
ard on waves of populär militancy toward an all-out challenge of the
artheid state. In the process, it became less of a front and more of a politi-
t organization as it tried to develop more ideological cohesion. In view of
™fi political and ideological diversity within the Front, pinpointing the basic
of the UDF's ideology is not an easy task.
Il Yet, under the UDF's wide anti-apartheid umbrella, three broad objectives
tcan be discerned: the establishment of Charterist hegemony, the building of
|j$emocratic organizations that ought to be prefigurative for a system of major-
rule characterized by populär participation, and a more egalitarian society
J in socioeconomic terms.
• In his court testimony, UDF general secretary Popo Molefe explained that
^the Front aspired to be "the only representative front representing all sections
l of our people."52 The UDF was not unique in having hegemonie aspirations,
| but it was more successful than such uncompromising rivals as AZAPO
(Azanian People's Organisation). The more pragmatic strategy, as pursued
by the UDF, was the building of a broad front, which could expand further
through tactical ad hoc alliances. This did not imply ideological abstentionism
but rather a hegemonie aspiration to impose one's own agenda on this broad
front. Alliance politics was seen as a zero-sum game: a gain for one side
implied a loss for the other side. Imposing Charterist hegemony was not an
end in itself, of course, but a means to conquer state power.
In the ANC's insurrectionary perspective, people's power was largely
understood in military terms: the creation of liberated zones to serve as bases
for revolutionary warfare. With this strategie concept, local negotiations, such
as with neighboring white municipalities, are ruled out. The strategy is not to
share power but to take the war into the white areas.53 The UDF, however,
saw the new strategy of people's power as a mechanism of promoting disci-
pline and organization, not just as a confrontational strategy.54 In the 1985-86
period of dual power, civic leaders attempted to establish some control over
radical youth and to provide some protection against the security forces. In
this perspective, dual power was not the prelude to a revolutionary seizure of
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power. On the contrary, dual power created the conditions for the first-evef
significant negotiations between whites and blacks on the local level, eithetj
with local businesspeople or with local administrators.55 j
But there remained a dilemma. If successful civics could deliver some goods
and perforrn some functions of local government, how far should this go?|
How great was the danger of co-optation? Would reformist initiatives act as a j
break on the insurrectionary potential? Whatever the strategie perspective— j
insurrection or negotiation—it was evident that the heady experience of peo-J
ple's power generated an increasingly radical conception of a liberated society.}
Even if many victories were short-lived, street committees and boycott cam-1
paigns gave ordinary people a sense of power for the first time. ;
There is an important distinction between the ANC and the UDF discourses j
on people's power. The UDF's strong focus on populär participation is lacking |
in the ANC and SACP publications, where people's power is seen as a means
to an end: hegemonie control. People's power, stated the ANC's historian ;
Francis Meli, is total power. "In South Africa, there is no question of power i
sharing. The people of South Africa are fighting for total power, people's
power. There is no question of our sharing it with Botha; nor with Gatsha
Buthelezi, for Inkatha's many crimes against our people . .. preclude this."56 '
What would the "Democratie People's Republic of South Africa," in which
"all our people enjoy security, peace and comfort," look like?57 In 1987, the
UDF outlined some of its democratie ideals in a conference paper.58 Democ-
racy is spelled out as both a means and an end. The UDF's democratie goal is
not simply about replacing white faces in parliament with black faces. The
essence of democracy is that people, and in particular the working class, have
control over all areas of daily existence, "from national policy to housing, from
schooling to working conditions, from transport to the consumption of food."
This understanding of democracy is fundamentally different from the vari-
ous power-sharing constitutional models that were being juggled around. "In
other words, we are talking about direct as opposed to indirect political rep-
resentation, mass participation rather than passive docility and ignorance, a
mornentum where ordinary people feel that they can do the job themselves,
rather than waiting for their local MP to intercede on their behalf?' Although
dismissive of conventional party politics, the paper acknowledged that a plu-
rality of different viewpoints is important for a democracy.
The vices and virtues of liberal democracy and populär democracy have
been a theme of discussion in numerous other liberation movements. The
decline of the African state in the 19805 inspired a new round of discussions
about the most appropriate form of government in the present state of eco-
nomie development.59 However, discussions in the UDF remained largely iso-
lated from the wider African debate. Charterists rarely turned to Africa to find
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„»»j of Inspiration or to learn the lessons of history. Their frame of refer-
E was largely shaped by Marxism-Leninism, the Russian Revolution of
|| the models provided by Eastern European communist countries, notably
•Berman Democratie Republic, and a handful of third-world models in
Nicaragua and Cuba figured most prominently.
a just and nonexploitative society a socialist society? Anticapitalist rhet-
|,was pervasive in UDF publications and speeches, but this does not nec-
tóy indicate a choice for orthodox Marxism. Non-Marxists in the UDF,
t as Allan Bcesak, advocated communalism rather than socialism, using
.al arguments rather than Marxist textbooks. Communalism was also an
jftent in the concept of people's education, controlled by "the people them-
Sres." Free-marketeers, however, were virtually absent from UDF ranks, one
iable exception being Soweto physician and entrepreneur Nthatho Modana,
air of the Soweto Civic Association (SCA). Socialist preferences were man-
sst among trade unionists and students, including white students. But the
jddle-class nationalists in the UDF were basically fighting to establish their
ace in the socioeconomic System, not to destroy the system.
Clearly, the UDF could mean different things to different people. These
ological tenets are largely constructed on the basis of UDF publications and
jjpwidemic writings. To what extent was the UDF's ideological discourse and
academie analysis consonant with the beliefs and aspirations of its foliow-
at the grassroots level? What kind of society was envisaged by the youth
pnovement in Sekhukhuneland, civic activists in Kagiso, and media workers in
[Fthe Grassroots office in the Western Cape?
TWO
|The Struggles behind the Struggle:
ree Case Studies
CHAPTER THREE
Confusion to Lusaka":
e UDF in Sekhukhuneland
There is a confusion between the parents and the sons
There is a confusion between the tribal authonty and the Community
Poem composed in Sekhukhuneland, 1986
beUDFs Rural Policy
•MÜN SUPPORT OF THE STATE'S allcgation that the UDF leadership was the driv-
P ing force behind a nationwide insurrection, the prosecution in the Delmas
treason trial stated that the "Organisation, politicisation and mobilisation of
l the black people in the rural areas is a very important part of the aims and the
fl objects of the UDF."1 The state's claim fitted well with the image of omnipres-
|, ence that the UDF liked to portray in its propaganda. In rural areas, so the
UDF claimed, "tribal authorities are being replaced by democratically elected
village councils."2 Among the Bantustans in the Northern Transvaal, Lebowa
and KwaNdebele were reputed to be UDF strongholds (sec map i).
In a press statement issued in 1986, the UDF Head Office presented a sur-
vey of the state of rebellion and repression in the Northern Transvaal. Con-
cerning Sekhukhuneland, a district of Lebowa with a history of resistance, die
press release boasted that the "people of Sekhukhuneland under the leadership
of SEYO [Sekhukhune Youth Organisation], the Sekhukhune Parents' Crisis
Committee and the UDF established entrenched organs of people's power
such as street, block and village committees which won the support and the
hearts and minds of the people."3 The sequence of actors is remarkable, with
the youth organization SEYO being ranked first among the leaders of "the
people of Sekhukhuneland." As diis chapter demonstrates, this order of actors
was quite appropriate. But the claim that people's power had been entrenched
in local organization based on mass participation was wishful thinking.
Sekhukhuneland, like many other rural areas, experienced an extraordinary
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Northern Transvaal
= mam road
i. The Northern Transvaal. Map by Nel van Bethlehem.
episode of youth mobilization, which for the first time brought great numbers
of rural youth in contact with liberation politics. But the relationship between
youth and parents was antagonistic. There were hardly any joint efforts to set
up "organs of people's power" such as civic associations. The backbone of the
UDF in die Nordlern Transvaal consisted of youdi movements, which pur-
sued dieir own liberation agenda while maintaining fleeting contacts widi the
formal structures of die Front.
Since its inception, die UDF had been strongly focused on urban areas and
national politics. Initially, die primary focus was on die new constitution and
on the colored and Indian constituency. In die Northern Transvaal, coloreds
and Indians are a negligible quantity. Second came die campaign against die
Black Local Audiorities in die African townships. In 1984, severe repression
against trade unionists and politica! activists in die Ciskei placed "fighting Ban-
tustans" higher on die poliocal agenda. From 1985 onward, insurrection spread
from die townships to remote rural areas. But beyond calls for die abolition
of die Bantustans and die return of die land to die people, die UDF did not
develop a coherent strategy toward rural issues.
arm workers, who were virtually inaccessible on the white-owned and
dy controlled farms, remained outside die scope of die UDF. But in other
«l communities where the UDF could have made an impact, die Front
tte no major effort at organization. The UDF did not manage to link up
l ongoing local struggles of communities diat were organizing resistance
stforced removals. Forced removals on a massive scale—of rural black
wtnunities from white-designated areas, of farmworkers from white farms,
lof squatters from peri-urban areas—were one of die most obnoxious fea-
«s of apartheid policy. Between 1960 and 1983, an estimated 3.5 million
ted removals were implemented. Yet, die matter had low priority on the
jp)B's national agenda.
F' Äware of its weak performance in rural areas, die UDF-Transvaal in 1985
[jpointed Murphy Morobe to the newly created post of rural secretary.
eweto-born Morobe, part of die 1976 Soweto generation diat had served
We on Robben Island, was not the most likely candidate for rural Organizer:
£ was a city boy who had earned his credentials in student politics and trade
iiion work in Soweto. Shordy after his appointment hè was sent on an inter-
Eonal tour and subsequendy had to take over duties from his detained col-;ues. He dien served as acting publicity secretary on die UDF Nationalcutive and never really began his work as rural secretary.From 1985, the UDF's national leadership began strategizing how rural
Igrievances could be converted into formal organization. One obvious way of
obtaining access to die Bantustan villages was through migrants, who could
be reached in die hostels and compounds and who would carry die message
to dieir home areas, "so that diese men can give die seal of approval to die
. Organisation."4 This strategy of organizing migrant workers in die cities in
* order to bring organization from their point of employment to dieir place of
residence was outlined in die UDF's 1985 secretarial report. "The migrant
workers living in hostels and elsewhere must also be organised. These people
provide a vital link widi die rural communities. The skills diat diey learn and
the political consciousness they develop can be transferred to die next of kin,
fiiends and acquaintances in diese areas. The extent to which we mobilise and
organise the migrants will determine die pace of Organisation of rural com-
munities."5 The Northern Transvaal was the only region where die UDF lead-
ership actively promoted networks of migrants in order to reach die rural
villages, but even here die strategy of urban-rural linkages was not pursued
widi much vigor.
Mobilizing die countryside via tiiis urban-rural network was not a novel
idea. Contesting die prevailing view in scholarly literature diat die ANC and
the Communist Party in the 19405 and 19505 were urban based and quite
remote from rural concerns and rural constituencies, Peter Delhis has drawn
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attention to the role of migrant workers' organizations in the Northern Trans*
vaal, such as the Zoutpansberg Balemi Association in the 19405 and Sebatafc-
gomo, an organization of BaPedi migrants from Sekhukhuneland, in th|
I95OS.6 The ANC organizational strategy aimed at establishing rural branches
through chiefs. This approach limited its capacity to mobilize a mass con-
stituency, as populär grievances were accumulating against chiefs. In the eyesj
of many, the office had been corrupted by the control exercised by the Nativej
Affairs Department. This erosion of the legitimacy of the chieftaincy was exac-l
erbated by the imposition of the Bantu Authorities Act in the 19505, which\
aimed at self-rule and ultimately independence for the Bantustans. Chiefs were i
transformed into salaried officials, totally dependent on the Bantustan admin-
istration. State recognition had become more vital for the chieftaincy than \
populär support.
But while the ANC organizational strategy had reached the end of its
potential by the early 1950$, the communist partners in the Congress Alliance
provided the primary impetus toward the formation of organizations with a
different social base than the chiefly elite: associations of migrant workers.
Sebatakgomo, which had originated as a mutual support organization
among BaPedi migrants in the PWV region, played a crucial role in linking
rural grievances to national politica! movements. Through this network,
Sekhukhuneland became known as an ANC stronghold. The revolts of the
19505 in Sekhukhuneland and other rural districts were provoked by the intro-
duction of Bantu Authorities, stock culling, and environmental rehabilitation
schemes. Although these matters were primanly peasant concerns, they were
also of vital interest to migrants for whom a rural foothold remained an essen-
dal part of their survival strategy. These revolts had been crushed with severe
repression, but the ANC nevertheless remained hopeful about the revolu-
tionary potential in the Bantustans. In the initial period of armed struggle,
stated the ANC document on Strategy and Tactics (1969), "the main physical
environment... is outside the enemy strongholds in the cities, in the vast
Stretches of our countryside."7 Organized sabotage in urban areas was seen as
an auxiliary activity. Only much later, in the strategie review undertaken after
the Soweto rising, did the urban areas become central to the ANC military
strategy. This initial prioritization of rural areas in strategizing the armed
struggle was presumably not so much a reflection of the actual support bases
of the ANC within South Africa but rather a reflection of revolutionary the-
ories and examples from Asia and Ladn America. The head of military intelli-
gence for Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), Ronnie Kasrils, was much inspired by
Fidel Castro's advance on Havana from his base in the Sierra Maestra, where
hè recruited a guerrilla force among the peasantry. "I sensed . . . that the key
reason for the limitation of our armed struggle was that we had not linked
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bp our rural people, as Fidel had, and did not fully appreciate the role they
ld play."8 After the series of rural revolts in the 19505, the Bantustans
pjained largely quiescent for the next twenty-five years, while African urban
las exploded periodically in waves of open protest. Only in the insurrec-
Aary climate of the mld-i98os did rural areas once again become the scène
Iwidespread protest and resistance.
ptis tempting to draw parallels between the rural struggles of the 19505 and
K19805. However, behind the appearance of continuity lay significant shifts
ifte social composition of rural resistance movements as well as in the issues
fstake. Delius has explored both the Sekhukhune revolt of the 19505 and the
rising of I985-86.9 He points to elements of continuity—notably the role of
coadly ANC-oriented political tradition—but also underlines major dis-
Ltinuities. In the 19505, an ANC-linked organization of migrant workers—
;i>atakgomo—played a crucial role, in alliance with a number of local chiefs
ho resisted the encroachment of Bantu Authorities on the chieftaincy. In
ueusing on the vital importance of urban-based migrant organizations, Delius
ïiodifies the classic picture of "peasant revolts." Migrants played some role
l the 19805, but the driving force of the uprising was youth.
This change of actors from migrants and chiefs to youth is the vital differ-
l«flce between the 19505 and the 19805. The Sekhukhune revolt of 1958 was not
Jaclear-cut example of a peasant revolt, but the migrant workers who played
! such a crucial role shared many peasant concerns. The insurrection in the mid-
ïpSos in Sekhukhuneland and other parts of Lebowa was definitely not a peas-
§'' ant revolt. This was above all a youth revolt, drawing its inspiration not fromstruggles for land or from working-class nationalism in the cities but from
1
 Orthodox Marxist textbooks disseminated through student organizations,
from a strong generational youth-consciousness, and from romanticized and
sometimes misunderstood notions about the ANC's armed struggle. The lead-
ership of the revolt had no peasant aspirations. The same is true for their fol-
lowing: they had no taste for farming. The main actors were high school
SOidents, for whom land issues were only a marginal concern. They were moti-
vated by grievances concerning the conditions in the schools and the use and
abuse of chiefly power.
The UDF in Lebowa, as in most of the Northern Transvaal, did not develop
into a broad-based social movement. With few exceptions, the bulk of its fol-
lowing was youth, under the leadership of students from secondary and post-
secondary schools. After some further observations on the UDF's rural policy
and the issue of chieftaincy, this chapter examines the formation of the UDF
in the Northern Transvaal, the role of the University of the North, and the
spread of rebellion from the urban setting to the villages. We then turn to one
of the main centers of rural revolt: Sekhukhuneland.
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The UDF and Chieftaincy
Just as the UDF gave scant attention to communities threatened with removal,
farmworkers, and migrant workers, the Front also failed to develop a policy
toward chieftaincy. Publicity secretary Terror Lekota suggested that chiefs were
a dying institution: "As the pressures of the capitalist economy penetrate even
those rural areas, more and more people are making a break with the tribal ties
of loyalties to the chief— who are being seen to be serving not the Community
but themselves. What we are going to see is the building of new leaders, not
on the basis of old tradition."10 Chiefs were generally equated with Bantustan
structures. Since the UDF stood for a unitary state without ethnically based
Bantustans, it followed that not only did the homeland governments have to
go, but so did the tribal hierarchies, which had become part and parcel of the
Bantustan administrations. The National Working Committee of the UDF
resolved in 1986 that "Organisation [in the Bantustans] must be intensified and
tribal structures should be replaced with democratie organisations."11
The 1987 rural report recalled that "the anti-chief campaigns and anti-
bantustan campaigns took off" in 1985, depicting chiefs and Bantustans as a
tandem.12 Combating chiefs was identified as a most suitable issue to unite a
broad range of people, but the report also considered the expediency of
alliances with chiefs, Opposition parties in homelands, and elements in home-
land civil services. The issue was left unresolved with the noncommittal con-
clusion that these alliances are inherently problematic. On the one hand, "our
inability to control them, or take them further may mean that the victories we
win are limited, in yet other circumstances people who are our allies during a
specific period may in fact turn against us." On the other hand, "these alliances
can also offer us protection and there are situations in which we can change
the politics and attitudes of our allies so that they will move closer to us in the
long term."
Indeed, migrants, women, and youth all had reason to resent abuse of
power and corruption by chiefs. Grievances centered around taxes and trib-
utes, and authoritarian rule. Special tributes were exacted from migrant work-
ers, as a form of thanksgiving to the chief for looking after the migrant's
household during his absence. Prior to the abolition of the pass laws in 1986,
migrants needed to obtain a permit from the tribal labor bureau in order to
qualify for employment and to pay a registration fee. The System also ensured
that the chief had considerable control over the movements of his subjects. He
could penalize recalcitrant villagers by refusing to have them registered.13 The
abolition of the pass system meant that migrants no longer had to present
themselves at the chiePs office. Chiefs lost their income from registration fees
and also missed the opportunity to collect arrears from their migrant subjects.
Faced with diminishing control, chiefs frequently reacted by imposing new
taxes to make up for the lost revenue.
Taxes, being a levy exacted from all members of the tribe, could be raised
for special purposes after the chief's council gained approval from the formal
gathering of adult men. In practice, these meetings were often called during
weekdays, thus excluding the migrants from the consultation process. Upon
their return to the village, migrants were presented with the bill upon which
the chief and the elder men had decided. The special purposes generally
included the building of a school, clinic, or post office, paying for legal advice
in cases involving the chief or the tribe, contributing to the chiefs marriage
goods or to the costs of his funeral, or procuring the services of rainmakers.
In rural areas, the provision of school buildings was the responsibility of
the local Community. Control over school building funds and over the school
committees responsible for running the school became one of the stakes in the
controversy between chiefs, principals, parents, and students. Complaints
about misappropriation of Community funds by the chiefly elite were com-
monly voiced by youth and adults alike.14
Village meetings could be held only with permission from the chief. Chiefs
generally opposed attempts to establish a civic association, which they rightly
perceived as an alternative power structure. Chiefs had good reason to obstruct
the formation of residents' organizations, as these were likely to become plat-
forms for villagers to voice their grievances about taxes and missing funds.
Frequently, the taxes were of more benefit to the chiePs private affairs than
to die Community. Taxes were raised to build a house for the chief, to buy a car,
or to pay his repair bill. Some informants came up with even more extreme
examples of arbitrary chiefly taxes, such as levies to pay for his traffic fmes and
diapers for his children.15 This system of taxation without representation was
at the root of many grievances against the chieftaincy. The migrants' organi-
zation NOTPECO (Northern Transvaal People's Congress), launched in the
19805 as the successor organization to Sebatakgomo, mobilized its following
mainly on this issue, by impressing on the migrants that they were entitled
to be part of the decision-making process.
Apart from taxation, free labor was also perceived as a form of exploitation.
Free labor, involving work on the chief's homestead and on the tribal land,
was exacted mainly from women and schoolchildren. Youth could be called
upon to provide free labor in the period before Initiation.16 Chiefs used this
prerogative to provide labor for agricultural schemes run by the Lebowa Devel-
opment Corporation and usually managed by whites. Women were poorly
paid for often strenuous work and would then spend their meager wages in the
shops owned by the chiefly elite. Abolition of "forced labor" became a com-
mon demand of the youth congresses. Faced with these challenges to their
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authority from different quarters, many chiefs reacted by forming armed vig-J
ilante groups to combat rebellious youth. Weapons were provided by thef
Lebowa government. The tribal authorities were among the pillars of the paci- j
fication strategy of the SADF (South African Defence Force) in die Northern
Transvaal and particularly in Lebowa.17
The imposition of the Bantu Authorities Act in the 19505 had not only
changed the relationship between the chief and his subjects but had also upsef
the balance within the tribal hierarchy. Sekhukhuneland provides a clear exam-
ple of the consequences of this divide-and-rule strategy. After the promulga-
tion of this act, the government wanted to establish one single tribal authority
under the paramount chief for the whole of Sekhukhuneland. The introduc-
tion of this new system was linked to a program of agricultural planning that
included unpopulär measures such as cattle culling and land demarcation.
Beginning in 1956, resistance built up against Bantu Authorities and agricul-
tural betterment alike, culminating in open revolt in 1958. The acting para-
mount chief, Morwamoche Sekhukhune, and a majority of his tribe were
opposed to the Bantu Authorities system. The Native Affairs Department
undermined the Opposition by breaking up the power of the paramountcy.
Morwamoche was deported, and the plan to institute one tribal authority was
shelved. Subordinate headmen were offered recognition as chiefs if they
accepted the establishment of Tribal Authorities. This scheme resulted in a pro-
liferation of chieftaincies. In the early 19505 Sekhukhuneland counted three
chieftaincies, but by the mid-i97os more than fifty chiefs had been officially
recognized.18 The doubtful origins of many chieftaincies served to further
weaken their legitimacy, since many chiefs were considered to be only head-
men who had usurped chiefly power. The disintegration of the paramountcy
resulted in more factional conflict as the traditional system of consultation,
conflict solving, and interdependence feil into disuse.
On the other hand, this history of resistance on the part of the paramount
chief and a number of subordinate chiefs could be drawn upon to demonstrate
the role played by traditional rulers in the fight against white domination.
This placed chiefs in a different category from township councillors, who
lacked any historica! legitimacy. Chiefs were, after all, part of Africa's heritage.
Although many individual chiefs were seen as corrupt and self-serving, the
institution of the chieftaincy could not be dismissed so lightly.
As it moved from one crisis to the next, the UDF never managed to map
out a policy on local government in the rural areas. Nor could it draw on a
coherent ANC policy, although most ANC pronouncements assumed that
chieftaincy either would die of its own accord or would be abolished. Govan
Mbeki, writing on the peasant revolts of the 19505, questioned the role of
chiefs in the industrial age: "If the Africans have had chiefs, it was because all
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uu.1 societies have had them at one stage or another. But when a people
ï developed to a stage which discards chieftainship, when their social
slopment contradicts the need for such an institution, then to force it on
l is not liberation but enslavement."19 Writing a quarter of a Century later,
nJier leading ANC intellectual was more straightforward: "Backward tribal
iJ other relationships, such as the role of the chiefs in such situations, will
f replaced by democratie institutions founded on the organs of people's
ver..»20
Aga
k*L.
gainst this background, it is not surprising that the emergence of a Char-
t organization of chiefs came as a shock to many UDF and ANC adherents.
ïfbrmation of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CON-
VLESA) in 1987 encountered an ambivalent reception in UDF circles.21
«j ld progressive chiefs be organized to further the liberation struggle?
* CONTRALESA had its origins in the battie against independence in
iKwaNdebele and the resistance in the district of Moutse against incorporation
TÜnto KwaNdebele, the most recently established Bantustan, which was sched-
luled for "independence" in 1986. Moutse residents feared that the planned
rfexcision of their district from Lebowa and its incorporation into KwaNdebele
Would entail the loss of their South African citizenship. One of the prime
; movers of the anti-independence camp was Prince Klaas Makhosana Mah-
~" langu, who belongs to the Ndzundza royal family in KwaNdebele. Klaas Mah-
, langu and other opponents of independence, many of whom had to flee Kwa-
Ndebele in fear of their lives, flocked to Johannesburg looking for help. Now
a new problem posed itself to the UDF leadership, which by this time was
itself in considerable disarray: What was the UDF to do with chiefs who sup-
ported a "progressive cause," such as the anti-independence struggle in the
Bantustans? Would organizing chiefs serve the purpose of broadening out and
further isolating the enemy?
After consultations with UDF leaders, trade unionists, and Peter Mokaba,
the president of the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) — all of whom
came from the Northern Transvaal— CONTRALESA was launched in Sep-
tember 1987 in Johannesburg, claiming a membership of thirty-eight chiefs
and subchiefs from KwaNdebele and Moutse. According to its constitution,
CONTRALESA aimed to unite all traditional leaders in the country, to fight
for the eradication of the Bantustan system, to "school the traditional leaders
about the aims of the South African liberation struggle and their role in it," to
win back "the land of our forefathers and share it among those who work it in
order to banish famine and land hunger," and to fight for a unitary, nonra-
cial, and democratie South Africa.22
The involvement of SAYCO in the launch of CONTRALESA gave rise to
the suspicion that this organization was being formed with the ultimate goal
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of abolishing the institution of chieftaincy. That suspicion was not unfounded.
Some of the activists involved in the formation of CONTRALESA were
indeed motivated by the belief that there was no place for chiefs in the class-
less society for which they were striving. In the meantime, however, harness-
ing chiefs to the progressive cause would prevent them from subverting the
struggle. Heeding the lessons from Angola and Mozambique, where "the
destabilising factors such as Unita and Renamo found fertile ground in the dis-
illusionment of rural people," the founders of CONTRALESA feit it was
imperative to "organise and unite all traditional leaders of our country and
to refrain from aligning ourselves with any particular oppressive System today
or in the future."23
Combining "struggle" rhetoric with wooing chiefs proved a diffïcult feat.
CONTRALESA advertised itself as a "progressive grassroots and community-
based Organisation." This phrase was usually used to denote civics or village
committees—the very organizations that chiefs saw as undermining their
authority. In line with the practice of UDF organizations and trade unions,
CONTRALESA handed out T-shirts to its distinguished members, who
would have preferred a tie or a classy briefcase. The relationship between
CONTRALESA and the UDF is not quite clear. Press reports at the time of
the launch and later present CONTRALESA as a UDF affiliate.24 However,
CONTRALESA's director of projects Samson Ndou stated in an interview in
1990 that CONTRALESA was not affdiated with the UDF or any other polit-
ica! movement.25 But Murphy Morobe, who held the rural portfolio in the
UDF Transvaal Regional Executive Committee (REC), had always assumed
that CONTRALESA was indeed a UDF affiliate.26 CONTRALESA's draft
constitution does not mention UDF affïliation.
While the formation of CONTRALESA as a partner in the Mass Democ-
ratie Movement was shocking news to many activists inside South Africa, the
ANC was quick to give its blessing. In February 1988, a CONTRALESA dep-
utation visited Lusaka to meet an ANC delegation headed by Secretary-
General Alfred Nzo. The ANC, UDF, and SAYCO all hailed the "heroic role"
that chiefs had played in the past against the forces of colonialism, pointed at
the significant role of the chiefs in the early years of the ANC, and welcomed
the "chiefs coming back to the people."27
This welcome is better explained by changes in overall ANC strategy than
by a changing mood in the rural villages. Grievances festered on, but the wide-
spread complaints were not translated into a broad populär movement against
chiefly rule. While UDF propaganda upheld an image of widespread populär
mobilization in the Bantustans, its interna! assessments struck a more sober
note. The 1987 rural report acknowledged that active organizational involve-
ment was largely limited to youth, while organization of the civic associations
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women remained extremely weak. The report noted that resistance against
Bantustans was mostly passive, "a spontaneous reflection of the alienation
rural masses from the homeland structures." What organization there
jpas had been smashed under the second State of Emergency. Rebuilding
lorganization and regrouping around the remaining core groups proved a dif-
Rficult process. "More serious is the fact that the government's vigilante and
«kitskonstabel strategy is based on the capacity of the state to recruit rural and
'jinemployed youth. In many areas youth structures have found that people
ifwho flocked to them during the height of mass struggle in late 1985 and early
11986 have now joined the security forces in one form or another. This has not
' only demoralised Organisation, but has exposed many activists to severe
l repression at the hands of the ex-comrades."
The report acknowledged that in many instances the Front had failed to
link up with local initiatives of people faced with removals or incorporation
1
 into Bantustans and had neglected to address the organization of farmwork-
ers in white rural areas. Excluded from the 1979 trade union reforms, farm-
workers remained the most isolated and neglected category of workers. The
report noted that rival organizations, such as Inkatha, had been more suc-
cessful in this sector.28
There is substance to the claim in the rural report that, for the first time in
decades, mass organizations were attempting to incorporate "the rural masses
within the mainstream of the national struggle." But most initiatives had local
or regional origins, and incorporating "the masses" did not advance much
beyond youth. The national UDF leadership was largely innocent of any cen-
tral planning or coordination with regard to rural areas.
The Northern Transvaal: The Rural Crisis
The Northern Transvaal is a vast, predominantly rural area with a few middle-
sized towns and some industrial and mining centers.29 The majority of the
white population supported politica! parties and movements to the right of
the ruling National Party (NP). This was the heartland of the Conservative
Party and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). During election times
their posters proclaimed an unequivocal message: "Die land is ons land" (The
land is ours).
In many respects, the Northern Transvaal is the most economically back-
ward region of South Africa. It is by far the most rural region, with a low
urbanization rate and the highest rate of male absenteeism as a consequence
of migrant labor. Official unemployment figures roughly trebled between
1980 and 1990.30 Two homelands in the Northern Transvaal, Lebowa and
KwaNdebele, became the scène of rural revolts in the mid-i98os. The other
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Bantustans in this region—Venda and Gazankulu—do not fïgure prorni-j
nently in accounts of rural struggles. In KwaNdebele, widespread resistancejj
against government plans to impose independence led to an unusual coalition|
of the royal house, commuters, and youth. -
Lebowa, a much longer established Bantustan, had consistendy refused to
accept independence. Like most Bantustans, Lebowa was not one Consolidated ,
territory but thirteen bits and pieces, scattered over the Northern Transvaal.
Most parts of Lebowa were remote from the main centers of employment.
Migrant labor provided the main source of income, with migrants returning
home perhaps on a monthly visit and for a longer period during the Christmas
holidays. Some 30 percent of the potentially economically active population
were employed outside Lebowa.31 Unemployment in Lebowa in 1986 was offi-
cially estimated at 37 percent of the labor force. Salaried employment in Lebowa
could accommodate only approximately 21 percent of the labor force.32
Global statistics for the Northern Transvaal obscure the vast difference
between the living conditions of whites and Africans. For example, the pop-
ulation density in Lebowa was twenty-three times higher than in the white-
designated part of the Northern Transvaal. People living in white areas earned
seven to eight times the income of people living in Lebowa. Whites earned on
average more than fifteen times the salary of blacks, who primarily worked in
unskilled or semiskilled work. For black migrants working in the "white"
areas, income was on the average doublé the mean income earned in the home-
lands. Agriculture in "white" areas was marked by highly capital-intensive,
mechanized large farms, while homeland agriculture was characterized by
unmechanized subsistence farming on small plots. Stock farming was the most
viable form of agriculture but resulted in overgrazing and erosion. It was esti-
mated that at least one-half (but probably more) of all households living in the
homelands were landless.33
The function of Bantustans has changed over the past decades. Their initial
function in the beginning of the twentieth Century was the reproduction of
cheap labor power: subsistence agriculture in the African reserves subsidized
the growth of South African mining and industry. The mines could pay wages
below subsistence level because household incomes were supplemented by
homeland agriculture. But the productive capacity of the homelands soon
reached its limits, as a consequence of population pressure, overgrazing, and
the long absence of the strongest inhabitants. By the 19205, agricultural out-
put per capita was falling. Households came to rely increasingly on income
from migrant labor. Gradually, the roles were reversed: homeland agriculture
was now subsidized by migrant labor. Migrants sent remittances to the coun-
tryside to maintain an often tenuous rural foothold. The homelands became
importers of food. By the late 19805, only 30 percent of the food consumed in
the Bantustans was produced internally.34
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JfFith the rapid industrialization of the 19405, white farms experienced a
Értage of labor. Farmers were unable to offer wages to compete with man-
Icturing. The NP, in government since 1948, came to the aid of Afrikaner
liers, one of its main constituencies. The mobility of African labor was dras-
Ey curtailed. Labor bureaus in the Bantustans channeled the labor supply
reen the mines, industry, and commercial agriculture. Without a permit
ü these labor bureaus, Bantustan residents were not allowed to look for
s in "white" South Africa. Tightening of the pass laws, which in 1952 were
uïnded to African women, served to contain and control the "surplus
ficans" in the homelands. Apart from their role in labor allocation, Ban-
itans assumed more politica! functions of control. The 1953 Bantu Authori-
$$ Act was a key element in this process, in which control was delegated to
Iquasi-independent administration of Bantustan officials and chiefs.35
«l Bantustans in general, and the Lebowa administration in particular, were
Ijbputed to be havens of corruption and incompetence. Commissions of
Jtflquiry came up with damning evidence, but not much was done about the
feebowa government until 1993, when the South African government took
•esponsibility for Lebowa's fmancial affairs, personnel matters, security,
liadrninistration, pensions, and the tender board. It was revealed that hundreds
f of Lebowa government officials had been awarded enormous backdated salary
•Jincreases, and that the Lebowa government had also appointed more than a
|thousand teachers whose salaries had not been included in its budget.36
f In spite of rising unemployment in the industrial and mining centers, the
j! use of migrant workers remained a widespread phenomenon. One of its obvi-
* ons consequences is the uneven makeup of the population, with dispropor-
I tionate numbers of women and children. Among the permanent residents of
j Lebowa, adults are a minority group. In 1980,56 percent of the de facto pop-
f ulation of Lebowa were under 20. Five years later, a staggering 72.3 percent
'_ were under 2o.37
The rural crisis shared some aspects of the crisis in urban areas but also had
, some definite characteristics of its own. Township priorities such as housing,
i rents, and service charges were not high on the list of grievances. Most people
owned their houses, and services were in any case mostly nonexistent. The
. structural conditions that help to explain the rural revolts in the Northern
• Transvaal center around the economie crisis with its high unemployment fig-
ures, the crisis in the schools, and the chieftaincy. These conditions feature
prominently in accounts of the Sekhukhune rebellion.
Sekhukhuneland has been described as "a country of row upon row of hills
and mountains, well-covered with trees and shrubs."38 These days, Sekhuk-
huneland is best described as a dust bowl with mountains. The land is heav-
ily eroded, and trees are scarce. As a consequence of high birth rates and forced
resettlement, Sekhukhuneland experienced a rapid growth in population. The
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population virtually doubled between 1970 and 1980, resulting in increased;
pressure for land and a drastic reduction of the role of cattle in the rural econ-
omy. In 1986, the population reached 393,000.39 The Sekhukhune Chamber
of Commerce stated that trade had dropped by 65 percent between 1984 and'
1986. Recruiting for the mines had come to a standstill.40 Sekhukhuneland was i
one of the poorest districts of Lebowa. Because of drought, environmental:
degradation, and population density, rural dwellers could no longer rely on
subsistence agriculture as a buffer against bad times.
While employment opportunities diminished, education opportunities -
grew at a spectacular rate. Rising Standards of education resulted in rising
expectations. High school students expected to get better jobs than their par-
ents, who were mostly working in mines or factories, on white farms, or as
domestic workers. But during the economie slump of the 19805, few new
opportunities opened up, while existing employment patterns could not
absorb all newcomers. Opportunities for upward social mobility were mostly
limited to employment in the teaching and nursing professions, the homeland
administration, and the police force.
In line with tendencies nationwide, the 19805 saw a spectacular growth of
enrollment in secondary schools in Lebowa. In 1986, almost 79 percent of
young adults in the age group between fifteen and nmeteen years and older
were attending a secondary school.41 The number of students in secondary
schools more than doubled in five years, from 91,965 in 1980 to 199,4-29 in
1986, an average annual increase of 13.8 percent.42 The massive influx of stu-
dents was paralleled by an equally massive increase in the number of teach-
ers, many of whom were young, inexperienced, and not properly qualified.
But the growth of classrooms lagged behind. Twenty-fïve years before,
there had been only one secondary school for the whole of Sekhukhuneland.
In 1980, the average number of pupils per classroom was 49.6, while in 1986
a classroom on average contained 62.1 pupils.43 Classrooms in Sekhukhune-
land were sometimes literally overflowing. A high school in GaMankopane
had to accommodate 600 students in three classrooms. It was a common sight
to see children sitting squeezed on windowsills, outside on a few bricks, or
simply on the ground. Schools had a chronic shortage of books and teaching
materials. Many teachers made excessive use of corporal punishment.
School careers frequently had to be interrupted as black students needed to
work for a while to earn money for school fees, school uniforms, and text-
books. For white high school students, education was free. As a consequence,
there was a wide range in age among students in African high schools. In the
highest grades, students were frequently in their mid-twenties. Guidelines
from the Education Department ensured that the percentage of failures was
limited. This policy had two consequences. Since many weak students were
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öoted to the next Standard or grade level, passing or failing a school year
hed completely arbitrary. Nevertheless, students who failed would be
Bied by their parents for being la/y. Hence the demand "pass one, pass all"
fintroduced by protesting students. The second consequence was that stu-
its got stuck in Standard ten, the final year, where they had to pass matric,
l Standardized final exams. Thus, matric classes were grossly overcrowded,
iÉietimes having to accommodate a hundred or more students.
IjBetween 1984 and 1986, the number of high school students in Lebowa in
ird ten doubled, from 10,900 to 20,300. With the growth of enrollment
•es came an ever increasing rate of dropouts and failures. The pass rate feil
(n 56.6 percent in 1984 to 41.5 peicent in 1986, which placed Lebowa well
aowthe national average of a 50 percent pass rate for African schools in 1986
fee table i). By 1989, only 34 percent of Lebowa matriculants passed their
ims.44 These students often spent not just one or two years in Standard ten
t three or four years before they either passed matric or dropped out. The
eat that students older than twenty-two years would no longer be readmit-
i added to the general dissatisfaction, although it never materialized.
DSAS (Congress of South African Students) was mainly run by older stu-
__nts and former students, giving the government an extra motive to exclude
liese "troublemakers" by imposing an age limit.
These various components of the rural crisis—poverty, resettlement, over-
jopulation, drought, unemployment, and the crisis in the schools—all played
l role in shaping revolts in Lebowa. But these structural conditions by them-
selves cannot explain the specific characteristics of the uprisings. The next sec-
Üon explores the role of human agency: Why would these conditions result in
payouth revolt? Why would that happen at this particular time? After sketch-
Ijing the broader context of the UDF in the Northern Transvaal, the focus then
IJshifts to the actors in the Sekhukhune revolt.
1
 The UDF in the Northern Transvaal
; When the UDF was launched in 1983, the Transvaal region of the UDF cov-
I ered the whole province. But the heavy dominance of the urban conglomer-
| ate of the Witwatersrand led to early complaints of neglect from the rural
[ areas. Rural activists feit that the urban leadership lacked sensitivity to rural
issues. A Northern Transvaal Coordinating Comrnittee of the UDF was
i formed in May 1984 to link up with existing organizations and scattered
•:, activists. lts backbone consisted of the student organizations COSAS and
AZASO (Azanian Students' Organisation), some township-based youth con-
gresses, and a general trade union, SAAWU (South African Allied Workers
Union). An anonymous memorandum written in the same year is sharply
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critical of the arrogance of the Johannesburg-based activists and the margin-
alization of the northern areas, which feit "treated as a bantustan . . . with no
right of participation." The people in the Northern Transvaal "are made to wel-
come the idea that their liberators would one day emerge from Johannesburg,"
and thus people's "confidence in being their own liberators was significantly
dwarfed." The memorandum complained that the UDF-Johannesburg was
using the Northern Transvaal as a labor reserve: the "advanced section of our
activists are usually drawn in the urban centres while the fate of the masses is
left to providence." It was pointed out that rural areas require different strate-
gies from urban areas. In order to unite the rapidly growing number of youth
organizations and the emerging women's organizations, trade unions, and
church struggles into an anti-Bantustan offensive, the Northern Transvaal
would have to become a region in its own right. If a Northern Transvaal
region were established and activities and efforts were coordinated with those
of the southern region, the memorandum concluded, the activists would be
"overstretching the enemy's resources beyond his limits. And nobody, not
even the imperialists would save apartheid from its death pangs."45
The accompanying Programme of Action, however, did not come up with
ideas that were different from those of other UDF regions.46 The most orig-
inal idea concerned Sekhukhuneland, where the Northern Transvaal activists
planned to revive Sebatakgomo, the migrant workers' organization that played
an active role in the revolt in tue 19508. This plan resulted in the formation of
the Northern Transvaal People's Congress (NOTPECO), the only organiza-
tion of migrant workers among UDF affiliates. But NOTPECO would devi-
ate substantially from what its founding fathers had in mind.
The first UDF rally in the Northern Transvaal was held in August 1984 in
the Pietersburg township of Seshego. The UDF coordinating committee
claimed that, with more than five thousand people attending, it was the
biggest political raUy ever held in the history of the Northern Transvaal. After
some delay, in February 1986 the UDF Northern Transvaal was constituted
as a UDF region in its own right. Now that the coordinating committee was
transformed into a regional executive committee (REC), it could draw up its
own budget and employ its own organizers. By early 1986, the number of affil-
iates had grown to sixty-three.47 But servicing the vast rural areas with their
poor Communications and bad roads was a task far beyond the means of the
central core of UDF activists, who clustered around Pietersburg and the Um-
versity of the North, with its adjoining township of Mankweng. The forma-
tion of a separate Northern Transvaal region did not bring the expected flow
of resources from Johannesburg, nor did it stop the flow of activists to Johan-
nesburg. Unlike the UDF in the Southern Transvaal or other regions, the
UDF Northern Transvaal did not have its own office. For a while it shared
some office facilities with SAAWU at the office of the Northern Transvaal
Council of Churches in Pietersburg. Later it used the office of a sympathetic
lawyer. The UDF Northern Transvaal was trying to cope with meager means,
but the regional center in Pietersburg was relatively well off in comparison
with facilities in the Bantustans. In the perception of rural activists, resources
and manpower centered on Pietersburg and Mankweng and did not filter
down to rural areas. Outlying areas voiced complaints against the REC in
Pietersburg that were fairly similar to the grievances expressed in the memo-
randum with regard to the leadership in Johannesburg. The center-periphery
problem was replicated on a smaller scale.
The UDF leadership in the Northern Transvaal spanned several generations.
It included ANC veterans from the 19508 with a working-class background
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and intellectuals whose political schooling had begun in the 19705 in the stu-
dent organizations oriented to Black Consciousness (BC). Chair of the UDF
Northern Transvaal region was Peter Nchabeleng, an ANC activist from the
19505 who had served eight years on Robben Island for involvement in
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). He had been branch secretary of the ANC-
aligned trade union SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions) in
Pretoria as well as a member of the executive of the ANC's Pretoria branch and
of the Sebatakgomo migrants' organization. On his release in 1970, Nchabe-
leng was banished to Apel, the village of his birth in Sekhukhuneland. Mean-
while, some of the core activists from Sebatakgomo, led by Flag Boshielo and
John Nkadimeng, had resumed organizing underground Umkhonto struc-
tures in the Transvaal. Boshielo, who had gone to Johannesburg as a migrant
from Sekhukhuneland to work as a garden boy, later became a commissar of
MK in exile. He was killed in an ambush in 1970, on his way home to organ-
ize the underground.48 Nkadimeng, who had been served with a banning
order, worked in Soweto at building the ANC underground. Around 1975,
Peter Nchabeleng and his co-accused, Nelson Diale, linked up with this net-
work. Before the underground network was properly organized, a group of
MKfighters, led by Mosima ("Tokyo") Sexwale, crossed from Swaziland into
the Transvaal, spurred on by the 1976 Soweto rising. They made contact with
the old Sebatakgomo network in Sekhukhuneland and organized political
instruction and military training for new recruits, including Nchabeleng's son
Elleck. After a clash with police, where Sexwale wounded two constables with
a hand grenade, the whole Transvaal network was rounded up. Sexwale and
some others were sentenced to long prison terms, but Peter Nchabeleng,
Diale, and Joe Gqabi were acquitted and served with internal banning orders.
Gqabi was later assassinated while serving as ANC representative in Zim-
babwe. Elleck Nchabeleng was sentenced to six years, most of which were
spent on Robben Island. John Nkadimeng had managed to slip out of the
country.49
In 1984, Peter Nchabeleng was among the first members of the UDF coor-
dinating committee of the Northern Transvaal. While serving in the UDF
organization, hè remained involved in the ANC underground, where hè was
in charge of the ANC network in the whole of the Northern Transvaal, one of
the few areas where the ANC had some measure of success in the Integration
of political and military structures.50 With the formation of the UDF North-
ern Transvaal, Nchabeleng was elected regional chair. Barely two months later,
Peter Nchabeleng was detained and killed by the Lebowa police. He was suc-
ceeded by the vice-chair, Louis Mnguni, a philosophy lecturer at the Univer-
sity of the North, who was a relative newcomer to resistance politics. The new
vice-chair, Thabo Makunyane, underwent his initial politicization as a student
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in the 19705 in SASO (South African Students' Organisation), the standard-
bearer of the Black Consciousness Movement. Like many of this student gen-
eration, hè subsequently became involved with the ANC. In 1979, Makunyane
was sentenced to five years for ANC activities. Upon his release in October
1985, hè became active in the UDF. Makunyane was one of the few business-
men in the regional UDF leadership: hè had some business interests in Sek-
hukhuneland and in the Pietersburg township of Seshego. Both Mnguni and
Makunyane spent three years in detention without trial from 1986 to 1989.
Secretary of the regiond executive was Joyce Mabudafhasi, a library assis-
tant at the University of the North, who hailed from Venda. Mabudafhasi
experienced her first spell in detention in 1976. From the late 19705, she had
been involved in organizing women's groups by initiating Community activi-
ties such as gardening, soap making, and building clay ovens. Unlike the youth
congresses, however, these women's groups did not grow into any kind of sus-
tained organization. There were no systematic attempts to set up women's
organizations in the Northern Transvaal. In April 1986, Mabudafhasi was seri-
ously injured when a firebomb exploded in her house in Mankweng, the
township adjacent to the university. Her house had become a hive of activists;
the garage, nicknamed "Moscow," was taken over as a meeting place for com-
rades. In January 1989, Mabudafhasi joined with two other women to initiate
a nationwide hunger strike by political detainees, which resulted in the release
of hundreds of activists.51
Publicity secretary of the UDF Northern Transvaal was Peter Mokaba,
whose stature as a youth leader was unrivaled among local youth. Like Ma-
kunyane, hè belonged to the 1976 generation. During the student uprising
hè had been involved in organizing school boycotts in and around Mankweng
and Pietersburg. He subsequently helped to establish local branches of COSAS
and AZASO. In 1980, almost the entire executive of the AZASO branch at the
University of the North, where Mokaba had enrolled as a student, went into
exile to join the ANC. On his return in 1982, Mokaba and a fellow student
were arrested and charged with activities for the ANC and MK. He was sen-
tenced to six years, but hè was acquitted on appeal and released in 1985. Imme-
diately after his release hè became involved in the regional interim structure of
the UDF. Mokaba, who survived many attempts on his life, played a pivotal
role in coordinating the youth organizations that were sprouting all over
South Africa. When the long awaited national youth organization, the South
African Youth Congress (SAYCO), was finally launched in March 1987, Peter
Mokaba became its first president.52 He was arrested in March 1988 on charges
of MK activities in the Northern Transvaal. As had happened at a previous
trial, once again state witnesses refused to give evidence, and Mokaba was
acquitted in May 1989. This series of acquittals prompted allegations in the
94- "Beyond Our Wildert Dreams"
press that Mokaba had been working as a police informer. Mokaba was called
to Lusaka for investigation. According to some reports, hè was cleared by ANC
headquarters; others maintained that grounds for suspicion remained. In spite
of these spy rumors, Mokaba was elected president of the ANC Youth League,
when it was reconstituted in 1990.53 He was indispensable to the ANC efforts
to establish a measure of control over youth militancy.
Thus, the central core of UDF activists in the Northern Transvaal had a
clear and militant ANC profile. The charges of ANC and MK activities did
much to enhance Peter Mokaba's standing among the youth but may have
made more conservative sections of the population wary of the UDF. In 1992,
when the time had come to placate other constituencies besides youth, Mo-
kaba was presented in a very different capacity. ANC president Nelson Mandela
introduced him to the million or more Zionist Christians who had gathered
for their Easter celebrations at Moria, in the Northern Transvaal, as a member
of the Zion Christian Church (ZCC). Mandela emphasized the overlap of
ANC and ZCC membership and their "common objectives."54 During the
19805, the relationship had been less cordial. When Bishop Barnabas Lek-
ganyane of the ZCC played host to President P. W. Botha at the Easter gath-
ering in 1985, hè exhorted his followers to practice "Love and Peace. The key
to them is obedience to the laws of the headmen, the homeland governments
and the government of the RSA."55
The UDF leadership in the Northern Transvaal was dominated by inteüec-
tuals and students. Trade union involvement remained limited. Overall, the
trade union presence in these parts was weak. Most labor laws did not cover
the homelands. The 1979 labor reforms, which had boosted the growth of the
black trade union movement, did not apply in the homelands. Unions could
not use the official disputes machinery to force employers to bargain. Nor
could they hope to build a power base by sheer numbers. Unemployment was
so high that those who joined unions could be easily replaced.56 Since the pol-
icy of the Lebowa government precluded recognition of trade unions, most
companies used homeland policies as an argument to refuse to deal with
unions. Thus, unions found their sphere of Operation in the Northern Trans-
vaal largely limited to the mining areas and the conservative towns of "white"
South Africa, outside the Bantustans.
A Pietersburg branch of SAAWU, the UDF-affiliated general union that
played a central role in me Eastern Cape and the Ciskei, was set up by students
at the University of the North. The main Organizer was law student Alf Make-
leng, who also served on die UDF executive. He was detained in June 1986
and died two years later in police detention.57 Elleck Nchabeleng also worked
briefly as a SAAWU Organizer. The union gained a modest foothold in the
commercial and catering sector and in the metal industry. The other trade
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union that became involved in the UDF was the metalworkers union UMMA-
WUSA (a split from MAWU, the main black union for metalworkers) with a
membership concentrated around the mining region of Steelpoort, south of
Sekhukhuneland. The Steelpoort region was also one of the few areas where
youth organizations made some attempts to link up with African workers on
the white farms.
The UDF Northern Transvaal region was subdivided in six zones. Ideally,
each zone should have coordinated the activities of affiliates in its area. In prac-
tice, organizations tended to link up vertically with their particular parent
body, such as SAYCO or COSAS, rather than horizontally with organizations
in the same area. The image of a proliferation of organizations is to some
extent misleading, as a fairly limited number of activists were able to form the
core of a range of organizations. Thus, Louis Mnguni was also chair of the
Mankweng civic, formed in 1985, of which Joyce Mabudafhasi was the secre-
tary and Peter Mokaba the publicity secretary. All three were also active in the
Detainees Support Committee (DESCOM). Mabudafhasi was involved in the
National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) as well as in the Human
Rights Commission. Her son Raymond was chair of the Mankweng Youth
Congress (MAYCO).
The absence of a regional office and of functioning subregions com-
pounded the organizational problems. Thabo Makunyane later recalled how
activists often used the name of the ANC or the UDF to legitimate a wide
range of activities, from fund-raising to the burning of witches. People would
produce letters with UDF letterheads to collect donations from local busi-
nesspeople or make pamphlets with a SAYCO logo, proclaiming that the aim
of die organization was to recruit soldiers for MK. "Many affiliates took off in
different directions, assuming a life of their own. Especially, this was the case
with the youth. In many places, people were doing things in the name of ANC
or UDF without these organizations even knowing."58
The old guard of the 19505 and the generation of die 1976 student revolt
manned the organizational structures in the UDF Northern Transvaal. But the
battles were fought by young men in their late teens and early twenties who
were as yet inexperienced in the struggle.
Sources oflnsfimtion, Mobilization, and Orgcmizatwn
The UDF Northern Transvaal may have had meager facilities, but it did man-
age to latch onto institutions whose resources it could tap. The University of
the North, also known as Turfloop, played a vital role as a center of commu-
nication, coordination, ideological direction, and recruitment and as a hid-
ing place for activists on the run from the police. "The engine of building the
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structures was the University."59 Nicknamed "Lusaka" in activist and police
circles alike, die University of die Nordi was, on die face of it, an unlikely place
to become die planning center of revolution in die Bantustans. It was estab-
lished in 1960 as a segregated institution for Africans from die various home-
lands in the Transvaal. In the 19705, Turfloop was a bastion of the Black
Consciousness Movement, but in die 19805 die UDF/ANC became die dom-
inant force in student politics. Around 1980, die student organization AZASO,
which had its origins in the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), was
taken over by Charterist students. In 1981, AZASO observed Republic Day
witii a daring feat: students replaced die Soudi African flag at die Mankweng
police station widi an ANC flag.
The university itself remained largely under the control of die Broeder-
bond. Lecturers were mosdy conservative Afrikaners. Most of die black staff
kept aloof from politics. Philosophy lecturer Mnguni and library assistant
Mabudafhasi were rare exceptions. In some instances, students acted with suc-
cess against right-wing lecturers who victimized political activists. "It could be
a blessing in disguise when tiiey were making racist remarks, then diere is a
reason to act against them; or when they are consistently failing students."
Class boycotts resulted in the expulsion of several lecturers. The demand for
die dismissal of law professor P. van Warmelo was put more forcefully: stu-
dents poured acid over him.60
As AZASO worked its way toward hegemony on the campus, violent
clashes ensued between AZASO and its rival, AZASM, die Azanian Students
Movement, which remained true to BC ideology. AZASO managed to gain
control of die student representative council (SRC) at Turfloop, dius obtain-
ing access to the use of telephones, photocopy machines, meeting facilities,
and occasionally cars for "student activities." Sport outings to other black uni-
versities and colleges were used for "spreading die gospel." Thus, student
organization spread to die University of Venda, which originated as a branch
of Turfloop. Through AZASO, the University of the North became the main
resource center of die UDF in die Northern Transvaal.
In the early 19805, bodi Charterist student organizations, COSAS (sec-
ondary students) and AZASO (postsecondary institutions), promoted student
involvement in Community affairs. AZASO took die initiative for the regional
launch of SAAWU in die Northern Transvaal. AZASO's subcommittee for
education assisted high school students m setting up SRCs. At its 1982 con-
ference, COSAS had resolved to initiate die formation of youdi congresses, so
as to organize nonstudent youdi. Student activists, bodi in secondary and in
postsecondary institutions, saw it as their mission to build organizations in
townships and villages. AZASO met regularly with members of the UDF
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: Regional Executive to plan rural campaigns. According to the students inter-
viewed, die UDF and the ANC encouraged people to study at Turfloop radier
' than at die University of die Witwatersrand in Johannesburg because of Turf-
loop's central role in mobilizing die Northern Transvaal.
In 1983, the students from Sekhukhuneland met at Turfloop to discuss
forming organizations in their home villages.61 During holidays, students
went to their villages to form youth groups. Afterward they would meet
again at die university to exchange experiences. Among die core activists in
Sekhukhuneland were several students from the University of die North.
These were an important source of organizational know-how and of "politi-
cal education." They taught youdi how to conduct meetings and ran work-
shops on Marxism-Leninism.
However incongruous it seemed, a highly formal brand of ordiodox
Marxist-Leninist discourse became die language of village youtii meetings.
Thus, at a meeting in 1990 of die SRC at a teacher-training college in Sek-
hukhuneland, one could listen to students discussing dieir decision-making
procedure in die context of "democratie centralism." Was it necessary to "con-
sult die masses" of die student body about a request to lend a sound system
to die local youtii congress for a village meeting? Or did "democratie central-
ism" mean diat "die masses" were in need of leadership, so that die SRC could
take die decision now and report aftenvard to its constituency?62 The draw-
back, however, of this organizational strategy was that many of die village-
based organizations had litde permanence: frequendy structures collapsed or
were left widiout direction when students returned to dieir campus.
In spite of intermittent police raids and closures of die university, students
could organize relatively freely on the campus before the declaration of the
State of Emergency on 12 June 1986. Meetings could simply be advertised.
Academie programs were regularly disrupted by boycotts and demonstrations,
but up until mid-i985 the university administration remained fairly tolerant of
political activism. However, by mid-1986 the administration requested die
South African army to patrol the campus because "safety of property and
person could not be guaranteed, looting, malicious damage to property and
physical violence became tools of student militancy."63 About four hundred
students were expelled. The SRC members went underground or into exile to
join die ANC. Outside visitors were no longer allowed; students' movements
were stricdy controlled. Meetings on campus could be held only witii police
permission. But boycotts continued intermittendy. After a boycott of lectures
in 1988, which lasted several weeks, die university administration granted stu-
dents the right to reestablish die SRC. The army presence on the campus
lasted until 1989.
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Student organizations of both secondary and postsecondary institutions
and student contacts played a key role in initiating local youth congresses. The
1976 Soweto uprising had filtered down to some urban centers in the north
but not to outlying areas such as Sekhukhuneland. Because schools in Sekhu-
khuneland and other rural districts remained quiet, parents in Soweto and
other townships on the Witwatersrand began sending their children to school
in rural areas, where they stayed with relatives or in boarding schools. These
external linkages proved important: new ideas, such as student representa-
tive councils in high schools, music, magazines, and the latest township fash-
ions were brought in by students from Soweto but also by high school stu-
dents from Sekhukhune who spent the holidays with relatives on the Reef,
looking for a temporary job. COSAS began forming branches in Sekhu-
khuneland in the early ipSos.64
Through COSAS, high school students began making demands for the
introduction of SRCs in their schools, free books, and the abolition ofcorpo-
ral pumshment. But COSAS was perceived as an urban organization. Among
rural youth there is a clear feeling of resentment against the arrogance of town-
ship youth. Township youth used to refer to boys from rural areas as "ploos
boys" (farmhands). Although some students became involved in COSAS,
youth organization gained momentum only with the formation of local youth
congresses, such as the Sekhukhune Youth Organisation (SEYO). COSAS was
seen as "a thing from town," whereas SEYO was "our own organization."65
The Spread of Rebellion
Student unrest in the Northern Transvaal predated the formation of the UDF
but escalated after 1983. Protest actions in schools in the vicinity of Turfloop
and Pietersburg centered on the demand for SRCs and for an end to corpo-
ral punishment. The first youth congresses, set up to organize nonstudent
youth, were formed in Mankweng and Seshego, the townships of Turfloop
and Pietersburg. Mankweng was also the first township in the Northern Trans-
vaal to have a civic. The civic was formed in 1985 in the course of a campaign
by the Mankweng Youth Congress, which had forced the local town council
to resign.66 But initially, political activity outside the Turfloop campus and
its immediate vicinity remained at a low ebb. UDF activists had initiated the
Mankweng civic hoping that from there the civic movement would spread to
other townships and villages. But while youth congresses spread like wild fire,
the formation of civics took off only in 1990. In Lebowa's largest urban set-
tlement, the Pietersburg township of Seshego, a youth congress was formed
in 1984, but only after February 1990 did Seshego have its civic. The initia-
tive then came from a group of young men who, by that time, considered
\«from Conjuswn to Lusaka" 99
t themselves too old for the youth congress. The civic provided them with a
laew avenue for political involvement.67
! The first casualty in the Northern Transvaal occurred on 16 June 1985, when
l:high school student Shadrack Mafokoane was shot and killed by the Lebowa
Ifolice when fights erupted after a commemoration of the Soweto uprising on
f the Turfloop campus.68 In protest, the Mankweng civic organized a local boy-
•cott of the police. Shops selling to the police were targeted for a consumer
boycott. The campaign 1-0 isolate the police was taken up by the UDF and
spread to other townships and subsequently also to rural areas.
From July 1985 onward, many activists were detained and others forced into
' hiding. From November, several UDF affiliates organized consumer boycotts
' to demand the release of prisoners. In Mahwelereng, the township adjoining
Potgietersrus, the youth congress instigated a ban on police entering hotels
and shebeens, or taverns. Tensions escalated after the police opened fire on the
youth and arrested 40 members of the youth congress. The youth retaliated
with attacks on policemen's homes and government offices. The home of
Lebowa's minister of education in Mahwelereng was destroyed in a firebomb
attack. AZAPO activist Lucky Khumalo was beaten to death at the local police
station.69 In Motatema, a township near Groblersdal, battles between police
and youth erupted in February 1986, leaving ten youth dead and scores of peo-
ple injured or in detention. Six of these casualties feil when police tried to pre-
vent youth from attending a funeral of earüer victims.70 This funeral became
one of the landmarks in the Lebowa uprising. Large numbers of young peo-
ple from remote areas-including Sekhukhuneland-flocked to Motatema to
attend the funeral. As elsewhere in South Africa, mass funerals played a vital
role in the process of mobilization. Similar deadly cycles of violence were
reported in the first months of 1986 from Seshego, where police went on a
rampage against UDF and AZAPO members alike.
These months also marked the escalation of rebellion in Sekhukhuneland.
In March 1986, thousands of youth all over this rural region poured out of
their schools, commandeered buses and other vehicles, and drove in a convoy
to the Lebowa capital, where they wanted to present their demands to the
Lebowa government. But the convoy was stopped halfway by the Lebowa
police. A battle ensued between police and youth, in which many youth were
badly beaten or wounded by gunshots. Mass arrests inspired demands for the
release of the students. Subsequent battles resulted in more youth being killed
or injured. As in the townships, funerals of young activists "killed in action"
became an important meeting place to make further plans.
By this time, open warfare had broken out with the police. Youth targeted
property that they believed belonged to those sympathetic to the enemy, the
Lebowa government. Local businesspeople, who depended on the homeland
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administration for licenses and contracts, were largely seen as belonging to
the enemy camp. Buses, shops, and some schools were burned. Pressure was
put on shopkeepers, shebeen owners, and taxi drivers to refuse their services
to policemen.71
Beginning in mid-ipSs, the Lebowa government took harsher measures to
stem the tide of radicalism. Public servants who were members of "subversive
organizations," namely UDF and AZAPO, were threatened with dismissal.
The assistance of the South African army was asked to help the Lebowa police
force in combating the unrest. Chiefs were given more powers in school mat-
ters, including die right to prohibit admission of students from outside the
area in which the school was situated.72 The following year, the Lebowa leg-
islative assembly passed an indemnity act, which granted indemnity to its offi-
cials and police force members for any action or utterance performed in
curbing political unrest from i June 1985 up to n June 1986. After n June, a
nationwide State of Emergency gave similar indemnity to all members of the
security forces in the whole of South Africa. As a result, hundreds of lawsuits
against the Lebowa government were frozen. Attorney Don Nkadimeng, for
example, had to abandon 643 claims for assault, totaling two million Rand in
damages, against the Lebowa minister of law and order. In 1988, the Lebowa
Indemnity Act was nullified by the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein.73
The state was not alone in reacting violently to the spread of rebellion.
Businessmen who became the target of boycotts, extortions, or hijackings
joined forces with the police or formed vigilante groups on their own accord.
In the newly built "capital," Lebowakgomo, youth threatened businesses to
obtain money to bail out friends arrested for various offenses. In case of
refusal, shops were looted or burned. Several businessmen paid 500 Rand or
more to keep their shops open.74 When requiring transportation to meetings
or funerals, youth often commandeered cars or refused to pay taxi fares.
A particularly bitter hostility developed between young activists and mem-
bers of the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) after President P. W. Botha's visit to
the Easter celebrations. Pretoria's propaganda made the most of the respect-
ful reception of the state president by two million law-abiding blacks, while
Bishop Lekganyane condemned the violence in the townships. The traditional
political neutrality of the ZCC members seemed already an anachronism in a
"struggle culture" in which people belonged either to the "people's camp" or
to the "enemy's camp." But Botha's visit to Moria had made the ZCC mem-
bers positively suspect in the eyes of the youth. The following year youth
organizations in several places demanded that ZCC members stay home at
Easter and not make their customary pilgrimage to Moria. Zionists did not
always turn the other cheek. Student periodicals reported several instances
where groups of ZCC men, nicknamed the Moria Defence Force, invaded
schools to teach die youth some "discipline."75
, But organization and mobilization remained largely confined to youth.
f Not only the conservative sectors of African society—such as business, chiefs,
l or the African independent churches—were aloof or antagonistic to UDF
? actions; in addition, the UDF was largely unsuccessful in involving workers,
^ supposedly the vanguard of the liberation movement. In some areas, however,
Inotably in the mining regions of Phalaborwa and Steelpoort, students mounted
l joint campaigns with workers. The presence of an industrial workforce meant
that youth activists could link up with union activists.
The Steelpoort Valley, south of Sekhukhuneland, is also one of the rare
places where protest action by farmworkers was reported. In this area of
forced resettlement, about 130,000 BaPedi displaced from the white farms
have been resertled at Mampuru, inside Lebowa. The local chief in Mampuru,
> himself a victim of forced removals, was sympathetic to the UDF and allowed
! meetings to take place in his village. Some inhabitants commuted daily to the
white farms in the Steelpoort Valley, making them more amenable to organi-
zation than farmworkers living on the farms. In 1986, farmworkers heeded a
call for a stay-away from work on i May, which was most unusual.76 At several
farms, workers stayed away from work, demanding a daily wage of 5 Rand.77
White farmers in the Steelpoort Valley complained about youth intimidating
farmworkers, hijacking or firebombing their trucks, stealing from their lands,
and burning buildings. They claimed that at roadblocks in Lebowa they had
to buy an "ANC permit" for 1000 Rand to get safe passage. Armed farmers
declared that they would shoot any youth found in their fields. "We eat barbed
wire for breakfast and we are more right-wing than the AWB [Afrikaner Weer-
standsbeweging, the Afrikaner Resistance Movement]"78 They favored sim-
ple solutions to the insurgency: an electrified fence along the border with
Lebowa and a blockade of food deliveries to Lebowa. When hunger would
begin to bite, the "ordinary blacks" would evict the "comrades," after which
life could resumé as usual.79
These examples of linkages between youth and workers, however, were
fairly exceptional and were limited to areas with a resident industrial work-
force. The townships and villages of the Steelpoort and Phalaborwa region
were not typical of rural Lebowa. In the rural parts of Lebowa, youth move-
ments had little contact with migrant workers. Few workers showed an inter-
est in political gatherings organized by youth. Asked about student-worker
alliances, one student activist later recalled: "Actually, we had problems with
people working and being union members in Johannesburg and Pretoria.
They did not want to be involved in our struggle. Perhaps they were not polit-
ically motivated and just union members because they wanted better pay and
job protection. The traditionally minded people complained that we were
undermining the chiefs position."80 Migrant workers were generally seen by
activists as "parents" not as workers with whom an alliance could be sought.
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Through youth networks, the cycle of rebellion and repression, which orig-
inated in mid-ipSs in the urban centers of Turfloop and Pietersburg, had
reached the rural areas by the end ofthat year. By early 1986, rebellion had esca-
lated to such an extent that it made the national newspapers. Reporting on the
insurgency in the Northern Transvaal, the Sunday Times asserted that it reached
"deep into the near-inaccessible rural areas of Sekhukhuneland," where "tribes-
men are being introduced, sometimes violendy, to the ideologies of the left."81
The Sekhukhune Revolt: The Actors
The roads of Sekhukhuneland are admittedly bad, but the description in the
Sunday Times conjures up misleading pictures of a primeval wilderness inhab-
ited by innocent tribesmen who are being infected by foreign ideologies. In
reality, Sekhukhuneland is only a four- to five-hour drive from Johannesburg,
lts inhabitants, who for the most part belong to the BaPedi people, have a
long history of exposure to the outside world, largely due to a pattern of
migrant labor that goes back more than a Century to the early years of dia-
mond mining at Kimberley. Even before the advent of the mining industry,
young men from Sekhukhuneland went to work for cattle farmers in the
Eastern Cape. Whereas migrant labor initially was a passing phase in the life
of young men, lasting long enough for the purchase of a gun and perhaps
some cattle, as the twentieth Century progressed, migrancy increasingly became
an almost lifelong necessity for many men and a growing number of women.
As previously described, migrant organizations played a vital role in the
uprising of the 19505 when the NP government attempted to impose its Ban-
tustan system on Sekhukhuneland. Nor were the people of Sekhukhuneland
total strangers to the "ideologies of the left." Several leading figures in the
migrant workers' organization Sebatakgomo, such as John Nkadimeng, Elias
Motsoaledi, a trade unionist who was among Mandela's codefendants in the
Rivonia trial, Flag Boshielo, and Peter Nchabeleng, were active members in
both the ANC and the Communist Party. Although overt political activity was
impossible during the 19605 and 19705, the UDF in the 19805 could draw on
a small nucleus of ANC veterans and on a collective memory of earlier
episodes of resistance.
Students and Youth
The main actor in the Sekhukhune revolt was the Sekhukhune Youth Organ-
isation (SEYO), which was not formally constituted until 1986. But from 1984
on ward, local youth movements had been sprouting at the village level. The
first Sekhukhune Youth Committee was formed in 1984 in the twin village of
Apel-GaNkoane, in the northern part of Sekhukhuneland. The major inspira-
tion came from student organizations like COSAS and AZASO, while small
nuclei of local ANC activists, like the Nchabeleng household in Apel, provided
a link with local ANC traditions.
The Nchabeleng household was an important center of UDF activity in
Sekhukhuneland. Several sons of the UDF president played a pivotal role in
the youth movement, both on a regional and local level. People like Peter
Nchabeleng and a few otLers kept alive something of an ANC tradition.
Buried under the goats' kraal behind the Nchabeleng house was a collection
of documents, including a tattered copy of the Freedom Charter. Some polit-
ical discussions were held with his children and a few friends, but on the
whole, political activity was low. Not many people dared to visit Nchabeleng's
house because the police always came to interrogate visitors. Many villagers
feared the household was a nest of terrorists. One youth activist recalled, "We
were told that Peter Nchabeleng was a communist, that hè had been trained
by Russia and that hè was coming with bombs to destroy us."82
Peter Nchabeleng survived several attempts on his life. In one instance in
1983, the principal of the local high school sent him a letter bomb in an enve-
lope that allegedly contained the school report of his son Maurice. Because the
envelope feit suspicious, Nchabeleng sent it back to the principal with Mau-
rice and asked him to verify the contents. The principal refused. An expert
analysis confirmed that the envelope did indeed contain a letter bomb.83
Nchabeleng's eldest son, Luthuli, fed up with continuous harassment by
police and schoolteachers because of his "terrorist" background, had crossed
the Botswana border in 1982 to join the ANC.84 In 1984, the second-born son,
Elleck, returned home from Robben Island. Following the general instruc-
tions given by the ANC leadership on the island to departing prisoners, hè
became involved in various organizations such as trade union and youth
movements in the Northern Transvaal, including a group of students in Apel.
Initially, there was not much talk of politics: "The first meetings were with
rasta kids who came to smoke dagga [marijuana]."85 Later, when Elleck went
to work with a Community resource center in Johannesburg, he was instru-
mental in getting newspapers and other informational material and money for
transportation costs to youth activists. Shops in Sekhukhuneland were afraid
to stock newspapers, even such mainstream papers as the Star, Rand Daily
Mail, Citizen, or Sowetan. Shopkeepers feared police harassment. "Lebowa
police wanted to keep the rural areas isolated from the towns, so that people
would not be aware of the revolt elsewhere in South Africa."86
In the remote village of GaMasemola, Nelson Diale, who was co-accused
with Nchabeleng in the 1978 trial for terrorism, was also in touch with the
local youth organization. Diale manned an advice office that became a nerve
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center of information and communication. This office was opened late in 1986
in Jane Furse, a village widi a concentration of educational, medical, and com-
mercial facilities. Many people were in the habit of coming to Jane Furse to
seek help from the Lutheran Dean Mimiela and from Aaron Motsoaledi, a
medical doctor, both of whom were sympathetic to the UDF. When repres-
sion became severe, with the police assaulting, robbing, and raping people,
legal and other types of assistance was much in demand. Since there were no
local lawyers, people had to travel to Pietersburg or Johannesburg to get legal
advice. The advice office staffed by Diale and supported by the Lutheran
Church and the human rights organization Black Sash was meant to provide
for these needs. In its first years, however, the office could hardly function
because of the continuous presence of police and the South African army.87
Whereas most church ministers in rural areas were either hostile or indiffer-
ent, the UDF had a good relationship with the office of the Northern Trans-
vaal Council of Churches in Pietersburg and widi the Lutheran Church. The
Lutherans, who benefited from fairly generous overseas funding, could per-
haps afford a more courageous stand than churches that were dependent on
local revenue. The Lutheran mission at Lobethal in Sekhukhuneland served as
meeting place for a series of UDF meetings and allo wed the use of its photo-
copy facilities.
The ANC input in the youth movement, while providing the youth with
the powerful symbols of armed struggle, served to frighten off most of the
older generation. "Many people were saying that the ANC was a bad thing.
That is what they heard from parents and teachers. At first, old people were
totally opposed to talking about the ANC. They warned us that we would
land in jail."88 However, it was not the old ANC guard but a burgeoning
movement of youth, led by secondary and postsecondary students, that caused
the Sekhukhune revolt. "In Jane Furse there was talk of SRC's for the first time
in 1980-1981," recalled Philip Mnisi, who attended high school in Jane Furse
and later worked as a student teacher in Apel. "COSAS was introduced at the
same time. It was an idea that came from town, from the urban areas."
In Apel, COSAS was introduced in 1985. The demand for student repre-
sentative councils ran into stiff Opposition from principals and teachers. Overt
organization in schools was not possible at the time; meetings were held in
schoolyards. Some high school students became involved in COSAS, but
when local youth organizations were formed, they became the dominant
movement, absorbing most of the COSAS activists. "When SEYO came, then
COSAS activity died. Because SEYO was our own organization. People now
pursued the same issues in SEYO, and it were mostly the same people who
were involved."89 The SEYO constitution was obviously inspired by the
COSAS concept of youth congresses: an organizational formula to accom-
modate both student and nonstudent youdi and to link up with Community
issues. The SEYO constitution, modeled after that of the Soweto Youth Con-
gress, states as one of the key objectives: "to mobilise and conscientize the
youth for involvement in the struggles of their communities and to encourage
the formation of community-based organisations."90
The villages of Jane Furse and Apel were the two main centers from which
youth organization spread to other villages. Apel was locked in long-standing
disputes concerning land rights with the neighboring village of GaNkoane.91
Occasionally, these dispute? had led to violent confrontation. This animosity
had prevented any kind of joint organization or joint activities between the vil-
lages. "Sometimes your parents would beat you up if you were friendly with
the other camp."92 Rather than forming two organizations, youth leaders
decided to form one youth organization for the two villages to demonstrate
that "faction fights and division" could be overcome in the interest of unity in
the liberation struggle. In 1985, Richard Sekonya of GaNkoane, a student at
the Agricultural College in Tompi Seleki near Marble Hall (west of Sekhu-
khuneland) became the president of the Sekhukhune Youth Committee in
Apel-GaNkoane, which subsequently became the local branch of the umbrella
organization SEYO. He linked up widi die youngest son of Peter Nchabeleng,
Maurice, who attended high school in Apel. Anodier Nchabeleng son, Petrus,
was a law student at Turfloop. The Nchabeleng house became a center of
youth activity. As Sekonya recalled: "That old man was spending sleepless
nights trying to help us and to solve our problems. Also he always involved us
in solving our problems." From Apel, youth organization spread quickly to
other villages. "People from all over Sekhukhune came to Apel to ask advice,
because we were more advanced, we had the first branch and also die biggest."
With die help of some funds provided by Elleck Nchabeleng from Johannes-
burg, activists from Apel traveled to other villages to organize branches of die
youth movement. "We managed to organize many branches. For instance,
Tafelkop exploded within a week after our visit. Our branch was well built."93
Contacts widi die outside world proved important for die beginnings of
youdi organization in the villages, not only because die outside world pro-
vided an input of ideas and resources but also because by living in die villages
of Sekhukhuneland one missed die politicizing direct encounters widi racist
teachers or employers and widi die apartheid state. For firsdiand experiences
with apartheid, one had to go outside Sekhukhuneland. One activist recalled:
"Political activity was very low. We were not politically active, we used to look
down on people wasting their time on politics." His politicizing experience
came in 1985, when hè went to Pretoria to find a temporary job. "There I saw
this long queue of men, some of diem even old men, queuing for a job in a
white man's garden. I saw apartheid alive in Pretoria; at home it was some-
diing you read about in die newspapers."94 Encounters widi die pass laws also
proved a politicizing experience.
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Richard Sekonya became involved in politics as a student at the Agricultural
College in Tompi Seleki. Many stafF members at the college were Afrikaners.
Students from Turfloop assisted in forming an AZASO branch and a SRC, of
which Sekonya became the general secretary. He described an incident that
took place at the school in 1985:
Oppression was at a peak that side, they could not even take a Suggestion. We
had objections against one black vice-principal and one white vice-principal. We
sent a memorandum to the principal, but after a month there was still no reply.
We resolved to take a school truck and load the possessions of the black vice-
principal on the truck, to make clear that hè had to move out. After we had put
his things on the truck, we went to the house of the white vice-principal, but that
was guarded by soldiers who fired warning shots. The white man also stood
with a gun in his door. Students told him that they did not want him on the
campus anymore. The soldiers would not allow us to take his furniture. We were
angry because his house was guarded, while die black vice-principal's house had
not been protected. We went to a filling station, made petrol bombs and
bombed the house. The soldiers were shooting. Two persons were shot, they
were injured.95
After this incident in September 1985, Sekonya was arrested but later released
on bail. Since hè had been expelled from the college, hè could now become a
full-time activist in Apel-GaNkoane, at least until November 1986, when hè
was sentenced to six years imprisonment, subsequently reduced to four years.
UDF documents mention a combined membership of the youth con-
gresses of the Northern Transvaal totaling 120,000 members, making diis the
strongest youth movement in the country. When regional congresses linked
up to form SAYCO in May 1987, the Northern Transvaal boasted about 150
local congresses, of which 40 were located in Sekhukhuneland.96 But these fig-
ures are misleading. They suggest a signed up membership, while in actual fact
they must be wild estimates. In reality, everybody who was considered to
belong to the "youth" was also considered to be a member of the youth con-
gress. "In the early years of SEYO, all the youth was considered to be a mem-
ber. Sometinies force was used to get all the youngsters to attend the meetings.
We would not permit the presence of any other organization in the village,
such as the PAC. We threatened ZCC members diat we would disturb their
processions if they would not allow their children to attend our meetings.
These days we are more democratie. But it is not always possible to start an
organization without force."97
Youth organization in the remote village of Mphaaneng, which took off
with help from Apel activists and AZASO members from Lebowakgomo,
was run on the same principle. "We learned the lesson that you have to be
united to make the country ungovernable... . There were weekly mass meet-
ings on the banks of the Oliphants river. In five months time all the youth
, Was organized."98
Such sentiments on the need for all-encompassing organization were quite
; in line with views of other UDF activists at the time. On the Turfloop cam-
; pus, AZASO ran a recruitment campaign in 1985-86 under the slogan "every
- Student an AZASO member," which aimed to exclude rival organizations
' from the campus. A UDF publication quoted with apparent approval another
! youth activist, who stated: "The call in the villages is to organise every per-
son. Because those who are not with us can be used by the enemy against the
! people."99
SEYO's constitution put the age limit for membership at thirty-eight years,
but most of the activists were between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five. In
a sense, youth organization functioned as age groups: one did not join by
choice—one was considered a member by virtue of age. Compulsory recruit-
ment to age regiments was not a novel feature in BaPedi society. Delius and
Mönnig have described how youth progressed from the status of basema-ne
(boys) to masoboro (adolescent, uninitiated youth) and, after initiation, to
adulthood. Initiation (koma) was held in the individual chiefdoms approxi-
mately every five years, and it was compulsory for all youth of the appropriate
age—from early teens to mid-twenties—to attend.100
Initiation groups were formed into age regiments led by a son of the local
chief. The process was designed to cement the loyalty of the members to the
chieftainship and to reinforce bonds of solidarity and mutual cooperation
between age mates. Masoboro ran their own courts to administer justice within
the group. Group leaders emerged from switch-fighting competitions. Some
of these features are clearly visible in the rural youth congresses of the 19805.
In Mapulaneng, another district of Lebowa, leaders of the youth organization
were chosen by virtue of their physical prowess.101 Youth organization exhib-
ited the combination of unruliness and rough internal discipline typical for the
masoboro. But insubordination went far beyond what was deemed acceptable
in terms of custom. Not only did youth set the law for themselves, but they
also aspired to set the law for the adult world. Youdi groups administered
rough justice to age mates and also passed judgment in adult matters such as
domestic disputes between husband and wife, in matters that were the domain
of the head of the family or, in more serious cases, the chief and his council.
Tribal ritual no longer served to integrate youth into BaPedi society. High
school students identified "tribal custom" as a source of oppression. Boys
objected to their forced recruitment to the circumcision school, which was seen
as a means to subjugate them to the rule of the chief.102 Stories of young men
being drafted into initiation rituals against their will came from many parts
of the Northern Transvaal, from Sekhukhuneland as well as from Venda.103
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was formed primarily to address issues back home, in the rural areas. "We
formed NOTPECO committees in the villages, and also in hostels, like in
Tembisa, and Dube and Denver hostel. The purpose of these committees was
to organize the people in the hostels, so that they could address the problems
in their home villages, like the problem with chiefs who demand a levy from
migrant workers when they return home."113 Combating Bantustans and
involvement in home politics brought the NOTPECO leadership in open con-
flict with the chiefs, who were branded as being among "the worst oppressors
and exploiters of the people."114 The chieftaincy was obviously considered äs
an Institution beyond reform. NOTPECO's Organizers were not campaigning
to make chiefs accountable to the villagers; they wanted to abolish chiefly rule:
The administration of the villages must be run by the village committees. We
are strongly against the chief and his royal council running the whole affairs of
the village. The people benefit nothing out of this. The Community must be
actively involved in the way the village is run. The Community will take over the
chiePs office to administer the village. A constitution will be drawn up by the
whole Community. This will be used as a guideline to run the village. The chief
will be stripped of his powers over the Community. So it won't be like in the
past where the chief runs the village, and where people run bringing presents
to the chiefs.115
Calls for the dismantling of tribal structures and the installation of elected vil-
lage councils were certainly not inconsistent with mainstream UDF thinking
in 1986.116 However, UDF leaders contended that Monama hijacked NOT-
PECO in order to build the organization into his own fïefdom. They feit hè
then used this power base to wage his battles against chiefs and to interfere
in faction fights involving competing claims to the chieftaincy, particularly in
the festering dispute between the two half-brothers who contested the para-
mountcy of Sekhukhuneland. From Monama's point of view, this was not a
diversion from NOTPECO's objectives; on the contrary, involvement in
"home marters" was NOTPECO's very raison d'être.
Monama, in turn, replied that the UDF neglected the migrants. He com-
plained that the UDF failed to send speakers to NOTPECO's meetings. It did
not pro vide any funding nor assist with raising funds from other sources.
NOTPECO did not raise membership fees, but it did manage to get some
money from the South African Council of Churches, which it used to run an
office in Johannesburg.
Wilfried Monama had a background in me ANC and Sebatakgomo as well
as in township politics in Alexandra and Soweto. In the conflict with the UDF
about the "correct line" of action, hè therefore could invoke his own experi-
ence with the struggle and die rural-urban nexus. In spite of this background
in national and township politics, Monama could not see it as NOTPECO's
task to form a liaison with civics. Instead, NOTPECO's calling was to "fight
. against oppression at home," which involved fighting the Lebowa government
and abuses by chiefs.117 This view was shared by the NOTPECO secretary,
Jepson Nkadimeng, who was otherwise highly critica! of Monama's high-
handed leadership. Nkadimeng, a Pedi migrant who was also an active trade
unionist in Johannesburg, agreed that NOTPECO had no role to play in
township politics. In his eyes, there was a division of labor: unions organize
in factories, civics in the communities, and NOTPECO in die hostels. "Our
work was organizing the people in the hostels, to teil them not just to give
money to the chief whenever hè asked for it, and to teil the people that they
had a right to hold meetings. NOTPECO also called meetings in the villages,
but organizing in the hostels was easier. There people are free from chiefly con-
trol, so there is no fear."118
The UDF leadership complained that Monama refused to be accountable
to the UDF, that hè tried to raise funds independently, that hè called mass
meetings without consultation: in short, that hè tried to turn NOTPECO into
an independent power base. Moreover, the UDF looked with suspicion at
NOTPECO because its organizational setup in the towns was based on village
networks: "It had some tribal connotations, it was organizing along tribal
lines."119 Organizations based on ethnic appeal did not fit in widi UDF think-
ing. This taboo on ethnicity might in part be responsible for the UDF's fail-
ure to appeal to migrant workers, for whom ethnic networks provide a sense
of identity and security in a hostile urban environment. Few organizations
catered to specific migrant concerns. Trade unions organizing among migrant
workers focused on pay and conditions in town, not on rural concerns. For
the unions, "community involvement" meant involvement in the townships.
On the basis of the limited information available, it is difficult to judge
NOTPECO's impact. None of the people interviewed could give any indica-
tion of its membership or support base. At one point, Nkadimeng, after long
hesitation, mentioned a membership of "more than 10.000," but that seems
highly exaggerated. The organization seems to have been effective in only a
handful of villages. In Apel, there was no NOTPECO presence. NOTPECO's
most active period was from 1986 to 1988. In 1989, Monama intended to run
a campaign against chiefly rule, for which the questionnaires were already
printed. But by then, attempts were underway to recruit chiefs into CON-
TRALESA, an organization sympathetic to the UDF and the ANC. Although
Monama had initially opposed the formation of CONTRALESA, hè subse-
quently yielded to pressure from the UDF and abandoned the campaign.
The UDF attempted to get NOTPECO more into line by suspending
Monama as acting chair and calling for new elections, while ofFering him a job
as UDF organizer.120 Although the constitution called for annual elections,
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the same leadership had stayed in place from 1986 to 1990. Monama, however,
refused to call new elections and accused the UDF of meddling in NOT-
PECO's affairs. After the unbanning of the ANC, NOTPECO faded away, for
no more activities were undertaken. NOTPECO could have become a useful
vehicle to articulate migrant concerns, but it never realized its potential due to
interna! feuds and to a strained relationship with the UDF leadership, which
on the whole remained quite remote from the world of hostels and migrants.
Some of the problems surrounding NOTPECO are reminiscent of Seba-
takgomo's experience in the 19505. At the time, some criticism was voiced of
Sebatakgomo for being a tribally based organizarion. There was also the prob-
lem of loyalties divided between the imperatives of "the struggle," as inter-
preted by the politica! elite in the liberarion movement, and migrants' primary
loyalties to their home areas, which necessarily involved ethnic networks.121
NOTPECO's signifïcance in the 19805 was only marginal compared to the
central role of Sebatakgomo in the 19505. It is therefore difficult to draw par-
allels, but the central contradiction remained unresolved.
Monama and Nkadimeng gave conflicting views on NOTPECO's rela-
tionship with the youth movement. Monama saw it as part of his calling to
bridge the generation gap in rural areas. Therefore, hè said, youth were invited
to attend meetings, although older people found this difficult to accept
because it went against tradition. Nkadimeng stated that there were no joint
meetings with the youth congresses. Possibly, such meetings centered around
Monama rather than around NOTPECO. Among die UDF grievances is the
complaint that Monama tried to recruit youth into his organization, thus tres-
passing on the recruiting grounds of another UDF affiliate, SEYO.122
From interviews with youth activists, it appears that there were some spo-
radic contacts. Significandy, both sides saw their relationship in terms of over-
coming problems between youth and parents, not in terms of a potential
student-worker alliance. SEYO publicity secretary Dewet Monakedi recalled
having a meeting with Monama in 1986 "to discuss problems like parents who
would not allow their children to attend meetings; parents not playing their
role in the struggle. We tried to convince NOTPECO that they, the parents,
should also play their part in the struggle."123
Other SEYO activists were completely unaware of these contacts. A group
of SEYO core activists from Apel stated categorically that NOTPECO "never
worked as it was meant to work, because of the leadership problem. These
people also had no link with other progressive structures, they were just act-
ing on their own."124 The youth leadership looked upon migrants as adver-
saries rather than allies. "Migrant workers generally are conservative and
traditionalist in outlook. They have litde education and they feel inferior, com-
ing from a Bantustan. They are hostile to people with education. They tend to
be very sensitive towards things emphasizing their backwardness, they are very
defensive. They don't want to lose authority."125
The Sekhukhune Parents3 Crisis Committee: "Parents" Are Businessmen
If NOTPECO did not offer much prospect for linking the youth movement
to a broader alliance, neither did the Sekhukhune Parents' Crisis Committee
(SPCC). In name it resembled the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee, which
was formed by Soweto Community leaders in 1985 to reestablish communica-
tion with the high school students, to find ways of addressing their major
grievances, and to get them back to school. But the Sekhukhune version of
SPCC was a different type of organization, formed by business owners who
organized themselves against youth looting their shops, hijacking their vehi-
cles, and extorting money. Businessmen in the Lebowa context meant mainly
shopkeepers, taxi owners, and owners of the most lucrative business of all,
beer halls and bottle stores. Small traders in rural areas found themselves in a
vulnerable position. Obtaining a business license involved entrance into a local
patronage network, usually a chiePs council.126 Sekhukhune business own-
ers formed SPCC to protect their interests against unruly youth. As one youth
activist later related: "During funerals, youth would go and get food from the
shops and hijack buses and trucks. And then after being used, the vehicles were
burnt. Youth, when needing transport, did not ask for a lift, just ordered the
driver out and took over."127
SPCC secretary Morwamoche Makotanyane described similar experiences
when explaining the origins of his organization: "The sole purpose of the
SPCC was: to prevent violent activity of youth from penetrating into the busi-
ness Community."128 The SPCC was formed in 1985 at the initiative of the
Sekhukhune Chamber of Commerce after consultations among businessmen
on the proper modes of defensive action. Some favored a violent response to
ransacking youth, whereas others pleaded for consultation with youth leaders.
"The problem with the youth was that they were very secretive; you would
never know the names of the leaders."129
Peter Nchabeleng was invited to address a group of around fifty business-
people and to explain the policies and activities of the UDF. He called for
patience with the youth and consultations about their problems. Now that the
majority position was in favor of pacification rather than confrontation, SPCC
was formally established by the Sekhukhune Chamber of Commerce at a
meeting in Magnet Heights. In effect, SPCC emerged as an alternative to
right-wing vigilantism, not as an offshoot of the liberation struggle. About
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150 businessmen attended the meeting to form SPCC and elected M. W.
Makgaleng, a businessman in Apel, as SPCC's chair. The secretary was
M. Makotanyane, a businessman from Mohlaletse, who was heavily involved
in the dispute between die two half-brothers who contested the right to the
Pedi throne.
SPCC dien called a mass meeting for student« and parents, "to ask die chil-
dren what was their problem." The meeting was conducted in a highly
charged atmosphere and was taken over by youth who demanded that police-
men and members of the Lebowa parliament leave the venue so that die
meeting could proceed. The police left. The Lebowa MPs had to sign a state-
ment indicating diat if they wanted to stay in the meeting, diey would resign
dieir seats. Two signed, but only one actually resigned subsequendy. At diis
meeting a modus vivendi was worked out: the youth would no longer go
around to collect money and food and would not go inside die shops; in
turn, the business Community agreed to provide a fund for bail for political
activists.130 Youdi also pressured shopkeepers to refuse to seil any goods to
policemen, for the campaign to isolate die police had spread from die town-
ships to die rural areas.
On a few occasions, SPCC did venture beyond die concerns of business-
people and into die role of an organization of concerned parents. An SPCC
delegation attended a meeting in Durban in March 1986, called by die
National Education Crisis Committee to discuss die crisis in die schools.
There were occasional contacts with the UDF leadership, aldiough SPCC was
not a UDF affiliate. "At some point, the idea of forming a civic was discussed
in SPCC, but it never materialized. Many people would radier rely on the
army and police. People saw the comrades as their enemies... . Political activ-
ity became discredited."131
SPCC was not a bridge to reestablish contact across the generational divide.
Youtii leadership maintained at best an opportunistic relationship with busi-
nessmen who offered certain resources such as money and food—particularly
for funerals—or the occasional use of their vehicles in exchange for protection.
The deal seems to have worked fairly well for a while: lootings and burnings
of shops diminished, as die youth leadership tried to impose some discipline
on its unruly following. Plundering businesses was not a generally condoned
practice. "Some comrades abused the names of the comrades and hijacked a
van to take diem to a funeral. Others hijacked a lorry widi sweet potatoes at
Jane Furse and took 2000 Rand from the driver. But other comrades brought
the lorry back to the owner, an Afrikaner farmer, and diey said that die thieves
had abused the name of die comrades. Also, some time, comrades demanded
liquor from the bottle store and went to another village to seil the stuff. But die
comrades intervened and beat them up severely and brought die liquor back."132
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But when the army moved into Sekhukhuneland after the outbreak of full-
scale revolt, everybody who was remotely involved in anything resembling
Opposition politics became a suspect, including the SPCC leadership. In Apel,
Makgaleng had to resign his position on the chiefs council, and Makotanyane
spent some weeks in detention. Attendance at meetings diminished, and
SPCC ceased to exist in die latter half of 1986.
Limitations to Alliance Politics
The history of the UDF in Sekhukhuneland, and in die Northern Transvaal
more generally, clearly illustrates the limitations to alliance politics. COS AS
and AZASO strategy prescribed involvement of students in Community affairs
and close cooperation with community organizations. In the villages of
Sekhukhuneland this strategy foundered due to insurmountable problems.
There were no sympathetic organizations witii which to link up. As the youtii
revolt deepened into an uprising against all authority, the older generation
became even more alienated from political activism.
Following the example of the townships, the youdi movement did make
some attempts at community-oriented activities, but without success. The
Youtii Committee in Apel took up a bus campaign, demanding better trans -
portation to Pietersburg. "It was diffïcult, very difficult to organize and to
explain to people. People are afraid of organizing. We mobilized by having
marches and chanting songs. People were frightened when they saw a march
of chanting youdi."133
This activity soon provoked the wrath of Chief Phasha of GaNkoane, and
hè pressured the parents to keep their children away from the youth move-
ment. As the youdi became convinced diat the chief was intent on destroy-
ing their organization, "fighting chiefs" became one of the main objectives.
"Our chiefs are part of the Pretoria government, they feared diat we wanted
to take over."134 Several skirmishes ensued between youth and die chiefs men,
both in GaNkoane and in Apel. "In the evenings, we would sit on a big stone
and sing freedom songs. A house owner nearby dien went to complain to the
chief, saying that the youth was singing songs insulting to the chief. One
day, die chief came with his men, while we were singing, to attack us but we
managed to turn this attack." Then the chief's men went to the home of one
of the activists, where they broke the windows and the doors. The youth lead-
ers were now furnished with a clear-cut issue. "We decided that we should
organize our movement around local issues: we would resist the dictatorship
of the chief?'135
Chiefs became lumped together with other "enemy forces" in the cam-
paigns against community councillors, Bantustans, police, and Members of
uff
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Parliament. In fact, many chiefs were MPs; sixty out of the one hundred
members of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly were chiefs who were desig-
nated (not elected) members. In its most sophisticated form, the call on chiefs
to resign meant that chiefs were not asked to abandon their positions as lead-
ers of their tribes, but that they had to stop their "collaboration with the
Lebowa government."136 However, that is not how the call was generally
understood: calls to make chiefs "accountable to the people," emphasizing the
principle that kgosi ke kgosi ka batho (a chief is a chief by the people), gradu-
ally evolved toward demands to do away with chiefs altogether. "We intend
removing the tribal chiefs as soon as possible. We have called on them to
resign," youth leader Peter Mokaba of the UDF Northern Transvaal execu-
tive was quoted as saying in a newspaper interview. "Our ultimate intention is
to allow the people to govern diemselves. We have already established people's
courts in some areas and are in die process of forming our own militia which
will carry out the orders of the courts." 137This amounted to a direct attack on
the foundations of chiefly power. Faced with deadi threats and attacks on their
businesses, several Members of Parliament from Sekhukhuneland resigned
their seats. In the village of Driekop, Chief Marogo and three of his headmen
were hacked to death.138 The youth revolt reached its apotheosis in 1986,
between March—when high school students staged their aborted march on
the Lebowa capita!—and May.
Confusion: The Breakdown of a Moral Order
In recounting this episode of youth power, young activists displayed ambiva-
lent feelings. On the one hand, diey had clearly enjoyed a sense of power and
of pride in going it alone as vanguard forces of liberation, while the older gen-
eration was paralyzed by apathy and helplessness. As one activist said later,
"The parents had lost confidence, but now the youth got many things
done."139 On the other hand, these activists feit a profound sense of insecurity
and disorientation. The youth movement lacked sophisticated leadership and
had no clear sense of direction. Confusion was the key word, popping up time
and again in many conversations with young and old alike in Sekhukhuneland.
The various "confusions" in the world of BaPedi youth are vividly described
in a poern composed by a young activist in 1986:
From Confusion to Lusaka
There is a confusion between the father and the mother; there is a confusion
There is a confusion between the parents and the daughters; there is a confusion
There is a confusion between the parents and die sons; there is a confusion
There is a confusion between the tribal authority and the community; there is a
confusion
There is a confusion between the principal and the teachers; there is a confusion
There is a confusion between the teachers and the students; there is a confusion
There is a confusion among the students; there is a confusion
There is a confusion between the employer and the employee; there is a confusion
There is a confusion between the poor and the rieh; diere is a confusion
But who is in Lusaka?
I have been in Lusaka, and I found the Zambians. And I know Kennetii Kaunda
is their president but who is in Lusaka?
Is Lusaka die capita! city of Zambia or Zambia the capita! of Lusaka?
Is Kenneth Kaunda in Lusaka?
Yes I was never been in Lusaka.
Who is in Lusaka?
Many people have been in Lusaka!
Political leaders have been in Lusaka!
Student leaders have been in Lusaka!
Church leaders have been in Lusaka!
Infiltrators have been in Lusaka!
Hit squads have been in Lusaka!
Bantustan leaders want to go to Lusaka!
Ramodike140 wants to go to Lusaka!
Even the people's enemy Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi wants to go to Lusaka!
But who is there; who is in Lusaka?
Is Chris Hani141 in Lusaka?
Is Umkhonto we Sizwe, the spear of the nation, Lerumo la Setshaba142 in
Lusaka?
Is it black, green and gold who is in Lusaka?
My poem will never be complete until I include my president Comrade
O. R. Tambo
O for Organise
Rfor Regiments
and T for take over
Who is in Lusaka?
The African National Congress is everywhere.
Extracts from a poem by Mokibe Sydney Ramushu, Apel, 1986
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How did young activists view the objectives of their movement? A common
answer ofFered by interviewees was "fighting chiefs." Another answer fre-
quendy given pointed toward a more fundamental goal: "making revolution."
"Making revolution" implies a vision of a new social order. In die eyes of
young activists, the old order was rapidly disintegrating. Moreover, the ANC
and the UDF had called upon the youth to hasten the hour of death of the old
order by making the country ungovernable. In early 1986, UDF pamphlets
with the slogan "from governability to ungovernability" were circulating in
Sekhukhuneland. But making revolution was a goal that clearly went beyond
breaking down the already crumbling order. Amid the images of disruption
and destruction, building a new society became the ultimate mission of the
youth. Not only did they perceive themselves as the vanguard of the liberation
struggle, implementing the call to make South Africa ungovernable, but they
were also purging society of the forces of evil in order to construct a new
moral Community.
This pervasive sense of breakdown of the moral order is well captured in
the poem above, composed in 1986 by Mokibe Sydney Ramushu, a high
school student in Apel, who interwove verses by Mzwakhe Mbuli with his
own stanzas. Mbuli, nicknamed the "People's Poet," was immensely populär
among black youth, from Durban to Sekhukhuneland. Sydney Ramushu's
poem "From Confusion to Lusaka" caught on among local youth. Years later,
several young activists were reciting parts of the poem during meetings or
evening strolls.
Confusion between Father andMotber
In their endeavors "to re-establish harmony and to effect reconciliation" youth
activists took it upon themselves to solve domestic disputes.143 Long periods
of Separation as a consequence of migrant labor contributed to a sense of fam-
ily breakdown. Constructing a new order also required a reconstruction of
family relations.
People's courts, in the form of either mass meetings of youth or a discipli-
nary committee of the youth organization, handled criminal cases such as
theft, rape, or robbery and dealt with political matters such as "speaking ill of
the organization." "Disciplining" deviant behavior usually meant administer-
ing a series of lashes with a sjambok. These youth courts also judged family
disputes such as husbands beating wives, husbands who were not support-
ing their families, and cases of divorce. Divorce was considered a social evil
that ought to be rooted out, so people's courts ordered couples to stay
together.
Confusion between Parents tmd Daughters, between Parents and Sons
From the perspective of adults, people's courts usurped the functions of tribal
courts and adjudication by elders, thus challenging the authority of parents
and chiefs alike. It is unlikely that adults submitted voluntarily to courts run
by youth. But faced with a mass of sjambok-wielding youngsters, they had lit-
tle choice.
The generation gap was further accentuated by the recent upsurge in sec-
ondary education, which resulted in "educated youth" having different aspi-
rations from their "uneducated" parents. In the past, rural people thought that
"making revolution" was something for the Reef. But now, schools provided
youth with a base for organization. Parents generally made considerable finan-
cial sacrifices to send their children to school in order to secure a better future,
but they also resented the youth taking control. For student activists, the
dividing line between educated and noneducated largely coincided with the
gap between young and old. "The division in the community here is mostly
between the illiterate old guard and the educated people. Most people who
have not gone to school think that organization is only for educated people."144
The forced recruitment of youth into the youth organization was another
major source of conflict. For parents, the sudden recruitment drive was a
traumatic experience. "In 1986, the youth invaded our houses to take our chil-
dren. They said all children must come; they were forced. There was no prior
warning for this youth outburst. It took everybody by surprise."145 Moreover,
parents and teachers found it appeared to them as highly secretive and with-
out a clearly defined leadership. The world of the comrades seemed beyond
comprehension. 'They are shadows in the night. Shadows we have all come
to fear," the chief of Apel said to the Johannesburg Sunday Times.146 The gap
between youth activists and parents was further widened by a campaign that
became known as "building soldiers" One activist described this crusade as
folio ws:
Since the Boers were killing many people, there was a need to make more sol-
diers. The girls should abandon the preventions. So the youth carried out attacks
on clinics, because at the clinics, contraceptives were given to the girls. And girls
were forced out of their houses, to join die comrades. And then the girls would
only come home the next morning. Most girls got pregnant in 1986 The
youth were saying: we need to make more babies to become soldiers, because
the Boers were killing us. It caused much strain between youth and parents. The
youth would go around the village singing and marching and collect die youth
for a meeting. Girls were also forced to come. The parents could not complain
or refuse to let their daughter go, because otherwise their house might be
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burned. At that time, the youth did not have clear direction; they antagonized
the parents. . .. But these mistakes were also made because the youth had no one
to turn to. There were few people around who could provide direction. The
youth thought that the parents failed to solve any problem.147
The ideals of serving the Community with a millenarian perspective of a better
order blended with a reign of terror, which profoundly upset the relationship
between parents and children. By early 1986, "there was a deep conflict with
the parents. They saw us as terrorists. We could not sleep in our homes
People were blaming us for wanting to be Jesus Christ, wanting to die for the
masses.»148
Confusion between Tribal Authority and Community
Chiefly rule was a major source of grievances among youth and adults alike.
Since the chiefs were in the pay of the Bantustan administration, they no
longer needed to maintain a significant level of legitimacy in their own village.
A particular source of conflict was the control of the tribal authority over the
school funds. In numerous instances, high school students wanted to call the
chiefs accountable and demanded to inspect the books.
Women and girls were frequently ordered to plough or irrigate the chiefs
farm. As two female high school students complained: "This is called 'helping
the chief's wife,' but of course the wife of the chief is never there Many
weekends we are called to come and work. Sometimes only girls are called,
sometimes only mothers are called. We don't get paid, we don't get food.
This chief is not even aware of the discontent amongst us, because it is our
tradition."149 In these years of persistent drought, young men and women
were regularly called upon to participate in rainmaking rituals and to perform
certain duties. "The people in the village believed that the youth should go out
in the mountains to catch a cobra. They believed that then the rains would
v. i en
come."150
But these old ways of "serving the Community" did not fit in the scenario
of the youth movement. Parents and chiefs were held responsible for forcing
these rituals on rebellious youth. Young men protested against forced recruit-
ment into the initiation school. Female students in particular seemed to find
tribal customs repugnant and contrary to their status as "educated women."
From their descriptions it is apparent that these rituals had lost all meaning:
If a girl gets married, she has to run around the village half naked, with only a
little transparent skirt. Or she has to run over the mountain, because she is told
to chase a goat Girls are ill-treated and smeared with mud, after they get
married. . . . They do funny things with you We think that the chief is
responsible for keeping this tradition. It are the older women who make us do
these things. It is the tribal law This hurts our dignity. . . . We were not
around when homelands and tribal authorities were introduced. We do not want
their laws. We want nothing to do with that, and with tribal custom.151
Confosion between Principal and Teachers
l The principal and the chief together were usually the dominating forces in the
:
 school committee that ran the school. Both would resist encroachments on
their authority. One such attempt was the campaign by students to replace the
old school committees with parent-teacher-student committees. Generally
speaking, principals ruled the schools in an authoritarian marmer; if teachers
offered advice, they were branded as troublemakers. Principals were known to
control the union membership of their teachers by employing the "stop order
system": the principals deducted union fees from teachers' wages on behalf of
the Transvaal United African Teachers Association (Tuata), which was known
as a conservative union. Young teachers wanting to join the UDF-leaning
National Educational Union of South Afnca (NEUSA) could expect to run
intotrouble.152
The principal had to present the Community with an annual financial state-
ment on the school fund. Because of the high level of ilüteracy in rural villages,
principals wielded a great deal of power. School committees tended to rubber-
stamp what the principals presented to them, as few members had the quali-
fications to effectively monitor the principals' activities. If principals called
meetings on weekdays when the migrants were away in the towns, it was likely
that unacceptably high school-building taxes would be imposed.153
Confusion between Teachers and Students
Demoralized teachers in overcrowded and under-equipped schools resorted
to rule by the whip. Students were struck with the sjambok for all kinds of
shortcomings, such as coming late or not understanding the lessons. Humil-
iating punishments, imposed for coming late, included "digging a hole so
deep that you can stand in it without being seen" and being sent to the moun-
tains to collect "a stone, as big as the size of a donke/s head." Teachers ordered
pupils to run errands or perform jobs for them, even during school holidays.
Girls had a particular difficulty. "Schools were a big problem. There was sex-
ual harassment by teachers. If a student refused to make love with a teacher,
then she would be lashed for not being able to aiiswer a question. Or she
would fail the test."154 The abolition of corporal punishment became a central
demand of the youth movement, along with the demand for free books and
elections for a student representative council.
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For the teachers, the outburst of revolt came totally unexpectedly: "On al
certain day in 1986, after the morning prayer the children refused to come into j
the classrooms. They sat on the ground and threw stones on the roof. All the]
teachers ran for cover. Students then had no representatives, we did not know'1
whom to talk to," related a high school principal. Subsequently, at this schooi!
in the village of Mankopane, an improvised SRC was elected to improve
communication between teachers, the school committee, and the students.
"But that made the parents very angry with the teachers. They did not want to
discuss problems with children. Children should respect authority. Parents:
were also angry with teachers, for not enforcing discipline in schools. At that
time, there was chaos, they were burning cars all over the place."155
A high failure rate in matric led to a buildup of frastrated students in this
final year, with students often sitting repeatedly for the final exam before they
either passed or dropped out. By that time, they were frequently in their mid-
twenties. Among older high school students in particular, a sense of great frus-
tration had been building up. Parents and teachers were not receptive to
grievances. There was no one to turn to—at least until the youth organization
came along. "It was only through SEYO that you could make your voice heard.
. . . But now SEYO was powerful. People became motivated again, because
SEYO could change things. The relationship with the teachers improved. In
SEYO, awareness was the main thing. SEYO is a project within the ANC."156
Confusion among Students
However, confusion also reigned among the students. This was a multifaceted
confusion; it involved differences between the politically motivated vanguard
and those followers who were inclined to drift off into criminal activity. It also
involved gender aspects.
At times, the dividing line between political activism and criminal activity
became blurred, as shops were raided, cars hijacked, and money extorted in
the name of the "struggle." Since all youth were considered members of the
youth movement, it could be difficult for the politically motivated comrades
to disassociate themselves from the thugs. In cases where the core leadership
got hold of criminal elements, the scoundrels were often severely beaten up,
and they in turn would try to take revenge.
Youth political activism involved mainly boys and young men. In the ini-
tial phase, a few girls and young women attended the meetings, but they
found that the males were not inclined to take their contributions seriously.
Issues of particular interest to women, including the unequal division of work
between men and women, were not discussed at youth meetings. "The men
do not help when it comes to fetching water, cooking, and sweeping." In this
ade of drought, fetching water for the household had become an onerous
«den, as it involved long walks and long waits to get a bücket of water.
Being overruled or shouted down by male comrades taught young women
hè lesson that a better forum in which to address their problems would be a
iromen's organization. In Apel, the first attempts to form a women's group
Jate from 1988, but only in 1990 did it become feasible to openly work toward
ï women's organization. Even then, a high school student in the neighbor-
ng village of GaMankopane who aspired to be a women's organizer found
, Jiat she had to rely on men from the old ANC guard to call a meeting. She
[;was somewhat more successful in trying to organize her own age group:
[•;*When trying to organize our own age group, I'll teil them that they are
•'oppressed by their parents and their brothers. The oldest-born girl has to stay
-.at home and do all the work, till she is 21, 22 years old. If this is discussed in
fan age group, then people realize the importance of organizing."
!i Tribal rituals for newly married wives were seen as degrading for women
^ and were mentioned as another motive for women to set up their own orga-
• nizational structures. By 1990, these attempts had not progressed much beyond
: some cautious initiatives by a few female high school students. They had no
outside contacts to support their ventures and no links with the UDF-affili-
ated Federation of Transvaal Women (FEDTRAW), which centered mainly
around the urban areas of the Witwatersrand. But traces of a feminist aware-
ness had nevertheless trickled down to Sekhukhuneland. When asked about
her motivation to work toward a women's organization, one of the interviewet!
, high school students recited the classical formula of South African women's
' struggles: "Women are more oppressed than men. Women are oppressed by
men, by national oppression and by class oppression." To this classical trio, she
added a fourth source of oppression: "tribal custom."157
Male youth activists generally were of the opinion that the struggle was
largely an affair for men. Females were seen as weak, unreliable, and easily
intimidated or bought by poücemen, who would seduce them with presents
such as cheap jewelry or perfumes. "Some girls were involved in the early days,
but not so much now. . . . But then the struggle became tough, we were
detained, harassed and beaten Girls are afraid of the police, that is why
they withdrew, they are cowards."158 Gender aspects hardly figured in the
SEYO version of the liberation agenda.
In early 1986, the problems among the students came to be overshadowed
by one overriding concern, which is best summed up in the comments of a
female high school student in Apel: "During 1985-86 we used to attend the
meetings, but we did not know what it was about. Our political education
only started in 1987. That time, '86, we got confused by witchcraft. . . . We
were very occupied by witchcraft."159
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Forces of Division: Tribalism, Witchcraft, and Capitalism
iiWho or what was causing all this confusion? Activists interviewed some yearS-i
later tended to identify three elements as subverting society and sowing dis-'
cord. The stumbling blocks on the road to a new harmonious order were trib-
alism (or factionalism), witchcraft, and cafitalism.
Tribalism
Tribalism and factionalism were often used interchangeably: youth leaders
believed that "faction fïghts" had to be overcome in order to reestablish har-
mony. Factionalism and tribalism were used in two meanings: these terms
could refer to ethnic conflict and also to comrnunal conflicts such as land dis-
putes or conflicts involving succession to the chieftaincy.
When UDF leaders in Pietersburg or Turfloop mentioned the need to com-
bat tribalism, they referred to the need to overcome ethnic conflict. For exam-
ple, the UDF leadership had to deal with conflicts erupting between residents
of Lebowa and Gazankulu, two Bantustans that each had chunks of territory
around the white towns of Tzaneen and Phalaborwa. In the battle against Ban-
tustans, youth organizations were encouraged by the UDF leadership to
organize along nonethnic lines, so that people would not be fïghting "the
wrong battles."160
In Sekhukhuneland, similar motivations inspired the youth when trying to
overcome communal conflicts and faction fights. But when they discussed the
need to overcome tribalism and factionalism, they were generally not referring
to ethnic conflict. They spoke about the long-standing feud between the
neighboring villages of Apel and GaNkoane as a tribal conflict, although these
were both BaPedi villages. The people of Apel, however, claimed that they
were the first arrivals in these lands, and that the settlers in GaNkoane came
later but kept encroaching on the land rights of the Apel residents. The vil-
lagers of GaNkoane did not dispute that those from Apel were the first
arrivals, but they maintained that the original settlers did not establish them-
selves in the present village of Apel, which invalidated their claim to these land
rights. Over the past decades, this dispute over land rights was fought both in
court and in actual battles between the villages. In the 19705, Peter Nchabe-
leng's father was killed in one such armed invasion from GaNkoane. In local
discourse, the term tribe refers to a totemic group. The BaPedi were not
labeled a tribe but an ethnic group. Petrus Nchabeleng explained: "The BaPedi
have numerous tribes, each with his own totem. Like the Nchabeleng totem
is a lion. They used to fight each other."161
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Wfflitchcraft
Fin the minds of young activists, tribal conflicts were associated with back-
Lwardness, with chiefly powers and tribal custom. In this age of modernity,
ptiiese divisive practices had to be overcome. Youth intervention could at times
f'Solve the conflict, but it could equally serve to exacerbate tensions. In Mohla-
* ktse, the village of the paramount chief, youth organization was split into two
* Camps supporting the rival claims of the two half-brothers to the paramountcy.
l In Apel-GaNkoane, youth leadership made a conscious attempt to overcome
\ this long history of faction fights by forming one youth organization for the
; twin villages of Apel and GaNkoane. In early 1986, when a conflict broke out
* in the neighboring village of Strydkraal, the youdi of Apel decided to inter-
Vene. "The youth saw it as their mission to solve tribal conflicts, for example
in Strydkraal and Mohlaletse. In Strydkraal the youth was not conscientized.
Apel was more advanced. So we went to solve that problem."162
Since the people of Strydkraal feil under the authority of two different
chiefs, a conflict had arisen about access to certain lands and the control of a
school. Singing freedom songs, youth from Apel-GaNkoane marched to the
kraal of Chief Masha in Strydkraal. They were met by the chiefs men, who
opened fire when the procession of chanting youth approached to "settle the
faction fight." One of the bullets killed Solomon Maditsi, who thus became
the first casualty of the Sekhukhune youth revolt. Other demonstrators were
assaulted by the police and then locked in the same house with the dead boy.
In February, the youth from Apel had a meeting with youth from neighbor-
ing villages to discuss subsequent action. It was decided to start a school boy-
cott to demand the release of the detained activists. The youth marched to the
Sekhukhune College of Education, a teacher-training college in Apel, where
the students then joined the boycott. This march, however, ended in a con-
frontation with the police and with army units, leading to the detention of
more youth. These clashes spurred the youth to further action—the formation
of defense units, which went out to burn government property. Arnong the
targets were tractors and buildings of agricultural cooperatives.
The funeral of Solomon Maditsi on 8 February 1986 became a milestone in
the process of youth mobilization, drawing youth from many villages and
infusing them with a sense of militancy and determination. According to some
accounts, Chief Masha sent two delegates to the funeral and offered four cat-
tle to apologize for the death of the youth.163 Shortly after the funeral, a
young activist was struck by lightning, which is commonly associated with
witchcraft. The youth then took it upon themselves to establish who was
responsible for this new attack on their ranks.
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A mass meeting was called, to which the parents were also invited. In nor-
mal times, accusations of witchcraft directed against the Community as a whole
were dealt with by the chief s court, where only initiated men could attend the
proceedings.164 This gathering was called by the youth leadership. Chairing
the meeting was twenty-year-old Maurice Nchabeleng, Peter Nchabeleng's
youngest son. People who had information about the lightning incident were
asked to come forward. Two youths recalled that at Solomon Maditsi's funeral
they had heard an old woman complaining that the young men these days
were behaving disrespectfully. She allegedly threatened to organize lightning
to teach the youth a lesson. The accused woman was present at the meeting.
According to the chair's later account, the woman admitted having said these
words but denied any responsibility for the lightning. Calls were made to burn
the woman. Chair Maurice Nchabeleng split the meeting into two groups:
parents and youth each assembled in separate meetings to discuss the matter.
The parents returned to the füll gathering with a resolution to take "severe
action." The youth had adopted a resolution that the woman must be burned
immediately. It was dien argued that there was not sufficient proof of witch-
craft, so those in attendance decided that to obtain more certainty a ngaka had
to be consulted.165
A delegation of the youth went out to consult a local ngaka, Ramaredi
Shoba. After the proper ceremonies, during which the members of the depu-
tation were given a medicine to drink, they saw the faces of the perpetrators
of witchcraft appearing on a screen in the ngaka's hut. The suspected woman
was not among the people who were identified as witches. The delegation
returned to the meeting with a list of the people who had been found guilty
of witchcraft. To obtain further proof, it was decided to ask a second opinion.
One youth was sent to KwaNdebele, because the Ndebele dingaka had a rep-
utation for being particularly powerful. However, the youth did not manage
to find the ngaka hè was supposed to consult. On his return to Apel, the
young man found that the other youth had already burned the three culprits
whose guilt had been established in the first consultation.
Some weeks later, lightning struck again. A delegation made another visit
to the same ngaka, and afterward two women were executed. More suspects
accused of witchcraft were hunted down. In about a week's time in the first
half of April 1986, thirty-two people were burned to death: two in Apel and
thirty in GaNkoane. The second späte of killings happened as a spontaneous
outburst in a highly charged atmosphere, with the youth no longer bothering
to follow traditional procedures. They decided not to waste any more time
and money on Consulting dingaka, reasoning that these people were just mak-
ing profits, and that, anyway, "we all know who are the witches here."166
There is no long-standing history of witch burning in the Northern Trans-
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d although ten years earlier two people had been burned to death in the
bamè village, GaNkoane, which had a reputation for having «problems with
Iwitchcraft." Traditionally, those convicted of witchcraft were expelled or exe-
Otted by other means such as hanging, stoning, or impahng. But the pne-
Lnenon of burning witches had been spreading throughout the Northern
Riansvaal since the early i98os, although other means of execution also con-
tinued to be used. In 1984, the liaison officer of the Ixbowa pohce said that
Ithe killing of witches had become a «national problem." In the past, there were
^ two or three executions in each rainy season-when lightning strikes -but
I «xently the numbers had increased. Previously, hè explained, peop c accused
| of witchcraft were usually driven out of the village rather than being ; kükd, but
fc
 in the past ten years there had been a tendency to execute them.167 The späte
of witch killings in the first half of the !98os is popularly attributed to the long
period of drought. In the local beüef System, an explanation was required for
the misfortunes that befell the community: the crisis caused by the persistent
drought was frequently attributed to evil machinations by witches.
In the initial rounds of witch killings in the early I98os, the procedure usu-
ally involved Identification of the guilty party by a ngaka and an authorization
from the chief. Many mass trials were reported in 1983-84. One mal involved
a chieftainess, or female chief, who was a sister of the Ixbowa homeland leader
Cedric Pathudi and 227 of her subjects from the village of GaChuene near
Lebowakgomo. They were charged with the stoning to death of a woman
who had been found guilty of striking a house with lightning m December
82 "
But from the mid-i98os, several innovations were introduced as the youth
usurped the powers of village hierarchies. The practice of burning social ene-
mies had spread from the countryside to the townships, now taking the grue-
some form of the neckladng of impimfis (suspected informers and other
collaborators). Several of the alleged witches in Apel and GaNkoane were also
subjected to a necklace execution; thus an urban innovation had come to
Sekhukhuneland. Judging from the rather sensational press reports at the
time there seems to have been a mixed reaction among the villagers Many
were terrified at the sight of chanting youth carrying tires and roundmg up
witches to be necklaced on a stony mountain slope, but some voiced approval
attheeliminationoftheforcesofevil.
Family members of the victims were worried that those accused of witch-
craft were not "smelt out by nyangas."^ Some expressed total incornprehen-
sion such as the relatives of the old and blind Mrs. Ramatsnnela Sekonya:
"Her death is something none of us understand-but then there is much hap-
pening now which we have yet to learn and understand. Now there is a great
fear upon this place. At night we lock our doors and never go out into the
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dark. There is a devil here." The "rule of the comrades" instilled great fear in
people who were at a loss to comprehend the collapse of the old order. "We
hear these city words spoken by the youths. They talk of'comrades' and the
'necklace.' We do not understand them, but we fear them deeply."170 Many of
the women interviewed at the time feit that the absence of men in the villages
had complicated their problems and given the comrades a free reign. "If only
our menfolk were here our mothers and grandmothers would not have been
taken away and killed so ruthlessly."171 However, other villagers were quoted
as saying that "it is time that these people who ride on brooms and fly over
other people's roofs at night are eradicated."172
After the witch burnings, the police and army moved into the village in füll
force. The youth fled to the mountains, but not without a battle. "By then, the
youth had control of die villages. We were ruling ourselves and policing our-
selves. The police could not just come in. It took them some days and then the
Lebowa police came with support of the South African Police. The youth
resisted. They fled into the mountains and wanted to fight the police."173
In the previous few months the villages had become no-go areas for the
Lebowa police, to the extent that the Nchabeleng household, formerly a focus
of close police attention, was harboring an MK fighter who had escaped from
police custody. The week of witch burnings effectively ended the "rule of the
comrades" in Apel. Armored police and army vehicles invaded the village
while helicopters scoured the mountains to flush out the youth in hiding.
When the police came for Peter Nchabeleng's sons, they found only the
father. Some villagers believed that Peter Nchabeleng, one of the few adults
who was influential with the young activists, was behind the murders. In fact,
Peter Nchabeleng had called a meeting with the youth to explain that the UDF
was not there to deal with witchcraft; it was a political movement. Youth
activists recalled that hè was angry with them, impressing on them that the
witch-hunts would give the police an excuse to intervene. They believe that
without Nchabeleng's intervention, the burnings would have been more wide-
spread. However, the Lebowa police suspected Nchabeleng of organizing the
youth who were responsible for the murders. His wife, Gertrude Nchabeleng,
later recalled the nocturnal visit on n April 1986 by the squad of about ten
policemen who detained her husband. "They woke him up, saying, 'last time,
it was Robben Island, this time we are going to kill you.'"174
The next morning police knocked again on the door, this time to teil her
that her husband had died of a heart attack. For a whüe, the family remained
uncertain about his whereabouts, until his body was located in a mortuary in
Groblersdal. The inquest brought to light that Nchabeleng had died within
twelve hours after hè was taken to the police station in Schoonoord, the seat
of the local magistrate. The postmortem report revealed that hè had been
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severely beaten, causing subcutaneous bleeding that eventually caused uncon-
sciousness during which hè suffocated. At the inquest hearing the police offi-
cers admitted that their prisoner had appeared very sick, but they had made
no effbrt to call a doctor. The officer in charge of the investigation in which
Nchabeleng was arrested told the court, "A policeman may beat a person to
death if he resists-but not intentionally."175
Several hundred youths were rounded up for questioning and for the beat-
ings that had become part of police routine. Chief Richard Nchabeleng of
Apel was also briefly detained and beaten up. Patents were ordered to bring
their children to the chiePs kraal, or homestead, where subsequently about 150
youth aged fifteen to twenty-one gathered.176 The youth leadership managed
to escape and went into hiding. Several youths hiding with student friends on
the Turfloop campus were later arrested when the police raided the student
quarters on the eve of the declaration of the State of Emergency in June.
Maurice Nchabeleng and Silas Mabotha, chair and vice-chair, respectively, of
the Apel branch of SEYO, were arrested on the Turfloop campus. Both were
severely beaten and assaulted in the various police stations where they were
kept for several months for interrogation.
By August 1986, charges were laid against 103 accused, but this number
included youth accused of subsequent witch burnings. Including the thirty-
two corpses found in Apel-GaNkoane, the number of victims of the Sekhuk-
hune witch killings totaled forty-three. All of the accused were under thirty,
and some were as young as fifteen. All except one were male.177 Only m the
first of the series of trials was evidence heard in court. In this initial case, the
defense presented beüef in witchcraft as a mitigating factor. In the case of mne
of the accused, who pleaded guilty, this was accepted by the court. But two
defendants, who denied such a belief and who maintained their innocence
despite all the evidence accumulated against them, were sentenced to death.
The sentences were later commuted to fifty-year prison sentences.
In subsequent trials the lawyers followed a different strategy. Once the
accused had heard what had happened in the initial case, they were willing to
confess their involvement in the killings. The lawyers would then attempt to
strike a plea bargain with the prosecutor. It was agreed that some of the defen-
dants would plead not guilty to the charges and would consequently be
acquitted, whüe others would plead guilty to murder, provided that certain
mitigating factors be recognized. The lawyers tried to get as many as possible
of the younger defendants into pleading guilty. In the previous sentences,
those under eighteen had received only a few cuts with the sjambok, while
those over eighteen would be subject to comparatively severe prison sentences.
Aware of Maurice Nchabeleng's record of political activism, the lawyer made
sure that hè and other political activists were not sacrificed in the plea bar-
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4. The funeral of Peter Nchabeleng, UDF president in the Northern Transvaal, Apel,
3 May 1986. Photograph courtesy of Steve Hüton-Barber.
gaimng. Both Maunce Nchabeleng and Silas Mabotha were acquitted. The
court did not perceive the case against them as a political case.178 Nchabeleng's
own version of events is somewhat different. He claimed that the state had
bought witnesses for 500 Rand to testify against him with a statement drafted
by the police. The witnesses, however, mformed the lawyer that they were
being bribed, and when the lawyer raised the issue in court, the judge decided
not to cail these witnesses.
Not surprisingly, accounts of events in this fateful week are inconsistent and
sometimes contradictory. The young men who held leadership positions at the
time maintain that they, the "politically educated" leadership, had distanced
themselves from the witch-hunts, as "the organization is not about these
superstitious things." However, they were swamped by a mass of young
newcomers, most of whom were around the age of fifteen. Those who had
attended Initiation school were allegedly the most zealous participants in the
witch-hunts. Feelings were running high, and it was argued that anyone inter-
fenng to stop the burnings would have been killed also. Possibly this was the
case, but this argument may be a rationalization after the event.
Several of the young men interviewed insist that the youth had been
encouraged by older people, includmg Chief Phasha of GaNkoane, to go on
A CÖMBATANT FOR LIFE
A PATRIOT TO THE END
5. UDF poster of Peter Nchabeleng. Offset litho poster m black, red,
and yellow produced by Mars for UDF, Johannesburg. Courtesy
South Afncan History Archive (SAHA); from Images ofDefiance
South Afneem 'Resistance "Posters of the igSo's/Poster Book Collective, South
Afnam History Archive Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1991.
with the witch burnings. The chief is said to have promised the youth four
cows if they would "finish the job." But in a newspaper interview, chief Phasha
was quoted as saymg that if the killings did not stop, the parents would be
organized to fight the comrades.179
There is no clear pattern as to the victims of the witch burnings. Most were
elderly women, although several men and a young woman were also singled
out. Several newspaper reports at the time interpreted the killings as the liq-
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uidation of suspected impimpis. This was definitely not the case. It was alleged
that the victims were guilty of subverting the struggle, but they had done so
in their capacity as witches, not as informers. Most of the victims were said to
be "known witches." In some cases children even accused their parents of
witchcraft. The evidence against them was that chimpanzees had been spotted
around their houses and that they possessed herbs. Witches (balot) are believed
to make use of familiars (dithuri), such as monkeys, snakes, and owls. These
familiars are used to perform evil errands for the witches. Witches, I was told,
are capable of changing humans into chimpanzees. It was also widely believed
that witches could transform people into zombies, who were then put to
work. Some youths claimed to have found the proof of witchcraft in the
houses of the suspects, who allegedly kept hands of little children in hidden
places in their houses. This story refers to a widespread belief that the posses-
sion of certain human parts will bring good fortune.180
Arnong the victims were several dingaka, whose supernatural powers cause
them to be both honored and feared. The ngaka and the witch make use of
similar methods, but whereas the witch uses his or her powers for antisocial
ends, the ngaka performs a necessary service for the Community. This thin
dividing line between good and evil magie makes it quite conceivable that a
ngaka can turn a beneficial practice into a harmful one.181 That indeed was the
suspicion against the dingaka of Sekhukhuneland. Previously, die comrades
had turned to the dingaka for help when the youth were involved in battling
the police and the army. They had demanded a medicine that would turn bul-
lets into water or, alternatively, into bees. When the dingaka proved unable or
unwilling to provide this service, the comrades retorted that since the dingaka
were able to make lightning and to kill people, it was evident that they did
possess supernatural powers. It was now established that they used these pow-
ers not to support the freedom struggle but to inflict evil. Therefore, these
dingaka were judged guilty of witchcraft. It was deemed necessary to root out
this evil, which caused discord and division. Since the parents, once again, had
forsaken to solve this matter, it feil upon the youth to rid the Community of
the causes of misfortune.182
The week of the witch killings marked both the apotheosis and the demise
of the youth movement. In retrospect, youth leader Moss Mabotha believed
that this was "a fateful event that caused the eventual crushing of the youth
movement in Sekhukhune."183 By this time the gap between die youth and the
older generations had widened beyond repair. Youth rebellion had escalated
into a revolt against all type of authority—against parents, teachers, chiefs, and
dingaka alike. In the späte of witch killings in the first half of the 19805, the
procedure involved identification of the guilty party by a ngaka and usually an
authorization from the chief. It was unheard of for youth to go and consult a
ngaka; only adults could do that. By simply skipping the whole procedure for
the later victims, the youth indicated that they were no longer interested in
obtaining legitimacy for their actions from the established authorities. Hav-
ing reached that peak of rebellion, the youth uprising was crushed in the
inevitable crackdown by the security forces. On the mental map of young and
old alike, the witch burnings mark a turning point. In numerous accounts of
the Sekhukhune revolt given to me, events were told in relation to this fateful
week: "this happened before the burnings," or "that took place after the burn-
ings." The witch burnings, or more generally "Eighty-Six" is the landmark in
people's memories. "After the witch burnings the people could no longer trust
the youth. The youth went around hijacking and looting delivery vans. The
older people could not understand what happened. They hated the slogans
used by the youth since they sounded revolutionary."184
Akhough witch-hunts spread throughout the Northern Transvaal in the
second half of the 19805, there is only one other recorded incident that matches
the scale of the witch burnings in Apel-GaNkoane. During April and May
1986, some 150 people in the Lebowa district of Mapulaneng were labeled
witches and attacked. Thirty to forty people were killed by various means,
including neckiacing. Although Mapulaneng was equally part of Lebowa, it
did not figure on the "mental map" of the BaPedi in Sekhukhuneland, from
which it is separated by a mountain range. Most of the people I interviewed
in Sekhukhuneland were not aware of the witch burnings in Mapulaneng,
although a few had read newspaper reports. The antiwitchcraft movements in
Mapulaneng are discussed by three authors who present rather different ver-
sions of events and different interpretations of the motives behind the witch-
hunts.185
In spite of some dissimilarities, there is a common pattern in the accounts
of the antiwitchcraft movements in Mapulaneng and Sekhukhuneland. In
both cases, the necklace method of execution was used, and the established
authorities—the ngaka, the headman, and the chief—were left out of the
process. The older generation had lost control over the youth. Youth rebelled
against a society in which they feit increasingly marginalized. Youth organiza-
tion, for which student organizations and the UDF had provided the models
and the legitimation, gave them a new place in society and a sense of power.
The strongest manifestations of youth power were the witch-hunts. But power
was not perceived as an end in itself: the Community had to be purged of evil
forces in order to achieve social harmony. As in Sekhukhuneland, the disinte-
gration of society was blamed on witchcraft. "If it was not for witches we
would be in Utopia. Everyone would know their place in the world and would
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act appropriately. There would be perfect harmony. Witches are to black cul-
ture what the snake was to Eve."186 Harmonieus social relations could be
established, not by restoring the old hierarchical order, but by building a new
egalitarian society.
Criticisms from adults were mostly not of witch-hunts per se but of im-
proper procedures used to identify witches and of exceptionally violent
methods of punishment. Because of this Usurpation of the powers of tribal
hierarchies by youth movements, the witch-hunts in Sekhukhuneland and
Mapulaneng in 1986 mark a watershed. As previously mentioned, witch-
hunts were not a new phenomenon in the Northern Transvaal. But there is
both a qualitative and a quantitative difference between the series of witch
killings in the early 19805 and the witch-hunts that bedeviled UDF politics
in the Northern Transvaal beginning in 1985. Publications attempting to
explain the earlier späte of killings emphasize that accusations of witchcraft are
likely to emerge in times of rapid social transformation with increasing com-
petition for scarce resources. Academies and activists alike pointed to the
power holders of the old order as those who used accusations of witchcraft to
bolster their position.187
That may have been the case, but beginning about 1985 the tables were
turned. Now the forces of change had taken it upon themselves to sniff out
the witches. The antiwitchcraft movements in Sekhukhuneland and Mapula-
neng can thus underpin the thesis that witchcraft is not just an archaic phe-
nomenon used to prop up the status quo in traditionalist societies. The idiom
of witchcraft can also be transformed into a reaction from below to challenge
the status quo and to provide a legitimation for modernizing strategies.188
The "new South Africa" inaugurated in 1990 did not mean an end to witch-
hunts. In the first half of 1994, more than seventy witch killings were reported
from the Northern Transvaal. Although youth activists were mostly in the
forefront of the witch-hunts, press reports also mention the involvement of
chiefs and dingaka in some of these proceedings.189 Antiwitchcraft movements
were by no means limited to the Northern Transvaal, although this region had
a reputation of witch-hunts. In the historiography of the struggles of the
19808, scant attention is paid to this phenomenon of witch-hunts, which
became more and more widespread in the second half of the 19805 and the
early 19905.19°
Far from being an exclusively rural phenomenon, witch-hunts also occur in
urban conditions, although they are not always labeled as such. In early 1986,
the youth organization of Mamelodi (MAYO), one of the Pretoria townships,
called upon the local youth to stop witch-hunting and burning suspected
witches. A crowd of several hundred people had set alight a local traditional
healer, who was suspected of having abducted a twelve-year-old child for
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witchcraft purposes. Two elderly women had a narrow escape from a mob
wanting to burn them for witchcraft. MAYO warned that witch-hunts did not
enhance the freedom struggle. "These acts divide us from our parents, whose
support we need to achieve our goals."191
What happened in Apel-GaNkoane in the aftermath of the witch burnings?
Several months after this fateful week, some of the youth leadership trickled
back to the village. They found their organization in shambles. Most fellow
activists had either been detained or had gone into hiding. Schools in Sek-
hukhuneland began reopening in August 1986, but under strict army con-
trol. Many people were afraid even to talk to the youth leaders. The initial
reaction of the villagers to the witch-hunts was the formation of vigilante
groups, in which nearly all adult men participated for some time. Silas Mabotha,
one of the local youth leaders, found his house surrounded by hundreds of
men, who took him to the chiefs kraal. There hè was sentenced to fifteen
lashes. However, after this punishment he did not experience any more harass-
ment from the vigilantes. In Apel-GaNkoane, the vigilantes were a short-lived
phenomenon.192
For a while youth activists feit isolated, pondering what had gone wrong.
Toward the end of 1986, when the police and army presence became somewhat
less pervasive, they decided to reorganize in underground structures. The
model was Nelson Mandela's M-plan, devised in the 19508 to préparé for an
underground organization based on small cells after the anticipated banning
of the ANC as a legal, above-ground movement. One of the lessons drawn
in this reassessment was the importance of strong grassroots structures, rather
than relying on a handful of leaders and an unstructured mass following.
Another lesson was the importance of political schooling, "to educate the
members in politics and clear them up about witchcraft, because this thing had
diverted our struggle from the real enemy."193 The ANC had indeed called
on youth to make the country ungovernable, but this call had been misinter-
preted. The ANC wanted youth to burn government offices, not witches.
Not all activists were convinced that their organization had gone awry
when they embarked on witch-hunts. Looking back, some still believed that
"we have to clean our own house first, before we can attack the enemy."194
They feit unjustly criminalized, for they believed they really had no choice.
Not only was it necessary to eliminate evil, as bewitchment could undermine
the struggle, but the witch-hunts were also meant as a positive service to the
community. Killing the witches was a lesson learned from the parents, who on
previous occasions had acted similarly against the forces of evil. True, in the
past this had been done with the services of dingaka and a mandate from the
tribal authority, but this Option was no longer available. The opinions of the
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youth feil on deaf ears. They had no other choice but to take matters into their
own hands—how could that be a criminal ofFense?
Many activists were vindicated in this belief by the publication of the book
Let Not My Country Die, dedicated to the memory of two victims of the
Sekhukhune witch burnings, Phadima Kupa and Ramatsimela Teka.195 The
book was written by Credo Mutwa, who is described on the back cover as a
"High Witch Doctor," "Prophet of Africa," and "High Sanusi." Apart from
these lofty distinctions, hè is also the caretaker of a museum of African magie
run by the Soweto Parks and Recreation Department, which is one the major
tourist attractions on the guided bus tours of Soweto.196 Mutwa launches a
diatribe against the ANC and its communist friends "that seek to plunge my
country and its people into the flames of Armageddon." He praises the mem-
ory of one of the victims, an old man with whom hè once journeyed to a
sacred tree in the Eastern Transvaal, "which must only be visited by those who
have reached the highest peak of sanusiship." This book convinced many com-
rades that they had correctly identified the right persons as witches.
Capitalism
Although the belief in witchcraft lingered on, leading youth activists con-
cluded that the focus on witches had diverted the liberation struggle. Argu-
ments on whether or not witches exist were mostly deemed fruitless. Energies
had to be redirected toward other battlefronts. The enemy had to be exter-
nalized: if people wished to believe in witchcraft, dien it should be pointed
out to them that "apartheid is the biggest witch." Under the State of Emer-
gency, mass meetings were out of the question, but beginning in 1987, small-
scale workshops were held to further the "political education" of young
activists. The best antidote to unscientific superstitions was believed to be sci-
entifïc socialism. Witchcraft beliefs had proved to be divisive, setting people
against each other. Marxism, in contrast, provided useful knowledge, such as
die scientific insight that lightning can be explained as a natural phenomenon.
By separating beliefs from knowledge, Marxism helped to overcome the con-
fusions and to establish unity: beliefs were divisive, but knowledge provided
common ground.197
Here again, the link with student organizations at the University of the
North proved important. University students possessed literature that pro-
vided the clue to understanding and to a new harmonious social order. Three
volumes on dialectical materialism, written in the 19505 by Maurice Cornforth,
an orthodox British Marxist, became the bible of the "politically advanced"
activist. These volumes, entiUedMa.teria.lism and the Dialectical Method, His-
torical Materialism, and The Theory of Knowledge, must have appeared like a
book of revelation.198
Cornforth sets out to explain some key concepts of Marxism-Leninism,
placing strong emphasis on its practical significance. Once readers have
l grasped the basic tenets of the philosophy, they are in possession of a revolu-
tionary tooi. Marxism, as Marx himself had stated, is "a philosophy which
seeks to understand the world in order to change it."199 This revolutionary
theory "illumines the road by which the working class can throw off capital-
ist exploitation, can take the leadership of all the masses of the people, and so
l free the whole of society once and for all of all oppression and exploitation of
man by man."200
Cornforth then points the way toward the discovery of "truth." People are
prone to believe that if we genuinely seek the truth, then we must be strictly
impartial and nonpartisan. "But the contrary is the case. It is only when we
adopt the partisan stand-point of historically the most progressive class that
we are able to get nearer to truth."201 Unlike other classes, the working class
f has no interest in justifying its position and perpetuating its own existence, for
1
 its main interest is the establishment of a classless society. Therefore, the phi-
losophy of the working class has a right to lay claim to the truth. As Lenin has
stated: "The Marxian doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is complete
and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world conception which
is irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction or defence of bour-
geois oppression."202
For young people, searching for guidance in a period of great upheaval and
social disintegration, these were welcome certainties. Thus far, teachers and
parents alike had endeavored to impress upon youth their impotence and
ignorance. Now, from this marginalized position in South African society,
they were suddenly thrust into the forefront of history and entrusted with a
vanguard role in the impending revolution. "Materialism teaches us to have
confidence in ourselves, in the working class-in people. It teaches us that
diere are no mysteries beyond our understanding, that we need not accept that
which is as being the will of God, that we should contemptuously reject the
'authoritative' teachings of those who set up to be our masters, and that we
can ourselves understand nature and society, so as to be able to change them."203
Marxism-Leninism presented itself to young activists as a tooi of empow-
erment. It laid the theoretical foundations for people's power because it
showed how ordinary people, once they had mastered socialist science, could
become masters of the future. It provided the scientific evidence that truth,
progress, and victory were on the side of the new order. According to Corn-
forth, man is about to embark on a new phase of evolution. He is on the
threshold of "communist society, in which the whole social process will be
brought under his own conscious, planned direction."204 Here was the prom-
ised land with a new, harmonious social order. This goal could be reached only
if one was prepared to make a clean break with the past.
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Orthodox Marxism, teaching man how to onderstand society in a materi-
alist way in order to "become masters of the future," was becoming the dom-
inant ideology shaping the views of the youth leadership.205 In the 19505,
rebellion was inspired by memories of a strong independent Pedi polity in the
nineteenth Century and images of a harmonious precolonial past. Neither the
Sekhukhune rebellion of the 19505 nor the heroic battles of the Pedi armies
against the Boers and British in the nineteenth Century seemed to have played
a prominent role in youdi consciousness. Their ideal was not the restoration
of peasant society but a victorious proletariat that would herald a communist
social order. There is, however, a common strand between the glorifïcation of
a mythical peasant past and the idealization of a communist future: both types
of societies were perceived as egalitarian and harmonious social orders. Visions
of restoring the "primitive communism" of precolonial times could coexist
with the idealization of the Soviet model as the guiding example for South
Africa. The yearning for the communalism of olden times also inspired
NOTPECO's vision of the future: "We agree with the Freedom Charter. The
land shall be shared among those who work it. It is not that we want a Situa-
tion where there are small farms and big farms. We want a Situation where the
people work the land collectively. The land must be returned to the people."206
Whether the call for land could have become a rallying cry to mobilize a
broad alliance in the Bantustans is a matter of conjecture. On the rhetorical
and emotional level, this call is sure to command wide support. In practice,
access to land does not mean diät one also has the resources to cultivate crops
or keep cattle. Even in those rare years when the rains come to Sekhukhune-
land, considerable expanses of land still lie fallow. Although there is a resid-
ual peasantry in parts of the Bantustans, a large part of the population is made
up of rural proletariat, victims of resettlement and of the expulsion of black
labor from the white farms. Access to urban areas and to urban support net-
works was likely to have a higher priority for many migrants than the main-
tenance of a rural resource base.207
These ideological discussions, however, were not of immediate interest to
the rank and file of rural youth movements. Dialectica! materialism is a rather
complex topic. The workshops attracted only a limited number of activists.
The mass of the youth lost interest. Many were demoralized after the experi-
ence of harsh repression.
The Charterist Movement in the 19905: A Realignment of Forces
In Sekhukhuneland, the revolt was crushed in April and May 1986 when the
South African army moved in. Villages were in a state of military occupation.
People were forbidden to move in the streets with two or more other people.
Months of mass detentions, shootings, and beatings drove youth into Sub-
mission, apathy, criminal gangs, or underground organizations. Some of the
unemployed youth, many of whom had drifted along with the youth move-
ment without much political motivation, were recruited into vigilante groups
or the Lebowa police. This transformation of unemployed youth into vigilantes
was seen as a serious threat by the youth movement. In 1987, the Northern
Transvaal Youth Congress announced the formation of defense committees to
deal with vigilante forces and committed itself to stop the recruitment of
young people into vigilante groups. Money and the possibility of settling per-
sonal accounts were seen as the main motivation for becoming vigilantes.
Although youth were the primary victims of both vigilantism and army and
poüce repression, military occupation proved a harsh experience for the adult
population as well. Soldiers and policemen behaved as an occupying force in
conquered territory, robbing and beating people at random. It is widely
believed that the SADF employed mercenaries from neighboring countries
who had previously served in Namibia or in units of RENAMO (Resistência
Nacional Mo9ambicana) in Mozambique. These foreigners, who did not
speak any local language, had the reputation of being especially brutal.
In other parts of the Northern Transvaal, UDF activity still continued,
although under increasing pressure. In protest against the murder of Peter
Nchabeleng, the UDF Northern Transvaal had called a consumer boycott.
Added to the protest were the demands that had become familiär features of
consumer boycotts in the urban areas: an end to detentions, reductions of bus
fares and rents, withdrawal of troops from the townships, and resignation of
town councillors and members of homeland legislatures. By May 1986, con-
sumer boycotts were affecting Pietersburg, Phalaborwa, Potgieters rus, and
Tzaneen. The boycott was reportedly highly effective in Pietersburg, where the
chamber of commerce admitted a 20 percent drop in sales during the first
week.209
After the declaration of the nationwide State of Emergency in June 1986,
most members of the UDF Northern Transvaal Regional Executive were
detained, with the remainder going semi-underground or into exile. At this
point the lack of a second layer of leadership became an acute problem. "The
UDF never was a very strong organization," Thabo Makunyane said with
hindsight. "What was missing, was a link between the structures. And then,
the structures became static. No new leadership was coming up."210
Small nuclei of youth activists kept sporadic contact with SAYCO, which
was formally launched at the height of repression, in March 1987. Activists
who had fled to Johannesburg had occasional contact with the UDF Head
Office, but there was hardly any framework for coordination and consultation
between UDF organizations in the Northern Transvaal. Worst hit by the repres-
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sion were Sekhukhuneland, Turfloop, and, beginning in 1988, Venda. To i
the organizational vacuüm, some new, semi-clandestine structures sprau|
up. In 1987, a Far Northern Transvaal Coordinating Committee of the UDï
was formed, comprising Venda, the townships around Louis Trichardt;
Messina, and the northern half of Gazankulu. The far north had not expcu«
enced anything like the revolt in Lebowa, although the social basis of the UDH
was similar in this region. The UDF consisted of SAYCO, AZASO, and a fe^
sympathetic clergy. "Politics was youth politics.... The few adults who wei?
involved in the UDF were very isolated. They were regarded as terrorists."21"
Only some sympathetic church workers could continue to operate openly,,;
although they also faced arrest and confiscation of documents. The North"|
ern Transvaal Council of Churches continued its support work, providingj
some income for the families of detainees and helping to find legal advice. This j
assistance, however limited, proved important in the dark years of 1986-88 and j
provided at least some sense of continuity and hope.
Most members of the regional executive were released in March 1989 after
having joined a hunger strike, but some were placed under restrictions that
did not lapse until February 1990. Finding that many organizations had col-
lapsed and that surviving organizations were in a state of disarray, the execu-
tive members convened a consultative conference at which a task force was
elected to revive the UDF structures organization and to broaden it out
beyond youth organization by establishing more civics and women's organi-
zations. Initially, progress was slow. The thaw in the political climate after
F. W. de Klerk's succession to the presidency was not immediately noticeable
in the harsh political landscape of the Northern Transvaal.
Confidence was partially restored with the UDF's Defiance Campaign in
1989 and the release of Walter Sisulu and other ANC stalwarts frorn Robben
Island in October 1989. But at the time of Sisulu's release, UDF organization
in the Northern Transvaal was still crippled so severely that the region could
not send an organized delegation to the welcoming rally in Soweto.212 By
December 1989, however, organization had been sufficiently restored to assem-
ble a delegation to the Conference for a Democratie Future in Johannesburg.
Among the UDF activists in the Northern Transvaal who were trying to
piek up the pieces was the remainder of the SEYO leadership. They identi-
fied the centralized structure as one of the weaknesses of their organization
because it left the organization in disarray when the leadership was detained.
Reconstituting SEYO along federal unes, based on village units, would make
the organization less vulnerable. But by the time a SEYO congress was con-
vened in March 1990, circumstances had changed drastically. In line with a
previous SAYCO resolution, SEYO decided to dissolve and to join the ANC
Youth League. In its concluding statement, SEYO resolved to embark on cam-
s for the dismantling of Bantustans and to give maximum support to the
Ongress of Traditional Leaders.213
When the UDF Northern Transvaal reported on the state of its affüiates as
f January 1991, the UDF had not progressed much beyond its original youth
d student basis.214 Two new affiliates had been added to the list: the North-
™,l Transvaal Civics Association and the Congress of Traditional Healers, an
jpöiguing organization that was to have a life span of just a few months. The
ifp>9o UDF financial statement also reveals a rather modest organization. The
jJpDF Northern Transvaal had three Organizers on its payroll, while the report
n organizational assets mentioned four typewriters, two of which could not
e used, one rhoneo (stencil) machine in the possession of an activist currently
i detention, and a bakkie (van) that police confiscated in June 1986 and appar-
jitly subsequendy sold.215
; The challenge in this transitional period was to broaden the social base of
Jthe Charterist movement in the Northern Transvaal without alienating its
'jyoudi constituency. While the UDF withered away, the ANC—in a transfor-
Biation process from liberation movement to ruling party—attempted to gain
gcontrol over the Bantustans. How did it cope with the legacy of this extraor-
Idinary period of youth mobilization?
•' In much of the Northern Transvaal, the UDF as such was not understood
as a distinct movement with its own discrete symbolism and meaning. In fact,
quite a few people whom I interviewed in Apel-GaNkoane had never heard of
the UDF. If they belonged to the youth movement, that implied that they
Were part of "the organization." And "the organization"—that was the ANC.
In this sense, the ANC faced no problem of legitimacy. After the unbannings
in February 1990, it was a foregone conclusion in the Northern Transvaal that
the UDF should disband in order to let the ANC take its rightful place. In
other respects, however, the ANC faced a difficult start. It could not simply
build on the foundations laid by the UDF, which in the rural parts of the
Northern Transvaal had become largely identified with rebellious youth. In
anticipation of the coming elections, the ANC needed to broaden its support
base. Part of the ANC strategy was to win over Bantustan rulers, chiefs, busi-
nessmen—in general, the Bantustan elites who had been the adversaries dur-
ing the 19805. Much to the dismay of the youth congresses, Lebowa homeland
leader Nelson Ramodike joined the ANC. Initially, this ANC strategy caused
considerable tension between the Johannesburg-based leadership and local
structures. The sight of Bantustan leaders wining and dining with the vener-
ated old guard of die ANC leadership, while local ANC representatives were
kept in the dark about what was going on, caused much bewilderment and
resentment. In some instances, local activists even boycotted visits by ANC
dignitaries. Much "political education" was required to explain to a youthful
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constituency that it was necessary to broaden out in order to "isolate De K1&
The rapprochement with Bantustan leaders was as difficult to tolerate as i
overtures to chiefs.
Here, CONTRALESA was available as a vehicle to guide chiefs toward ti
ANC. But before it could assist in establishing ANC hegemony, CO|
TRALESA needed to be revived. After the initial excitement surroundii
CONTRALESA's launch in 1987, not much had happened until 1989. Nou*
prisingly, organizing chiefs via youth organizations proved to be an unviafa«
option. A new start was made with a conference in June 1989, attended faj
about 150 chiefs, at which the organization was restructured and a new ex
utive elected. When interviewed in 1990, CONTRALESA official Sarns
Ndou claimed a membership of just over 1,000 chiefs, of whom some 350 ta
joined after 2 February 1990. He listed the CONTRALESA strongholdss
Lebowa, Venda, KwaNdebele, and Gazankulu, all in the Northern and'
ern Transvaal.216
The formation of CONTRALESA allowed for consultations with the !&»»
ership of progressive organizations, but it did not always improve relatiortl
ships at grassroots level. According to Ndou, clashes between youth and chie
had worsened since February 1990, which hè blamed on "agents provoca
teurs."217 Activists rightly believed that chiefs joined CONTRALESA in orde
to entrench their position under a future ANC government. Enlisting chiefej
as CONTRALESA members should have facilitated the formation of civiel
associations in homeland villages, as all could now find their own organiza-,
tional home under the Charterist umbrella. But in practice, attempts to form
civics frequendy met with Opposition from the chief, who wanted to keep con-
trol. The relationship was competitive rather than cooperative, as is evident:
from Nelson Ramodike's complaint that civics were competing for legitimacy i
and authority with the chiefs: "It is increasingly becoming clear that the major [
case in point is to have the Civic Assodation replace our Magoshi [chiefs]."21^
Among CONTRALESA's most active members in Sekhukhuneland was
Chief Masha from Strydkraal, where the deadly volley fired at the demon-
strating youth in 1986 had done much to accelerate the process of youth
mobilization. He worked as CONTRALESA organizer. One of the most
enthusiastic members was K. K. Sekhukhune, who in 1991 became the offi-
cially recognized acting paramount chief after a Pretoria court had setded the
succession dispute hè had with his half-brother.
From 1990, CONTRALESA was seen as an important rural partner in die
ANC's strategy to "isolate De Klerk" by drawing all kinds of disparate forces
into a broad alliance under ANC guidance. Chiefs were seen as constituting
part of die middle ground between the ANC and the government, hanging in
laia from which they could swing either way. The prospect of the ANC
5 swamped with yesterday's enemies elicited much criticism. On the other
, in the conditions of 1990 it could not be taken for granted that the ANC
pd get majority support in the Bantustans. "We will be lucky if we get one
pid of the population organized on our side. A large part will be neutral,
fbe sympathetic, but they can be swayed to the other side," was the assess-
Ht of an ANC veteran in Sekhukhuneland. To consolidate support, it was
isidered vital to recruit chiefs to the ANC's side: "We have to rob the gov-
p,ment of this ground on which they can build."219
l The dingaka had come to the same conclusion as the chiefs: forming an
nization would diminish their individual vulnerability. In 1987, several
Bgaka approached UDF representatives to discuss problems related to the
fcch burnings. An attempt was made to affiliate with CONTRALESA, but
:e the dingaka were not chiefs, they did not qualify for membership. Sub-
uently, in 1990 applications were made to the ANC ofHces in Johannesburg
I Pietersburg, from which they were referred to the UDF since the ANC
j ld only accommodate individual members and not a group membership.
the UDF leadership in Pietersburg sent two delegates, ANC veterans Nelson
jiale and John Phala, to the initial conference of the Union of Traditional
pealers in GaPhaahla (Lobethal) in Sekhukhuneland.220
: At this meeting, held in January 1991, those in attendance drew up a state-
fflent explaining the reasons for the formation of the union. "Traditional heal-
:CE8 must form their own union which will represent them in the new South
Äfrica. Oppression must be abolished against traditional healers."221 Much
|time was devoted to a discussion about membership fees and certificates.
r j?roper certificates were considered of vital importance to convince western-
feducated medical doctors, customers, and comrades of the qualifications of
[the dingaka. "True proper certificates will show the difference between a healer
Fand a witch." Oppression was obviously seen as coming from various quarters:
f" from chiefs, who demanded money from healers when they were collecting
pherbs or healing people in the chiefs village; from hospitals, which did not
allow them access to their patients in hospital wards; from the government,
which prosecuted healers for illegal hunting although it was the only way they
, could obtain the raw animal fat needed to mix with their medicines. This
problem, the healers resolved, could be solved if the government provided
them with free animal fat, to be supplied by slaughtering some animals in the
Pretoria Zoo. There was also a prolonged discussion on the use of crocodile
brain, and it was decided that since the brain was used only as poison, it
should be prohibited. Perhaps the most compelling reason for the healers to
join forces is summed up in the first paragraph of the statement:
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Conflict between healers and comrades
(i) Healers were burnt to death by comrades reasons being that they bewitched
people (no prove has been given)
(ii) There must be communication between Healers and comrades to end this
conflict.
(iii) The reasons for this is to build to the new S.A.
The ANC was rather ambivalent about this venture. John Phala believed that
is was wise for the ANC to support the healers' union for the same reason that
support was given to CONTRALESA: "You cannot simply abolish them, you
have to try and control them." By working with the dingaka, the ANC hoped
to stop the witch-hunts. This, Phala thought, could be achieved by convinc-
ing the healers that they should no longer deal individually with accusations
of witchcraft but should refer the matter to the councils of their unions.222
The dingaka agreed that the witch burnings ought to be stopped. In cases
where the healers had provided their services to witch-hunting comrades, they
claimed that they had done so under threat. They argued that both these mat-
ters—youth consulting dingaka and the burning of witches—went against the
tradition. But those youth who had sought the services of healers had done so
with the argument that "it is everybody's democratie right to come and con-
sult a doctor." The dingaka now agreed on a procedure where they would still
treat the victims of witchcraft, but they would avoid publicly naming the cul-
prits. After having identified the perpetrator of witchcraft, they themselves
would deal with such a person and prevent him or her from inflicting any
more harm. The healers attending the meeting adopted a constitution, elected
an executive, and issued a warning to the ANC that there would be no victory
in the liberation struggle without their services.223
The healers' union, with its rather flimsy organizational base, proved to
be short-lived. The driving force was Steve Mamaro, a young man from
Sekhukhuneland who lived in Tembisa, on the Reef. When Mamaro disap-
peared shortly after the Lobethal meeting, the union collapsed. Effbrts were
made to revive the organization, now under the name of CONTRADOSA
(Congress of Traditional Doctors). CONTRADOSA issued membership cer-
tificates but seems not have conducted many activities beyond that.224 Most
union members were unaware that their organization had affiliated with the
UDF, for outside contacts were conducted by Steve Mamaro. Most youth
activists in Sekhukhuneland were equally unaware of the existence of the
"comrade dingaka." Although many of them recognized the political expe-
diency of working with chiefs, they reacted rather scornfully to the idea of
working with dingaka, who were seen as profiteers making a lot of money
from poor and ignorant people. Their practice was "unscientific" and thus
could not easily be reconciled with the progressive cause, which entailed fight-
ing superstitions. In the beginning of the 19905, scientific socialism continued
to be seen as the more obvious remedy for unscientific superstitions.
Sekhukhuneland Revisited
il' What was the legacy of "the times of the comrades" in Sekhukhuneland? My
' first visits to Sekhukhuneland took place between July and September 1990.
Calm had returned to the rural villages, but the atmosphere was somewhat
unsettled. On the one hand, there was the uncertainty about De Klerk's inten-
tions: Was all of this really irreversible? On the other hand, there was insecu-
rity about the future: Would the ANC deliver on its promises? Or would the
leaders settle comfortably as the new ruling elite? In smoke-filled shebeens,
young men discussed the contradictions inherent in "negotiating the seizure
of power." Was the ANC on the point of "selling us out"? How many con-
cessions were going to be made? To local youth activists, it seemed that the
ANC leaders were too worried about their shiny Mercedeses to venture on the
bumpy gravel roads of Sekhukhuneland. But the festive relaunch of the South
African Communist Party in a Soweto stadium in July 1990 inspired great
excitement in Apel-GaNkoane. A bus had been hired and filled to capacity-
and more-to take local youth to this memorable event. Joe Slovo and Chris
Hani, leaders of the SACP as well as MK, had assumed almost mythical
dimensions among Sekhukhune youth, even more than Mandela and Sisulu.
After all, the armed struggle had not been waged from Robben Island.
Maurice Nchabeleng tried to persuade villagers to sign up as ANC mem-
bers. One hundred members were required for the formation of an ANC
branch. It was not easy. "Even now," hè conceded, "we have no links with
our parents." Apart from building the ANC, the greatest challenge in these
months was the formation of a civic association. The two villages of Apel and
GaNkoane were going to have a joint ANC branch but two separate civics
since the civics would deal with village matters. This required intricate rounds
of consultations between youth, ANC veterans, the chief, teachers, principals,
and businesspeople. Members of all these groups could often be found in the
bottle stores, shebeens, and beer halls: here at least was common ground.
Mr. Makgaleng, formerly the chair of the Sekhukhune Parents' Crisis Com-
mittee, was in favor of forming a civic but warned youth activists against too
much singing of freedom songs. Youth, hè told them, should try and keep a
low profile, as some people still associated comrades with the burning of people.
This advice went unheeded. When the GaNkoane civic association was
launched on a hot Saturday in September 1990, the dusty schoolyard was alive
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with wildly shuffling feet of toyi-toying schoolchildren, freedom songs, vtttu
and amandlcfs (power-to-the-people salutes). A jarring sound System blasi
a pop version of Nkosi Sikelele. The invited dignitaries had indeed coiïi
Paramount Chief K. K. Sekhukhune, Chief Phasha of GaNkoane, Lou
Mnguni, representing the ANC and UDF leadership from Pietersburg, and
COSATU delegation from Johannesburg. They were all welcomed by a guaiM
of honor, formed by young men and women in various fantasy uniforfljj|
adorned with ANC colors and SACP symbols.225 There were the combatil
slogans of the 19805: "Long live die spirit of no surrender, long live the spM
of no compromise" and "Viva proletarian internationalism." But there we
also new slogans, blending the spirit of the 19805 widi die quest for new allie
"Long live the classless society, long live progressive chiefs." Louis Mngun
speaking on behalf of the ANC, reassured the dignitaries who were seate
behind a table under a makeshift shelter: "We of the ANC love our chiefs afld|
have never undertaken anything against chiefs." But the representative ofthsj
newly formed Northern Transvaal umbrella structure of civic associations\
sounded less inclined to honor chiefly traditions. Civics, hè explained, should 1
form committees to look after education, social welfare, pensions, healdi, and J
building activities. He complained that the government had forced die peo-
ple to go through the chiefs to address problems, but now die civics should'
deal with the issues direcdy.
The address of Chief Phasha, who had not yet been officially installed after
succeeding his father, was delivered by a spokesman. Things had changed, said
the spokesman, but in the past they had been afraid of the youth. They were
aware that their youth liked politics, but education should come first, for lack
of education causes bad things, like stealing and poverty. If all people were
educated and rieh, diere would be no need to steal items like cold drinks from
the shops. He ended with an exhortation to the youth "not to take action,
because diät will frighten us." Although Chief Pasha's spokesman and orher
speakers were rewarded widi a poli te applause, die arrival of SAYCO president
Peter Mokaba caused a frenzy. Mokaba had a clear message, not of modera-
tion and "back-to-school" calls, but of familiär battle cries: die people should
be armed to fight Inkatha and the Boers and to repossess die land.
The meeting was a success in that all the prominent guests, from the para-
mount chief to the ANC delegation from Pietersburg and the COSATU del-
egation from Johannesburg, all made the journey to the dusty schoolyard in a
homeland village. But the main invited guests were absent: the adults of
GaNkoane. The vast majority of the several hundred people in the schoolyard
were schoolchildren, most of them young, many under twelve. There was a
sprinkling of elderly women and old men, including some old ANC activists
from the 19505. But people in the age group between twenty-five and sixty
^. conspicuously lacking. The civic never took off. Chief Phasha insisted
ftt the civic should meet in his kraal, in order for him to keep control over
proceedings. The executive insisted on meeting in the school. Without the
ePs support, the civic could not function.
The ANC branch for Apel-GaNkoane was indeed established. Within a
Jfetr, it was firmly under the control of teachers, who had taken care to assure
Iheir positions in the "new South Africa" by joining an ANC-leaning teachers'
' ttion. Most of those elected to serve on the executive were teachers, plus
re were two principals and one or two businessmen. It was explained to me
t one needs a businessman as treasurer: "If hè eats the money, it can at least
reclaimed from his shop."
Youth politica! activity was now mainly confined to the ANC Youth League.
Be of the original student activists conceded his marginalization with a mix-
,_re of resentment and resignation: "The youdi has been demobihzed." The
ïisbandment of SEYO and SAYCO aroused mixed feelings among Sekhuk-
:tteie activists. In spite of their loyalty to die ANC, they clearly feit the chan-
jfeling of their movement into the reconstituted ANC Youdi League was a loss
sof autonomy, making youdi organization subservient to the "modier body."
The "old men" were taking control again, telling the youth to go back to
>chool. How could the "old men" understand that the youth of Apel and
GaNkoane were in urgent need of a disco?
Youth power was not Consolidated. As the constitutional negotiations
dragged on, many young activists feit increasingly marginalized. Their ven-
erated leaders, who had urged them on as shock troops of die revolution, were
now preaching the virtues of patience and moderation. Among die benefici-
aries of the constitutional negotiations were not only the chiefs, who obtained
official recognition of tiieir role and status, but also the Bantustan officials,
who won a promise that all civil servants would continue to be state employ-
ees after the abolition of Bantustans. Their pensions were guaranteed. Many
youth activists found it difficult to accept that their former enemies fitted so
comfbrtably in the new order.
But village youth emerged from this decade widi more organizational expe-
rience and a stronger self-confidence. Corporal punishment was not abolished
but was gready curtailed. Principals and teachers were generally willing to deal
widi student representative councils. Rural youth had forcefully put them-
selves on die national agenda. They had appropriated die modes of political
action from the townships and the Marxist discourse from die university cam-
puses, and they blended diese into tiieir own brand of millenarianism, com-
bining the battle for political power and a better place in society with a zest for
moral renewal.
I returned to Sekhukhuneland in April 1994, on the eve of the elections.
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Talk among local ANC activists centered on the lack of development in L~
areas and the comfortable deal secured by their formet adversaries, such u»,
chiefs and Bantustan officials. Much Indignation was aroused by the ANC;
decision to put Lebowa's prime minister Nelson Ramodike on the ANC list.5
He was forced to step down at the last minute when local ANC structures ift
the Northern Transvaal sent the message to headquarters that this was over-
stepping the limit of what they were prepared to tolerate in the interest of
"unity." Otherwise, local interest seemed at a low ebb. Where would we find af
place to watch the much trumpeted television debate between De Klerk and*
Mandela? In Nelson's Place, a shebeen frequented by youth, only about ten;
boys and young men had assembled to witness this historie event. They
watched mostly in silence, grinning gleefully at the thought that De Klerk
would be serving as vice-president under Mandela. But why the lack of inter-
est? Where were the other comrades? "People are tired of politics. Mandela is
the messiah. He will help us."
Chief Richard Nchabeleng of Apel, now a member of CONTRALESA, was
equally indifferent about the "independence elections." What would the elec-
tions mean for the village and the position of chiefs? He kept rubbing his eyes,
sighing that these were difficult questions. Only one topic could arouse any
passion on the part of Chief Nchabeleng. "Those GaNkoane people must be
stopped." A new conflict between the two villages had arisen over a piece of
land. GaNkoane residents had torn down a house that belonged to one of
Nchabeleng's subjects. If only those people would be arrested, the trouble
would be over, the chief feit. But nothing happened because the civil ser-
vants of Lebowa were on strike. In the Lebowa administration, civil servants
indulged in an orgy of promotions and went on strike when Pretoria refused
to foot the bul. The police strike was now over, but at the magistrate's office
nobody was working—therefore nobody could be arrested. But after the elec-
tions, Chief Nchabeleng intended to "take the law into my own hands" and
settle this thing once and forever.
The talk of the village was the resurgence of the old animosities between
Apel and GaNkoane, not the impending historie elections. Those from Apel
had launched a consumer boycott against shops in GaNkoane after the
destruction of the house. The revival of "tribal conflict" was of no consequence
for the elections. Like those from Apel, the people of GaNkoane would vote
for the ANC, for there was no alternative. While by far the majority of the
roughly 350 members of the Apel-GaNkoane branch of the ANC lived in Apel,
membership in the ANC Youth League was spread more evenly between the
two villages. Young activists made house-to-house visits to educate the vot-
ers. Some of the old people were still afraid of the youth, explained an eld-
erly woman who served on the local ANC executive: "They are saying 'the
uth will kill us.' They remember what happened in 1986. But those were not
; comrades. Those youth smoked dagga and they came from GaNkoane.
Nkoane, that is a different place. There they burn witches when lightning
»j hit. Those GaNkoane people don't know sympathy."
^ Thus the generational conflict that marked the witch burnings of 1986 had
l been reformulated to express the most salient conflict of the present. Other-
wise, not much had changed in Apel-GaNkoane over the past four years. Edu-
Cation was still a shambles. In most schools, teachers were on strike because
halaries had not been paid over the past months. Since the beginning of the
»school year, students at the teacher-training college had been boycotting
jdasses in support of their demands that more students be admitted to the col-
jc fege. Because of the civil servants' strike, pensions had not been paid for two
"months. Now Radio Lebowa announced that officials from the Transvaal
| Provincial Administration would take over from the Lebowa civil servants. In
• Sekhukhuneland, pensions would be paid out at the magistrate's office in
Schoonoord and the police station in Apel, which had been built in 1990.
Thousands of elderly men and wornen converged on the police station, queu-
ing patiently to await the arrival of the officials. Hundreds of people had
already arrived the evening before payday, fearing that the money would have
run out if they came late.
"Remember Sydney's poem?" asked Maurice Nchabeleng as we drove away
from the police station, where hundreds of old men and women sat huddled
together to spend a long, cold night in the open. "Remember all the confu-
sions? They are still here. Except for one. There is no more confusion between
the parents and the children. The parents no longer fear their children."
CHAPTER FOUR
"Tahy God Is on OUT Side":
The Kru0ersdorp Resident*
Organisation and Township Revolt
For once, God has given us that spirit to do it just right.
Yah, God is on our side.
KRO chairphoning the secretctry of the civic
Civics and Populär Mobilization
TOWNSHIP-BASED ORGANizATiONS of residents known as civic associa-
tions or civics made up an important part of the UDFs membership. During
the i98os, civics vacillated between different roles: watch-dog bodies repre-
senting the interests of all township residents; politica! bodies aspiring to con-
struct Charterist hegemony at the local level; brokers taking up individual
Problems and grievances of residents; organs of people's power; front organ-
izations for the ANC, preparing to grab local power in the event of a seizure
of power by the liberation movement. Sometimes a civic was formed as an end
m itself, namely to provide residents with a vehicle to address township issues
such as rents, transportation, crime, electricity. Sometimes a civic was a means
to an end: activists launched a civic in the belief that campaigns around rents
or washing lines would provide a low-threshold starting point from which res-
idents could graduaUy be drawn into wider political struggles against the
apartheid state.
The nse of the civic movement predates the formation of the UDE Com-
munity organizations, which became known as civic associations began to
emerge toward the end of the I97os, pardy prompted by the Installation of
commumty councils in a number of townships. These councils took over some
of the functions of the state administration boards, notably the collection of
rents and the allocation of houses. Rent increases generally accompanied the
Installation of the Community councüs. Opposition to rent increases became
ISO
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2. The West Rand. Map by Nel van Bethlehem.
a prominent feature of civic struggles in the 19805, as the community councils
and their successors, the town councils that were established under the 1982
Black Local Authorities Act, unsuccessfully attempted to make ends meet with
frequent increases in rents and service charges. Among the first civic organi-
zations were the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) and the Port Elizabeth Black
Civic Organisation (PEBCO), both of which subsequently served as models
for community organizations in other townships.
During the 19805, most civics affiliated with the UDF, but some remained
outside the Charterist fold. The Soweto civic was initially reluctant to join
because it included AZAPO activists. In some townships, UDF-affiliated civics
had to compete with Black Consciousness organizations or those commu-
nity organizations leaning toward the PAC (Pan Africanist Congress), while a
number of civics in the Western Cape adhered to the Trotskyite doctrines of
the New Unity Movement. Civics in the African townships were not a vital
concern to the UDF in its early phase, as the campaign against the tricameral
parliament centered on the Indian and colored communities. But with the
outburst of township revolt in September 1984, civics sprang to national
prominence.
Community organizations were formed on the assumption that township
residents shared a community of interests, by virtue of the fact that they lived
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in the same place. This assumption often proved true when the inhabitants feit\
beleaguered from outside—for example, by the police or the army. Joint ]
action against a common threat may engender a community spirit, but this is i
rarely a lasting phenomenon. As with "the people," the widespread "commu-
nity" discourse obscured the fact that the inhabitants of a certain place share
some interests on some issues but may have divergent interests on other issues.
As townships began to show more economie differentiation, the assumption
of common interests became less self-evident. But in the African townships of
the 19808, increasing economie differentiation had by and large not yet
resulted in clearly class-based political organization and action. Under condi-
tions of repression and disenfranchisement, mobilization was less likely to
occuralongthelinesofsocialclass. :
Among the Transvaal civics, the Krugersdorp Residents Organisation
(KRO) in Kagiso had the reputation of being a strong, well-organized civic.1
The story of Kagiso modifies the image of township revolt as it was transmit-
ted by the mass media. Images of almost unbridled militancy and near anar-
chy dominated media coverage of rebellion in the townships. Kagiso presents
a picture of reluctant rebellion: residents were not eager to plunge mto mili-
tant mass action, and when they finally did, they were not intent on promot-
ing chaos and anarchy. On the contrary, their appreciation for the civic was
predicated on its capacity to deliver a certain amount of law and order. Within
the Kagiso civic, different perceptions of the proper role of a civic organiza-
tion coexisted, partly because of the different backgrounds of civic activists.
Should the civic leadership give priority to mobilizing residents in mass cam-
paigns and then use the momentum to build strong organizations? Or should
organization precede mobilization, in order to avoid the risks of undisciplined
actions and ill-considered ventures?
What kind of people were the driving force behind the Krugersdorp Resi-
dents Organisation? What motivated them, and how did they try to mobilize
their fellow residents? Who was included in "the community," and who
remained excluded or on the margins? What were the issues that galvanized
the people of Kagiso into collective action? What was the impact of the UDF
on township organization? The story of the rebellion in Kagiso is preceded by
a discussion of the structural conditions and an introduction of the actors.
Structural Conditions: A Profile of Kagiso Township
Kagiso—the name means "peace" inTswana—was a medium-sized township
on the West Rand, some fifteen miles west of Johannesburg. The township,
established in 1956, was designed to serve the white town of Krugersdorp and
the adjoining Chamdor industrial area. To the northwest of Krugersdorp was
fjnother, much smaller and older township, Munsievüle. During the 19805,
IfMunsieville residents were threatened with the destruction of their homes and
f removal to Kagiso to make room for the planned extension of the white resi-
•Eential areas of Krugersdorp.
l In the mid-ipSos, Kagiso had between 60,000 and 70,000 inhabitants.
L Around 20,000 people were living in Munsievüle.2 Two hostels in Kagiso
jhoused about 5,000 people. Another 10,000 people were without conven-
f tional housing and lived mostly in backyard shacks. On average, one dwelling
, accommodated 9.2 people.3 In terms of age and gender, Kagiso's population
f was fairly evenly distributed. The ethnic composition was mixed, with a dom-
inance of Sotho andTswana speakers.
Sprawling squatter settlements on the outskirts of the township sprang up
, only in the late 19805. Kagiso had thirteen primary and two secondary schools.
' There was no secondary school in Munsievüle, so those high school students
attended school in Kagiso. At the edge of the township was the fairly large
Leratong Hospital, which also served as a training Institute for nurses. Liv-
ing conditions were roughly comparable with other PWV townships, and the
new housing extensions buüt in the 19705 and 19808 compared favorably with
. the older settlements.
Kagiso consisted of two parts: Kagiso I, one of the older townships in the
, region, and Kagiso II, a much bigger extension, buüt mostly in the 19705 and
• 19805. Kagiso I became the stronghold of the civic organization. Only the
main roads were paved, and electrification was slow in reaching the area. At
, the beginning of the 19808, only about 10 percent of the houses had electric-
;
 ity. Since the early 19805, residents had been paying a monthly fee for the elec-
trification of the township, but only 14.5 percent of the homes had electricity
by the end of the decade.4 Nevertheless, in spite of these monthly fees, fami-
lies applying to have electricity connected to their homes still had to pay a fee
of 2000 Rand.5 This was an outrageous amount, compared to the tariffs in
the adjoining white city of Krugersdorp. Throughout the 19805, electricity
remained high on the list of civic concerns. Numerous residents complained
about extremely high electricity buis, which gave rise to the suspicion that the
councü tampered with the electricity meters.
During my visits to the township in 1990,1 found Kagiso residents in the
midst of a boycott of rents and service charges. The town councü had reacted
by halting several services, such as garbage collection. The streets of Kagiso
were lined with enormous pües of rotting garbage. On days with heavy rains,
garbage mixed with overflowing sewers and rain to create torrential streams,
damaging the poorly maintained roads. Roads deteriorated further as a result
of the inventiveness of residents, who dug gullies in the road to extend elec-
tricity cables to houses that were not formally connected. Improvised wiring
IS4
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also crisscrossed from electricity poles through windows of houses. The ele
tric Company ESCOM had complained that it had a monthly loss of 300,0
Rand and threatened to cut off electricity.
Next to the hostel in Kagiso I was a block of burned-out houses, whic™
were deserted after Inkatha fighters in the hostel had launched an attack on thej
neighborhood in August 1990. The battle between Inkatha and the Kagiso i
idents erupted in the context of the township war in 1990, when Inkatha nu.,.
lessly attempted to establish a foothold in the Transvaal while the ANC triedl
to safeguard its hegemonie position in the Transvaal townships. At the time off
my visits, the two hostels had become no-go areas for township resident«,'
Most of the original inmates had fled the violence, and the hostels had beenfl
taken over by Inkatha. The original dwellers had sought refuge in the towrt-|
ship or in a nearby squatter camp. But this was a new Situation. During the|
1980$, the two hostels were on the margins of township life but were not out-
of-bounds for the residents.
Most residents of Kagiso and Munsieville worked in Krugersdorp and the;
Chamdor industrial area, while some found employment in Roodepoort or
Randfontein and in Johannesburg. As several activists pointed out, the
Chamdor industries, which included chemical enterprises and a brewery, paid
their taxes to Krugersdorp and spilled their pollution in Kagiso. As elsewhere
on the West Rand, trade union presence in Kagiso was fairly weak. At the
beginning of the 19805, only the Food and Beverage Workers Union (FBWU),
an affiliate of the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), was organiz-
ing in Kagiso. The general union GAWU (General and Allied Workers Union),
an affiliate of the UDF, recruited some followers during the 19805, whereas
the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) established a presence in this
region only in 1987.
The recession of the first half of the 19805 had an uneven impact on town-
ship residents. Income distribution became more uneven, with a simultane-
ous growth of an upper-income group and a very low income group.
Unskilled workers and casual labor generally experienced falling wages. Skilied
workers, on the other hand, could look forward to fairly substantial wage
increases, partly thanks to the increasing bargaining power of their trade
unions. At the same time, African urban areas witnessed the growth of a mid-
dle class as new opportunities opened up in retailing and transportation, such
as the booming taxi business.6 The increasing social differentiation in the
townships manifested itself in a greater variety of housing. This development,
made possible by the greater security of tenure, which was introduced as part
of the reforms of the Botha government, was clearly visible in Kagiso. Private
developers built new neighborhoods with fairly comfortable homes next to
the all too familiär "matchbox" township houses. But even the so-called elite
estates had unpaved roads.
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Before 1971, townships formed part of the municipal area of the white
ras. Soweto, for example, was part of the municipality of Johannesburg,
ile Kagiso was part of Krugersdorp. Townships and towns had a common
l base, so the municipality could provide township services from local tax
nue on business and property. This state of affairs changed in 1971, when
^wnships were taken away from the municipalities and put under the control
f the Bantu administration boards. The government introduced the princi-
Êthat Africans must pay for their own administration. Since the boardsived no money from the municipalities, local government for Africanse to depend on income from rents and site rents, service charges, the saleouses in leasehold schemes, and the boards' monopoly on liquor and beer
^ales. Restrictive regulations against business in the townships meant that for
!a long time no viable business sector could emerge, which could have helped
• aUeviate the fiscal crisis. Township residents continued to spend the bulk of
[|fheir income in white areas. In the scheme of Grand Apartheid, townships
t were designed as dormitory towns for a temporary labor force whose ultimate
' destination lay in the homelands.
l The town councils, established under the 1982 Black Local Authorities Act,
r were faced with financial disaster. Many councillors were aware that the new
i System of local government lacked a financial base. They demanded the inclu-
sion of industrial areas within township borders. They argued the case for gov-
ernment subsidies on municipal services and claimed access to income from
municipal traffic licenses and traffic fines. But none of these requests were
granted. The town councils also lacked the traditional source of black town-
ship revenue: beer and liquor sales, which had provided 70 percent of the
income of the administration boards. The boards retained the revenue from
sorghum beer sales in the beer halls, and most other liquor sales were priva-
tized. Thus the new councils' income from alcohol was restricted to fees
obtained from distributing licenses for liquor stores. These licenses were much
sought after, and the mayor and councillors generally saw to it that the income
from liquor outlets lined their private pockets. Fourteen out of fifteen liquor
outlets in Lekoa, in the Vaal Triangle, were reportedly in the hands of mayor
Esau Mahlatsi or members of his family.7 Similar patterns prevailed in other
townships, where mayors and councillors ensured that the lion's share of the
required licenses for bottle stores, gas stations, supermarkets, and other shops
went to themselves or their relatives. Faced with a lack of income and füll of
ambitious plans for the improvement of township infrastructure, the town
councils set out to increase rents, in many cases by substantial amounts. In the
19705, as was the case in the 19805, people's resentment was aroused not only
by financial hardship but also by the total lack of communication between the
local administration and the residents.
Kagiso went through its first experience with township revolt in the 1976
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uprising. In spite of some evidence of underground activity by the PAC in j
1977, Kagiso seemed politically calm at the beginning of the 19805. In the 1981 j
elections for Community councils, Kagiso had a relatively high turnout of 4§jj
percent of registered voters, which amounted to 7,700 voters. Three years t
later, in the 1983 elections for the new Black Local Authorities, Kagiso again«
showed a relatively high poll of 36.6 percent of the registered voters.8,
Although the council hailed this turnout as an "outstanding success," this •
percentage is misleading, since only 4,008 inhabitants had bothered to regis-
ter on the voters' roll. The "registered voters" were only a small portion of the
eligible voters. Elections were held in three wards only, as the candidates in
the other wards were uncontested. The actual number of votes cast was defi-
nitely less impressive: i,445-9
The Actors: The Krugersdorp Residents Organisation
As in many other townships, rent struggles provided the impetus towards the
formation of a civic association in Kagiso. In 1980, house owners in a new
extension refused to pay their water bill in protest against a steep rise in the
monthly bill for the repayment of the loan, interests, and service charges. Ini-
tially the council threatened to cut off the water supply. But after the local
Action Committee formed an alliance with members of COSAS (Congress of
South African Students) who promised to bring water in drums, the council
gave in and reduced the monthly bills.10 Later that year the mayor of Kagiso
announced in a newspaper advertisement an increase in rents in the older part
of the township. The matter was discussed in an informal gathering of youth,
most of them in their early twenties. Their anger was directed not only at the
rent increase but also at die arrogance of the Community council for making
an announcement in the press without bothering to inform the people of
Kagiso.11 A core group of perhaps five young men discussed plans for a cam-
paign against the rent increase. They envisaged more than an ad hoc protest:
their goal was to involve people in Kagiso in building an independent organ-
ization of residents, following the example of PEBCO and SCA.
Their strategizing sessions were inspired with new ideas by the arrival of a
newcomer, Bafana Seripe, who had worked in the Western Cape as an organ-
izer for the Young Christian Workers, a remarkable organization that is dis-
cussed in more detail later in the chapter. Seripe told his friends in Kagiso
about the civic movement in the Western Cape: how they were conducting
door-to-door campaigns and using media to organize people. More youth
were contacted, including members of AZAPO and members of a Christian
youth club that had been established at the initiative of a local pastor, Frank
Chikane. By this time, about fifteen young men were involved.12 These men
iconducted house-to-house visits and discovered that people were unaware ofthe impending rent increase. In their discussions, many other issues came up."The activists were sometimes greeted with suspicion and taken for tsotsis,and on the other hand sometimes welcomed with tea or coffee. The activistsbecame convinced that the time was ripe for the formation of a civic organi-
fsation."13
Their style was apparently not confrontational. The house-to-house cam-
.paign "even stretched to the houses of ordinary policemen, who took the issue
'solely as a rent problem and merely as a civic matter."14 The activists met fre-
quently to evaluate the progress of the campaign and to plan the next stage.
The core group had grown to about thirty people, and the idea of forming a
, residents organization took more concrete shape. "But most of us were still
young, and then older people would be reluctant to get involved, because the
youth had the image of being radical."15 In further discussions, "it was decided
that the Organisation would need a mature experienced leadership, which
would be elderly people."16 Among the people approached were a local trade
unionist, Joe Makgothlo, who was in his forties, Lettie Nzima, a middle-aged
woman who was active in church-based social work, and Frank Chikane, the
pastor of the Apostolic Faith Mission.
The launch of the civic took place in February 1981, in a venue made avail-
able by the Catholic Church in Kagiso I. As it happened, the residents elected
the executive committee from among the people who delivered speeches at the
meeting. Makgothlo was elected chair, and Ike Genu, a worker in his late
twenties who was active in Chikane's youth club, became vice-chair. One of
the youth activists, George Moiloa, found himself elected secretary, rather to
his surprise. The meeting was characterized by a joyous mood: "It was for the
very, very first time, the people of Kagiso feit and enjoyed an experience of
Organisation which they themselves set up and named."17
The same sense of embarking on a historie mission permeates the pream-
ble to KRO's constitution:
We the Residents of Kagiso, having noted over years:
That there was no Leadership In Kagiso of the people by the people for the
people except government created institutions or bodies to further its oppres-
sive and exploitative machinery;
That this community of Kagiso, like any other black community in South
Africa, has been and is brutally subjected to the inhuman, discriminatory unjust
laws of the white racist regime and forcefully depnved of any say in the enacting
and execution of the said laws;
That thus most of the residents have no houses, and some denied the right
to. Many are unemployed, resulting in poverty stricken families and persons in
the Land of Gold;
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That further noting that our children are forced to go through an unaccept-
able form of education;
therefore RESOLVE to found the Kagiso Residents Organisation based on
the following Constitution.18
The day after the launch of KRO the Kagiso council decided on the immedi-,
ate suspension of the rent increase. With the most pressing issue apparently ;
solved, many inhabitants lost interest. Subsequent mass meetings were not.
well attended. "It appeared people feit there was nothing to worry about any-
more. It also appeared like people feit that the committee was elected and had
to do everything for the people."19
The fledgling civic went through a lull until the rent increases were rein-
troduced in August 1981. Organization building was to prove a slow process,
with many ups and downs. In spite of the varying fortunes of KRO, there was
a remarkable continuity in the civic leadership. Although several new people
were co-opted to the executive in subsequent years, no new elections were
held until the end of the decade.20 This continuity allowed for an accumula-
tion of organizational experience, but at the same time may have impeded the
development of new local leadership. When the executive was detained, there
was no second-layer leadership to take over.
Although several older townships residents were to play leading roles dur-
ing the 19805, the inception of the civic association in Kagiso was the work
of the Soweto generation. "In each and every township, there existed a core of
youth which remained deeply politically motivated." Whereas before 1976
friendships developed around football and "other frivolities," now youth was
brought together by the desire to come to grips with the issues of "real life,"
noted a group of students—themselves part of the 1976 student generation—
in their oral history paper on the Kagiso civic.21 Around 1980, there were at
least three politically motivated youth groups: the Young Christian Workers
(YCW), the Interdenominational Youth Christian Club (IYCC), and the Con-
gress of South African Students (COSAS).
Membership was to some extent overlapping, but before the formation of
KRO there was no intensive contact between the diree groups. Nevertheless,
diere were obvious common Strands in youth consciousness: a religious inspi-
ration, drawing on Christian values but frequently combined widi distrust of
the established churches; a legacy of Black Consciousness (BC), which could
coexist with adherence to Charterist principles; strong anticapitalist senti-
ments and a belief in socialist and communal values; the strong conviction that
they were fighting for a just cause; and a sense of mission to work toward of
a new, egalitarian society. All these elements are eloquently expressed in poetic
form in the diary of one of the graduates of the Soweto revolt, Lawrence
Ntlokoa, who was to play a key role in civic life in Kagiso.
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The Kagiso civic could draw on a wider range of experience than just cur-
nt and former high school students and young workers. Several local lead-
developed links with national political organizations. A Roman Catholic
Sister Mary Bernard Ncube, who was closely involved with youth groups
•n Kagiso, became president of the Federation of Transvaal Women (FED-
HRAW), an afïïliate of the UDF. Frank Chikane became vice-president of the
Transvaal region. Several Kagiso activists had links with the ANC, either
Jtdirectly or through their family background. The KRO chair was an active
j trade unionist, as were several other civic activists. What motivated the peo-
[|jple who became leading civic activists?
l Religious Leadership
\
' Two Christian institutions played a pivotal role in promoting Community
j Organization as well as in stimulating youth involvement in community affairs.
f Sister Mary Bernard Ncube, a short, middle-aged nun who exuded unfailing
energy and a natural authority, and her small congregation of nuns in a con-
vent in Kagiso I provided meeting facilities and a network of contacts outside
J the township.22
; Sister Bernard was arrested in March 1983 and later sentenced to twelve
months for possession of banned literature. Among the publications found in
s her possession was a photograph of ANC president Oliver Tambo and a copy
\ of an article in the ANC magazine Sechaba. containing a speech by Tambo.23
| Among other documents later confiscated and produced by the state in the
KRO trial was a letter to her from Nelson Mandela in Pollsmoor Prison. In
the course of die 19805, she was detained repeatedly, including diree mondis
spent in solitary confinement due to terms of the 1986 State of Emergency.
; When Sister Bernard was banned from Kagiso in 1987, she went to live in
j Soweto and took up employment with the Institute of Contextual Theology
:
 in Johannesburg.
One other church-based center of inspiration and resources was the Apos-
tolic Faidi Mission of pastor Frank Chikane, who was appreciated by youth
activists as "a very powerful person." In his autobiography, Chikane describes
how, at a young age, hè became involved in the life of this church, which was
marked by grassroots participation, mutual support networks, and a holistic
form of spirituality. In Chikane's view, the spirituality of his church fitted with
the African world view. In both, diere was no conception of a dualistic world
of the spiritual that was different from the world of the social. 'Africans' total
life experiences were understood and interpreted in relation to their God."
God was not a spectator in die war that was raging between the evil spirits and
the spirit of righteousness—God, Chikane feit, must be involved. But in hind-
lol
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sight, hè saw a basic problem in the church's acceptance of the sociopolitical
status quo in South Africa. He realized that "whereas this grassroots form of
holistic spirituality addressed our spiritual and social needs, it did not address
the source of this country's social abnormalities. It was more of a survival strat-
egy of the victims of society than a strategy to end victimisation."24 According
to Chikane, the missing link in his church was "a direct confrontation with the
forces of evil within this struggle between evil and goodness in the world." The
task that Chikane now saw before him was to reappropriate the Bible and to
oppose the use of Christianity for the legitimation of evil Systems.25 He started
work in Kagiso barely a week or so before 16 June 1976, beginning his minis-
tering in an intensified conflict Situation. In the months after 16 June, Chikane
helped to tracé members of the community who had suddenly disappeared.
He was detained in June 1977, badly assaulted for six weeks, and released only
in January 1978.
Following Chikane's arrival in Kagiso, several social and youth projects had
been set up around his congregation. The Interdenominational Youth Chris-
tian Club (IYCC), combining evangelical work with social projects, proved a
training ground in leadership and organizing skills for numerous young men
and women in Kagiso. Ike Genu, one of the young congregation members
and later vice-chair of KRO, recalled his first encounter with what later became
known as liberation theology: "Frank then began preaching this new philos-
ophy and that was what made us aware."26 Genu became chief deacon in the
parish and stayed with his family in the mission house. The driving force
behind the social project, known as the Kagiso Seif Help Scheme, was a
middle-aged woman, Lettie Nzima, who in 1981 became one of the members
of the KRO executive. The church premises became the focus of police atten-
tion, while the church establishment warned Chikane against involvement in
politics. Because of this pressure from his church, hè declined the request to
become chair of the civic organization in Kagiso. Li an informal capacity, how-
ever, hè participated in the formation of KRO. Subsequently, in August 1981,
Chikane was provisionally suspended by his church. The family was evicted
from the church premises and moved to Soweto. After another spell in deten-
tion, Chikane went to work with the Institute for Contextual Theology in
Johannesburg. Freed from the constraints of the church, in which hè could no
longer be a pastor although he remained an active member, hè became vice-
chair of the Soweto Civic Association. From 1983 to 1985 hè was vice-president
of the UDF Transvaal region. As one of the accused in the Pietermaritzburg
Treason Trial, hè was out of circulation for most of 1985, but hè nevertheless
played a key role in initiating the Kairos document, which stated that the seed
of a "prophetic theology" had been sown and which demanded that Christians
participate in the liberation struggle.27 In 1987, Frank Chikane succeeded
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[ Dr. C. F. Beyers Naudé as secretary general of the South African Council of
Churches (SACC). In 1990, hè was fully reinstated in the Apostolic Faith
Mission.Although they represented different church traditions and different gen-
erations, there are marked similarities in the religious and politica! visions of
Sister Bernard Ncube and Frank Chikane. Both were influenced by the call
of Latin American theologians to take sides in the "struggles between the
- forces of righteousness (light) and unrighteousness (darkness) to be able to
develop an authentic theology. . . . To be part of the liberating work of God,
you have no choice other than to take sides with the poor, the downtrodden
and the weak."28
For Sister Bernard as well as Frank Chikane, both capitalism and apartheid
belonged to the forces of unrighteousness. In his autobiography, Chikane
counterposed "those who live at the expense of the blood, life and sweat of
others" to the "classless society which could be compatible with the ideals of
the Kingdom [of God]."29 This egalitarian vision of the Kingdom of God was
shared by some influential young activists for whom religious Inspiration
i remained important in spite of their scorn for the church establishment. Sev-
t eral found an organizational home in the Young Christian Workers, a remark-
able international movement that produced a synthesis of Christianity,
Marxism, and militant social action.
The Toung Christian Workers
Unlike COSAS or BC-inspired youth groups, the Young Christian Workers
(YCW) rarely made the headlines. The movement emphasized organizing at
the grassroots level and was rather scornful of organizations that sought a high
public profüe, such as the UDF. YCW never became a UDF affiliate. But this
youth organization deserves more attention than it has thus far received in
newspapers and history books, because it has produced a remarkable erop of
highly motivated and talented activists. After their years with YCW, many
moved into leading roles in the trade union movement, the civic movement,
or, to a lesser extent, the UDF itself.30 YCW was an urban-based organization.
There were no traces of YCW in the Northern Transvaal Bantustans, but both
in the Johannesburg area and in the Western Cape a substantial number of
interviewees traced the beginnings of their political involvement to the YCW.
Several leading activists in Kagiso had a background in the YCW; some came
to represent the "workerist Opposition" in the civic. YCW also offered youth
the opportunity to keep in touch with other townships and to exchange
experiences.31
The Young Christian Workers organization owes its existence to a Flemish
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priest—later cardinal—Jozef Cardijn (1882-1967), who in the 19205 began
organizing young workers in the industrial town of Laken in Belgium. After
World War II, in which Cardijn was imprisoned in a German concentration
camp, the organization grew into an international movement, the Young
Christian Workers.32 In South Africa, YCW was introduced by Eric Tyacke,
who in 1970 was also instrumental in the formation of the Urban Training
Project, a service organization for African trade unionists. In the 19505 and
19605, YCW was a broad, church-based movement, but in the 19705, YCW
became more specifically mvolved in workers' issues, such as advising on
workers' rights and addressing the problems of young domestic workers.
Although the links with the Catholic Church offered some protection, the
YCW leadership jealously guarded the autonomy of the movement against the
church establishment. The image YCW sought to portray was that of worker
militancy rather than religion. Many YCW members were in fact unaware of
its links with the Catholic Church, but a militant Christianity remained a
source of inspiration. As Lawrence Ntlokoa told his police interrogators, YCW
stood for the theology of liberation rather than for chansmatic Christianity.33
Indeed, the 1975 Declaration of Principles of YCW expresses strong anti-
capitalist sentiments and pledges "to bring about complete change, a new
organization of the structures of society in the cultural, social, politica! and
economie fields. A society that will ensure the complete fulfillment of man as
a HUMAN being, i.e. a classless society."34 In this struggle for a better world,
YCW projected itself in a vanguard role, aspiring to be a living example of
what this new society ought to be like. Lawrence Ntlokoa, who as a nineteen-
year-old was appointed YCW Organizer for the Transvaal in November 1976,
claims that hè was told in his training course that the YCW in South Africa
strove to bring about change by means of revolution, "but under the condi-
tion that the proposed change in South Africa must be obtained by the work-
ing class and not by a so-called bourgeois system.... To achieve this politica!
aim under Black Majority rule and to retaliate against military action by the
government, the YCW, the trade unions and the Roman Catholic Church, to
a certain extenft], wil! accept the support of armed forces irrespective of their
ongm and ideologies, from outside South Africa."35 A YCW chaplain showed
him how to tune in to the ANC's Radio Freedom. During YCW seminars
youth learned about the history of the banned liberation movements. Ntlokoa
was told that the ANC and YCW shared the vision of a classless society, for
which Tanzania stood as a model.
After his conviction for public violence on charges of stoning a bus and set-
ting afire a delivery van of the Afrikaans newspaper Rapport, Ntlokoa became
thoroughly disilmsioned with YCW. During his spel! in detention hè received
no salary and no other support, as YCW policy did not condone the use of
a violence. The Roman Catholic hierarchy most likely fostered a different vision
of the Kingdom of God and of the road leading toward this destination.
Detention was followed by a banning order, which gave Ntlokoa the distinc-
tion of being the youngest banned person in South Africa. Due to this ban-
ning order, Ntlokoa could not openly participate in civic activities, but hè was
in touch with several leading activists, and Frank Chikane allowed him the use
of the facüities of the IYCC. During most of 1981 and 1982, he was in prison
on various convictions for violations of his banning order. After the lifting of
his banning order in 1983, hè became secretary of the Kagiso civic.
Ntlokoa was bitter about the YCW "oligarchy" and skeptical about church
institutions, but his politica! ideals remained inspired by a mix of Christian-
ity and socialism, as is evident from his diary and from a letter written in 1980.
Rereading the Bible during the long months of his banning order, hè discov-
ered that "Salvation history is totally on the side, objectively and subjectively,
of the poor, the oppressed. .. . Faith then, brings with it new dimensions of
the liberation struggle."36 The following fragments from Lawrence Ntlokoa's
diary, written in Kagiso in 1985, illustrate how Christianity and socialism con-
tinued to inspire Ntlokoa's world view, even after hè had left YCW.37
Goodbye 1984
Just the year before you
I was a banned man
The newspapers said I was
The youngest banned m S.A.
I was banned because I bekeved
I believed in goodness
f I believed in the Bible
And I was a Christian
1984 let me teil you about
theself of mine
So the Rastas say
They spent no trial six months
At a prison called the Fort
and guys mside call it No. Four
A prison I once visited
I also visited Groentpunt
And Leeukop Maximum
And also a prison in Benom
They call it Modder Bee
I don't know what Modder means
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It sounds like Afrikaans to me
I also saw the eyes of the church
the good I praise
the evil I crmcise
I reserve my soft words
for the workers
the working class
also for beggars
who are the slaves of misery
while pnces mount up
like waves of the sea
ah—each wave stronger
Who among us can fight waves
except Jesus Christ the only begotten
Christ the friend of the workers
who died for their cause
who was tortured in detention
and died in pain
hanged on the wooden cross
who once said to his comrades and the masses
"do you suppose that I am here
to bring peace on this earth
No, I teil you.
But rather dissension
why do people pretend to be godly
when they are filthy inside
only the sharks survive the waves
there is no peace
and never can be peace
without change
without revolution
but hè was sold out
by a sell-out—Judas
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most of the people really did hear what the
preacher man was saying
the brother said
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"God blesses only those who suffer
who suffer with resignation"
:
 ff the brother saw
Chddren eating leftover food
sometimes rotten
given by a corrupt system
which creates hunger
hè would stop talking about resignation
and rebel
rebelkon comes from bitterness
but the brother is too fat
and a shark
to can care about people in hunger
how can hè say that
Not even a cent
it is not backwardness
or the colour of a man's skin
that causes poverty
it is capitalism
Umtyofstruggle
of the two opposites
the oppressed on the one hand
the oppressor man
the class contradiction between
workers and capitalists
capitaksm exploit workers
and workers are exploited by capitahsts
a fusion
an illusion
remake the world
too many people are sad
too kttle people have everything
too many people have nothing
Lefs bring it nght
letfs make the condiüons necessary for free
and democratie South Afnca
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when the colour
black or white
means nothing more than the colour of a man's eyes
From the Diary of Lawrence Ntlokoa, Kagiso, 1985
Ntiokoa dropped out of school in the sixth Standard, or grade, but hè i
always been an avid reader, and hè continued his education by correspond
courses. From his YCW experience he kept an analytical approach, an int
in revolutionary theory, and an awareness of sociopolitical struggles in O ~ ,
parts of the world. Among the publications that the police confiscated in 1983
when hè was charged with the possession of banned literature, were many arri-,
cles on the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. At the time of the formation of KRO,!
Ntlokoa had broken off contact with YCW. But YCW was to provide another*
core of young activists who played a leading part in civic activities in Kagiso,'
Like the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), YCw
decided against affiliation with the UDF. A position paper stressed the role of j
YCW as an autonomous organizaoon of working-class youth diät should not J
engage m joint action "with non-class based organisations as this can cause
problems during actions and regarding the aims and direction of actions."38
The paper objected to the UDF's formula of representation, in which large
trade unions would not carry more weight than a service center employing just
a few people. "YCW wanted to keep its prophetic mission, it did not want to
be swallowed in this broad movement."39 With its emphasis on building
strong working-class organizations with proper channels of accountability,
YCW was bound to be suspicious of the UDF's tactics. From its "workerist"
position, it criticized the populist politics of both the UDF and the civics,
which tended to move from one protest campaign to the next without build-
ing a solid organizational infrastructure. There are valid points in these criri-
cisms, but the YCWs puntamcal clinging to its "class base" hampered its
effectiveness. In Kagiso, for example, YCW activists contributed signrficantly
toward the formation of a civic. But subsequently they left the fledgling civic
to its own devices because YCW wanted to be "class based," whereas a civic
was a "populist" orgamzation.
The YCWs organizing method was to start from daily experiences in peo-
ple's lives. Small groups would hold weekly meetings and discuss strategies for
change, beginning widi very concrete actions. Factory workers would discuss
a strategy to get management to give overalls to the workers or to improve
safety conditions. High school students devised a way to approach die bus
Company with a request to fit the bus schedule to the school hours. These
tions would then be evaluated and, if necessary, followed up. As people
ßed more confidence, they moved on to tackle bigger issues. But this step-
•Step approach was rather out of tune with the spirit of immediacy in the
jd-ipSos. YCW activists were generally critical of consumer boycotts of
hite-owned shops, since they usually lacked clearly defïned goals, were
iforced in an undemocratic way, and could result in the loss of jobs. In many
ses, shopkeepers m the townships took advantage of the boycott to raise
eir prices. One activist commented on how YCW was somewhat out of step:
,l People were also romanticizing the armed struggle at that time. There was this
mood that the seizure of power is imminent. YCW lost many people to MK. We
l were told to stop analyzing and to come and fight, because hberation is around
l: the corner. People got impanent with the YCWs method of analyzing and strate-
gizing. It was the time of easy slogans... . Also, the inter-orgamzational nvalry
badly affected the YCW. In YCW were people both from UDF and from
AZAPO. YCW was preaching political tolerance, but that went against the mood
of the time. Some YCW members in the Eastern Cape were almost killed by the
UDF because they did not want to side against AZAPO.40
t Thus, although it had made a significant contribution to the development of
Italented leadership for trade unions, student organizations, and civics, in the
l ftay of the mid-i98os YCW was mcreasingly forced to the sidelines. Toward
[ the end of the decade, YCW membership stood at a low ebb. The unbanning
t of the ANC caused a new discussion about YCWs future. The 1991 YCW
" national executive remained convinced that the organization still had a role to
play: "The YCW has to look beyond immediate political goals; you need to
have a vision, a vision of a better society, the Kingdom of God."41 YCW as
such was not among the main actors in die mid-i98os. The organization nev-
. ertheless deserves to be taken into account in any assessment of this episode,
because of its importance as a training ground for youth leadership.
In Kagiso, YCW deserves mention in at least two capacities. Several lead-
ing activists had an YCW background, while a core of YCW activists came to
present the local variant of a "workerist Opposition" in the heady months
of people's power in 1985-86. The young man who introduced a group of
Kagiso youth to YCW was Bafana Seripe, who had been working for YCW in
the Cape. He became YCW organizer for the West Rand in 1981 and served as
YCW national president from 1982 to 1984. His audience was duly impressed.
"Most of us had much problems with Christianity, but the YCW was dealing
with our concrete problems. It dealt with issues like SRC's, corpora! punish-
ment, problems of unemployment, the importance of unionization, the dif-
ferent Strands in unionism, like workerism and populism, with worker
problems like health and safety, long working hours and with Community
issues like the corruption of town councillors."42 Seripe's YCW group then
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linked up with Frank Chikane's IYCC and some AZAPO activists to condi
house-to-house visits to infbrm residents about the impending rent increase
and to préparé the ground for the formation of the civic.
Other civic activists in Kagiso with a YCW background were the brothers
George, Tizza, and Busang Moiloa, and Serge Mokonyane. At the time, th£
YCW group consisted mainly of young workers and unemployed youth, not
high school students. George Moiloa, who in 1981 was elected secretary of
KRO, recalled a certain ambivalence in his YCW group toward his civic
ities. "The emphasis was on workers' action. People in the YCW would be
somewhat scornful of Community work such as in KRO." The "heavy guys"
the YCW favored work floor action and regarded Community work as a "soft
option." They were rather dismissive of all the campaigns, rallies, and com-
memorations that tended to become an end in itself. "It was more noise than
substance, it did not change anything."43
COSAS, ANC, cmd Trade Unions
Since they are much better known than YCW, the Congress of South African
Students (COSAS), the ANC, and the trade unions need less introduction.
Kagiso had a fairly active COSAS branch in 1979-81. One of the COSAS
activists in 1980 was Vusi Gqobi, who also served on the COSAS national
executive. He was in touch with Chikane's IYCC, where hè met Lawrence
Ntlokoa. In 1981, when Ntlokoa, thoroughly fed up with his banning order,
unemployment, and police harassment, wanted to flee the country, hè con-
tacted Gqobi, who was a student leader of some stature. Gqobi arranged
transport to Swaziland for Ntlokoa, his girlfriend, their baby boy, and one
other young man. But Gqobi was apparently working as a police informer.
The car was halted at a roadblock by policemen who knew all the details about
its occupants. Ntlokoa landed in jail for 14 months for contravening his ban-
ning order. Meanwhile, Gqobi skipped the country but was subsequently
arrested by the ANC in Mozambique.44
This incident led to the breakdown of the COSAS branch in Kagiso. Later,
in 1984, the branch was reconstituted by a new erop of high school activists,
but it remained weak and ineffective. "There was too much harassment. We
could not have meetings, not in the schools and not in the churches. Only
later, in 1985-86, then it was possible to have meetings."45 The absence of an
active COSAS branch partly explains why Kagiso remained quiet in 1984-85,
while riots spread through the Vaal and the East Rand townships.46 Although
the YCW branch in Kagiso seems to have produced only male activists,
through COSAS some young women became involved in civic marters. One
of them was Nomvula Mkhize, who after having completed matric became an
gttive trade unionist and a civic activist with a strong interest in women's
BSues. She emerged from this turbulent decade as a dedicated member of the
South African Communist Party (SACP), serving on the SACP Transvaal lead-
ership in 1991.
The ANC was virtually unmentionable in the early 19805. George Moiloa
and his brothers never discussed politics at home but discovered the ANC on
.their own: "We began listening to Radio Freedom around 1973. We used to
Ikind of steal my father's radio. When hè came home after work, hè would
Lonlock his cupboard and I would take the radio out and take it to school. One
t Ome hè caught me. I told him that we were listening to Radio Freedom and
i hè was absolutely furious. Eight years later I found out that hè been an ANC
{ member all along."47| At the time of the formation of KRO, ideological loyalties were not clearly
• crystallized. George and his friends worked with AZAPO members and gen-
erally considered BC organizations to be allies rather than adversaries of the
ANC. The extent of ANC underground organization in Kagiso is difficult to
I gauge. My interviews were conducted in 1990-91, when many people claimedthat they had been working in the ANC all along. Ike Genu, the vice-chair ofKRO, mentioned himself and Sister Bernard as members of an undergroundANC cell in Kagiso.48 He saw it as his responsibility to ensure the primacy ofthe ANC in township politics and to guard against tendencies to build the
UDF or the civic leadership as an alternative organization. For example, hè
distributed banned ANC literature during civic meetings.
Trade union organization was rather weak in Kagiso, but the civic leader-
ship included some active unionists. KRO chair Joe Makgothlo acquired orga-
nizational experience in the Food and Beverage Workers Union (FBWU). He
worked as an overseer for South African Breweries (SAB) in Chamdor and
was actively involved in the FBWU and in its umbrella organization CUSA
(Council of Unions of South Africa), as well as in the Lutheran Church.
Unlike FOSATU, CUSA favored involvement of its union membership in
Community issues. Makgothlo agreed with that position: "If I get a pay rise,
I and the rent goes up, then I lose again. I am the same person on the factoryfloor and in the township." He found that the organizing and negotiating skillslearned in his union activities were helpful in his civic work. Trade unions and
the Soweto Civic Association served as a model when members of the KRO
sat down to write a constitution for the civic.49
I Another active trade unionist in the KRO executive was Serge Mokonyane,who lived in Munsieville and worked for an engineering Company in Krugers-dorp. He was a voluntary organizer for GAWU (General and Allied WorkersUnion) before hè became a full-time employed GAWU organizer in 1983. Not
only did the civic benefit from people with union experience; conversely, the
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unions could make use of civic channels. "The West Rand had a low level <
trade union organization. The civic saw it as significant to popularize l
unions, to give workers advice, to distribute pamphlets with information <
various trade union offices. Kagiso became a GAWU stronghold."50
With these various inputs, KRO could benefit from wide-ranging exp
ences and organizational expertise. Leading activists were linked into an extenl
sive network of contacts with other organizations and other townshipsj
Sympathetic church leaders provided meeting facilities. The civic could draw J
on the experience of older, respected township residents and on the energies'
of highly motivated and articulate youth activists. It had the potential toj
become a broad-based organization.
KRO's First Phase, 1981-1983
Of the ten people who were elected to the executive of KRO in February 1981,,
only four or five actually took up their positions. Active involvement in civic
marters meant taking risks, and the KRO leadership was acutely aware of this.
When George Moiloa accepted his election as KRO secretary, hè decided to
resign his job as distributor of the West Rand Sorghum Beer Board. He
expected to be victimized if hè combined civic activism with work for a state
enterprise. Moiloa, who had completed high school in 1978, decided to look
for a factory job instead. But hè remained unemployed for nearly a year, dur-
ing which hè worked as a full-time activist. He then managed to get a well-
paid clerical job at Hoechst m the Chamdor Industrial Area, with prospects
for further improvement. But the police used to follow him around the plant,
and hè was detained several times until hè lost his job because the management
found the police presence embarrassing. Immediately after Moiloa was fired,
the police came to fetch him and made it clear to him that he would never find
a new job. He remained unemployed until 1983, when hè was appointed
Organizer for the Young Christian Workers.51
After the suspension of the rent increase, the immediate cause for the for-
mation of KRO, many residents lost interest. It proved difficult to staff the
various subcommittees. The original plan for a signed-up, fee-paying mem-
bership, as outlined in the constitution, did not materialize. Initially, only the
Catholic Church and the Apostolic Faith Mission were willing to provide
accommodation for meetings. Other churches refused because of objections
by the Community councillors, some of whom were also church elders, and
out of fear for the security police. The KRO executive arranged a meeting with
all the churches in Kagiso, explaining that "the churches do not belong to the
security police, but to the people."52 But it was only after KRO approached
: South African Council of Churches in Johannesburg that churches in
ps»giso were made available for civic meetings.
U Interest in the civic was revived when the council decided to reintroduce
: rent increase m August 1981, and the bus Company announced a raise in
:s from 30 cents to 32 cents. Also at this time, the council decided to go
lead with the construction of a large hostel for migrant workers, a project
at had been planned back in 1976 but that remained unknown to the inhab-
iiänts of Kagiso until work on the building actually began. Not only KRO
but also the board of Leratong Hospital and a training center at Chamdor
«rotested against the erection of a 20 million Rand hostel that was to accom-
f
">date about six thousand men. The hostel, much larger than the existing
grant workers' barracks in Kagiso I, was to be built between Leratong
)spital and Kagiso II. The proposed hostel was branded "a danger to the
ïimunity" and a threat to "the morals of the people."53
* In a newspaper interview, Frank Chikane explained that the planned hostel
| .would "injure the morals" and break up family life in the township. Thousands
|of married men would be forced to live together in this huge complex. Hos-
- tel dwellers, however, were portrayed not only as menaces but also as victims
s of the system. "Hostel-dwellers are only human. They are forced to live in cir-
cumstances that force them to misbehave." The site of the hostel caused fear
among student nurses at Leratong Hospital, who would have to pass it on
their way to work. Residents quoted in newspaper interviews were generally
of the opinion that hostels did not belong in townships altogether, in view
of the attacks by hostel dwellers on residents in several sections of Soweto after
the 1976 unrest.54
KRO also linked the building of a unisex hostel to the perpetuation of the
migratory labor system and noted that, whereas the labor was required by
white industrialists, the black township was saddled with the social conse-
quences of the migrant labor system. Moreover, the township had a severe
shortage of housing, as was evident from the proliferating numbers of back-
yard shacks and the overcrowded houses, which parents had to share with
their married children. The solution proposed by KRO was to build the hos-
tel in a white residential area and to provide houses for township residents on
the proposed hostel site. The Kagiso council, which had initially approved
the hostel complex, now reversed itself and supported the demand to build
two thousand houses instead. The issues were discussed at a public meeting
attended by about a hundred residents. The council argued that the rent
increases for Kagiso and Munsieville were long overdue, for rents in other
West Rand townships had already been raised back in 1979.55
KRO called a mass meeting at which those attending decided not to pay
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the rent increase. Instead, they would stage a boycott against the Greyhot
bus Company and would march to the West Rand Administration Board o£
in order to see the mayor. The marchers were met by police wielding sjamb
and firing tear gas. Some violent incidents took place, such as stoning l
and setting afire some buildings.56 The mayor refused to see the petitione
arguing that most of the marchers were children. Arter the march, three meni
bers of the KRO executive were detained for over two weeks on accusatioa
of holding an illegal meeting, but the charges were eventually dropped. Tea
others, arrested on charges of public violence, were later acquitted.
The campaign was partially successful. The hostel project was not
 R
doned, but it was scaled down to a smaller size, and new housing projects:
were undertaken. But the rent increase was implemented, although KRÖj
made another attempt at stopping it by engaging a lawyer who argued that the
measure was unlawful since it had not been officially announced, as legally
required. However, rents were simply announced in retrospect.57
A new rent increase in 1982 brought a new protest meeting. This time, at;
two meetings organized by KRO, petitions circulated calling for the resigna-
tion of the council, the scrapping of the Community Council Act since "it was •
not approved and accepted by the Black people of Krugersdorp" and the ;
recognition of KRO as "our sole representative Organisation established
according to a constitution made and accepted by the Black people of Krugers-
dorp."58 This was going one step beyond pretests and petitions: now the civic
declared the council illegitimate since it was based on legislation in which
Africans had had no part. Thus, even before the formation of the UDF, civics
linked local issues such as rents with the disenfranchisement of Africans.
Information on the relationship between KRO and the migrants in the hos-
tels—a relevant matter, particularly in view of the events in 1990—is rather
sketchy. Representatives of the older hostel in Kagiso I were invited to the 1981
meeting protesting the construction of a new hostel. According to Sister
Bernard, they joined residents in rejecting the new hostel.59 George Moiloa
recalled several not very successful attempts to involve the hostel people in
civic matters. At one point, the civic tried to address hostel issues when hos-
tel dwellers approached the civic with a complaint about the lack of hot water.
"We were willing to look at their problems . . . but there was no follow up.
But we were already struggling with organizing the residents, that was our
first priority. It was a difficult time, people were scared, it was very depressive.
. . . Hostels feil outside the scope of KRO; squatters mostly, too."60
The inmates in the hostels were not affected by rent increases in the town-
ships, since their fees were set under different regulations. Backyard tenants,
living in snacks in the backyards of township houses, would be indirectiy
affected, as the landlords would generally pass on any increase in rents and
,vice charges to their tenants. However, tenants were in a more vulnerable
ijsition that did not allow for collective action. Township residents in coun-
1 houses could diminish their individual vulnerability by engaging in a col-
gtive rent boycott, but backyard tenants could not link forces and were afraid
feviction in a time of acute housing shortages. Another raise in service
ges came in 1983, but KRO succeeded in getting the increase in rates
E-iced by petitioning the minister of cooperation and development.
61
 This
the year of constitutional reform, with a concomitant relaxation of repres-
i in the colored and Indian communities, the main targets of the govern-
lent's co-option strategy. For Kagiso, however, 1983 was a year of fear.
In March, Sister Bernard, Lettie Nzima, and Ike Genu were detained on
irges of possession of banned literature and, in the case of Genu, ANC
rmcmbership. When other members of the executive were called as state wit-
ipesses, the KRO leadership became divided on whether or not to give evidence.
After consultations with a lawyer, chair Joe Makgothlo did give evidence but
jwithout further incriminating Genu. George Moiloa and Lettie Nzima
• refused to testify.62 Moiloa was detained in August 1983, together with two
, Others, on charges of furthering the aims of the ANC, charges that related to
• the celebration of National Women's Day in 1982. The state alleged that in the
tpast this event had been commemorated by the ANC Women's League.
„ Therefore, if the accused had now marked this occasion on the same date, they
were guilty of furthering the aims of the ANC. After a trial lasting more than
three months, all three were acquitted.
In the case against Genu, the public prosecutor produced some T-shirts in
green, yellow, and black with texts such as "Mayibuye" and "Back to God" and
a copy of the ANC magazine Mayibuye. One of the T-shirts sported the words
"Viva Mandela," a text obviously puzzling to the court clerk, who noted in the
proceedings: "Mandela who is on Robben Island. Apparently a prisoner."63
The judge noted that Genu had no previous convictions and that hè had
already spent over half a year as a remand prisoner, but hè considered ANC
membership a "very grave crime." Genu was sentenced to eight years. Testi-
mony in the court case against Genu appears to indicate that hè had been
openly propagating the ANC, bringing ANC flags to civic meetings in church
halls, pointing out the radio frequencies for Radio Freedom, and telling peo-
ple that KRO was fighting civic issues under the banner of the ANC.64
This harsh sentence, based solely on the use of ANC Symbols, was more
severe than had been customary at that time. In the trial against Moiloa, the
state produced ANC publications that hè claimed hè had never seen before.
"They also brought in an ex-ANC fighter to testify in camera. This scared
everybody to death. People were thinking that we were involved in under-
ground activity." He interpreted the court case as an attempt to take the KRO
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leadership out of circulation and to warn residents not to associate with these
"terrorists." The political trials served their purpose. Many residents were thor-
oughly intimidated, and the civic leadership became weakened by interna!
division. Suspicions had been sown by a seemingly arbitrary policy on the part
of the public prosecutor as to which persons were issued with a subpoena to
testify in the case against Genu. George Moiloa, although called as a state wit-
ness, was not subpoenaed in the case against Genu. This had the usual effect
of causing rumors and speculations: Why would the police have decided to
leave Moiloa alone? Moiloa was critical of Genu's "populist" style, which
aimed at popularizing the ANC rather than building grassroots support for
the civic. "I did not want this very high political profïle. People began to
freak."65 Shortly afterward, Moiloa left Kagiso where his "opting out" was not
taken kindly by the remaining civic leadership. However, he did not drop out
of activism but, rather, chose to operate in a new environment: hè went to
work as YCW Organizer in Soweto.
By late 1983, KRO had seriously declined. Attempts to revive the civic pro-
duced no concrete results. "KRO had reached a state of exhaustion."66 The
lapse into inactivity can be partly explained by repression. An important part
of the leadership was removed from civic life by trials that dragged on for
months, while the Kagiso Community was intimidated by the severe sentence
against Genu. It has also been argued that KRO had a weak structure, rely-
ing too much on single-issue campaigns rather than on organization build-
ing.67 Moiloa had a somewhat different assessment of KRO. In accordance
with YCW principles, hè believed that concentrating on the concrete local
issues of everyday township life was the best strategy for building solid organ-
izations. But confidence in the benefits of collective action would grow only
only if it could be shown that the action produced concrete results. Deliver-
ing the goods generally required dealing with relevant authorities. He blamed
KRO's relative ineffectiveness on the strong focus on protest and the lack of
negotiating skills. "KRO believed very much in protest action. You would
have meetings and blast the councillors as sellouts. . . . We limited ourselves
to protest, we got ourselves arrested, we scared people off, and we could not
deliver anything for fear of engaging in reformist action."68
This verdict seems overly harsh: KRO was not adverse to dealing with
authorities. On several occasions its campaigns were at least partially success-
ful. KRO's leadership was not out of touch with residents who preferred non-
confrontational tactics over radical posturing. Illustrative of this is the fact that
KRO only called for a boycott of the rent increase; residents continued to pay
the original amount of rent. In the insurgent atmosphere of the mid-ipSos,
many civics, including KRO, went through a process of rapid radicalization.
But before radicalization set in, from 1983 until 1985 KRO first went through
a phase of decline and revival.
KRO's Decline and Revival: 1983-1985
f For South Africa, 1984 was marked by the introduction of the tricameral par-liament, the successful election boycott spearheaded by the UDF, and, begin-ning in September, the eruption of township revolt in the Vaal Triangle. Butin Kagiso not much happened. In late 1983, KRO affüiated with the UDF but
I did not take an active part in UDF campaigns. Another rent increase failed to
galvanize protest. The Kagiso civic had now joined forces with the Munsieville
Development Committee. Renamed as the Krugersdorp Residents Organisa-
tion (KRO), it represented both the Krugersdorp townships. Up until this
time, the committee in Munsieville had been fairly ineffective, limiting itself
to the occasional organization of charities or assistance with funerals. Never-
theless, some important changes occurred in this period of inactivity. Begin-
ning in 1985, youth became more prominent in civic activities, while KRO also
experienced a partial change in leadership.
K Lawrence Ntlokoa's banning order was lifted in July 1983. The severe terms
H of this order, which forbade him from receiving visitors without prior per-
mission, had precluded any active involvement in civic matters. Unable to find
a job, hè completed his high school studies through a correspondence course.
In December 1983 hè was attacked and stabbed by a group of balaclava-clad
men. During a three-week stay in the hospital hè did some hard thinking
about the next phase of his life. He first wanted to get a job. He did indeed
I manage to find a position as stock-controller with Hoechst in the Chamdorindustrial area and joined the Chemical Workers' Union, later becoming shopSteward. In June 1984 hè was co-opted to the executive of KRO and appointed
secretary of the civic. In the somewhat milder political climate of 1984, having
a regulär job and holding a leading position in a civic were apparently no
longer incompatible, as they had been in the days of George Moiloa. Ike Genu
was acquitted on appeal and returned from Robben Island in August 1984. He
resumed his position as vice-chair of KRO.
Ntlokoa, now in his late twenties, embarked on an evaluation of KRO's
performance with the use of methods learned in his days in YCW, While the
civic was still trying to get on its feet, the townships of the Vaal Triangle
erupted in a violent conflagration of rent protests, attacks on councillors, and
police repression. "We were then drawn into events, like the other civics.
There was no time for a thorough reorganization."69 In support of the Vaal
townships, KRO launched a consumer boycott against white businesses. It
was a purely local boycott, not linked to similar initiatives elsewhere, and it feil
flat because of poor organization. Later that year, an attempt to boycott Grey-
hound buses in protest against a rise in fares also failed.70 The two-day stay-
away in November ofthat year, also called in protest against repression in the
Vaal townships, was equally ineffective in Kagiso.
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Strategy and tactics receded to the background when KRO became caught
up in unfolding events. But the strategy document drawn up by Lawrence
Ntlokoa in late 1984 still makes interesting reading. Under Lenin's adage
"without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolution," hè criticized the
absence of social cohesiveness and the lack of political education.71 Civic
activists, claimed Ntlokoa, met only at meetings. They did not attempt to
involve their families or friends, and they had no other joint activities, which
the author blamed on bad ways, womanizing, excessive drunkenness, nega-
tive attitudes, and bad Company, among others: "It is because some people
(activists) are not wholly revolutionary are opportunists who are in struggle
for what they can get out of it, e.g. information (to be passed on to the enemy)
popularity that the individual gains and material gains. That is why they don't
try to conscientize those close to them." After this rather stern moral judgment
on his fellow activists, Ntlokoa lamented the lack of political education, result-
ing in spontaneous action without proper organizational foundations and
without a clear sense of direction. This amounted to taking "advantage of
spontaneity without sowing the seeds, so die struggle can be a class-conscious
struggle. Now that things are happening in Vaal, East Rand, Evaton and other
places we feel left out and without proper planning we want to jump the
wagon." He pointed to the absence of an organized fee-paying membership.
KRO was based on the assumption that every resident in Kagiso was a mem-
ber and that anyone attending meetings was an activist. This resulted in loose
structures and lack of funds to finance further activities. "There is no political
hegemony and coherence. The organization since its launching has been work-
ing loosely. There was no political education of the activists at all, let alone of
the masses." Building a "community of activists" required more social activi-
ties and also a more service-oriented approach—for example, by setting up a
burial society and a food cooperative that could provide low-priced groceries
because of bulk-buying. Ntlokoa aspired to build a "political community" in
Kagiso, rather than an issue-oriented civic with limited goals. In spite of the
revolutionary headline, the focus was on organization building rather than on
confrontation.
In spite of these discussions on how to reorganize the civic and how to
widen its base and its scope, not much happened. Another analysis of KRO,
presented at a committee meeting in May 1985, again noted that KRO had
"the potential of becoming an efFective Organisation," but that it was hampered
by limited participation and inadequate communication "with the masses."
"We tend to talk too much at meetings but our talking never produces any
action and deeds."72
Meanwhile, KRO was apparently sufficiently revamped to engage in a suc-
cessful battle on familiär terrain: a rent issue. In March 1985, residents had
6. Silkscreened poster in black and yellow produced by KRO Ad-
Hoc Committee, Johannesburg, 1985. Courtesy South African
History Archive (SAHA); tmmlmagesofDefiance: South African
Resistance Posters of the loSo's/Poster Book Collective, South African
History Archive. Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1991.
received notices from the council claiming rent arrears ranging from 22.50 to
900 Rand, in some cases dating back to 1981. No explanations were offered.
Instead, mayor Edward Moeketsi had added a message that read: "Thank you
for your loyal support of my council and for keeping Kagiso calm in these
troubled times."73 Two mass meetings, organized by KRO in Kagiso and
Munsieville, were attended by about two thousand people. At these meetings,
it was resolved that a KRO delegation should meet the town clerk to demand
an explanation for these arrears, since many residents could produce their
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receipts of rent paid since 1981. It was also resolved that until the matter was
solved satisfactorily, residents should pay only their normal rents. Those
attending the meetings also called on the town councillors to resign.74 One
resident raised the question whether KRO could meet with the council, but
this apparendy was not a cause for much debate. The minutes simply state that
"it was explained that it is possible."75 A KRO delegation met town clerk B. J.
Vorster, who explained that a mistake had been made with a change in admin-
istration. It was all blamed on the computer. All arrears accumulated befbre
July 1984, the date on which die Kagiso council became a local authority under
the new system of local government, were written off.76
The call for the councillors to resign had been made repeatedly in previ-
ous months, with KRO warning that it would call for a boycott of shops
owned by town councillors if they did not heed the call to step down. Mayor
Moeketsi had retorted that "for the sake of peace in the township," KRO
should "not try to emulate what our contemporaries in other areas are doing."
He gave a curious justifïcation for wanting to serve on the town council: "We
are equally involved in the struggle. Even scavengers play a significant role in
the struggle because without their help, diseases could spread."77
Although KRO successfully intervened in the rent dispute, this action did
not lead to a revival of sustained civic activities. In the same period, a housing
seminar had to be canceled due to lack of attendance.78 A transportation dis-
pute, which arose in early 1985, was resolved between the Kagiso Taxi Associ-
ation and the town council, apparently without intervention by KRO. The
Greyhound Bus Company, which ran intertown bus lines on the West Rand,
had introduced a new system of minibuses that operated in the township and
between Kagiso and Krugersdorp, charging five cents less than the local Black
Taxis. The Kagiso Taxi Association, representing about eighty taxi owners, was
angry about the perceived unfair competition that threatened to put local
enterprise out of business. The council, which had not been informed by
Greyhound about the new minibus service, sided with the taxi owners.79 The
taxi owners obviously saw no need to turn to KRO, since they were assured
of a sympathetic hearing by the council. It was common for town council-
lors to have an interest in the Black Taxi business, either through direct own-
ership or through front men.
Nor was KRO involved in a limited rent protest in Riverside, an elite hous-
ing section in Kagiso, where residents protested against high rentals of over
loo Rand for poorly built houses. The Kagiso town clerk admitted that houses
in Riverside were expensive, but added that nobody was forced to live there.80
The localized protest action by these relatively well-ofF residents was appar-
endy conducted without involvement from KRO.
One long-standing issue, the threatened demolition of Munsieville to make
way for an extension of Krugersdorp, seemed resolved when Gerrit Viljoen,
minister of cooperation, development and education, stated that no Commu-
nity would be moved by force. The Kagiso Council warmly welcomed the
announcement, which cleared the way for the upgrading of Munsieville. It
also meant that land in Kagiso, which had been set aside for Munsieville resi-
dents, could now be allocated to private developers for a new housing divi-
sion.81 KRO, however, remained suspicious of the suspension of forced
removals.82 They had good reason: the demolition of Munsieville would be
contemplated again in 1986.
TkeRoleofWomen
Meanwhile, KRO made new but largely unsuccessful attempts to broaden
itself from a single-issue organization to other spheres of township life. In Feb-
ruary 1985, KRO held a special "Mothers Mass Meeting" to discuss problems
of pensioners and "specific mothers' issues at house, community and at
work."83 But attendance was poor. At a subsequent meeting, the KRO exec-
utive resolved that a women's organization needed to be formed to establish
cooperation with the Federation of Transvaal Women. It was decided that
"Sister Bernard should co-opt some women."84 It is noteworthy that KRO
chose to address its potential female constituency as "mothers," which indi-
cated limitations both to the range of women addressed and to the scope of
envisaged activities. In Kagiso as elsewhere, women's issues were frequently
marginal to the civic's central concerns.
The young men who laid the foundations of KRO "did not consciously
think about involving women." They reasoned that the "mass consultation
process was done at night. It was thought that only men would be able to
move around the township at night."85 After the formation of KRO, women
did play a role, with Sister Bernard and Lettie Nzima, both middle-aged
women, being the main exponents. Prominent women like Albertina Sisulu
and Amanda Kwadi were invited to address civic meetings, and KRO also par-
ticipated in the commemoration of Women's Day on 9 August. But women's
involvement remained problematic. Women were reluctant to assert their
position; men generally believed that a woman's place was in the home. "Im-
tially, women were unable to participate in civic activities," recalled Nomvula
Mkhize later. "One reason was the insecurity of the streets at night. But another
reason was that men would not allow their wives to be involved in these activ-
ities It was a general thing; no attention was given to women's issues." She
herself became involved in politics through COSAS and church youdi activi-
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ties. But not many young women took an interest in politics. Mkhize's inter|
est in politics was raised because she used to hang around with the boys on hè
street. She commented further on the complications women faced:
There was the combined problem of age domination and gender domination:
as a young girl you could not raise issues like sexual abuse, women's problems,
female unemployment etc. Men usually did not take these issues seriously. For
instance, if the husband dies, then the house—the ownership or the rent con-
tract—goes to the oldest son, not to the wife. Women are in a dependent posi-
tion. There are also the problems with health care. There are no proper clinics in
Kagiso, The clinics that are there focus mainly on contraception. That is very
humiliating for women, because if you are seen going to such a clinic, the men
will point at you and say, hah, she is taking contraceptives, she must be having
a boyfriend.
The women's group in Kagiso, formed in 1984, later became a branch of
FEDTRAW (Federation of Transvaal Women). But even in 1984 "it was still
very difficult to get women to come to meetings, because the men left many
responsibilities to the women, household work, looking after children. They
thought that women should stay at home; even men who were themselves
political activists would take that position. Because it would have conse-
quences for themselves, they would have to share in household work. Taking
women's issues seriously is very threatening for men."87 Nomvula Mkhize
came to represent the women's organization in KRO, where she tried without
much success to get women's issues on the agenda.
The problems encountered in Kagiso were fairly typical of women's organ-
izations in the Transvaal townships, as is evident from a report on a workshop
held in 1984 by the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW), which
was also attended by representatives from Kagiso.88 The various women's
groups described how they organized women around everyday concerns: high
prices, high rents, low wages for women workers, child care, a bulk-buying
scheme to provide cheaper groceries to members, mutual aid schemes, day-
care centers. These were low-threshold concerns likely to engage ordinary
women. Politics and matters specifically relating to the oppression of women,
such as rape and other forms of sexual violence, proved more difficult. The
Soweto group reported that many grassroots women were apprehensive of
joining because of the high political profile of the group. Elsewhere, women
had even accused the Organizers of "hijacking them into politics." Other mem-
bers had become "confused" about women's organizations after reading about
the "women's liberation" movements in England and the United States.
The participants discussed extensively why women, although active in trade
unions, student organizations, and civics, rarely got elected to leadership posi-
tions. This problem was blamed not only on men who believed that women
ere inferior but also on women who had internalized the established role
atterns: "We are told that we are weak and we believe this." This lack of con-
dence enables "our male comrades to take us for granted." They "don't always
ÉJOW us respect. They also teil us what our women's groups should be doing."
However, from these proceedings it is clear that even women activists hardly
«Qntemplated a redefinition of roles. Although tradition, culture, and churches
were blamed for perpetuating the belief that women are weak, and although
fc was emphasized that women needed to take part in the broader struggle, the
'women's organizations basically limited their concerns to family and house-
Jiold obligations: "As women we have to look after die children and the house.
This means that we have to deal with all the financial burdens, the rising
• jjfices, GST, increases in Community services. We also have to see to the edu-
I cation of our children. So we are the ones who take all the responsibility—
'• we are the sponges at the bottom absorbing all the shocks."
Even in discussing how women should be involved in the political strug-
gle, it was still taken for granted that women should play this role in their
* capacity as mothers: "We, as mothers, are the first teachers of our children. We
are the ones teaching future generations. .. . Without getting this knowledge
for ourselves, we cannot hope to educate our children in a responsible way nor
will we be able to teach other women."89 Both political culture and religious
ethics, even in the variant of liberation theology, militated against women's
involvement as women. A document entitled "Black Woman's Theology"
stressed that men and women were absolutely equal in personal and funda-
mental values, but that women fulfilled different functions that were not com-
petitive but complementary to those of men. It then pronounced a divine
sanction over women's role as mothers: "The primary function, the lofty goal,
and the sublime mission which God himself has set a woman is mother-
hood."90
Politically active women were often inclined to subordinate women's inter-
ests to the national liberation struggle. Amanda Kwadi of FEDSAW, who held
the women's portfolio on the UDF Transvaal executive, harbored deep sus-
picions against feminism: "The idea of feminism goes hand in hand with cap-
italism and imperialism, something which the Women's Federation in South
Africa denounces. Maybe, as time goes on, there'll be clarification, but at the
moment when we get deep into feminism it goes so much against African tra-
dition that it is totally out. We're in the middle of a liberation struggle, but
women's liberation is not necessary at this stage. We are far more concerned
about total liberation; and automatically our own liberation will follow."91
Not only men but also women invoked "tradition" or "human nature" to
justify patriarchal gender relations, even though actual practice was often far
removed from the supposed traditional ideal type. After a slow start, the
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women's organization in Kagiso grew to about two hundred members inj
1985-86. Members tended to see their organization as a discussion group fora-
mothers' problems, such as undisciplined children, juvenile delinquency, and j
housing problems. Funds were raised by selling secondhand clothes. Mem«',
bers did not see their group as a lobby to put women's affairs on the agenda j
of the civic, for "they were dealing with separate issues."92 Overtly politica!;
action was taken only when repression mounted, and women saw their chil-!
dren beaten up by the police. Thus, when in early 1986 the women marcheeï
to the police station in Krugersdorp to protest against police harassing their,
children, they were acting in their role as mothers. The march was welcomed
by the civic leadership and still was mentioned in the interviews with KRO
leaders as one of the feats of township resistance in Kagiso.
This example of repression inducing a radicalization of women is at odds
with Jeremy Seekings's Suggestion that the shift to violent conflict in the mid-
19805 contributed to the exclusion of women. In seeking to explain why
women were less prominently involved in township politics tiian in the 19505,
hè points to the tensions between "the politics of Organisation and the politics
of confrontation." Escalating confrontation brought a growing influence of
former or potential gang members, with their machismo group culture in
which women were more likely to be seen as "rewards and trophies" than as
equal participants.93 This may well be the case, but it would not be a reason
for women to keep clear of civic activities. Many civics became actively
involved in improving public safety, an issue to which women gave high pri-
ority. In Kagiso, the civic and the youth congress owed much of their popu-
larity among women to their anticrime campaigns.
Youth Organization: A Slow Start
Attempts at organizing women in the context of the civic had a slow start.
More surprisingly perhaps, setting up a local youth congress also proved dif-
ficult. Like elsewhere, high school students in Kagiso were impatient with the
pace of events in the adult organizations: "The youth is more fast thinking."94
But transforming youth consciousness into youth organization was not a
smooth Operation. About two hundred people had been invited by KRO to
a workshop in May 1985 to discuss the feasibility of forming a local youth con-
gress, but only eleven people showed up. The participants believed that there
was a potential for a youth organization, "but lack of Organisation is having a
role of frustration and confusion." Politicized high school students, the most
likely youth to take the initiative, were being "victimised at school level."95
After the COSAS branch had collapsed in 1982, attempts had been made to
reconstitute a Kagiso branch. An interim structure had been formed in 1984,
but schools did not permit COSAS meetings on the school grounds.
l- In Munsievüle, "youth interest groups" had been established in late 1983,
bfganized to take up general issues such as the lack of facilities for youth but
to tackle matters of public safety such as stabbings and rape.96 In May
g>5, a committee was formed by youth from Kagiso II. KRO discussed
iwhether the International Year of the Youth could provide a suitable frame-
Work for a local youth organization to get off the ground. The range of pos-
itie activities discussed sounds surprisingly apolitical: drama, music, reading,
; tennis, cinemas, meetings, football, poetry, boxing, horse racing.97
The nationwide banning of COSAS in August 1985 provided another impe-
tus for the formation of a youth congress in Kagiso. Church youth groups and
|; Sports clubs were approached as youth began to assert a distinct role for them-
^selves in township politics. The Kagiso Youth Congress (KAYCO) was formed
around July or August of i985.98 Meetings were held in the Catholic Church
near Sister Bernard's convent. Surprisingly, KAYCO leaders saw their main
responsibilities not in addressing specific youth issues but in maintaining pub-
lic safety. The high death rate in Kagiso, as a consequence of crime, stabbings,
and excessive drinking, was singled out as the most pressing concern.99 The
first major campaign undertaken by KAYCO was the anticrime campaign in
December 1985.
Violent protest in Kagiso began on 16 June 1985 with the commemoration
of the 1976 student revolt, in spite of KRO's efforts to ensure a peaceful day of
remembrance. The Taverners' Association had agreed to KRO's request to
close the shebeens, or taverns, on the weekend of 16 June; shops would close
down from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. No special observance of the day was demanded
from the Taxi Association.100 Violent incidents erupted when police fired tear
gas into the crowd after the service in the Methodist Church.101 The shop of
town councillor Goodman Mabasa was set on fire ahhough hè had obeyed a
call to keep his shop closed. Shortly afterward, Mabasa and another council-
lor resigned their positions on the council and were applauded by KRO for
doing so. Violent incidents intensified during July and August. Houses of
councillors and police vehicles were pelted with stones, and a supermarket was
plundered and set on fire. Most incidents involved youth, with schools—both
primaiy and secondary—being the main centers of violent protest. In several
instances police fired teargas or rubber bullets.102
An attempt by the civic to enforce a consumer boycott in August 1985 feil
flat, and several KRO leaders were detained for a hundred days.103 Ike Genu
would remain in detention until March 1986. Unrest in the schools simmered
on after the events of 16 June, which had led to the arrest of several students.
One of the causes of unrest was the death of a pupil from the Junior Secondary
School, who was allegedly shot by his uncle, a shopkeeper, during an argu-
ment over gasoline. Youth plundered the shop and later set afire the shop-
keeper's house. In September, firebombs caused 300,000 Rand of damage in
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the Senior Secondary School. Student demands included the introduction <
democratically elected student representative councils (SRCs), an end to cor-1
poral punishment, improvement of the library, and the release of fellow stu«
dents who had been detained in June.104
Violent incidents, including more attacks on the houses of town council-1
lors, continued until December. But compared to many other townships in|
the PWV region, Kagiso remained fairly quiet. The partial State of Emergency,*
declared on 20 July 1985, included Soweto and several other West Rand town-
ships, but not Kagiso. Only in December 1985 did Kagiso enter a phase of mass;
mobilization and widespread rebellion and repression. Before looking at KRO
in that phase of township revolt, we examine the changing context in which
the civic was now operating.
Local Politics and National Liberation
Why was it that Kagiso, and other townships like Soweto and Mamelodi,
remained relatively quiet until late 1985, while die Vaal townships erupted in
September 1984? Why do people not revolt?105 If rebellion was a natural state
of life for oppressed Africans, as die liberation movements proclaimed and as
many authors have assumed, why then was it that most of the time most
people did not revolt? If civics formed part of a UDF/ANC conspiracy to
overthrow the South African government in a violent revolution, as the state
argued in numerous political trials, why dien was revolt so very uneven, both
in time and in place? The idiom of the struggle, in which all die oppressed are
lumped together into the underdass or thcfighting masses, paints an exagger-
ated picture of the homogeneity of black South Africa and of die revolutionary
fervor of ordinary black South Africans. It ignores the cleavages—economie,
social, cultural, ethnic, generational, and gender—within black society. At least
part of the rebellion of the mid-i98os was a generational revolt, challenging
not only the white oppressors but also African patterns of authority.
The picture that emerges from this chapter thus far is that most people in
Kagiso were not waiting impatiendy to plunge themselves into a revolution-
ary onslaught on the state—not because they were contented helots but
because most of the time the perceived risks of collective action outweighed
the perceived benefits. Township revolt in Kagiso was a reluctant rebellion.
Kagiso residents were driven toward revolt when violent repression interfered
with their daily lives to a point where it could no longer be ignored.106 While
the UDF head office in Johannesburg and the ANC headquarters in Lusaka
undoubtedly aspired to steer and coordinate events, most outbreaks of revolt,
in Kagiso and elsewhere, were spontaneous and local. Local incidents pro-
vided the spark that set off the explosion into revolt. But the existence of the
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3F made the sparks into a bushfire that began to resemble a general insur-
pection Struggles against local governments became linked to a challenge to
fee central state. As most civics affiliated with the UDF, they entered into a
(broad network allowing for consultation and coordination and providmg
l access to new resources.
l In the first one and a half years of its existence, the UDF was strongly
f focused on national politics. After a reassessment in 1985, linking local gnev-
ances to the strategie issue of state power became central to the UDF mode
t Of Operation. The UDF could stage massive protests. But-with boycotts as
f acenterpiece of its strategy-could it also point toward concrete improve-
• ments obtained as a result of mass action? How could the UDF negomte
improvements without falling into the "reformist trap"? How did KRO deal
With the local town council? What did affiliation with the UDF mean for civic
activities?
For KRO the replacement of the old community council by the new town
council, established under the Black Local Authorities Act, seemed to make lit-
: tle difference. Sometimes confusion could arise, for some fermer responsi-
bilities of the administration boards were transferred to the town councils.
Complaints of incompetence and corruption continued as before. For years
on end, residents kept paying a monthly fee of 2.50 Rand for the electnfica-
tion of the township without seeing any progress. Councillors were widely
accused of giving out trading concessions, liquor licenses, and building sites
for bribes. The mayor himself was a shop owner, and one councülor report-
edly had allotted nineteen trading sites to himself. In the view of KRO, coun-
cillors were a self-serving clique of shop owners "who only get themselves
voted into the council only to get business."107
KRO dealt with the town council while at the same time calling for the res-
ignation of the town councillors. Meetings with the council were arranged
to discuss the riots in June 1985 and again in early 1986, at die height of town-
ship revolt, shordy after Mayor Moeketsi's house burned down. In the same
period a KRO delegation went to meet the commander of the Kagiso pohce
station to discuss what could be done about escalating violence and unruly
youth burning delivery vehicles.108
The KRO chair, however, made a clear distinction between dealmgs with
local authorities and contacts at the level of national politics. Although con-
tacts on a township level were unavoidable in order to function as a civic
organization dealings at a national level would amount to usurpmg the posi-
tion that righdy belonged to the liberation movement.109 KRO had no pnn-
cipled objection to dealing with the town council, but the leadership preferred
to deal witii the "whites who are controlling the councü," in this case the town
clerk.110
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Joining the UDF made no difference for KRO's contacts with the town
council. Civic activists maintained a largely pragmatic view in which obtain-
ing results outweighed a principled rejection of contacts with "puppet struc-
tures." Affiliation with the UDF was discussed and approved late in 1983 at two
KRO meetings, attended by a total of perhaps five hundred people. But affil-
iation with the UDF was initially not perceived as making a distinct political
choice. Leading civic activists had an image of the UDF as a service organiza-
tion providing support and better coordination for civics. Only later did it
transpire that the UDF was a national political organization with a clear polit-
ical identity. When the UDF assumed an overtly Charterist profile, some saw
this as a betrayal of the original idea behind the Front, which was to unite "all
the political groupings of the oppressed. . . . It was intended that the Front
would incorporate the Black Consciousness Movement and what was known
as the progressive non-racial democratie movement and church groups.""1
Others put the blame on BC-oriented groupings for opting out, thereby mak-
ing the UDF adopt a Charterist position.
A KRO representative attended the monthly meetings of the UDF West
Rand Area Committee, which functioned, in fact, as a kind of civic forum to
coordinate activities and exchange information between the civics of Kagiso,
Munsieville, Azaadvüle, and Mohlakeng. Exchanging information was partic-
ularly useful because all these townships had to deal with the same adminis-
tration board. Lawrence Ntiokoa, who usually served as KRO representative
on the UDF Area Committee, had a less favorable assessment of the UDF
General Council. In this body representing all the UDF affiliates in the Trans-
vaal (beginning in 1986 it represented only those in the Southern Transvaal),
KRO apparently feit somewhat marginalized: Johannesburg- and Soweto-
based activists called the tune. "Cliques and cabals were building their own
power-base, trying to gain control over resources. People based in Johannes-
burg had a much stronger position in terms of resources. The Soweto Civic
Association had three offices and füll time staff. We were working from our
houses and from the convent. The SCA had nationally well-known personal-
ities, like Dr. Motlana, Winnie Mandela, Curtis Nkondo. They got fonds
from overseas. When people overseas think of South Africa, they think of
Soweto."112
Tizza Moiloa, who later served as chair of the UDF West Rand Area Com-
mittee, equally believed that the UDF was useful but that it did not make
much difference for KRO. KRO activists helped with the distribution of UDF
News, but otherwise there was only limited participation in UDF cam-
paigns.113 The UDF provided a plethora of media, either through its own
workshops for media skills or through sympathetic service organizations.
KRO representatives attended some workshops, but they believed that the
UDF had only a modest bearing on the functioning of the civic. UDF T-shirts
and publications, however, did find their way to Kagiso, and certainly the lead-
ing activists kept well informed about events elsewhere in South Africa.
The UDF, of course, made a difference in one crucial aspect, although this
would only gradually transpire: through the UDF, the Kagiso civic became
linked to national politics. Taking up the UDF demands on the level of
national politics inevitably made KRO more of a politically aligned organiza-
tion, incurring a loss of support from non-Charterist residents. In the early
19805, people from various political tendencies, including AZAPO and PAC
sympathizers, had worked together in civic activities. The antagonistic rela-
tionship developed only in the second half of the 19805. In the beginning of
the decade, the ideological borderlines were not yet clearly drawn. Civic
activists interviewed generally agreed that AZAPO or other BC activists occa-
sionally turned up at meetings, but when it came to the door-to-door cam-
paigns, "they did not really do their bit."114 In the eyes of residents with
Africanist sympathies, KRO indeed functioned initially as a nonpartisan
organization, catering to all residents. But then KRO was "hijacked by certain
elements" into the UDF, thereby giving "certain elements now access to
resources, while others had no access."115 Robert Mangope, regional Organ-
izer of the PAC-leaning AZANYU (Azanian Youth Organisation), attended
the meeting where affüiation with the UDF was discussed. In his view, KRO
stands accused of using what hè considered a classical ANC tactic: swamping
the meeting by inviting a multitude of organizations—youth, students,
women's league, trade unions—which all served as a front for the ANC.
Opponents would then be overruled and intimidated by the singing of revo-
lutionary songs. As a representative of AZANYU, which was labeled a "polit-
ical formation" rather than a "mass formation," Mangope was ordered to leave
the meeting. AZAPO activists had not bothered to come to the meeting.
With Charterist hegemony established in KRO, Africanists decided in 1984
to form their own organization, the Kagiso Civic Organisation. KCO was
mainly based in East Park, one of the new neighborhoods where rents were
much higher than in the old section of Kagiso. In style with this middle-class
profile, KCO took a highly legalistic approach, engaging lawyers to take up
rent issues and other matters. It avoided mass demonstrations, boycotts, and
other forms of populär mass action. It had no qualms about dealing with the
town council. The Africanists' stated belief was that civics should not have a
political profile but, rather, should act as a nonpartisan lobby for civic matters.
They even considered it irrelevant who ran the township, as long as proper
services were delivered. Political affiliation by a civic was seen as hampering
efforts to address the basic needs of residents. Although there is some sub-
stance to several of the KCO criticisms on the performance of KRO, this alter-
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native civic organization seems to have limited itself largely to censuring their !
more successful rival, rather than coming up with alternative action. In com-
mon with many Africanist and BC activists, KCO leaders produced perceptive
comments that could easily lapse into armchair criticism. Some of their swipes
at KRO are clearly a caricature. The claim that the KRO executive was dorni-
nated by youngsters who "still live under parental care" is without sub-
stance.116 KRO obviously owed its fairly wide base of support at least in part!
to the leading roles played by respected older residents like Joe Makgothlo and
Sister Bernard. Apart from ideological differences, a battle over control of
resources seems to have been at the center of the antagonistic relationship.
KRO, as a UDF affiliate, managed to impose Charterist hegemony on
Opposition politics in Kagiso because the Africanists and BC proponents with-
drew or were forced out. After this description of KRO through its ups and
down in more or less quiet times, we now examine how in late 1985 Kagiso
was drawn into the general pattern of rebellion.
Mobilization and Mass Protest, 1985-1986
The consumer boycott, launched in December 1985, brought Kagiso into the
maelstrom of township revolt. Previous efforts to link up with nationwide or
regional mass campaigns—like the November 1984 stay-away and the August
1985 consumer boycott—had largely failed. Now Kagiso moved into the next
phase, from limited local protests to challenging the power of the (local) state.
Escalating state repression as well as extrastate terror attacks were decisive fac-
tors in this process of mobilization and radicalization, which assumed a
dynamic of its own once it got underway.
Boycotts aimed at white businesses and at shops owned by black collabo-
rators originated in mid-1985 in the Eastern Cape. The idea behind this new
tactic was twofold: business could be pressurized to address some of the local
grievances and could intercede with the Pretoria government in support of
some of the national political demands. The Eastern Cape boycott was highly
efFective and resulted in a working relationship between local businessmen and
local civic and UDF leaders, notably in Port Elizabeth. This became a model
for boycott campaigns elsewhere, but the successes of the Eastern Cape—
which had the reputation of being the most militant and the best organized
region—were not easily matched.
It is not quite clear what made KRO decide to join the boycott at this par-
ticular moment. It was probably the temporary lifting of the consumer boycott
on the Reef that prompted KRO to join in when the boycott was reimposed.
In Soweto and other Reef townships, consumer boycotts had been in force
since the end of August, with varying degrees of effectiveness. On 29 Novem-
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( ber, the boycotts were lifted for eight days, to be reimposed on 8 December.
|Swo reasons were given for the suspension: consumers needed an opportu-
lïlity to make purchases in white business areas, particularly those goods not
l available in township stores, and the Transvaal Consumer Boycott Commit-
I tee (CBC) needed a break "to sort out the confusion of the past three months
j^and give the campaign a new direction."117 Serious problems had been encoun-
t tered in enforcing the boycott, since Soweto and the East Rand townships had
f numerous routes that people could take to white shopping areas. Monitoring
!
 the boycott was the preserve of youth. Although their participation was indis-
I pensable for the success of the boycott, even the boycott Organizers acknowl-
' edged that their often violent methods easily antagonized people. Stories of
excesses by monitors who forced boycott breakers to drink fish oil or eat soap
? powder circulated throughout the townships. A third problem was that many
l township businesses took advantage of the boycott by raising their prices.
Because of these previous experiences in the same region, KRO must have
been well aware of the potential problems when it embarked on a consumer
boycott.
The CBC called for a "Black December," which was to last from 8 Decem-
ber until 31 December, in support of demands for the army to pull out of the
townships, the release of all detainees, the lifting of the State of Emergency,
and the resignation of town councillors. Residents were also asked to boycott
all businesses owned by councillors, to refrain from excessive drinking, and to
abstain from birthday and graduation parties and lavish weddings. Various fes-
tivals and shows, including the Black Miss South Africa beauty contest, were
canceled or postponed.118 Any hopes that white businesses might have had for
an early end to this boycott by making arrangements with the Organizers
were quashed when CBC members were detained. The renewed boycott call
for the Christmas season was not universally populär, as the CBC realized.
IM-conceived campaigns, lack of adequate consultation and information, and
various degrees of coercion and interference in people's lives had made many
residents wary of boycotts. Apologizing for the behavior of some overzealous
monitors, a CBC spokesperson pointed out that "it is not our intention to
drag people kicking and screaming towards independence. We would be hap-
pier if they willingly got involved."119
Although the Kagiso boycott was called after consultation with the CBC,
it remained a locally run campaign that would last much longer than the boy-
cotts in other townships on the Reef. KRO activists told conflicting accounts
about the initial degree of support for the boycott. Some activists were criti-
ca! of the inadequate groundwork, of the mixing of national political demands
with local issues, and of insufRcient attention to the adverse effects of a boy-
cott on certain groups of workers. KRO also held a meeting with the Kagiso
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businesspeople, who became closely involved in the boycott. The critics allege
that the businessmen ended up almost running the boycott, since they stood
to gain most.120 Information on boycotts elsewhere also came through news-
papers, which reported in considerable detail about the successful campaign
in the Eastern Cape.
A local consumer boycott committee was formed in Kagiso, the Krugers-
dorp Consumer Boycott Committee (KBCB), on which KRO, the women's
organization, the youth organizations, KAFCOC (the Kagiso African Cham-
ber of Commerce), and others were represented. The committee appointed
boycott monitors, most of whom were youth. Aware of abuses occurring else-
where, KRO leaders told the boycott monitors to "educate the people" and to
explain that the boycott had been called in protest against the detentions and
the presence of the army and police in the townships. If withdrawal of the
security forces was the aim of the boycott, then for Kagiso it had an adverse
effect. It was the boycott that for the first time brought a massive, heavy-
handed, trigger-happy police force into the township. As Makgothlo stated
later, before the consumer boycott no one had ever been shot by the police,
but after the boycott it happened regularly.121 As township violence nared up,
tear gas, bullets, batons, and sjamboks became a regulär feature of life in Kagiso.
The Consumer Boycott
Whether or not preparations had been adequate, the consumer boycott in
Kagiso made a false start. In the first week after 9 December 1985, there was
widespread harassment, intimidation, and "generally unruly behavior by
youths, acting against adults whom they beheved to be breaking the boy-
cott."122 As one Kagiso resident told a reporter: "Youths as young as 14 years
stop taxis and private cars coming from town. They destroy groceries found
in the vehicles and in some cases assault those who refuse to hand over their
goods. Where in the world have you seen youths as young as 12 years mak-
ing decisions?"123
Youth were in the forefront of the boycott monitors, who had erected bar-
ricades at the entrance routes in the township, where taxis were stopped and
passengers searched. Yet the first resident shot dead by police while hè was
searching people's groceries was not zyouth. Steven Rooi Mashigo, shot in the
stomach after being confronted by policemen who accused him of intimidat-
ing and destroying people's groceries, was thirty-four years old and a father of
three children.124 This incident illustrates the ambiguous nature of the cate-
gory of youth, a label that was often equated with unruly behavior. Adults
who engaged in unruly behavior—in other words, who behaved as youth—
frequently came to be labeled youth.
"Yah, God Is on Our Side" m
During the rest of the month there were several more casualties among
boycott monitors. Most died at the hands of the police; one was shot by a
local businessman. During the second week of the boycott, at least fourteen
Kagiso and Munsieville residents were detained because of the consumer boy-
cott. At the same time, spokespeople for KRO and KCBC were obviously
worried about excesses. One of the problems was how to distinguish between
genuine monitors and people intent on robbing in the name of the struggle.
A KRO spokesperson told the Star that the civic leadership disassociated itself
from "acts of hooliganism and criminal behaviour perpetrated by people
claiming to be monitoring and enforcing the boycott, but whose intention is
to rob black people." He emphasized the nonviolent nature of the boycott,
which hè saw as a peaceful way of "indicating our abhorrence of the apartheid
regime. We want white businessmen to take up our grievances with the Gov-
ernment, which must realise that we are also human beings and that our
demands should not be suppressed." He said that fifteen knives and other
weapons had been confiscated from people posing as members of the boycott
committee.125 Criminal elements who robbed motorists, shebeen owners, and
taxi drivers in the name of the struggle had been punished and later lectured
on what the boycott meant. Hundreds of rands in cash and goods that false
monitors had seized were recovered.126
Nor was it always clear to residents what the boycott entailed. Could her
husband go to town and buy a lawn mower and new planks to fix the ceil-
ing, without fear of being confronted by the comrades? a resident inquired
in a phone call to Sister Bernard. Sister Bernard explained that the boycott
applied to foodstuffs only, not to hardware.127 There was, of course, no guar-
antee that the boycott monitors would apply the same criteria; there were con-
flicting interpretations of what the boycott entailed.
Precautions had been taken to prevent windfall profits by local business
owners in Kagiso. Shops owned by town councillors had already been forced
to close down as a result of previous boycotts and attacks. Mayor Moeketsi's
shop also had to close. KRO held talks with local business owners, asking
them to lower their prices as they would now get more customers. KAFCOC
reportedly agreed that its members would reduce the prices at their shops by
25 percent.128 Boycott monitors would also see to it that local shopkeepers
were not exploiting the Situation. The Krugersdorp Consumer Boycott
Committee was fairly broadly based. The rival Kagiso Civic Organisation was
not officially involved in the boycott committee, although KCO activists did
attend meetings in an individual capacity. Although some of their ideas found
a receptive ear, they were at the same time labeled a "reactionary organization."
"If you did not go along with a mass meeting's decision, you were labeled a
sell-out. There were songs like: neighbor, you are a sell-out if you oppose the
192 "Beyond Our Wildert Dreams" "Tak, God Is on Our Side" 193
people."129 Although KCO supported the consumer boycott, difFerences devel-
oped over the mix of national and local demands and over the duration of the
boycott. AZANYU called off the boycott in January, to allow parents to buy
school uniforms and schoolbooks, but KRO's boycott lasted until the end of
February. During that month, serious skirmishes reportedly took place
between AZANYU and KRO activists.
The beginning of the boycott campaign also marked an upsurge in violent
attacks on councillors. The three-year-old son of councillor Anthony Zulu died
after a firebomb attack on his house. Zulu, who suffered injuries, vowed not
to resign, for that would amount to showing weakness. The councillor, who
was also an Inkatha official, suspected that the people who wanted him to
resign from the council would likewise want to force him out of his four busi-
nesses in Kagiso. Two other councillors, including the deputy mayor, resigned
shordy afterward. Another councillor was said to be on the run after his house
in Munsieville was firebombed. 13° A week after the consumer boycott started,
a meeting was called by the women's organization and the Kagiso and Mun-
sieville Youth Congresses to discuss the excesses. Participants decided that
intimidation had to be curbed, and the burning of delivery vans was ruled out.
Another item on the agenda was how to combat crime.
The anticrime campaign was to become one of the major feats of the youth
congresses, for which they were widely praised. Township violence declined
after the youth went from shebeen to shebeen asking customers to surrender
their knives. A huge pile of knives was subsequently stored in the convent.
Apart from confiscating weapons, the youth activists also ordered youngsters
out of the shebeens. As with the monitoring of the boycott, the anticrime
campaign raised the issue of who was a comrade. "Some people would harass
drinkers and shebeen owners, but they are not moving with the comrades
themselves. If shebeen owners came to complain to KRO, we did look into
it." Makgothlo traced the origin of the use of the term comrades to COSAS,
but then others took over the name, doing "very bad things in the name of
comrades. So a hooligan today calls himself a comrade."131 But Makgothlo
remained outspoken in his support for the "original" comrades: "It are the
comrades who bring some order in the townships." Excesses did not disappear,
but subsequently intimidation by youth enforcing the boycott seems to have
diminished, although the burning of delivery vans continued for months.
The anticrime campaign won wide support for KRO and the youth organ-
izations. Both in court statements and in interviews, numerous residents men-
tioned this campaign as a useful function performed by these organizations.
"As a result of these actions there are no more tsotsi's carrying knives in the
area and Kagiso is now as a result thereof a safer place to live."132 Although the
festive season usually brought a fair share of dranken fights, Christmas 1985 is
remembered as the most peaceful Christmas in Kagiso's history: "
Hospital reported not a single casualty of violence, no stabbing, nothing."
One problem with enforcing discipline among young activists was the weak
state of youth organization. KAYCO (Kagiso Youth Congress) and MUYCO
(Munsievüle Youth Congress) were formed after the banning of COSAS in
August 1985. Accounts of the exact date of the formation of the youth con-
gresses vary, but it is clear that they did not come into their own until the
December campaigns. These campaigns attracted many new recruits, most
of whom had little or no "politica! education"; likewise, the youth leadership
was equally lacking in experience. The chair of MUYCO joined the youth con-
gress in December 1985 and was immediately elected chair. MUYCO claimed
a membership of about three hundred, whüe KAYCO was said to have seven
hundred members.134
On New Year's Day, the Krugersdorp Consumer Boycott Committee called
mass meetings in Kagiso and Munsievüle to announce the end of the boycott.
Others, however, argued that the goals of the boycott had not been met, so
the residents resolved to continue the boycott of white-owned shops for an
indefinite period and to extend the boycott to the Greyhound Bus Company.
The boycott Organizers were now overtaken by a ground swell of militancy.
The boycotts in Kagiso were no longer part of a nationwide campaign-the
Transvaal Consumer Boycott Committee had called off the boycotts in the
Pretoria townships, Soweto, the Vaal Triangle, and the East Rand.135
A series of mass meetings, usually disturbed by police firing tear gas, had
now become a regulär feature of civic activities. Previously, one meeting
would be called for all Kagiso residents. But in this phase of populär mobi-
lization, no hall was large enough to accommodate all the interested residents.
In one week in January, seventeen meetings were held in various church halls;
all were packed, with over a thousand people attending each meeting.
Issues discussed at these meetings included the township crisis, the education
crisis, the consumer boycott, combating crime, and keeping young children
out of the shebeens.
The Bus Boycott
On 6 January 1986, the West Rand townships of Bekkersdal, Kagiso, Mun-
sieville, and Mohlakeng embarked on a boycott of the Greyhound Bus Com-
pany. Greyhound saw the move initially as simply a part of the general
consumer boycott, but there were specific grievances against Greyhound. The
Company was accused of insensitivity to people's problems. As Ntlokoa
explained to journalists, Greyhound had refused to make buses available for
funerals, had allowed police to use its buses to carry vigilantes who assaulted
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members of organizations, and had not invested any of its profits in the com-
munity in the form of bursaries or improvement of educational facilities. Grey-
hound had also neglected to erect bus shelters.137
The bus boycott began as a great success. Residents walked to work or took
taxis. KRO chair Joe Makgothlo went on foot to work at Chamdor, to show
others that it could be done. One can sense the feeling of exhilaration in his
phone conversation with Lawrence Ntlokoa, when hè describes how the boy-
cott took off. After all the trials and tribulations of failed previous boycotts and
the radier messy start of the consumer boycott in December, Ntlokoa feit that
the struggle had now been vindicated:
For once, God. . . . has given us that spirit to do it just right.
Makgothlo: Yah, God is on our side.138
The boycott was hailed as the weapon of the powerless, as one of the few
remaining options for nonviolent resistance. But the boycott was not unprob-
lematic. Enforcing die boycott entailed various degrees of coercion. The role
of youth in monitoring the boycott was not always readily accepted by older
residents, who resented being subjected to questioning and searches. And res-
idents were differently afFected by die boycott: for some, it simply meant an
inconvenience, for others, it put their livelihoods at stake. People employed at
stores in Krugersdorp risked losing their jobs when employers began retrench-
ing workers for lack of business. Others were obviously directly benefiting
from the boycott, notably local shopkeepers and the taxi business. At the time,
the taxi fare was only fïve cents more than a bus fare. The Taxi Association
agreed to charge half price for students. Taxi owners had their own grudges
against Greyhound, as the Company was believed to have opposed their license
applications and to engage in unfair competition.
In the second week of the bus boycott, Greyhound was ready for talks. The
Company would no longer oppose taxi license applications, would provide free
travel for pensioners on days when they received their money, and would act
on requests for free buses or reduced charges for special occasions according
to their merit. But by now several boycott leaders had been detained, and their
release was made a precondition for talks with the bus Company. Police harass-
ment resulted in increased Community support for the bus boycott. Taxis were
stopped by police for being overloaded; private cars carrying people to work
were stopped, and drivers were fined because they had no taxi licenses. In this
second week of the boycott, police used bird shot to disperse youth who were
helping people to form queues for taxis at taxi stands. Many were injured—
one youth had more than 130 bird shot pellets lodged in his body—and a
number were arrested.139 By this time, revolt in Kagiso had escalated to the
point of drawing national political attention. Adriaan Vlok, deputy minister
of law and order, paid a visit to the township on 22 January to discuss the
unrest and the consumer and bus boycotts with the local authonties. The day
:
 after Vlok's visit, traffic officers, police, soldiers, and local road transportation
board officials carried out a blitz on taxis. Residents claimed that police and
soldiers forced them to board buses. Private car owners were charged tmes
of up to 300 Rand for carrying passengers. Taxis had long delays as police
meticulously checked the safety of the vehicles and searched the passengers.
This type of police harassment continued for months, durmg which time
many residents continued to walk to work at Chamdor, Luipaardsvlei, or
Krugersdorp, a distance of between three and eight miles.1
In February, the boycott Organizers received a letter purportedly from
Greyhound employees urging the boycott committee to hold talks with Grey-
hound management, saying they feared loss of their jobs if the Company had
to close down certain bus lines. A spokesperson for the boycott Organizers
doubted the authenticity of the letter and dismissed it as «another attempt by
Greyhound management to confuse residents."141 The next day the Transport
and Allied Workers' Union denied any knowledge of the letter and distanced
itself from the letter's contents.142 Whatever the merits of the letter, Grey-
hound employees obviously had ample reason to be concerned. For the bus
drivers who had experienced frequent stoning of buses since mid-i985, work
had become positively dangerous. In the eyes of township youth, bus drivers
operated on the side of enemy forces. The police unrest reports for early 1986
registered frequent complaints of stoning and arson from Greyhound employ-
ees who were living in the Kagiso hostel.143 When after ten months of boy-
cotts Greyhound decided to withdraw its bus services from the West Rand
over a hundred workers were dismissed.144 KRO contacted the Transport and
Allied Workers' Union. The demand that Greyhound employees should not
lose their jobs as a result of the boycott was included in the list of demand^
But otherwise the dismissal of Greyhound workers was seen as mevitable: It
they lost their jobs, that was the work of the police, who was creatmg dm-
sions,notofKRO."145
When meetings were called to discuss the consumer boycott at the end ot
February, residents agreed to suspend the boycott until 7 April 1986 to give
people a chance to stock up. But when it came to a discussion of the bus boy-
cott people voted for continuation. Greyhound was now seen as sidmg with
the police and the South African Defence Force (SADF) and therefore as shar-
ing the responsibility for the loss of lives and for numerous injunes. Accord-
ing to KRO chair Makgothlo, the Kagiso bus boycott stood largely on its
own There was no coordination with bus boycott committees in Randfontein
and Bekkersdal.'^ In early April, KRO applied for permission to hold a mass
meeting in the Kagiso stadium in order to discuss the bus boycott. Permission
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was granted, and on Sunday, 5 April, about five thousand people assembled in]
the stadium. They were in an angry mood. On Saturday, Kagiso had buriedl
another fourteen-year-old victim of the unrest. Political funerals had now '.
become an almost weekly routine. According to the police version of events,
 (
young Modiri Mmesi was shot dead and three of his friends were injured i
when a policeman opened fire after a beer hall in Kagiso was attacked widj
firebombs. But according to an eyewitness, die boys were nowhere near a beer
hall: they were playing in the garden of Isaac Genu's house.148 Police inter-
fered with die funeral and opened fire on a group of youdi near the cemetery.
Four youth were reported to be in critical condition in the hospital. Speaker
after speaker called for a resumption of the consumer boycott since the
demands had not been met. The boycott was presented as the weapon of the
powerless. "They have the guns, we have the buying power." The crowd
replied widi "asithengi edokbheni" (we do not buy in town). It was resolved to
resumé the consumer boycott and to continue the bus boycott. KRO was
mandated to present "the people's demands" to Greyhound management;
until these demands were met, residents would continue die boycott. The list
of demands was now further extended to include an end to apartheid in buses,
paving of roads, scrapping of plans for die minibuses, rehiring of dismissed
Greyhound workers, free buses for funerals, and an Obligation to consult the
civic on future fare increases.149 After these decisions were made by residents,
the police pounced widi renewed vigor on residents traveling in taxis and pri-
vate cars in a new bid to break the boycott. As before, police explained die
roadblocks as an exercise in crime prevention.150 Eventually a meeting
between Greyhound and KRO took place, with the bus Company agreeing
to most of the demands. Greyhound would offer normal bus service begin-
ning i July. The deal was scutded by the proclamation of a nationwide State
of Emergency on 12 June and by the detention of the entire civic leadership.
The agreement had been reached before this date, but under emergency reg-
ulations KRO could no longer hold meetings to put the deal to the residents.
With the KRO leadership in detention or on the run, the bus Company no
longer had a negotiating partner. A similar Situation prevailed in other West
Rand townships. At the end of October 1986, Greyhound decided to with-
draw its bus service from the West Rand townships.
Aldiough residents were obviously affected by the boycotts in different
ways, one group deserves special attention: the migrant workers in the town-
ship. In view of the bloody batdes in 1990 between hostel dwellers and resi-
dents, the question arises whether the seeds of confrontation were sown in this
period of boycotts. Unfortunately, information on the experiences of hostel
dwellers in Kagiso is scarce. Those among them who were Greyhound bus
drivers had obvious reasons to resent the boycott, but they cannot have been
aierous. I was unable to interview people who had been living in the hos-
Ji in 1985-86. Accounts by KRO activists vary, with some civic leaders admit-
sJlg that the hostels were largely neglected, whereas others stated that diere
•Jpere regulär consultations. Varying accounts can be explained in part by the
Bjfferent positions of the two hostels. The old hostel in Kagiso I seems to have
feeën more involved in civic marters than die new, much larger and better
pquipped hostel in Kagiso II. Some KRO meetings were conducted in the old
ihostel. The civic took up some of the grievances of the hostel dwellers, such
las the lack of electricity and hot water and the provision of proper beds radier
! than cement bunks. The hostels were included in the cleanup campaign in
[ early 1986. Efforts were made to get sponsors for the hostels' football team.
f Trade unionist Serge Mokonyane recalled that hè addressed many meetings in
\ the hostel, "and I would go in my UDF T-shirt, diere was no problem about
f; that."151 Civic activists generally asserted that diere was a good relationship,
j-certainly with the hostel in Kagiso I. It remains unclear how the migrants
tthemselves viewed the position, taken by KRO, that the migrant labor system
Jf and the hostels needed to be abolished altogedier. From the scant studies of
migrant life, it is clear that many migrants retained strong links with their rural
homesteads and had no ambitions of becoming permanent city folk.
The School Boycott
From mid-1985, schools in Kagiso experienced intermittent boycotts, as pupils
protested against the detention of fellow students or campaigned against
corporal punishment, the shortage of textbooks, overcrowded classrooms,
or underqualified teachers, or in support of dieir demand for student repre-
sentative councils. Beginning in December, school boycotts were called in
support of the consumer boycott. Teachers in Kagiso schools were generally
regarded as conservative. They did not actively participate in civic activities.
Efforts to set up teacher-parent-student committees to manage the school
crisis were unsuccessful. KRO made some attempts to fill the void. A KRO
delegation attended the conference organized by the Soweto Parents' Crisis
Committee in late December in Johannesburg. This initiative dien led to the
formation of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC), which
played a prominent role in attempts to solve the school crisis.
The meeting in Johannesburg resolved that children should return to
school on 28 January 1986. This date was chosen in an attempt to reach con-
sensus with student organizations: the official date for the opening of the new
school year was 8 January. Boycotting students, on the other hand, were reluc-
tant to go back to school before their demands had been met.
KAYCO had called a meeting on 27 January in St. Peter's Catholic School
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to discuss the back-to-school call. While the meeting in the school hall was itj
progress, two armored police vans—nicknamed hippos in township parlance-
drove toward one side of the school, while a third hippo and a police •
parked on the other side. Some KRO leaders who were attending the me
ing—among them Ntlokoa—walked to the gate to ask the police why the
had come. Before any discussion could take place, police fired tear gas at 1
hall. While the children scrambled out of the hall, police started shooting bir
shot at the doors. About twenty policemen had taken up positions near 1
main exit. Desperately trying to escape, children broke the Windows andf
jumped out at the other side of the hall. Some were bleeding from cuts. See-l
ing that children were jumping out of Windows on the other side of the build- j
ing, police ran around the hall to start shooting there as well. Some studentSj
were sjambokked while running away. Several children feil, and most ran ofl
in different directions. Police rounded up about a hundred pupils and begaaj
loading them into police vans. Alarmed by the shooting and shouting, par*
ents rushed to the schoolyard to protect their children. Ntlokoa and Sister
Bernard made another attempt to talk to the police and were greeted wittt
"Shut up, kaffir" and "Fuck off, girl," respectively. After some discussion, the;
children were released. But when the pandemonium was over, fourteen-year-
old schoolgirl Maki Legwate was found lying on the school grounds, bleed-;
ing profusely. She died soon afterward. The girl had been killed by police •
bullets.152 In spite of this incident, children in Kagiso went back to school the
next day, demonstrating that they were disciplined students who followed the
call of the leadership of the struggle.
More than any other single event, this incident had a profoundly politi-
cizing effect on ordinary townships residents. People who previously had been
wary of militant youth disrupting township Hfe now became united against a
common enemy, and getting rid of the murderous presence of the security
forces became their number-one priority. Tennessee Maleke, who subse-
quendy became active in the women's organization, recounted how her polit-
ical involvement began on this very day: "We simply had to protest. . . . My
involvement in the organization started then and there. Before, many people
were scared, or they thought that the youth was to be blamed for throwing
stones. But then it was so evident that the police was wrong."153
The school crisis, of course, was far from over. The next focal point was
Kagiso Senior Secondary School. Pupils demanded that their principal resign
either his position as a town councillor in Mohlakeng (the township of Rand-
fontein) or his position as principal. Until hè had given up one of these posts,
they refused to go back to school. The principal refused to resign but prom-
ised to go on leave to quell the explosive Situation.154 At this point, police
ded the school and detained numerous students. This was the sign for a
„/ round of school boycotts, demanding the release of the comrades m
;tention. For a few months, "the students were in power." Former student
„Sivists recalled that principals became willing to consult with them and to
Encede the recognition of student representative councils (SRCs). "There was
aost mutual understanding." When the principal indeed disappeared from
; scène and the students were released, it was decided to resumé classes. But
s roles would soon be reversed. After the imposition of the State of Emer-
„ncy, the principal returned to the school, and many students were detained
pnew. He refused to readmit students who had been in detention. Students
Itóed enlisting the help of parents, but this produced no decisive results. Par-
ients above all wanted to see the Situation in the schools return to normal. "In
hè end, the students forced themselves back to school. Then the principal had
j let them stay."155
At Kagiso Senior Secondary the relationship between pupils and principal
Fwas clearly antagonistic. A similar Situation prevailed at Matsoepe High School,
[ where the principal refused to recognize SRCs and expelled many students.
l His house was firebombed just before Christmas. But more sympathetic
^ teachers were also at a loss when they had to handle a Situation in which their
pupils set the law for themselves. The phone conversations tapped by police
aüow a glimpse at their problems, as in the case of a school teacher phonmg
Sister Bernard about her predicament. Five boys had come to her house, say-
ing that her students complained about her. She told her visitors that the stu-
dents were mannerless; that is why she had been telling them to behave
themselves. She regarded herself as being "in the struggle," and she wondered
how the comrades could behave as if only they were in the struggle. She feit
that the pupils must humiliate and despise her since they had gone to the point
of reporting her. After having listened to this emotional outburst, Sister
Bernard, a fellow educator, offered words of encouragement.156 Although not
all student demands were won, some victories proved durable: SRCs were still
fanctioning five years later. Corporal punishment had not been abolished, but
teachers resorted less readily to the use of the whip.
Persuasion and Coercion
Boycotts were generally hailed as "the community's peaceful weapons of
resistance." But in spite of their Gandhian pedigree, the enfbrcement of boy-
cotts could involve considerable degrees of coercion. Kagiso activists derived
at least part of their Inspiration from the press reports on the Eastern Cape
boycotts. But local conditions in Kagiso were rather different from the East-
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ern Cape. Krugersdorp was dominated by the Conservative Party. Business
owners in Krugersdorp made no attempts to negotiate with the boycott lead-
ers; nor, it seems, did KRO leaders take the initiative and contact Krugers-
dorp businessmen.
One advantage of the boycott tactic was that it allowed for participation by
ordinary people. KRO activists indeed saw it that way: "The methods we used
also helped narrow the gap between the activist and mass element. Every per-
son actually feit they were playing their proper role and participating."157 But
KRO never developed the tight web of street committees that was recognized
as the foundation for people's power. In fact, these elaborate structures with
street committees were largely limited to the Eastern Cape townships and a
handful of townships in the Transvaal. Alexandra, an old freehold township
located in the heart of white Johannesburg, assumed a symbolic role as a
model of people's power. But Alexandra was atypical.
KRO intended to rely on persuasion, and it opposed intimidatory tactics in
the enforcement of boycotts. But even persuasion could involve the loss of
hard-earned goods. "For those who break the boycott, the activists explain the
issues to them and take die stuff to the pensioners and me needy."158 In spite
of attempts by KRO and the Consumer Boycott Committee to run the boy-
cott by persuasion radier than coercion, violent incidents kept flaring up. The
burning of delivery vans was initially blamed on "agents of the System," since
the vigorous crime prevention campaign had supposedly eliminated "the
menace of the so-called comrade tsotsis."159 Obstructing delivery vehicles was
obviously at cross-purposes with the boycott: if residents were to buy in the
township, township businesses needed to receive provisions. But attacks on
delivery vehicles continued, and KRO apparently had no control over the per-
petrators. Speaking to journalists, a KRO spokesperson emphasized that these
attacks ran against KRO policy: "We warn these people—we do not know
where they come from—that disciplinary action will be taken against them."160
In spite of all the warnings, the burning of vans and hijacking of cars contin-
ued. Firnis in Krugersdorp that phoned Sister Bernard or Ntlokoa found that
the civic could offer little help. In some cases, firms requested KRO to send a
group of comrades to protect deliveries against thugs. Ndokoa firmly rejected
the offer of protection fees: "Oh no well, we don't work on those basis. We
just don't feel its right." But at least one youth leader, named Thabo, appar-
ently approached firms with an offer of protection for money.161
Several stores in Kagiso itself were equally under direat. The local bottle
store, property of the town council, was apparendy considered fair game. A
woman in the bottle store phoned Sister Bernard to ask for help when the
brewery truck arrived. The previous day, a truck had been burned while the
driver was trapped inside. "We are now scared and we don't know where we
should direct our complaint," said the woman. Sister Bernard could offer, or
would offer, no help.162 Others resented the arbitrariness of the rule of the
comrades. A supermarket owner complained that "the UDF boys" had closed
his shop and told him it would remain closed until the end of the boycott.
Three reasons were offered: hè was charging high prices; hè had tried to pre-
vent youth from burning a delivery truck with Coca Cola; and "when they
wanted to burn those youths who were helping with the delivery truck, we
protected those youths."163
Such violent behavior that was clearly out of line with KRO policy was
often blamed on "outside elements." This claim is not altogether unlikely:
youth from several townships kept close contact and paid frequent visits to
each other, particularly during weekends with funerals. Kagiso was one of the
few townships around Johannesburg where die State of Emergency did not
apply. It was not exactly a free haven, but it might have offered militant youth
somewhat more room to maneuver. But unruly elements outside KRO's con-
trol also came from Kagiso itself. The tsotsis, or township gang members, who
supposedly had been flushed out during die December anticrime drive, had
made a comeback posing as comrades. They used the name "the United
Front," or simply "the United." This gang of about thirty to forty people, aged
between sixteen and diirty, emerged as an organized force in January. "They
were very active, but they had no history of political involvement; they just
took advantage, confiscating shopping, looting and burning delivery vans,
hijacking cars."164 Without exception, the KRO leadership, when interviewed
later, was füll of praise for KAYCO and blamed the excesses and the violence
on the United Front. KAYCO, which boasted a membership of about seven
hundred, was credited with stopping crime and spreading the word about the
consumer boycott by going house to house. The United were particularly
active in manning the roadblocks where vehicles coming from outside were
stopped and searched for goods from white shops. Rivalry and animosity
between KAYCO and the United at times resulted in violent encounters. As
two KAYCO activists later explained:
There were different approaches to the struggle. Some wanted to politicize the
youth. Others wanted to burn cars. So the United boys made a mistake. They
thought they could burn the cars because the cars belonged to the bourgeoisie.
And many youths were very angry because of the daily killings. And they were
also responding to Tambo's call to make the country ungovernable. That is why
they went out burning cars. . . . Some youths moved away from organizarional
politics. They were tired of all this talking and wanted action. We introduced
workshops to discuss strategy and tactics, but not everybody would come to
those meetings.165
This type of workshop, conducted in English, was likely to highlight the divi-
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sion among youth between the politically aware high school students, wfe
could conduct meetings and express themselves in English, and the dropoufi
the uneducated lumpen Proletariat who lacked the background, the skills, <
the patience to participate on an equal footing in these sessions. The lump
element chose the battlefield where they feit most at home: the streets.
Lawrence Ntlokoa and Sister Bernard, who worked with KAYCO, did i
manage to come to grips with the United boys. The note of despair in sou
phone conversations among civic leaders indicates that the gang's activities l
become very disruptive. In mid-March 1986, after another hijacking of c
(minibuses), Sister Bernard told Ndokoa that she was losing hope.166 Tov
the end of April the problem was still unresolved, as indicated in the follow-j
ing conversation between Makgorhlo and Ntlokoa:
Makgothlo: Those youngsters! I told them that it is the last time we will hold a
meeting of this kind. . . . Ja, because they think as they can terrorise pcople,
the people are scared of them. . . .
Ndokoa: We don't want to be bullied by eleven guys.167
As Sister Bernard explained to the lawyers in the KRO trial: "Let me say
plainly that they are a tsotsi element, people that don't go to school and kind
of really rough—a crime element. We would teil them that is not reaüy nec-
essary that you should be killing one another and getting drunk, being kind of j
useless. They are unemployed people roaming around. .. . Most are ill-edu-
cated, drop-outs, they are angry and bitter youth."168 Moreover, they had their
own network with other gangs of comtsotsis, or comrade gang members, in
Soweto, Alexandra, and other townships, keeping each other informed of
events in all townships. Groups visited each other and exchanged information,
especially during vigils and funerals. One dispute between KRO and the
United involved a most common source of division in township politics:
money. Access to resources could be a divisive matter. Rumors circulated
that South African Breweries had donated 18,000 Rand to KRO and that
Lawrence Ntlokoa was driving a car donated by the brewery. Another rumor
had it that KRO had taken money from Greyhound. In actuality, the car had
been provided by KRO's lawyers in the court case against the minister of law
and order to facilitate collecting evidence and witnesses.169 KRO had no reg-
ulär income, as it had no registered fee-paying membership. It did not have a
bank account. Civic leaders used their own resources, such as Makgothlo's car.
And from time to time, the civic asked for donations. Makgothlo mentioned
churches, businessmen, and South African Breweries—where hè worked as
overseer—as sources of contributions.170 Attempts at collecting money were
also conducted by various groups or individuals during funerals, "but it was
not a KRO activity and we discourage that very strongly."171
s Rok ofRepressim: Police and Vigilantes
fa presence in Kagiso had significantly increased in December 1985. Begin-
>• in early January, police became particularly brutal after two white ponee-
rt from Krugersdorp had been killed by miners in a nearby mining
ompound. Police claimed that they had to operate heavily armed because of
fe attack.172 After the start of the bus boycott, police action became especially
cious. Kagiso now entered into the deadly cycle that already prevailed in
her townships. Victims of police violence were carried to their graves by
„•ge and angry crowds. Police turned out in equally massive numbers, pro-
»öking the funeralgoers. A political fbneral frequently produced more martyrs.
|At the funeral of schoolgirl Maki Legwate, police fired tear gas, sjambokked
fiHourners, and detained seven funeralgoers. A prayer service in the Methodist
ICburch for Maki Legwate was disrapted by police throwing tear-gas camsters
tinto the church and then storming the building. Scores of schoolchildren
jlwhere injured as they scrambled through broken windows.173
l At the end of February, a campaign of social Isolation was called against
ftown councülors, black policemen, and black soldiers. «Nobody wül talk to
l them," Ndokoa announced to the press, "they will not be allowed m any she-
f been or shop and those who stay in backyards will be told to leave because the
F Community has decided that we don't want these people."174 Indiscriminate
| police violence and brutal nightly patrols by white vigilantes from Krugers-
' dorp strongly contributed to the process of political mobilization in Kagiso.
In a Community under siege, many residents closed ranks behmd the civic
leadership. "Before 1986 the system had targeted the leadership only, and the
i residents were mosdy left alone. But in 1986 the police started shooting at ran-
,' dom and that is what made people more militant. It is the system which really
l managed to mobilize the people."175 Genu's view of the role of the police m
. the process of politicization is borne out by numerous statements by residents
in the KRO trial. "I only became a member of the Kagiso Youth Congress
after having been beaten up by the police. This happened as a result of being
taken to meetings held by the Kagiso Youth Congress by a fnend. Before I
was not really concerned about politics in the township."176 Police presence
became all-pervasive, demonstrating a total disrespect for people's privacy.
They were "walking into people's bedrooms in the middle of the mght."
At least six people were killed in January 1986, with scores of people having
to be treated in the hospital for gunshot wounds or for injuries caused by
sjamboks and batons. Residents also alleged that the security forces were rap-
ing women 178 Faced with this escalation of state violence, KRO decided to
seek an interdict from the Supreme Court to restrain the security forces. With
the help of lawyers, KRO collected 118 affidavits detailing the allegations of
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brutality committed by the security forces against the residents of Kagiso and
Munsieville.
In February, vigilantes from Krugersdorp unleashed a reign of terror. The
leader of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbe-
weging (AWB), Eugene Terreblanche, had called on AWB branches on the
West Rand to form vigilante groups.179 Residents of the Krugersdorp suburb
Dan Pienaarville, which borders on Munsieville, held an urgent meeting in
late January, following the firebombing of a house in the suburb and allega-
tions that blacks from the townships were planning to burn down white
schools. The Krugersdorp Town Council and the security forces promised to
build a security fence between Dan Pienaarville and Munsieville and to secure
army protection for the schools.180 Residents in Dan Pienaarville lived in fear
of firebombs and kept buckets with sand and water on hand during the night.
Over ten thousand town residents signed a petition demanding that Mun-
sieville residents be moved to Kagiso within a year. The people of Munsieville
reacted angrily to this petition. Older residents had already experienced
removals before they were resettled in Munsieville in the 19405. Several
Munsieville residents said that they had lived in the area long before the whites
settled in Dan Pienaarville and that if whites objected to being neighbors, then
they were the ones who should leave.181
Dan Pienaarville was an extension of Krugersdorp built in the early 19805.
People who bought houses there did so in the belief that the squalid township
next door was going to be demolished. They feit cheated when the govern-
ment announced in October 1985 that Munsieville was not going to be moved
but would be upgraded. The Krugersdorp Action Group was formed to con-
test this government decision. While police and town authorities turned a
blind eye, the Krugersdorp Action Group formed an armed vigilante group
and announced its intentions in the local newsletter: "We intend to take dras-
tic action if we feel the Situation warrants it, and it can be left to the police to
come and fetch the bodies."182 In February 1986, the Krugersdorp Town
Council unanimously rejected the government decision and demanded the
removal of Munsieville as soon as possible. Council members called Mun-
sieville "a cancer that needs to be removed. We have to protect our white skins.
We will remove it, true as God."183 Nighdy raids by masked whites, sometimes
accompanied by blacks believed to be policemen, were a regulär occurrence in
both Munsieville and Kagiso. The Sunday Star, having interviewed dozens of
township residents, painted a grim picture of "an orgy of destruction."184
Whites with balaclavas descended on the townships nearly every night, shoot-
ing residents and beating them up with truncheons, pickax handles, sjamboks,
and rifle butts. One twenty-two-year-old man, Stephen Matshogo, was so hor-
rendously beaten that his corpse was hardly recognizable. A township doctor
< Said hè treated people who were pulled from taxis and cars and were beaten
ap by men dressed in what were thought to be police uniforms. One night
alone two doctors reported seeing at least fifty-two victims of violent attacks,
dl of them with massive bruises and cuts. Among the victims were young chil-
dren. Medical reports, submitted as evidence in the court case, present a pic-
ture of indiscriminate violence. The victims were between ten and sixty-seven
years of age and included both men and women.185 A local priest, Bishop
William Kunene, told how masked men would beat little children playing in
front of his church with sjamboks and rifle butts. The men threatened to burn
.• the bishop's house, since the comrades had been burning poücemen's houses.
Not only people but also the people's parks, arranged by township youth,
: were the targets of attacks. The parks were ruined by the invaders.186 The
;. South African police denied any allegations of misconduct, blamed Matshogo's
• death on faction fights, and claimed that poüce units were carrying out a crime
prevention action in Kagiso on 24 February. This was the most violent day in
a series of vigilante raids. Among the victims was a local black policeman who
was severely sjambokked by six white policemen and one black, although hè
indicated to them that hè could identify himself as a police constable.187
With temperatures rising in both the townships and in Krugersdorp, the
issue of Munsieville had become a symbol of South Africa's racial polarization.
Since the vocal right-wing activists in Krugersdorp belonged to the camp of
the Conservative Party and the AWB rather than to the National Party—they
had called for the resignation of their NP member of parliament, Leon Wes-
sels—the Botha government had litde reason to woo the angry whites. Toward
the end of March, President P. W. Botha announced that Munsieville would
not be removed. Instead, the government had opted for a patrolled buffer
zone with a road, safety fences, and high streetlights between Munsieville and
Dan Pienaarville, which was soon dubbed the "Berlin Wall" solution.188 This
left both sides dissatisfied. Militant whites feit betrayed because the state had
reneged on earlier promises to remove the township residents, while the peo-
ple of Munsieville did not relish the thought of being fenced in. The stipula-
tion that Munsieville could not expand beyond its existing borders made
residents doubt whether the promised upgrading of their township would
amount to anything substantial.
Besieged by Krugersdorp vigilantes and a vengeful police force, the people
of Kagiso and Munsieville tended to close ranks behind leaders who shared
their anxieties and who took concrete action to try and protect them against
arbitrary violence. When KRO leaders pleaded their case in court, they were
confident that they represented the overwhelming majority of Kagiso resi-
dents. Living under siege had contributed to the forging of a political com-
munity.189 The court application was supported by three ministers of reügion
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in Kagiso and backed up by 118 affidavits containing allegations of polie
brutality. In view of the "particularly grave" nature of the allegations, Judg
R. J. Goldstone ordered the affidavits to remain private and confidential unti
the ministers of la w and order and of defense had an opportunity to rept)
While not admitting any of the allegations, the minister of law and orde
undertook to pass on instructions to the police on the West Rand prohibitk
them from committing unlawful acts.190 But serious incidents involving l
police continued.
The funds for the litigation were provided by the South African Council <
Churches (SACC) and the Commission for Justice and Reconciliation of d
Catholic Church. When the court proceedings opened in Aprü, the minist
of law and order, the minister of defense, and the divisional commissioner <
police on the West Rand all denied the allegations. They stated that the alL,
gations had been made to further the aims of the ANC and to create "libet-1
ated" areas in the townships.191 The army, however, acknowledged the validityj
of the claim that on several occasions SADF officers had thrown rubber snakej
into passenger cars at road blocks. This was meant as a "practical joke" tol
defuse tensions, and according to the SADF, it was appreciated as such by •
mostresidents.192 <
When the case proceeded in open court with well-documented charges ,
against the police and with accompanying media publicity, it became a matter
of increasing embarrassment for the state. The proclamation of a nationwide
State of Emergency in June 1986 provided the state with an opportunity to put
the lid on it. On n June, the entire executive of KRO was detained under the
emergency regulations, as well as a whole range of other activists from Kag-
iso. Later the members of the executive were detained under section 29 of the
Internal Security Act, which allowed for unlimited detention without trial for
the purpose of interrogation. They had no right to see a lawyer, which meant
that the court case against the minister of law and order could not proceed.
The widely supported court case of KRO against the minister of law and
order was a manifestation of Kagiso as a political Community. The concept of
Kagiso as political Community, with strengths and limitations, is further
explored in the conclusion of diis chapter. The next section deals with another
civic activity that contributed to the shaping of this political Community: pop-
ulär justice.
Populär Justice
The Kagiso Disciplinary Committee (DC) had its origins in the December
anticnme campaign and in efforts to curb abuses in the enforcement of the
consumer boycott. It was constituted in January, when it became obvious that
,gs were getting out of hand. "People were just generally burning things
hout having a clear direction as to what is happening."193 Around this time,
oup of people who would later become involved in the DC went to see the
:imander of the Kagiso police station and Mayor Moeketsi to discuss the
blem of escalating violence, notably the burning of delivery vehicles. This
npt at joint action by calling a mass meeting to discuss the problems came
othing, perhaps because shortly afterward the house of the station com-
nder burned down.
The DC, chaired by KRO executive member Bongani Dlamini, was com-
»sed of young activists in their twenties.194 The DC heard cases of people
,und with knives and confiscated their weapons. Formally, the DC was "not
l organ of KRO, but KRO would have consultations with it."195 At the
ne time, elderly men founded an organization with the same goal of "con-
(trollmg the tsotsi element."196 Significantly, it was called the Fathers' Con-
feess. There is no unanimity on the origins of the Fathers' Congress.
f According to Serge Mokonyane, it was an attempt on the part of KRO to get
l elderly men involved in Community affairs. "Some fathers were fairly conser-
I vative; they did not want their wives to attend meetings. So we thought to
> solve this problem by organizing the fathers." But apart from an attempt on
the part of the civic to organize the more conservative elements, it was also
an attempt by these elderly men to regain control over a terrain that they tra-
ditionally considered their own preserve: administering justice was seen by
some as "exclusively a fathers' domain." They invoked African tradition and
è the practice of township makßoMa (informal courts conducted by elderly
men) to support their stance that this was a matter for fathers only. Here was
a potential source of generational conflict, but it was solved within a couple
of weeks as the scope of the DC widened to include mediation in disputes
between neighbors and domestic problems. Mokonyane commented on the
involvement of the elders:
But people said they could not present domestic problems to these youngsters.
You cannot discuss problems like barren wives or husbands who cannot pro-
vide sexual satisfaction because the husband is always drunk, with a group of
youngsters. This type ofthing could turn against KRO. So we purposefully
took a decision to get parents involved in the DC. Initially, it took a great deal
of convincing, because the people thought they were not educated enough to
conduct these things. Some people came fbrward in meetings, they offered
themselves to sit on the DC. These people had various backgrounds, there were
no set criteria. At the other hand, the youth had some problem to let go their
handling of disciplinary matters. But in the end they were convinced to hand
over to older people.
The role of youth was now limited to summoning people to the meetings of
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the DC. Most members of the DC, which counted about ten members, \
elderly men. Women and youth had some input, but their influence ,
clearly limited, for "most fathers thought that women had no business on!
DC, since they ought to be at home and attend to household things."197'
Munsieville DC, however, had one female member, and in Kagiso, wor.„
were sometimes involved when the DC dealt with domestic issues. The ne
chair of the DC was a man of about fifty years in age, Morgan Montoedi. „
exercised this function for only two months. In March, his wife, three chi
dren, and one grandchild were burned to death when firebombs were throw
into his house. Montoedi himself was badly injured. KRO blamed the attac
on "agents of the System."198 The house of another member of the D(
George Xolilizwe, was also firebombed.
Soon after the personnel change from youth to "fathers," the commit
found itself dealing with all kinds of petty crime, domestic matters, and je_
ousies. The DC did not consider itself fit to deal with serious crime such u
murder, rape, or assault with grievous bodily harm. But KRO claimed that thijL
type of crime did not happen during the months that the DC functionedj
"There was very little crime, untü we were all detained. Then crime soared."199*
Marriage problems were apparently among the main issues before the com-J
mittee, with both men and women phoning Sister Bernard at the convent toc
complain about wives not sleeping at home or not looking after the children ;:
or about husbands who ran off with their pay envelopes to sleep with other '
women. Both parties to the conflia were summoned to the convent to present
their case to the Disciplinary Committee. From the phone conversations, it'
seems that women were generally in a weaker position: if a husband went off •
with his pay to another woman, the party to be "disciplined" was apparently
the other woman, not the unfaithful husband. The DC saw it as its duty to
counter divorce. "We would teil the couple to solve their problems and stay
together. For example, a husband chasing his wife out of the house and taking
his girlfriend in. We would talk to that man and teil him that hè cannot do
that since hè is a married man."200 According to this committee member, the
DC was successful in solving marital problems. "There was no more divorce
at that time."
Interestingly, the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Committee in these mat-
ters seems to have been widely accepted. Tapped phone conversations,
recorded by police, include calls with the local leader of the Zion Christian
Church, generally regarded as politically conservative. From his reply it
appears that the sessions of the DC had his füll approval and that hè referred
marital conflicts to this committee.201 But there were also limitations to the
legitimacy of the court. Residents who adhered to AZAPO, AZANYU, or the
PAC refbsed to accept its jurisdiction. The rival civic KCO opposed the DC as
».<ui&a court," although it supported the anticrime campaign. While
oy people apparently regarded mediation in domestic conflicts as a useful
fel role, the Africanists were opposed to meddling in their femily affaire,
ione of the AZANYU members or their families were ever touched by the
s. We had made it clear that we would not allow that. They avoided peo-
with AZANYU or PAC links."202
:
 One harrowing case involved a woman who-fearing the DC as much as
snc feared her boyfriend-attempted to commit suïcide by drinking a bottle
idetergent when she was summoned to a meeting. She no longer wanted to
* t with her boyfriend in his backyard shack because there were quarrels with
owners of the house. At a previous session, the DC had told the woman
> submit to the authority of her boyfriend: if she left the place without his
4>ermission, she was to get five lashes.203
f In many of the cases brought to its attention, the DC fuMled a useful role
Sdispenser of justice, but there were obvious limitations. The role of youth
tsummoning people to DC meetings was considered improper by many
pdcr residents, and the taboo on invoking police assistance put people in an
f awkward position when they tried to claim what was legally theirs. Punish-
Lent meted out by the DC was on the whole moderate: the emphasis was on
f reeducation rather than on punitive sanctions. If children were found guüty
l of misbehavior such as stabbing, stealing, or assault, the DC would call in the
tparents. After explaining what the children had done, the DC would ask
: parental approval for the punishment to be administered. The average pun-
:
 fehment was five lashes, with a maximum of ten. Some KRO activists main-
{tained that only children were flogged and that matters between adults were
setded without physical sanctions, but there is room for doubt.
' Although the DC undoubtedly served a useful function, and the civic
widened its support base by allocating the function of populär justice to eld-
erly men, the DC also had its critics. It was, after all, a new venture, and most
members lacked experience. The most common criticism was that the DC neg-
lected its educative functions because "some members thought that all prob-
lems can be solved by administering a couple of lashes."204 Activists m the
Young Christian Workers, who had campaigned against corporal punishment
in the schools, were inclined to oppose the use of the whip. This was for prin-
cipled reasons but also because in YCW they had learned to weigh the conse-
quences before jumping into action. "So we were critical of the handlmg of
the lumpen proletariat by the People's Courts. If you beat them up, they might
side with the police."205 Another YCW activist was critical of the lack of
accountability, experience, and "political direction" of the members of the DC.
In principle, both parties could present their own side of the story; but m
practice, the DC had often already made up its mind. Apart from the lack of
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a fair hearing, the DC was also used to settle all kinds of scores. "Peopl*
dragged their neighbors to the court to setde some old feud. The civic was ni
equipped to deal with this kind ofthing. I saw a group of comrades arrivii
to fetch someone in a house next to mine. He did not want to come and 1
beat him up on the spot, quite severely."206
Moreover, even loyal critics of the proceedings of the DC were acute
aware that the court would not take kindly to criticism. Several interviewe™
mentioned the case of one activist belonging to this "workerist Opposition!
who had been critical of the consumer boycott and of the "kangaroo courtsl
He was summoned before the DC, ostensibly because of some domestic issue|
but in reality because the DC members wanted to teach him a lesson for his|
criticism. The case, however, was settled without resort to the whip.
The Emergence of a Political und Moral Community
To what extent was Kagiso in 1985-86 transformed into a political Community*.',
A Community, not in the sense of residents sharing the same geographical
space, but of people sharing a common purpose. In interviews with many civic
activists from Kagiso, a clear sense of nostalgia transpired for the heady days
of people's power. It was, on the one hand, a period of fear and heightened
repression; but on the other hand, residents shared a feeling of solidarity and
a sense of purpose that was not experienced either before or after this episode,
Forging active political communities was a key element in the strategy of the
UDF and many civics, as can be seen from Ntlokoa's 1984 strategy document,
in which hè laments the lack of social cohesion.207 A civic, in liis view, had to
move beyond a single-issue interest group of residents toward building a polit-
ical community. One feature in the shaping of these political communities was
a sense of a shared destiny: a vision of a future society that was prefigured in
attempts to establish an alternative hegemony.
The most visible manifestation of the emergence of an alternative hege-
mony in Kagiso was the way in which youth tried to remodel the world of the
township. Once the youth became organized in the congresses, they provided
various services to the community. Help with the organization of funerals was
generally appreciated, although some parents, grieving over the loss of their
children, resented youth hijacking the burial ceremony from the family and
the church leadership. Youth also conducted cleanup campaigns and thought
of various means of embellishing the township. Apart from the practical pur-
pose of winning community support, these campaigns also served an ideo-
logical goal. People's parks, baptized Nelson Park or Biko Park and adorned
with car tires painted with the names of fallen heroes, represented an effort to
reclaim ideological ground from the state. Graffiti proclaimed that the future
ould belong to the youth: "We are the world, we are the children" or "We
K the future and nothing can stop us."208
Funerals offered an obvious platform for symbolic mamfestations. This,
öfact, was one of the arguments advanced by police against KRO during the
ttial. Police spokespeople claimed that KRO took over the funerals, with slo-
ans, banners, speakers, and crowds of funeralgoers wearing political T-shirts.
br the police, displaying these symbols of the struggle meant that KRO dis-
[ÊSpected the solemnity of a funeral. KRO explained that this was not at all
j&respectful, as people dress in a "uniform" according to the occasion. If the
peceased
 Was a member of a football team, the other team members would
lattend the funeral in football T-shirts. If he was a trade union member, the
pther members would come in union T-shirts.209
i Police imposed strict restrictions on funerals, arguing that black youth
l«xploited funerals to promote lawlessness and violence and to advertise the
f banned ANC and SACP with flags, banners, and slogans. Funeral processions
F on foot were banned. The ceremony was to be limited to the church and the
!
 churchyard, with funeralgoers transported in motor vehicles. Political speeches
were banned; the use of loudspeakers was not allowed. The number of mourn-
. ers was limited, usually to four hundred, while nonblacks were banned from
participation altogether. The restrictions on numbers and the ban on walk-
ing processions were frequently ignored, as in the case of the funeral of sev-
enteen-year-old Joseph Mono, which was attended by about fifteen hundred
people 21° Mono had been shot by police during the march of Munsieville
mothers to the police station while hè was helping several women who had
been tear-gassed by police. Many funeralgoers were subsequendy detamed,
including two Catholic nuns, Sister Bernard and Sister Christina.
The ideological meaning of these symboüc manifestations was not lost on
outside observers. The Afrikaans Sunday paper Rapport reported how children
as young as twelve or thirteen had unleashed a reign of terror, applying Maoist
revolutionary principles. They manned street blockades, checked on taxis, pre-
scribed to businessmen how to run their businesses, and cleaned the streets. A
striking feature of this reign of terror was the "ominous quiet and order." "The
children clean the rubbish, keep the streets clean. The fairly neat parks are
named Biko Park, Nelson Mandela Park and 'The Fallen Heroes.' The stated
goal of all these activities is to make clear that they are more effective than
the town councils."211
Efforts to establish an alternative hegemony were apparently tar more
threatening to white domination than sheer anarchy. The people's parks were
thus interpreted as elements in the alleged total strategy of the UDF and the
ANC to create "liberated zones." The reporter spotted the ominous presence
of car tires not only in the parks but also in front of certain homes, notably at
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the house of a town councillor in Munsieville, where they obviously served a
purpose of intimidation. The report then went on to quote policemen and
politicians who equally emphasized the discipline that is apparent in this
"revolutionary onslaught." Leon Wessels, the National Party MP for Krugers-
dorp, believed that white South Africans could no longer claim to understand
the black man. "A new breed of black people has grown in South Africa, peo-
ple who do not fear death and who are prepared to die for what they regard
as freedom."212
What made KRO into one of the more effective civics in the PWV town-
ships.'' Within its limitations, it managed to some extent to deliver the goods.
It preferred a nonconfrontational strategy, thus minimizing the risks to which
township residents were exposed, and it combined political radicalism with
some socially conservative features, as shown in the section on populär justice.
Rather than espousing calls to make the townships ungovernable, the civic
endeavored to create some order with the anticrime campaign and the provi-
sion of some kind of justice. Therefore, it performed socially useful functions.
In afFidavits for the court case, many ordinary residents declared their support
for KRO.213 They described the civic as "an Organisation which is chosen by
the people and not appointed by the government," and one that enjoys legit-
imacy among township residents. Also, the civic performed effectively as a
pressure group: "An example of this the last time when there was an intended
rent increase, they approached the authoriries and negotiated with them as a
result of which there was no increase." Residents also expressed support for
KRO's political role, striving toward "a more just society" in South Africa.
This fits well with Makgothlo's own view of KRO's function. He explained
KRO's strategy in a meeting with KRO lawyers, who asked how hè would
reply to the state's charge that civics were conspiring with the ANC to make
South Africa ungovernable. KRO's strategy relied on mobilizing large num-
bers but was not averse to dealings with authorities, who, after all, were
needed if the civic wanted to function. KRO took up issues "by having mass
meetings . . . and making a heil of noise. Because of the pressure, things some-
times changed; there was the instance of a new hostel, and we said no hostels
before people had houses, and because ofthat pressure then houses started
springing up Houses are low quality with high rentals, but at least the hos-
tel came much later, after all these houses had been built, and then later on we
said all right, lert talk."214
Makgothlo disputed that Kagiso was ungovernable. "People still go to the
offices, they still pay for their services, water and light, rent is still being paid,
rubbish is still being collected." As further evidence, hè added that unlike
Alexandra, Kagiso had not become a no-go area for the police. Out of a total
of sixty police homes in Kagiso, only three had become the target of arson.
The attacks were carried out against specific policemen, such as the one who
was held responsible for the death of a child. Thirty-five black policemen were
still living in Kagiso, while by this time police in Alexandra had been forced to
cvacuate their houses. Rather than promoting ungovernability, KRO saw itself
as providing some useful services and maintaining some semblance of order.
Consumer boycotts were seen as a nonviolent tactic to seek redress for griev-
ances. While the local authorities were clearly seen as illegitimate, KRO took
a pragmatic position when it came to dealing with them.
It is a tribute to the responsible leadership of KRO that Kagiso was spared
some of the excesses, like necklacing, that bedeviled other townships. Winnie
Mandela made her notorious "matches and necklaces" speech in Munsieville
in April 1986. Speaking to about five hundred people in the Pentecostal Church
in MunsieviUe, Mandela exhorted the people of South Africa to join forces
to overthrow the government: "Together, hand in hand, with that stick of
matches, with our necklaces, we shall liberate this country."215 Although she
was at this time still held in wide esteem, this particular piece of advice was not
taken up in either Kagiso or Munsieville.
On the other hand, one should not underestimate the insecurity and bewil-
derment feit by ordinary residents who were subjected to "revolutionary dis-
cipline." Resentment against arrogant and unruly youth transpires clearly from
many phone conversations between residents and Sister Bernard, as well as
from several afFidavits and interviews. An illustration of this "balance of fear"
was given by a Kagiso woman in one of the afFidavits: "I do fear the comrades
but only in the sense that they mete out punishment after decisions have been
taken by people's courts, if people have been acting anti-socially. I however
fear the police more than I fear the comrades." Others professed that they
found cops and comrades equally frightening.
The construction of a political Community was not just the work of the civic
leadership. Only under conditions of beleaguerment was Kagiso transformed
into an entity that can be regarded as a political Community, ciosing ranks
against an external threat. Another necessary ingrediënt was a dose of ideo-
logical Inspiration, in order to give a wider meaning to the bread-and-butter
concerns of everyday life. Local concerns obviously were the key issues in
recruiting support for the civics, but most of these issues could not be solved
on a local level: it was unavoidable to address the vital issue of control over
central state power. Moreover, the sense of belonging to a nationwide move-
ment was a vital element in the shaping of political communities. Organiza-
tion and ideology, key factors in the making of a political Community, needed
to reach beyond the bread-and-butter issues of rents and transportation.216 By
virtue of belonging to the UDF and sharing its vision of a more just and egal-
itarian society, the civics provided an ideological underpinning to otherwise
largely parochial concerns.
The termfolitical Community perhaps overemphasizes the political dimen-
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sions. Turning back to Kagiso, I would suggest that the forging of a politie^
community can also be seen as the making of a moral Community. Because off
the prevailing liberal and Marxist paradigms, the role of religion as motivat-l
ing force and source of legitimacy is often overlooked. As Chikane explains in:
his autobiography, the dualistic world view in which the spiritual world is sep-.
arated from the social world does not accord with the African world view. Not J
only were the people of Kagiso involved in a battle against an oppressive state; f
they were—in Chikane's words—taking part in the "struggles between the \
forces of righteousness (light) and unrighteousness (darkness)."217The anti-;
crime campaign, the cleanups, and the social isolation of the police and the i.
town councillors au fit in with the endeavor to cleanse the township of evil
forces. The anticrime campaign was described as "cleansing the township of
thuggery.... We have actually ridden the township of youth drunkenness and
irresponsibility."218 By reaffirming famüy and community values, the Disci-
plinary Committee served as moral beacon in these times of confusion.
Lawrence Ntlokoa's diary provides a good illustration of the envisaged
moral order. While hè observes that Christianity is used to preach resignation,
hè is not going to abandon the terrain of religion in order to fight a secular
political battle. On the contrary, hè sets out to repossess the spiritual forces
from the fat clergy who have betrayed the cause of the poor. Christ is "the
friend of the workers, who died for their cause." It was not only a political ide-
ology but also a religious belief that provided a source of legitimacy for the
civic leadership. This became evident on the first day of the bus boycott, when
the overwhelming success of the boycott was experienced as a moment of
redemption: "Yah, God is on our side."
The envisaged moral and political order was egalitarian in terms of race and
class. There is considerably more ambiguity with regard to gender and gen-
eration. Women at this time played a somewhat more prominent role in the
township than in the early 19805, when they were not even taken into account
by the youthful activists who embarked on the first campaigns against rent
rises. But women remained largely confined to their role as mothers: a redef-
inition of roles was not really on the agenda. The DC enforced existing patri-
archal relations. In this sphere, although the committee provided an avenue
for women to call men to account, the DC operated as a conservative Institu-
tion, guarding an entrenched System of social and moral values. Youth had
conquered new terrain for themselves, but they met the boundaries of their
newfound power when it came to dealing with the domestic matters of adults.
The DC was formed precisely to take over from the youth the function of dis-
penser of populär justice.
The youth who constructed the people's parks and the elderly men who dis-
pensed people's justice did not, in all likelihood, share the same vision of a
are society. From the story of township revolt in Kagiso, it has become
,vious that there were limitations to the consensus that supposedly under-
f this political or moral community. People with Africanist leanings did not
cognize the authority of the Disciplinary Committee. Dissidents from the
*orkerist Opposition were excluded from the decision-making process. YCW
ftembers who were critical of the consumer boycott and who approached the
ELO executive with the proposal to confer about an alternative course of
fcdon were told that there was to be no discussion. "If you disagreed, it meant
„hat you were not supporting the struggle."219 Critics were excluded from the
feonsumer Boycott Committee. They questioned not only the wisdom of the
iconsumer boycott, which involved a considerable degree of coercion, but also
Hfae process of decision making and the lack of accountability. The civic lead-
prship made decisions, which were subsequently endorsed in mass meetings.
l These emotional meetings did not provide a platform for discussion or minor-
* ïty positions. Critics, even when loyal to the cause, were promptly labeled reac-
£ tionaries: "It was simply not possible to disagree with majority decisions."220
' Criticism was also voiced about the ill-considered goals of the consumer
boycott: the demands were a rather haphazard mix of local and national issues,
some of a short-term nature and others, long-term. Following the YCW tac-
tics, they would have preferred to concentrate on winnable issues as a means
of slowly building a more confident community. These critics believed that
civics ought to concentrate their efforts on civic matters, not on national pol-
itics. Only by focusing on the direct everyday concerns of residents could civics
hope to grow into strong grassroots organizations. The boycott in Kagiso was
called for an undetermined period without a chance of demands being met.
As a result, the campaign fizzled out without any demonstrable victory. The
bus boycott did not result in an improved bus service but in Greyhound stop-
ping the bus service altogether. The civic leadership underestimated the poten-
tially divisive character of the boycott. The political community proved a
fragile construction, which did not survive the detention of the civic leader-
ship. For the workerist critics, the phase of Kagiso's transformation into a
political community was a period in which they preferred to lie low. Several of
them were to play a leading role again when the civic was reconstituted along
somewhat different Unes in 1989.
Collapse and Resurrection, 1986-1991
From June 1986, KRO effectively ceased to function. The entire leadership was
in detention and would remain entangled in legal procedures for years. After
the Supreme Court declared their detention illegal in 1987, some members of
the executive were indeed released. But the day after the release, both the
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released leaders and those still in detention were charged with Subversion and l
sedition. The released KRO leaders chose not to go into hiding but appeared^
in court. The state asked for the defendants to be re-detained, but the judge
granted bail since the KRO leaders had demonstrated that they would keep
themselves available. The terms of bail, however, entailed serious restrictions.
Some members of the executive were restricted to the magisterial district of j
Krugersdorp, and others were not permitted to enter Kagiso or Munsieville
until 1988, when the charges against them were finally dropped. Some KRO
activists were not released until 1989. Some years later, an out-of-court settle-
ment was reached in which the state agreed to pay substantial damages for
unlawful detentions.
In addition to the members of the KRO executive, youth and student lead-
ers were taken into custody. According to KRO secretary Ntlokoa, more than
three hundred people were detained at some point during the State of Emer-
gency. Others went underground and left the area or the country altogether.
"Under the emergency, everything was immediately put down. As soon as
somebody raised his head, the police would swoop in. The violence died
down when the emergency was declared."221
7. Sister Mary Bernard Ncube meets a well-wisher on her release after sixteen months
in detention, 19 October 1987. Photograph courtesy of Eric Miller.
For Kagiso's political Community, conditions under the State of Emergency
f ied to a "reversal of gains. Crime re-emerged very strongly. Now the com-
Lfades-those who had not been detained-were afraid of the gangsters."222 In
P&e schools, teachers and principals reasserted their authority, although the stu-
\ dent representative councils survived the State of Emergency. For the boycott
^campaign against the town council elections in 1988, some trade unionists
!&om Johannesburg were enlisted to help with the distribution of pamphlets.
ï Only nine people were engaged in this campaign, trying to cover a township
of about seventy thousand inhabitants.223
With the UDF effectively banned, COSATU moved to fül the void in the
political arena. The COSATU Third Congress in July 1989 resolved to rebuild
the Mass Democratie Movement around the "strategie alliance" of COSATU
and the UDF. The congress called on union members to be active in strength-
ening and rebuilding structures at national, regional, and local levels and
emphasized the need to build street committees.224 It was this trade union ini-
tiative that led to civic revival in Kagiso. NUMSA (National Union of Metal-
workers) officials and shop stewards in Krugersdorp formed the Chamdor
Industrial Area Committee, which included six COSATU unions and two
NACTU (National Confederation of Trade Unions) unions.225 The area com-
mittee soon found itself involved in classic civic activities. In June, the Kagiso
Town Council announced a substantial increase in rent and service charges.
A week after this announcement, the area committee drew up a petition
opposing the rent increases and appointed a delegation to present the petition
to the town council. In July, about three hundred residents gathered in the
hostel in Kagiso I to hear a report-back on the delegation's meeting. The hos-
tel dwellers were active participants in the area committee.
Meanwhile, the Chamdor Industrial Area Committee attempted to resolve
a conflict between activists of KRO and the Kagiso Civic Organisation (KCO),
which had launched protest action against rent increases in the new neigh-
borhood of East Park/Joshua Doore.226 For a short while, the rivaling civics
worked together in the Kagiso Interim Co-ordinating Committee (KICC),
but this broadly based committee did not bring an end to the divisions. KRO
activists resented KCO calling separate meetings and making separate attempts
to meet the town council.227 KCO, as a minority partner, worried about being
swallowed by "a multi-structural body" such as KICC, which represented
unions, students, and youth. It suspected that NUMSA acted as «an organ
of the ANC" and had been assigned the task of reviving civics in order to
establish Charterist hegemony. Plans to form one joint civic organization
foundered on long-standing distrust, personal rivalries, and the inability to
agree on a System of representation.228 The attempt to establish one civic for
all Kagiso residents finally faltered when KCO withdrew from the KICC.
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When the protests failed to stop the increases of rents and service charges,!
those attending a meeting called by KICC on 30 July resolved to embark on &|
rent boycott. After three subdued years, 1989 marked the revival of defiancej
In December 1989, residents staged a protest march to present their demands J
to the city councii. The list included a demand for the resignation of the Kag-1
iso Town Councii and for a new System of municipal government with a sin- j
gle tax base and a single administration for Krugersdorp and the townships.229 \
The boycott of rent payments and service charges was implemented in Decem-
ber, after the councii had turned down a KICC proposal for a flat rate of 45:
Rand for all houses. Some residents paid the flat rate, others stopped paying*
altogether. This was the first organized rent boycott in Kagiso: previous
protests were limited to a refusal to pay the increases. As a result, Kagiso was
faced with further deterioration of services in 1990. Garbage collection was
suspended, while the electricity Company ESCOM threatened to cut off elec-
tricity now that residents had stopped paying their bills. The rent boycott pre-
sented the civic with a new problem: the main occupants of houses stopped
paying rent but were still charging rents from their subtenants. Most landlords
charged their backyard tenants around 30 Rand. The housing shortage had
become even more acute after the abolition of influx control in 1986, and the
number of subtenants had increased spectacularly. Ike Genu estimated that
in 1990 over half the inhabitants of Kagiso were backyard tenants. The civic
decided to issue a guideline for the subtenants' rents to be halved.230 Whether
the guideline was respected is, of course, an open question.
Another familiär issue that posed itself before the fledgling interim civic
was transportation. Taxi owners, who had a monopoly after the cessation of
Greyhound bus services, had forgotten their earlier promises about reduced
fares for students and pensioners and consultation with the Community about
fares. In mid-i989, the fares had again been increased, making taxis now sub-
stantially more expensive than buses. When a meeting of KICC with the taxi
associations produced 110 result, those attending a meeting of Kagiso residents
decided on a taxi boycott. However, this boycott never took off. KICC
found that the bus Company PUTCO (Public Utility Transport Corporation),
which also serviced various parts of Soweto, was willing to open a bus serv-
ice between Kagiso and Johannesburg, but the town councils of Kagiso and
Mohlakeng (the Randfontein township) refused permission for the bus serv-
ice. The town councillors presumably had an interest in the taxi business,
either directly or through front men, and had no desire to undermine the taxi
monopoly.
In March 1990, one month after the unbanning of the ANC, KICC was
transformed into a new civic organization, now called the Kagiso Civic Associ-
ation (KCA). It included some old KRO activists but also a significant element
tKRO's former "workerist" critics. Because of the trade union influence dur-
r the revival process, the civic now had "more of a working class perspec-
,é.... There is much emphasis on working with a proper mandate from the
sidents. It is less of an activist-led organization."231 Ike Genu, who had the
ost dear-cut ANC credentials, was the new chair. Tizza Moiloa became vice
air, Serge Mokonyane general secretary, and Lawrence Ndokoa vice general
„.cretary. Other long-serving civic activists such as Joe Makgothlo and Ben
§Ntsimane were chosen as members of the executive.
KCA did not become a UDF affiliate, but it joined the Civic Associations
-„f the Southern Transvaal (CAST), which now operated as an umbrella for
f civics planning to join with regional umbrella organizations elsewhere into
l a national platform for civic associations, while the UDF was phasing out. The
l aew civic had more elaborate structures than its predecessor. The new leader-
:
 Ship was critical of mass meetings as a forum for the decision-making process.
Mass meetings now served only an informative function. For purposes of deci-
sion making and consultation, Kagiso was divided into seventeen blocks, with
each block having a representative on the KCA Central Committee. This com-
mittee, which was to meet every week, was the decision-making body. Apart
from the seventeen block representatives, the membership of the central com-
mittee included two delegates from each hostel and two delegates from every
affiliated organization such as student and women's organizations, taxi asso-
ciations, and local business associations. In the new setup and in a context
where the ANC was heading for negotiations, the youth were no longer at the
center of civic activity. The emphasis on report-backs and mandates resulted
in a fairly cumbersome procedure, with block representatives conveying the
majority opinion of their block. The decision by the KCA Central Committee
was then taken back to the block meetings, where it could be either confirmed
or overturned. The KCA constitution prescribed a registered and paid mem-
bership, but this had not yet been implemented during my visits in 1990-91.
Although South Africa was now heading for peace talks, the year 1990 was
the most bloody episode in Kagiso's history. The township became engulfed
in the wave of violence that swept through the Transvaal when the power bat-
tle between Inkatha and the ANC was exported from the green hills of Natal
to the industrial heartland of the Witwatersrand. Patched together from news-
paper reports and interviews with several KCA leaders, the story of the hostel
war in Kagiso is roughly as follows. In August 1990, a fight between Zulu and
Xhosa migrant workers erupted in the hostel in Kagiso I, with Zulu rem-
forcements being bused in from outside. Three hostel dwellers were killed.
KCA made an unsuccessful mediation attempt. Inkatha then took control over
the hostel and drove out the Xhosa and Sotho workers. The civic came to their
assistance, providing food and shelter in church centers. This was interpreted
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by Inkatha as a hostile act. The Kagiso residents were obviously siding wi^
the Xhosas and were therefore on the side of the ANC. Nocturnal attacks fr<
the hostel on neighboring houses left between forty and fifty people dead, 1
majonty of them ordinary residents without any political afFüiation.233 W,
most of the original inmates driven out, both Kagiso hostels became InkaL
bastions. Civic activists in Kagiso were adamant that the bloody events i
August 1990 had nothing to do with tensions between residents and mig
but were planned and executed by outsiders. They claimed that violence U.
Natal had spilled over to the Transvaal townships and was not the result oft
sions that had been building up locally.
In May 1991, a new wave of violence engulfed Kagiso when more than al
thousand armed hostel residents attacked the recently established squatt
camp Swanieville in a predawn raid. A total of twenty-seven people we,,«,
killed, and thirty more were injured; eighty-two shacks were burned down '
A one-day stay-away called by KCA to commemorate the victims was aboutl
70 percent effective.234 The motivation for this attack was vague, but it seemed'
to involve a dispute between the squatters and the owner of the farm (a.
Mr. Swanepoel) where the settlement had sprung up. Initially, squatters had"
been paying site rents to the farmer, but the allocation of sites had been taken
over by a squatters' committee, which then also began to collect rentals.
Rumor spread that the owner had enlisted the help of hostel dwellers to drive
the squatters off the land.
Police stood accused of collusion in this attack. The day before the mas-
sacre, a curfew was declared in Kagiso, although the township was perfectly
calm. On the same day, police raided the camp and confiscated weapons.
Newspapers posed the question of how nearly a thousand armed men could
walk about five miles from the hostel to the squatter camp without being
noticed by police, yet immediately after the attack a large police force with
armored vehicles was on hand to escort the attackers back to the hostel.
Inkatha admitted responsibility for the attack, claiming it was done in retali-
ation for the kidnapping of two Inkatha hostel dwellers.235 Out of an esti-
mated one thousand attackers, only seven accused stood trial, and they were
acquitted for lack of evidence. While South Africa headed for a negotiated set-
tlement, Kagiso buried more victims than during the height of township
revolt in 1986. The hostels were the main source of violent conflict, but not
the only one.
For the first time, rivalry between ANC and PAC went beyond rhetorical
acrimony and an occasional skirmish. Two deadly encounters left much bit-
terness on both sides. In 1990, fights erupted between ANC youth and PAC
youth in Munsieville. The conflict onginated as a dispute between two boys
about a girl, but the brawl soon attracted numerous youth. The fight left one
»»„on injured and one young man, an ANC adherent, stabbed to death. Then
l heil broke loose, and PAC followers were forced to leave MunsievUle. In
1, when ANC and PAC agreed to work together in a Patriotic Front, peace
cs were conducted in Munsieville. It was agreed that the PAC followers
ld return to their homes. Fresh problems erupted when members of the
SIC youth found out that peace had been concluded without their involve-
nt. Meanwhile, the PAC apparently celebrated the agreement as a triumph
. reportedly boasted about their weapons, whereupon ANC youth decided
l an expedition to seize those weapons, leading to another ANC-PAC fight.
tós time a PAC member was stabbed to death. Cooperation between KCA
ld KCO was becoming even more unlikely after this incident.236
A new boycott campaign in 1991 exposed new fissures in the community.
: civic had called a boycott against a fancy new shopping mail, which con-
_™ited sharply with the increasingly squalid conditions in the township. The
feomplaint was that the investor in this shopping center, the Insurance com-
1 pany Old Mutual, had not consulted with the civic and that tax revenues from
Ithe mail were flowing to Krugersdorp and not to Kagiso. The boycott had a
famltifarious array of supporters and opponents. Among the ardent support-
[ ers of the boycott were small traders in Kagiso, who feared the competition
|ftom the big chain stores at the mail, and the taxi associations, which feared
[losing customers if people would shop at the new mail rather than travel to
! Krugersdorp. But the mall also had its advocates. People from Kagiso who
; found work at this shopping center saw their jobs threatened by the boycott.
;
 Some residents were attracted by the lower prices and the greater variety of
: goods. Unemployed youth provided a ready reservoir for the recruitment of
thugs by various parties involved. Several civic leaders received death threats,
• and at least one was physically attacked. In different accounts, the death threats
were said to be emanating either from unemployed youth or from members
of the ANC Youth League. No longer at the center of political life in the town-
ship, youth feit sidelined and marginalized. Some of the core activists of the
19805 were also disillusioned, resenting the takeover of the civic leadership by
some of their fermer critics. In 1990, Lawrence Ntlokoa was no longer in the
forefront of civic activity. In 1991, hè was running two shebeens.
Kagiso: A Reluctant Rebellion
The story of Kagiso's reluctant rebellion shows certain similarities, but also
stark contrasts, with the youth rebellion in Sekhukhuneland. The civic had a
broad social base and a fairly representative leadership. Unlike the Sekhukhune
youth, KRO had the capacity-albeit limited-to provide useful services. It
could build on organizational experience acquired in church work, trade union
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organization, and youth organization. lts leadership was well educated, but
not necessarily well-off. Some were employed; others were full-time activists.
Business was not represented on the civic executive, but KRO was not antag-
onistic toward local businessmen. It singled out just those businesses which
were owned or run by the town councillors.
Generational frictions came to the fore on numerous occasions, notably
in the complaints about excesses by youth in enforcing the consumer boy-
cott and in the initial stage of populär justice. But these are not as central in
Kagiso as in the story of the Sekhukhune revolt. On the whole, youth activ-
ity—with the exception of the tsotsi element—was fairly integrated into over-
all civic activity. KRO demonstrated that local issues provide a useful starting
point for populär mobilization, but its history also illustrates that issue-
oriented local mobilization does not easily result in sustained organization.
Most of its demands were marked by moderation. It is striking that Kagiso
residents kept paying rents throughout the 19805, whereas most of the Soweto
residents ceased paying rents in 1986. If residents protested against rent
increases, they only refused payment of the increase. Radicalization of town-
ship politics was a product of the genera! atmosphere of insurrection and, in
particular, of the indiscriminate police brutality in the first months of 1986. But
even at the height of revolt, Kagiso did not behave as a "liberated territory":
it had recourse to the courts of the apartheid state to restrain the security
forces. In this court case, the state alleged that Community organizations such
as KRO were being used as tools in the liberation struggle in order to make
the townships ungovernable, to set up liberated areas, and to establish an
ANC presence. By 1986, KRO leaders indeed perceived the civic movement as
part and parcel of the liberation struggle, but their concern was not to make
the township ungovernable. On the contrary, they owed much of their pop-
ularity to their erForts to establish a new order, deriving its legitimacy from a
mixture of old values and new ideals.
As in Sekhukhuneland, socialist ideals of a dassless society inspired an egal-
itarian ethos. Unlike Sekhukhuneland, Christianity also proved an obvious
source of Inspiration and legitimation. By 1990-91, the civic movement in
Kagiso was struggling back on its feet, preparing itself for a new role under
changing conditions.
The debate on the future of civics took off in the context of a renewed inter-
est in the importance of autonomous organs of civil society. After the fall of
the Berlin Wall, this was a lesson repeatedly stressed by several leading ANC
and civic activists: civics and other organizations such as student representa-
tive councils ought not to be used as conduits for the ANC or in the future
as simple transmission belts for the ruling party. Civics were now being cast in
a developmental role and simultaneously in a watch-dog role, to ensure that
: *ïkb, God Is on Our Side"
; members who were m power would not neglect the concerns of
[of civil society seemed to dormnate the debate. But m reality, the fate of *e
ANC and the civics was inextricably linked. Ideally, cmcs should have expe-
fnced a new boom in the more open and hopeful climate of the early^o,
F b practice, many avics virtuaüy coUapsed, as the "organs of ovd ««^
^ fmptied mto an ANC that now had to staff positions m governmen an
Hament at the national level, as well as at the regional and local level.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Grassroots:
From Community Paper to
Activist Play^round
We had the spontaneous awakening of the working masses,
their awakening to conscious life and conscious struggle, and
a revolutionary youth, armed with Social-Democratic theory
and straimng towards the workers.
Lenm
Media and Movements i
IT USED TO BE SAID JOK1NGLY that the United Democratie Front in the West- -
ern Cape was more media than movement. Media policy was central to the
UDF's overall strategy, but the Western Cape was most prolific in the media it
generated. This chapter explores the role of a pioneering initiative in the sphere
of alternative media, the Community paper Grassroots in the Western Cape.
A tabloid with a somewhat irregulär cycle of publication, Grassroots might
at first sight appear rather inconsequential. It hit the streets about once a
month. Under its red masthead appeared a bold headline, exposing a scan-
dalous deed by the government or celebrating a heroic victory by the people.
"They'll starve us to death," exclaimed the story about a rise in the bread price.
"Afdakkies to stay," assured an article that explained how "the people" had
forced the town council to give in to their demand that residents bc allowed
to build corrugated iron extensions onto their houses. On the inside pages,
it offered advice on pensions, divorce, and the prevention of diaper rash, it cel-
ebrated Charterist heroes of the 19505; and it featured the everyday struggles
of ordinary people. But a lot of strategie planning and thinking preceded the
production of these pages. Grassroots, launched in 1980 as "the People's Paper,"
was South Africa's first Community paper of this type. It became a model for
Bsnerous publications elsewhere in the country, where a Grassroots staffmem-
Er often rendered assistance in the initial phase. Most other commumty
jpers were short-lived ventures, but Grassroots survived until 1990.
«Community issues were central to the raison d'être of the alternative press,
' taddressing community issues was not an end in itself. Housmg, trans-
ation and jobs were more likely to awaken an interest in the average
mship resident than the Freedom Charter or Marxist classics. But these
ead-and-butter issues were a means to an end, stepping stones m a mobi-
fetion process against racial and class oppression. The Grassroots staff mem-
MB did not perceive themselves primarüy as journalists but as media workers
«th the mission to promote and sustain collective action. While the com-
ftercial press presumably anaesthetized its readership with "sex, sm, and soc-
T» the alternative media meant to empower their readers through promoting
ganization. Once organized, people would be able to exert control over
icir own lives.
, Who are "the people" and "the communities" in whose name the alterna-
Itive papers fought their courageous battles? The problematic nature of these
oncepts has been explored in previous chapters. In the Black Consciousness
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phase, these concepts were rather straightforward: they included all "oppr<
or "disenfranchised" people and excluded those who had chosen to worfc (
the side of the oppressor. But when following a Marxist analysis, as l
current in the 19805, the conclusion that the oppressed did not necessa
share the same class interests was inescapable. Media activists in the is
vacillated between these two positions. On the one hand, political loyale
remained a crucial criterion, with a sharp dividing line between "us" ;
"them." "Sellouts"—such as Indian and colored members of parliamen(|
African town councillors, or policemen—were not considered to be part<
"the community." On the other hand, many media workers aspired to i
their readers with a working-class consciousness. Apart from its innere
virtue in terms of Marxist doctrine, promoting class consciousness promis
an additional benefit in the conditions of the racially segmented West
Cape: Africans and coloreds would find common ground if they identifie
with their position as workers. However, building alliances across rac
divides proved difficult. Grassroots was not successful in trying to bridge t
gap between coloreds and Africans.
The community papers targeted their audiences both in terms of "resi*
dents" or "communities," and in terms of "workers." Middle-class elementsl
were encouraged to join forces with the working class and to accept "the lead-
ership of the working class" on the assumption that the interests of the two'
classes were compatible. The issues that bound these communities togethefl
were primarily negative in nature: Opposition to rent increases, forcedi
removals, bus fare increases, police brutality. By developing a culture of resist-j
ance, the left-wing media were able to articulate these struggles in positive <
terms.1 The young intellectuals who invested such an extraordinary amount'
of energy in the alternative media strove to lift their working-class audience i
beyond narrow parochial community concerns toward the class struggle. But j
the class consciousness of the activists themselves was often a rhetorical facade •
for youth protest against prevailing patterns of authority. Their media prod-
uas, more often than not, amounted to youth culture posing as class culture.
Moreover, for a "community paper" to fester "class consciousness" is a rather
problematic proposition. As explored below, Grassroots had for a number of
years a rather tense relationship with the main progressive trade unions in the
Western Cape.
In theory, the mission of the alternative press was clear: empowering peo-
ple to fulfill their part in the struggle for national liberation, and—in the eyes
of many media activists— to préparé for a socialist transformation as well.
Most of the alternative papers preferred to look beyond the anti-apartheid
struggle, taking the premise that racial conflict was merely a convenient cam-
ouflage for the real divide in South Africa: the class struggle.
väat in practice, happened in the dilapidated buildings where media
fes and volunteers struggled to bring their paper more or less regularly
.e streets? Was "the community" willing to devote their free Saturday
noons to discussions about the most effective way of portraymg rent
des and the wider ramifications of the battle for more washing lines? Or
l they rather indulge in "sex, sin, and soccer"? Following the pattern of
wo previous case studies, this chapter first sets the scène with a briet
ription of the structural conditions prevailing in the Western Cape. Then
duces the agent which is central to this case study: a newspaper as a col-
: Organizer.
de Western Cape: Conditions and Actors
hough Gmssroots was considered the model of a successful community
aper the communities it meant to serve are among the least homogeneous
f South Africa. In apartheid terms, the Western Cape was to be the unofficial
homeland" of the colored people. Some 40 percent of the roughly three mü-
'» colored people lived in the Cape Peninsula. The introduction of the
oloured Labour Preference Policy in the mid-i95os aimed at reducmg the
- of the African population. Under this policy, which was not abohshed
itil 1984 employers were obliged to give preference to colored labor. African
fcrorkers could be hired only if no coloreds were available. Africans were there-
ffixe relegated to the most poorly paid and unskilled jobs. The construction of
f&nily housing for Africans was virtually stopped. Since Cape Town itself was
f to be a white city, its colored and African inhabitants were forcibly resettled
Ion the uninviting sandy plains of the Cape Flats, with the most notonous
! example being the destruction of the multiracial heart of the aty, District Srx.
The Group Areas Act, designed to purge the cities of their black inhabitants,
f oused enormous social and psychological dislocation. The social fabnc that
l held District Six together disintegrated when its inhabitants were scattcred
'over the Cape Flats, where a high crime rate went hand m hand with high
unemployment. For the Cape coloreds, the Group Areas Act was perhaps the
most hated piece of apartheid legislation.
As influx control began to collapse in the early I98os, the size and compo-
sition of the Western Cape population, and of the Cape Peninsula m particu-
lar underwent a drastic change. With a population increase of 26.4 percent
- between
 I98o and I985, the population of the Cape Peninsula grew at a much
quicker pace than in South Africa as a wholc (16.5 percent), due to an influx ot
Africans. The "legal" African population had decreased, but the illegal
African population had increased considerably. Most Africans were Xhosa
speakers from the Eastern Cape, but the Africans themselves were far from a
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homogeneous "community." The settled urban population with secure
dence rights in the African townships of Langa, Nyanga, and Guguletu was i
a very different position from the newcomers who settled in sprawling squat^
ter camps, continuously subjected to police raids.
Although coloreds continued to be by far the most numerous populatie
group, by 1985 they had ceased to be an absolute majority. In 1980, colored
accounted for 54 percent of the Cape Peninsula population, but by 19851
had shrunk to 46 percent. Whites decreased their share of the population l
32.5 percent in 1980 to 25.6 percent in 1985. In other words, the Cape Pen
sula went through a process of Africanization that gained momentum in theÉ
beginning of the 19805 and continued at an accelerated pace into the 19905. 'l
The majority of the colored population belonged to the Dutch Reformed-;
Mission Church (Nederduits Gerformeerde Sendingkerk, or NGSK), a missioa {
offshoot of the main Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduits Gerformeerde 3
Kerk, or NGK) that was closely allied to the National Party and that provideéi
ideological legitimation for its apartheid policies. With Afrikaans as their pri-
mary language, many coloreds were oriented toward Afrikaner culture. Col-
oreds suffered from discriminating legislation, but they were not as severely
restricted as Africans. Compliance with white rule held the promise of social
upliftment, while identifying with the cause of African liberation promised
severe repression and an uncertain future. Colored advancement usually took;
the route of the teaching profession, church service, or employment with een-:
tral and local government.
A minority among the Cape colored people, the Cape Malays—descen-
dants of the Malay slaves of the Dutch East India Company—were followers
of Islam, although they, too, had adopted Afrikaans as their primary language.
Better educated and more isolated from Afrikaner institutions than the wider
community of Christian coloreds, the Islamic Malays boasted a tradition of
learning, entrepreneurship, and political radicalism. Much of this political
engagement, however, remained confined to left-wing fringe politics, which
had only tenuous and intermittent links with the mainstream movement of
African nationalism. The UDF, with its structure of local and organizational
affiliates, opened new avenues for involvement in a broader protest move-
ment. The Malays played a prominent role in the UDF Western Cape. The
Call of Islam, a religious-political association originating among the Malays,
became a UDF affiliate.
The peoples lumped together under the label cokred in terms of apartheid
legislation were, in fact, highly diverse. The Group Areas Act defined coloreds
as a "rest" category: "any person who is not a member of the white group or
the native group." With this intermediate position in the racial hierarchy and
the absence of a common history and culture, colored people were prone to
psense of insecurity and a crisis of identity, often internalizing negative white
:otypes of coloreds as being impotent, subservient, irresponsible, and
iv»Jied to violence, crime, and drunkenness.
These highly diverse communities formed Gmssroots's target audience,
indled together behind a common label as the "oppressed and exploited
lajority," an opaque phrase that refers to the African, colored, and Indian
pulation. Although these three groups could all be considered oppressed,
f were differentially affected by apartheid legislation. Separate legislation
: rise to separate forms of organization; for example, organizations of col-
iiwi and African students or residents had to deal with different regulations
ad authorities in the field of education or housing. As state policy in the 19805
s geared toward co-optation of coloreds and Indians, they enjoyed more
nvcdom of expression and organization than the Africans, who continued to
:be excluded from state power. Because of the demographic concentration of
?fcoloreds in the Western Cape, the UDF had more room for maneuvering
fthan, for example, in the Transvaal. But the UDF and Gmssroots were only par-
!tially successful in evolving formulas to bridge the racial divides. The problem
Was compounded by the left wing's taboo on issues of identity and ethnicity.
Adopting a working-class approach in order to find common ground in a
acially divided environment proved no solution, as the Western Cape's
^•.vorking class was itself highly segmented. Apart from the docks and the con-
gstruction industry, heavy industry was virtually lacking. The economy was
S dominated by light manufacturing—mainly textiles and food processing—
| services, and commerce. Sizable numbers of both coloreds and Africans
| worked as farm labor on the white farms of the Western Cape, but since these
| Were located outside the Peninsula, they fall outside the scope of this chapter.
In terms of labor struggles, the Western Cape stands out as the least mili-
I tant region in South Africa. Most strikes involved African workers. The largest
|j colored unions remained in the grip of a conservative, white-controlled trade
union bureaucracy almost until the end of the decade. However, a few radi-
, cal independent unions emerged in the 19705, of which the General Workers'
,' Union (GWU), the Food and Canning Workers' Union (FCWU), and, to a
l lesser extent, the Cape Town Municipal Workers' Union were to play an
| important role in radical politics and debates in the 19805. The FCWU, which
i
had roots in the Congress tradition, had a clear Charterist profile, with two
former SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions) leaders, Oscar
Mpetha and Liz Abrahams, playing leading roles.
The General Workers' Union was a general rather than an industry-based
t i union, but it folio wed a more cautious policy than its compeer SAAWU
| (South African Allied Workers Union) and concentrated on building workers'
organizations rather than seeking direct confrontation with the state. The
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GWU had a mainly African membership, with colored workers accounting l
at most 10 percent of total membership. Colored workers were unlikely to i
at home in a union that had become imbued with African culture. Xhosa v
the commonly used language in the GWU, while Afrikaans was the langua
of the colored working class.2 Conversely, African workers believed color
workers to be unreliable when it came to industrial action.
One consequence of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy was the lack«
opportunities for African advancement. Most African workers were unsk'"
or semiskilled; many were migrants. While organizations in the African te
ships of the Transvaal could draw on a reservoir of professionals and an c«»
cated working-class leadership, the African townships of the Peninsula had i
limited potential for providing African leadership for trade unions, comin
nity organizations, and the UDF itself. The UDF Western Cape was don
nated by coloreds—including many students—and white intellectuals.
If the African population of the Peninsula did not figure prominently in t
UDF leadership, it does not follow that militancy was lacking. The Africai«
townships had the reputation of having far more staying power when it cam«'
to bus boycotts, consumer boycotts, or strikes. The Africans in the squatter
camps became international front-page news, with their courageous resistanc^
against the state's deportation schemes. But the squatters, most of whom were™
illegals, were fighting different battles than the colored students or even the!
settled African township population. The squatters fought a battle for survival« j
Their first priority was to gain the right to stay in the Western Cape and not j
to be deported to the poverty-stricken villages of the Transkei. Squatter strug-^
gles took place in Isolation.3 Trade unions and the left-wing intelligentsia had '
other priorities. The launch of the UDF provided new opportunities to link j
up with squatters and to place the demand for residence rights on the politi-
cal agenda. But since the UDF leadership had few contacts in and little knowl-
edge of the squatter communities, they were uncritical in choosing their new
allies. Squatter leader Johnson Ngxobongwana was welcomed as a progres-,
sive leader, although in his home base—the squatter camp Crossroads—hè
had already become notorious for his extortionist practices and his violent sup-
pression of any Opposition to his leadership. Later, Ngxobongwana's men
would turn against UDF supporters.4
Although labor militancy was generally weak, the colored intellectuals pro-
duced more than their fair share of ultraleftist ideologies. ANC traditions have
historically been weak in the Western Cape. The Coloured People's Congress,
which represented the coloreds in the Congress Alliance in the 19505, was small
in numbers and weak in organization, in contrast to the much more influen-
tial South African Indian Congress (SAIC). Some of the political energy was
channeled through the Labour Party, which hovered between participation
l nonparticipation in state structures, until its 1982 congress finally decided
avor of participation in the tricameral parliament. But a sizable part of the
ored population kept aloof from politics. Social conservatism and the reli-
3 orthodoxy of the NGSK were more characteristic of large sections of the
ored population than political radicalism or working-class consciousness.
The Western Cape, however, is unique in its long tradition of Trotskyite
Jism, represented by the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM),
tóch in the 19805 was revived as the New Unity Movement (NUM). Other
Jeft organizations such as the Cape Action League (CAL) and the West-
t Cape Youth League operated in the same ideological vein. The birth of the
5F met with a mixed reception. "The UDF = a betrayal of the working
s," ran the headline of a pamphlet issued by the Western Cape Youth League.
: Unity Movement was traditionally opposed to the "pro-capitalist, anti-
arking class nature of ANC bourgeois social democracy" and the "unprinci-
1 Stalinism of the SAGE'5 Although the Unity Movement remained a small
f eore of colored intellectuals, it left an indelible imprint on resistance traditions
[•in the Peninsula. A sizable part of its membership were colored teachers, who
Uhus had easy access to new disciples in the high schools. The Unity Move-
pnent's basic argument with Charterist organizations concerned the issue of
l Äance politics. It was hostile toward multiclass alliances. lts position on non-
1
 racialism denied the validity of any concept of racial or ethnic differentiation
„or group or minority rights. The Unity Movement was therefore opposed to
the multiracial concept of the Freedom Charter and the multiclass nature of
the United Democratie Front. lts guiding principles of boycotts and noncol-
taboration with ruling-class agencies led the Unity Movement into a cul de sac
- of splendid isolation. Its sterile ineffectiveness is frequently blamed on the fun-
damentalist interpretation of the principle of noncollaboration.6 Close to the
Unity Movement's ideological position but more critical of its abstentionism
was Neville Alexander's Cape Action League, which in the early 19805 was
active in Community struggles over rent and housing, as well as in the election
boycottof 1984.
From 1981, Charterist political organizations and ANC symbols began to
reemerge. However, when colored activists began discovering the ANC in the
early 19808, they were mostly discovering the ANC in exile rather than the
ANC tradition that had survived in the African townships. In the 19805, the
ANC tradition would replace Black Consciousness as the dominant ideology
among colored high school students and on the campus of the University of
the Western Cape (UWC), originally established as a college for coloreds. UWC
students were active in Community organizations, in UDF campaigns, and in
Gmssroots. The university also provided legitimizing ideologies for the renewed
populär resistance: Vice-Chancellor Jakes Gerwel advertised his university as
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insisted on reciprocity, unions risked being dragged into "populist st
over which they had no control. For some Congress activists, suppor
union campaigns was a means toward an end. Their final goal was ent
ing Charterist hegemony, while trade union leaders worried that the i
fragile unions would be undermined by adventuristic strategies. In
Community activists reproached the unions for soliciting community supp
when it suited them but providing little manpower in support of commurÉ|
struggles.
For the emerging unions, two elements were vital for trade union or
zation: worker control and interna! democracy. Union leaders were some
skeptical about community organizations led by activists, and posed the qu
tion whether community organizations were inherently undemocratic becati
their "mass base" was at a distance from the activists, who were accountab
only to themselves. The General Workers' Union and the Food and i
Workers' Union (FCWU) decided against joining the UDF. They gave j
onty to working toward a trade union federation. The GWU did not wit;
draw from the political arena: it played a role in the Opposition against l
Koornhof Bills, which—ifimplemented—would further increase the inse
rity of Afncans without permanent residence rights. The union objected ]
ticularly to the lack of interna! democracy m the UDF and to its multic
nature. UDF afïïliates did not have the same strong tradition of membershiffj
participation and leadership representativeness as the GWU had. If the GW01
joined the UDF, its members could be swept into campaigns and strug
over which they had no say because the structure and practice of the UDÏ
would not allow them to play a meamngful part in the decision-makingj
process. Second, UDF afFiliates were mostly multiclass organizations, whereasl
the union was a working-class organization. Therefore, there was a danger thatj
working-class interests could be subordinated in the struggle for democrac
against die state.9
When the GWU decided not to affiliate with the UDF, it feil from gracel
with Gmssroots and the community organizations. The South African Allied
Workers Union (SAAWU), a general union that had joined the UDF, was,
then held up as the model of a progressive union, highly politicized and wav->:
ing ANC flags. SAAWU's self-appomted vanguard role was not appreciatedij
by other unions, which resented the lack of consultation.
Apart from the general dispute over the relationship between Community '<
organizations, which were primarily interested m engaging the state, and the•
trade unions, which viewed capital as their mam opponent, some of the old j
fault hnes in the Western Cape may have contributed to the later problematic
relationship. The GWU and, to a lesser extent the FCWU, counted many
migrant workers among their members, while township-based community
fenizations such as the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA) were
pninated by Africans with permanent residence rights, The UDF Western
:was generally perceived as dominated by coloreds. The dominant role of
i in the UDF also contributed to the sense of alienation on the part of
r migrants, for youthful activists showed little sensitivity for their tradi-
ïsual values. While the relationship between unions and community organi-
ttions was a subject of open debate in the UDF, other dividing lines in the
iaal makeup of the Western Cape were mostly obscured by the community
_fcos and the struggle rhetoric. There was no strategy to address the differen-
al concerns of migrants, residents, or squatters.
IThe strongest taboo was on the relationship between coloreds and Africans.
ïthough there was public debate on the desirability of whites—"members
f the ruling class"—in the struggle, there was hardly any mention of the
mde between coloreds and Africans. The constant drumming on the theme
f nonracialism certainly had its virtues, for it instilled nonracialism as the
:ed norm. But some ideologues were such eager consumers of this par-
jiar piece of propaganda that they failed to acknowledge the considerable
J between norm and practice.10 The old fault lines would resurface period-
»ally during the 1980$ and after. Civics in colored areas and in African town-
trips did not succeed in initial plans to form one single umbrella organization.
hè civics in the colored areas joined together in CAHAC, whereas the Afincan
vies worked under the umbrella of the Western Cape Civic Association. Sim-
problems beset the women's organizations, until they finally merged in
ipe organization, the United Women's Congress. The launch of the Cape
jjpouth Congress (CAYCO), prepared by colored activists, was saved only at
ie last minute when a compromise formula was devised to accommodate
wouth from the African townships. At the outset of the 19905, divisions
JJbetween coloreds and Africans continued to be a central feature of Western
JjCape politics.
T How did Gmssroots as a community paper deal with this profoundly divided
^Western Cape community? Before following Gmssroots on its course through
jthe 19805, we first explore the strategie concept behind the paper.
• ANewspaper as a Collective Organizer
s,,
More than the UDF activists in the Northern Transvaal or the West Rand, the
tiniversity-trained activists who stood at the cradle of Gmssroots had a cosmo-
politan outlook. Their background in student activism and academie learning
had equipped them with knowledge of social movements elsewhere and with
a network of contacts that could be tapped for both ideas and fundmg. Inspi-
ration came from Latin America, Britain, and prerevolutionary Russia. The
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much vaunted slogan POEM—Popularize, Organize, Educate, and Mo
lize—was an acronym derived from Latin America; it stood for methodsl
"communicación populär" diät were developed for rural areas and city slu
Another important source of inspiration could only later be openly reve
From the beginning, some of the core activists had a clear model in mi]
Lenin's project for a newspaper. But as they had never seen the Iskra mo
transplanting Lenin's recipe for a newspaper as an organizing tooi to a <
ent continent and a different age left ample room for improvisation.
Writing in 1901, Lenin described how the urban workers and the "con
people" were ready for battle, but the intellectuals were not fulfilling their r
there was a lack of revolutionary organization and guidance. This organh
tion would be built around a newspaper: "A newspaper is what we most of a
need."11 Without a regulär newspaper it would not be possible to spread pril
cipled all-round propaganda and agitation on a systematic basis. The :
quency and regularity of the publication would serve as a barometer for l
state of organization. The newspaper would not only serve to instill a socia
consciousness in the workers but would also broaden the horizon of revolt]
tionaries who were totally immersed in parochial local concerns. A newspap
was needed to link local organizations to the common cause. The role oft
newspaper would not be limited to spreading ideas, political education, and
winning political allies. "A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist andl
a collective agitator, it is also a collective organiser."12 Around this paper wouldl
grow an organization that would deal with local issues and also with genera!!
political developments: it would give meaning to the struggles of the people.;
In one of his most famous writings, "What Is to Be Done?" Lenin argued that j
workers cannot develop a socialist consciousness on their own: "The historyf
of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is l
able to develop only trade-union consciousness, i.e. the conviction that it is '
necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers and strive to compel the
government to pass necessary labour legislation etc. The theory of socialism,
however, grew out of the philosophic, historical and economie theories elab-
orated by educated representatives of the propertied class, by intellectuals."1*
Left to their own devices, said Lenin, workers would succumb to bourgeois J
ideology and forsake their long-term socialist aspirations for the short-term!
gain of a few kopeks' pay raise. Likewise, local organizations would fail to see
their struggles in a broader political context. The spontaneous growth of the
workers' movement and the theoretical doctrine of social democracy, which |
had originated independently, now had to come together. Needed was a cat-
alyst: the task of running a newspaper would create a revolutionary vanguard
that could channel and direct the revolutionary proletariat and infuse the
workers with the socialist consciousness that was not the concomitant result
f proletarian class struggle but that could come about only on the basis of
Jöfound scientific insight.
tteading these texts in the late 19708, Western Cape activist Johnny Issel
Bid not faü to draw the lessons. Workers in the Western Cape were manifest-
jan unprecedented militancy with a wave of strikes and boycotts. Students
involved in school boycotts and proved receptive to Marxist-Leninist
_e s prescribing a student-worker alliance. But there was no organization
£ channel all these struggles into one coordinated attack. Issel later recalled:
J There was a lot of confusion as to how to advance politically. . . . We had no
"• organization to support the workers. We wanted to mount a support campaign
by boycotting Fatti's and Moni's products, but organization was lacking You
l should see the emergence ofGmssroots in the context of the 1980 student strikes,
l involving the setting up of parent-teacher-student committees, the red meat
l Strike, the bus boycott. In 1980 we consulted local resident organizations and
J. other organizations: altogether 54 groups were consulted. The news-gathering
l meetings served as a forum to bring organizations into contact with each odier.14
3 January 1980, Johnny Issel became the first Grassroots Organizer, a job that
; soon had to give up because of a banning order. At the time of the launch
fGrassroats, thirty-three-year-old Issel regarded himself as a professional
«vist. Interviewed ten years later, he still regarded activism as his lifelong
jreer. He had a background in student politics at the University of Western
«ape, Community work, and trade union activities. Like many others, hè
Jbecame disenchanted with Black Consciousness after 1976: "From 1976 to 1979
f was a time of withdrawal, of repression, and reflection. It was an introspective
eriod. We began reading much wider than BC literature. I read Lenin: 'What
j to be done.' And I discovered the trade union movement. BC centered
P^ around a group of intellectuals and petty bourgeois, students, teachers,
f etc. But we had to involve the masses. That could be done through civic move-
[ünents, youth movements, and trade unions."
*• Detention in May 1980, followed by a new banning order in October, put
[ an early end to Issel's public career as a media activist. However, hè managed
to secure another base from which hè could work at the formation of a revo-
lutionary vanguard: the Churches' Urban Planning Commission (CUPC), cre-
lated by the Western Cape Council of Churches to train church workers for
work in the displaced colored communities that had been scattered around
l Cape Town after the destruction of District Six. Issel put the resources at his
f'disposal to a new use. "We turned it into a training ground for political
'' activists. The churches did not like that, but it was very effective."15 In addi-
tion, hè was closely involved in the formation of the youth movement.
Because of his series of banning orders, Johnny Issel's public profde was not
: as prominent as that of some other Western Cape activists. But throughout
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the 19805 hè remained a key figure, versed in a conspirational type of poli^
that aroused both suspicion and admiration. Behind the scènes, hè
remained closely involved in running Gmssroots. "He had a tremendous k
ence in the Western Cape," recalled a former youth leader, "but hè is also a
troversial person. Many admire him, others hate him. . . . He was a
speaker; hè could magnetize an audience. He could also tear people ap
they had not fulfilled their assignment. He demanded total loyalty; hè didj
tolerate dissent."16 Many feit attracted to Issel's magnetic personality but v
also uneasy about his ulterior motives. Issel played a central role in the
sistent factionalism that plagued the UDF Western Cape. This factionaüs
was caused by ideological and tactical differences as well as by rivalry betwe
leading activists who were each building their own power base, competingi
followers and funds.
For Grassroots., the controversies surrounding Issel proved a mixed blessk.
One of the key activists in the UDF Western Cape held that the effectivene
of Gmssroots was limited because it was identified with one faction withini
UDF. If you were not part ofthat faction, you had no access to the par
"Gmssroots was seen as Johnny Issel's thing. And you could not engage inj__
direct discussion with Johnny, because hè had a banning order. He did nC-
hold any position, hè could not be challenged, he was not accountable."17 l
His successor at Gmssroots was herself no stranger to Leninist recipes «J
the use of media. Leila Patel, a sociologist with a background in theoreticJ
Marxism, worked as the Gmssroots Organizer from 1980 to 1983. Like Lenifl
she asserted that a paper was needed to give meaning to the struggles of tb
people in the battle for hegemony between the state and the forces of revohjfl
tion. Without a local newspaper, nine-tenths of the significance of localb
struggles would be lost.18 Some of the discussions around the birth of Gn
roots echoed the polemics between Lenin and some revolutionary contemp
raries about the dialectics between media and organization: Which shou
come first?
The starting point for Gmssroots was to mobilize people around everyday
concerns such as rising bus fares or poor housing. This tactic led to the critiJ
cism that Gmssroots was "worshiping" grassroots organization as a goal in]
itself. This, it was believed, would result in the development of a trade unioni
or economistic consciousness. In focusing strongly on local issues, Gmonwarj
elevated the local, economistic struggle to class struggle and thus misplaced is
task of developing the political consciousness of its readers. Gmssroots wa
blamed by these critics for focusing only on building local organization while,
ignoring the vital importance of linking these organizations to a national polit-;
kal movement. Gmssroots retorted that one could not mechanically transplant!
Lenin's Iskm model onto local conditions in the Western Cape.19
ile the Gmssroots founding fathers recognized the tactical advantages of
„„zing people around everyday grievances, they were equally aware of the
r-term strategie perspective: they were the ideologicaUy trained vanguard
' l to lift community struggles to a higher level. The link between local and
jnal struggles, between rent struggles and the struggle for national liber-
„1 and socialist transformation, was frequently emphasized. The ultimate
„bition behind Grassroots was to grow into a nationwide newspaper project.
pUthough some media activists were arduous students of Lenin's classics, it
bvious that not all of the Gmssroots's workers were committed Leninists.
ne discovered Lenin only in the course of time, moving from practice to
^>ry rather than vice versa. Saleem Badat, the Gmssroots Organizer in 1983-86,
pkted the paper as a product of "spontaneity": "Through its own experi-
xs and quite aside from any theory or model of media, it began to defme
pole for itself as a community newspaper and elaborate its distinctive con-
tjbution in national liberation/socialist struggle. When Lenin's writing on
Bbw as agitator, propagandist and collective organizer did become available
»d was read, there was a sense of it being a second reading."20
Mindful of the prescriptions of the two-stage strategy of national liberation
d socialist transformation, the media activists were not bent on an undiluted
oletarian revolution. In the South African context, fighting apartheid was
j obvious priority. Here another source of Inspiration was of paramount
nportance: the ANC. For obvious reasons of survival, both Lenin and the
„ J4C had to be hidden from public scrutiny. "In 1980, the ANC was unmen-
ponable. ANC links was not something you could discuss. Many of us who
rent into Grassroots feit part of the ANC, although we did not know that the
#hers had similar sympathies. There were not formal links, but we saw our-
Èelves as fulfilling ANC objectives."21
l Early issues of Grassroots had no overtly poütical profile, but soon Grassroots
Ettas to play a role in establishing Charterist hegemony in the Western Cape.
I As the ANC unbanned itself in the course of the 19805, ANC slogans and lead-
I ers figured more prominently in the columns. For the Marxists on the Grass-
Imts project, one central question was the extent to which the Freedom Charter
ntailed a socialist program. Badat recalled a lot of debate among the Grass-
m.30ts staff about interpretations of the Freedom Charter. "What does it mean:
JTthe land will be shared'? Are we talking about collective Systems or are we
f going to divide the plots and create a peasant class?"22 But these debates were
; limited to the ideological vanguard and did not spül over into the newspaper
columns.
f This activist elitism stands in stark contrast to another source of Inspiration
l behind Grassroots: the participatory and egalitarian ethos of the 19805. The cen-
tral principle behind the Gmssroots Operation in the early 19805 was "the para-
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mountcy of democracy," not only in the content of the paper but also in l
structure, the organization, and the production cycle. An elaborate proce!
deciding on the contents, collecting stories, and writing was aimed at inv
ing as many people as possible. The organization of the production and(
tribution was also calculated to enhance participation.23 This model of c
democracy had its price in terms of efficiency, but for many it was an imp
tant learning experience. At Grassroots, people learned how to run a demc
organization, "how to take minutes, how to put up your hand if you w„
to speak, how to chair a meeting. Here I got the confidence for actively j,
ticipating in meetings. Without Grassroots, there would not have been suc
wide range of organizations."24 ^
Everybody had to be involved in everything. Grassroots employed a stafi^
three or four workers, who all received the same minimal salades. The eg
tarian ethos manifested itself also in a collectivist style. The paper had l
editor; the stories had no bylines. Not individuals, but organizations we
highlighted. Staff would not present themselves as professionals or jouri
ists, since these categories belonged to the world of the petty bourgeoi
They were media activists for whom news was not an end in itself, but a me
to promote organization.
The ideal type of Operation was represented by the Electricity Petition C
paign, which was later to become the subject of nostalgie reminiscences.'.
Electricity Petition Comrnittee was formed in 1981 by some residents .
Mitchell's Plain to get the due date for the electricity bills changed to the er
of the month when workers received their salaries. "The campaign reacheditï^
peak when 200 Mitchell's Plain residents—the people themselves—marchedjj
on Civic Centre to present City Council with a memorandum containing thei
demands and a petition signed by 7,500." In the jubilant story of "Peopl<
Power from the Plain," in which the term People is consistently spelled with \
capital P, Grassroots explains that in this campaign a "new concept of leader
ship" had emerged. Should the petition to the city council be handed ove*,
by a delegation from Mitchell's Plain? "No! The People would be their owttj
leaders. They would ALL go to Cape Town and hand in copies of the memo-'
randum. . . . Before they boarded the buses it was decided not to have a
spokesperson or persons. The People would speak for themselves. Each and •
everyone was fully acquainted with the issues at stake. It didn't matter which
individuals eventually spoke. The People were One."
The emphasis on collective leadership and the rejection of specializatioa
that would exclude the uninitiated are typical of this concept of democracy.
Grassroots was not bothered by the question of the extent to which this mani-
festation of people's power was actually representative of the residents of
Mitchell's Plain. "The People" were portrayed as uncompromising heroes, not
: intimidated by officials or security police. When a security policeman was
ted in the gallery during the discussion with the deputy town clerk, they
CCted to his presence. "'Go!, Go!, Go!,' the People thundered. And the
rity police, in the gallery and in the doorway, left." Later a man posing as
.„S photographer was identified as another security policeman. "Out! Out!
lt!," the People roared and hè was bundled out of the hall." The victory even-
ly gained by "the People" of Mitchell's Plain is not the major thrust of the
y. The Cape Town City Council agreed to grant residents a month respite
| pay their bills.25
; The newspaper's role in promoting organization was not limited to the
rerage of these glorious events. Half a dozen members of the Electricity
tition Comrnittee came together to write the story and devise a cartoon,
lich was then submitted to the füll committee for approval. The Sunday
orning after Grassroots came out, Mitchell's Plain volunteers gathered as
ual to seil the paper door to door. They had been briefed beforehand about
; electricity issue so that they could draw people's attention to the story and
vite them to a meeting. In this way, some three thousand copies of Grassroots
TOre sold, and one thousand people attended the meeting.
This focus on "the People" and "the Community" reflects a populist ap-
oach in which class divisions are obscured in order to underline the joint
„bit for the common good. This "unity of the oppressed" is a constant theme
lUDF discourse. But the Grassroots staff was itself somewhat uneasy with the
oncept of a community paper: they not only aspired to promote populär
gles but also made deliberate efforts at building a worker consciousness.
(Colored Identity to Worker Consciousness
„l addressing its readers, Grassroots used both a populär and a class appeal.
.Building working-class unity required instilling a worker consciousness that
f "Would also serve to overcome the division between African and colored work-
l'ers. If workers would identify with their position as workers in a capitalist
ï.economy, then the divisive legacy of apartheid could be overcome.
L A graphic example of how Grassroots tried to guide its readers from colored
Jtconsciousness to worker consciousness is a comic strip featuring Mrs. Williams,
a middle-aged clothing worker from Manenberg, as the heroine (see figure 8).
Mrs. Williams is first introduced in the August 1984 issue, where she is watch-
ing Labour Party leader Allen Hendrickse giving his election talk on television.
, She is marveling at how wonderful it is that "we coloureds are getting the vote
at last," until a UDF activist knocks on the door to explain that the New Deal
will benefit only a handful of sellouts, while more hardship and oppression is
in store for the majority of the people. Rents and prices will go up in order
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to pay fbr the newly privileged colored and Indian Members of Parliame
the Group Areas Act will remain intaa; colored sons will be conscripted ir
the army to be sent to the border in order to defend apartheid; Africans'
become more vulnerable to deportation to the homelands. At the end oft
first comic strip, Mrs. Williams has made up her mind not to vote in the i
cameral elections.
FORWHOfFORWHAÏÏ
SRASSROOT5 LOOKS AT THE NEW DEAL
half a year later,,,
r OKÉ
YOU'RI ISHINltTEI UIE.flRS WILLIAMS
NEXr nME^yoU'RE FIRED! THERE ARE
PLEHTT OF OTHERS U
IM 1155 THE COM6RE&S
THATIT
WAS TIME
PEOPLE OF feOuT« ^FR^CA
MADE 1HE LAWS, IHSTEAO
OF THE BO&StS AND THÉ
HEV.YOU LOT' TH
WENT 2 MIMUT
&-ET OFF
AND 8ACK
ONCE'
'THCSe FRBeOOMS WE MVH.L Ftfff r FOK.
9IP£ ßy SIPE, THROUGHOIST OUK LIVES,
UUTIL WE HAVE WON OUK LIBERTY'".
8. Comic strip, featuring a rapid transition from colored consciousness to worker
consciousness. Reprinted from Grassroots, August 1984 and February 1985.
sroots
l Half
. Wilüams at her workplace, where the boss is
W^v^
Ï2e way to buy a Grassroots «with this 'Freedom Charter' thrng m t Dur-
coffee brlk, the old cleaner-presumably an African-explains the
of and the id'eas behind the Freedom Charter. From < .margujd ^ non-
n the old man suddenly becomes a fountam of wisdom, whidi hè
U from his participation in the campaign in ^ o. «^w^thc
eedom Charter. Bright pictures of the workers' paradise of Cuba appe^ -m
B strip while the old man relates that employment is not a favor bu angta.
» countries where workers make the laws, everybody has a job. At Ae end
the story, while the boss again yells at her for exceedmg the break Mr,
Ls Ss truly imbibed a proletanan consciousness. hè is pondermg
lbout a bnght future, when "we'U make the laws one day, we 11 con«ol ± ^
ries And your days of rudeness and bossing will be over. Thxs is a rather
L Konversion Lm colored compUance to worker ^ c y o u b t -
[JU whether a real-life Mrs. Williams from Manenberg could identr
'
l e * readership from colored consciousness to bothnon-
wa-o suchlng i colored identity. Wh^ the ^ W^
be'ecognUasarelevantissueontheagendaofp
tek and publicauon, In this respect, Grassroots mirrored th UDF w«
• « m Cape at large: it offered a political home for colored people, but at the
?: price of denying or effacing their cultural baggage.
.
 F
 IntervJed in
 I99i, Jonathan de Vries, publicity secretary on the UDF
Western Cape Regional Executive Committee, made a crmcal assessment of
rSensioLviewofpeopleandpoütics-^ewere^^
We were building the workers' revolution; we were gomg to perform the
ï ^ ilttransforLion of South Afnca. People were ^portant c^ymso
were useful in this process. There was an enormous lack of humü-
were a means to an end.- Ixx*ng back, De Jnes ack^owledged
rking-class people, it was difficult to be involved in die UDF. Many
n e c e t^meetmgs because they were not fluent m English, they could
not follow the latest political or ideological argument or they were not weU
led in the activist jargon. Their days were filled wlth work w*h ^ onside.
able time spent on travel between home and work, on household work, on
c childrcn, and so on. "So the UDF became the playground
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for young people, many with a university education, many having cars so thatj
they were mobile; they became the operators of die UDE" In spite of De Vries's'"
criticism, in which he did not spare his own role in politica! power games*]
his overall judgment of the UDF remained positive. One of its most impor-
tant achievements in the Western Cape was that—for the first time—it gav
coloreds a political home, "which they did not have before, it gave them ai
sense of belonging." But he was also acutely aware of the price that had to;
be paid for becoming part of mainstream resistance. In this political home,
there was no place for "coloreds" as such, but only for "blacks." In order to.
be accepted as black, colored identity had to be forsworn. Years later, De Vries'
still became emotional about the negation of colored identity, about the taboo •
that made it impossible to refer to coloreds. "I am not a very colored colored,
I have moved away from my background, I have traveled abroad, I make
music with whites and Africans. But from this now somewhat more detached
perspective, I do believe that there is a 'colored identity,' and that the UDF
should have tried to accommodate that identity, rather than denying it. But.
the liberation culture was an African culture; the songs were either military
songs or church hymns. There was no incorporation of colored identity in the
UDF. That could not even be discussed."28 He regretted that the UDF and
Gmssroots had not tapped the creativity of ordinary people but, rather, had
sought to mold them into a unitary culture that would facilitate the imposi-
tion of a new hegemony. Colored culture, De Vries believed, required a kind
of carnival atmosphere. The military style alienated ordinary people.
Colored identity, of course, was not shaped by carnivals alone. Church and
religion were other important ingredients, but the young Marxists at the helm
of the UDF and Grassroots were not inclined to pamper the religious senti-
ments of their basically conservative church-going constituency. They were
building a secular movement: the youth were seen as taking the lead in break-
ing the stranglehold of the church. "The Youth... who have been bearing the
frustrations within their denominational and ecumenical church youth groups
very patiently for a long time broke with these and set out to build secular
movements which would articulate, in no uncertain terms, there [sic] bottled-
up political grievances."29
Grassroots had little time for the church leaders who were such a prominent
feature of UDF propaganda. Allan Boesak made international headlines, but
hè is hardly mentioned in the columns of Gmssroots, which preferred to por-
tray "working-class leaders." Only in the Gmssroots rural editions and in its
rural ofFshoot for the Southern Cape, Saamstaan, was much attention given
to Boesak and other religious leaders. In announcing the launch of the
UDF on the West Coast where Allan Boesak would be the prominent guest
_„r ker, Gmssroots resorted to a religious discourse: "We read everywhere in
pfte papers how people try to tarnish this man's name. We ask those people:
how can you tarnish the name of someone who is the spiritual leader of 700
laiillion Christians?"30
"A world leader speaks" ran the reverential headline announcing Boesak's
it to Oudtshoorn.31 Saamstaan has indeed been instrumental in building
e UDF in the South-West Cape, where organization was nonexistent before
;the paper was launched. Local leadership here was mainly provided by church
people, not by students or young academies. The paper was largely produced
% Afrikaans, with some sections in English and Xhosa. Repression in this con-
' servative rural district was harsher than in the Cape Peninsula. Saamstaan had
tto be printed in Cape Town; the copies were frequently confiscated by police
rtefore they arrived in Oudtshoorn. In contrast to its urban model Gmssroots,
f-Saamstatm was more inclined to stick to local issues rather than be carried
• away by high politics. While the Gmssroots staffwas justifiably proud of the
Jsuccess of Saamstaan in such a difficult environment, they also had some crit-
ica! comments on the contents. Saamstaan tended to address problems at peo-
ple's homes rather than at their work. Coverage of an important sector of the
rural population, the farmworkers, was far too limited. With progressive trade
unions virtually absent, worker organization was seen as a long-term objec-
tive. Saamstaan believed that a Community paper ought to highlight mostly
dvic issues.32 In other words, Saamstaan was too much of a Community paper;
it did not instül a worker consciousness in its readers.
Religious arguments and dignitaries were seen by the secular Marxists of
Grassroots as most suited to mobilize the not-so-sophisticated colored people
in the rural areas. They were most prominent in the 1984 campaign to per-
suade coloreds and Indians to boycott the parliamentary elections. Inter-
viewed by Gmssroots in Laaiplek on the West Coast, colored Dutch Reformed
minister Nico Botha gave religious arguments for his boycott decision: "This
decision is based on the gospel of Jesus Christ."33 Overall, the Grassroots radi-
cal activists seem to have been more enticed by the third-world militancy of
the Cape's Islamic leaders than by the vanguard of the Nederduits Gerefor-
meerde Sendingkerk.
Interviews with numerous Grassroots activists reveal that they did agree on
one characteristic of "colored identity": colored people did not have much
confidence in themselves, nor in collective action: "Colored people cannot
stand together."34 This was a negative trait, one that had to be overcome.
Bridging the divide between Africans and coloreds was perceived as a one-way
street. Coloreds needed to be persuaded to accept the "leadership of the
African majority." No allowance was made for bringing coloreds into the
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Charterist fold by appealing to the distinct traits of the Cape colored con
munity: its strong sense of religion, the carnival-like festivities, the fact l
Afrikaans was the mother tongue of most colored people, in particular igj
working-class and rural communities.
The language issue was hotly debated during the whole decade. Shou
"unity of the oppressed" be promoted by adopting a single unifying lang
Or should one start "where the people are," addressing readers in their mothe
tongue? The initial choice was for the whole newspaper to be produced inl
English since this was seen as the most unifying language. Opinions differedi
as to whether this choice would exclude part of the intended audience. Somef
argued for the inclusion of articles in Xhosa and Afrikaans; others believed that'i
although people spoke Afrikaans and Xhosa, they tended to read in English.:
"The view was also very strong that language in our society has been used to l
divide our people. And that the paper should at all times promote unity."35
In subsequent years, the staffexperimented with various compromise for-'.
mulas, such as translating some stories or inserting Supplements in Afrikaans
or Xhosa. With the recurrent language debates, Gmssroots was ahead of its
time. During the 19805, the progressive orthodoxy held that English was the
language of the struggle and the instrument of unity. General open debate
on language policy began only in the 19905. On the language issue, the Grass-
roots staff proved fairly flexible, experimenting with various formats. But in
many other instances, accommodating diversity could not be reconciled with
the overriding concern for unity. And building unity was one of the features
that distinguished the alternative media from the commercial press. The com-
mercial media were seen as divisive, while "our role was to bring people
together."36
An appetite for debate and diversity was not compatible with Leninist
recipes for the use of media. In "What Is to Be Done?" Lenin fulminated
against the freedom to criticize, which hè feit permitted unprincipled oppor-
tunists without a coherent theory to undermine the strength of socialism with
their eclecticism. Once the ultimate truth had been established, there was no
more need for discussion: '"Freedom of criticism' means freedom for an
opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, freedom to convert Social-Democracy
into a democratie party of reform, freedom to introducé bourgeois ideas and
bourgeois elements into socialism. . . . Those who are really convinced that
they have made progress in science would not demand freedom for the new
views to continue side by side with the old, but the Substitution of the new
views for the old."37
Defming the class interest of the proletariat could not be left to the workers.
This was the duty of the intellectual vanguard with the proper theoretical back-
ground. Similar thinking prevailed among the activists who ran Gmssroots and
.r the UDF in the Western Cape. As Andrew Boraine, treasurer of the UDF
;v;stern Cape, later recalled: "There was a lot of vanguardism, with many
tivists distrustful that the working class could make the right decisions,
.-hen left to its own devices." He also referred to the language issue to illus-
ate his point. Meetings were generally conducted in English, but if the lead-
's had really wanted to involve ordinary people, it would have been necessary
«»j have translations in Afrikaans and Xhosa. By way of reciprocating their
fêxdusion, the Africans would sometimes resort to a simüar strategy: if UDF
fmeetings were held in the townships, they would sometime deliberately speak
fonly in Xhosa and not provide translations.38
l Grassroots was instrumental in buüding a network of activists in the Western
f Cape, thus laying the foundations for the UDF in this region. Nearly every-
lone who became involved in the UDF had at one time or another been work-
f ing on Grassroots. But the activists tended to get intoxicated by an activist
jkubculture that was rather remote from the concerns of ordinary people. Com-
f .mented Gmssroots volunteer Rehana Rossouw:
When we became activists, with our workshops in Marxism-Leninism and
Gramsci, we lost touch with ordinary people. We were also rather patronizing.
We thought that debates were not relevant for ordinary people; they would only
get confused. Debates were for activists. The activist culture was too remote
from ordinary middle class and working people. We became a subculture. We all
looked like Che Guevara's. . . . We were into reggae, not disco. We called each
other comrades, we embraced African comrades. And we took for granted that
nonraaalism, socialism, etc., were accepted by "the people."39
;
 In the early part of the 19805, lack of participation by ordinary people was usu-
ally blamed on the false consciousness instüled by the dominant powers. But
with interest for and participation in Gmssroots declining sharply toward the
end of the 19805, the activists began questioning their own performance.
Earlier in the decade, they mobiüzed protest in the Western Cape to unprece-
dented heights. But when the wave of protest ran out of steam and crumbled
tinder the weight of repression, the weak foundations were revealed. The
activists had built numerous organizations, but many of these were not firmly
rooted. After more than ten years of involvement in organizing civic associa-
tions, CAHAC chair Wilfred Rhodes, one of the civic activists who had a
working-class background as a weaver in the textile industry, gave a mixed ver-
dict. As hè recalled, the initiative to build community organizations came from
students at the University of the Western Cape and other postsecondary insti-
tutions: "The problem with the activists is that they did not take the people
along with them. That is a problem when working with students, they want
to be where the excitement i s . . . . When the activists moved on, they did not
leave much behind. There were no people to take over the work."40
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Gmssroots in 1980-1983: The Mobile Revolution
The idea to launch a Community paper in the Cape Town area was first pro-
posed in May 1976, a month before the 16 June uprising, by a group of colored
academies, professionals, businessmen, and Community leaders who linked up
with the Union of Black Journalists (UBJ). The wave of bannings, detentions,
and repressive legislation in the post-ipjó years led the project promoters to
conclude that at that time there were no realistic prospects for a widely circu-
lated, professionally produced independent black newspaper. But government
restrictions could be circumvented by starting a paper that was inexpensive,
would not require registration, and cotdd be circulated through a ready-made
distribution channel provided by community organizations.41
Initially, the publication would avoid a high political proflle. It was hoped
that the paper would be financially self-sufficient after one year. The newsletter
would be distributed free of charge. Money would be raised from advertis-
ing and subscriptions by sympathetic individuals and organizations. The
Grassroots initiators expected to raise half the newspaper's total costs from its
own income. Meanwhile, Grassroots went in search of funding for the remain-
ing 50 percent. Local South African funding organizations such as the Urban
Foundation were judged unacceptable because they were seen as basically sup-
portive of the prevailing system. Some money was made available from church
funds in South Africa, but the bulk was to come from overseas sponsors,
notably WACC (World Association for Christian Communication in London)
and ICCO (Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation), a fund-
ing organization that was run by the Protestant churches in the Netherlands.
From a visit in 1980 by Mac Maharaj, a member of the ANC executive and a
prominent SACP member, ICCO learned that the ANC backed the promo-
tion of an aboveground, radical press inside South Africa. The ANC had con-
fidence in Grassroots but wanted to see more grassroots involvement in the
paper by involving civic associations and volunteers who could go from house
to house to discuss local issues with the people. Thus, unknown to most of the
people involved in the Gmssroots project, the ANC had encouraged ICCO to
adopt the newspaper project from the beginning. One of the few people who
were aware of the contacts between the ANC and ICCO was Essa Moosa, a
Cape Town lawyer who was chair of Grassroots. Wide consultations were held
before the launch of Grassroots, including external consultations with the ANC.
Talks with the ANC were conducted by people who made overseas trips to
Europe anyway. Another way of staying in touch with the ANC outside of
South Africa was through NGOs that would send representatives to visit proj-
ects, often passing through Lusaka on the way.42
• By 1982 there was no more mention that Gmssroots could shortly stand on
\ its own feet with help of local funding sources. ICCO committed itself to
' fiinding Grassroots for a period of three years. For the rest of the time that
l Grassroots was in existence, ICCO would remain the main financial supporter,
l occasionally urging Gmssroots to explore other sources of funding and to
generate some income of its own. By 1985, ICCO had become the only for-
' eign sponsor. The annual costs of the Grassroots newsletter amounted to about
' loo ooo Rand, of which two-thirds came from ICCO and one-third was
1
 carned by Grassroots. As repression mounted after 1985, the newspaper's sur-
- vival became a goal in itself, a beacon of hope signaling that resistance could
i aot be smothered altogether. ICCO then feit obliged to maintarn the financial
' Üfeline and questions about the long-term viability of Gmssroots became at
secondary importance. The fact that Grassroots still managed to continue pub-
lication was considered as a moral boost for the besieged anti-apartheid organ-
, izations43 In view of its puritanical advertising poücy, Grassroots was unhkely
to become a self-fmancing enterprise. The publication scorned advertising
from multinational firms: "AU content of news items and adverts should only
promote businesses and other organisations that are acceptable to the com-
I rnunity. . . . Our news and advertisement content should only promote the
l organizational activities of democratie bodies controUed by the community."
* Moreover, it held little attraction as an advertising medium. In 1982, 30 per-
cent of the costs were covered by advertising revenues. But businessmen saw
advertising in Grassroots as a donation to the cause rather than as a commercial
investment. By 1983, production costs per copy were calculated at 40 cents,
while copies were sold for 15 cents.
As the original idea to produce a newspaper with only volunteers proved
unviable three more full-time paid positions were created, in addition to the
permanent Organizer. A news and production officer, an administrative offi-
cer, and an advertising and distribution officer were appointed in 1981. In the
p first annual report, lavish praise was heaped on the sacrifices made by statt
l members: "It was a policy of the Organisation to equalize the salanes of the
1
 staff and we managed to do this over the last few months. Although the staff
can earn more elsewhere, they regard their work as a labour of love, rather
K j i «45f than as a means to earn a good saiary.
l But by 1983 a more sober note prevailed. Having to work with underpaid
t staff was now seen as a problem: "In the running and staffing of the project
1
 we cannot have any romantic notions of political struggle."46 Poor remuner-
ation hampered the hiring of professionally qualified people. Journahst Ryland
Fisher who worked as a volunteer convenor of the Saturday mormngs news-
gathering sessions, initially resisted the pressure to join the Grassroots staff. He
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had just been promoted to senior reporter at the Cafe Herold, a commers
paper directed at a colored readership. Going to work for Gmssroots me
going to one-quarter of his salary and consuming his savings. He saw the«
in salary as a much bigger problem than the politica! risks: "Police harassn
and all that was part of life in the ipSos."47
Gmssroots had a difficult start. While experimenting with methods of c
munity participation, the project suffered from disorganization as a result|
the banning of Johnny Issel. "We ended up with the worst of both wor:
no efficiency and no democracy."48 By mid-ipSi, Gmssroots was fairly wel! l
its feet. "Grassroots is now very firmly rooted in the community and is l
acclaimed not only in this country but in media circles throughout l
world."49 But a detailed analysis presented at the same meeting is less <
congratulatory. It questioned whether Grassroots was perhaps "too sleek i
too professional" and thus inhibited participation of its readers. The rep
stressed that, in order to reflect the interests of the community in the pap
the links between Gmssroots members, who were mainly intellectuals, and!
community had to be strengthened.50
Various methods were explored to enhance populär participation.'
decision-making body of Gmssroots, the General Body, set out the major j
icy guidelines at an Annual General Meeting (AGM). It was composed f
member organizations such as the civics, trade unions, women's organizatic
and youth clubs. Apart from determining policy, member organizations;
took part in making the paper. From the genera! body, subcommittees we
formed to carry out the news gathering and production, distribution, fond*J
raising, and workshops to train people in media skills. In terms of content, for-|
mat, and methods of production, Grassroots wanted to distinguish itself froml
the commercial papers, where "decisions are taken at the top and filtered to thé]
bottom. At Grassroots, all decisions are taken democratically by all the com-1
munity people and organisations involved."51
The paper was produced in a five-weeks cycle. At the first news-gathering \
session, au worker and community organizations were invited to send repre- -
sentatives so that "the new issue can grow from the very grassroots of the peo-
ple." A list of stories for the coming issue was discussed and approved, and the
assignments were divided among the participants. Three weeks were available
to complete the stories, during which time another meeting was held to check
on progress. If organizations were involved, the stories were submitted for
their approval. Meanwhile, the Advice Committee, consisting of profession-
als with a background in law, medicine, child care, or social work, contributed
articles for the "advice page." These articles also had to be approved by the
news-gathering committee. On printing day, about fifty youth volunteers
gathered for the collating and folding of the paper. Distribution was also seen
:
9. Frank Chikane addresses the Annual General Meeting of Grass-
roots. Photograph courtesy of Jimi Matthews.
as an important link in the Operation. Civics were the most important outlet:
civic activists used Gmssroots to go from door to door and to gam entry mto
houses by starting a discussion about local issues. But from this point, the
media activists lost sight of the Operation. «While Grassroots is reachmgthe
communities, we still do not know whether the paper is being read. Not
only did Grassroots receive litde feedback from the distributors, it also received
Me revenue. CoUecting the sales money from the distributors proved a major
headache.
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The second AGM, held in 1982, marked a peak in populär participation.:
was attended by 150 delegates representing 101 organizations. Circulation ha„
risen from five thousand copies for the first edition to twenty thousand in eadyi
I982.53 It was becoming clear that operating a paper as "an organizing tod* j
was more of a dialectical than a unilateral process. The level of active involvej
ment in Grassroots depended on the strengths of Community organizatior
The Grassroots raison d'être was somewhat rephrased: Grassroots was a prodtu.
of the level of organization in communities, its growth was dependent on die
growth of community organizations, and it could not grow independent!«
from organizations. This also became the explanation for the newspape^s poort
performance in the African townships: Grassroots was weak because the state
of organization was weak.54 '
This way of producing a newspaper ensured a wide participation, to such
an extent that it became difficult to give everybody an active part. But it also \
resulted in a considerable degree of uniformity. "Our stories follow the same
formula," noted the news-gathering committee in 1982, "a victory through;
community action is usually the thrust of the story.... We do not address our-
selves to problems experienced and mistakes made by organisations. Instead
we glorify their actions."55 By 1983, the AGM was still grappling with the
overemphasis on victory. It was resolved that the contents of the paper should
become more critical and educative and should stimulate debate.
Democmcy Turning "Democrazy"
The discussion on the balance between democracy and efficiency was also
taken up in the newspaper columns. This debate provides some interesting
insights in shifüng notions of democracy, evolving from an emphasis on mass
participation, with everyone being involved in everything, to a phase where
specialization set in and the emphasis shifted to concepts of mandates and
accountability.
A good example of the first phase of mass participation is the story of the
people of Mitchell's Plain and the Electricity Petition Campaign. In this phase,
the message driven home was the importance of organization, of standing
together to achieve common goals. Conditions could be changed, if people
were properly organized. Repenting scabs were to be welcomed into the ranks
of striking workers. The emphasis was on the importance of winnable goals
and standing by one's organization—hence the focus on the battle for wash-
ing lines and more flexible rules for the payment of the electricity bills. Rent
struggles proved more difficult to sustain. Although people might be willing
to take the risk of having their electricity cut off for a while, they were less
likely to risk eviction. In 1982 a campaign by CAHAC against rent increases
; had to be called off without the demands being met. The lesson drawn by
l Grassroots was that stronger "democratie people's organizations" were needed:
•'; "Sometimes people took militant decisions but were not able to carry this out."
"In the volatile political climate of 1980, protest campaigns persuaded the
authorities to postpone rent increases. But by 1982, the authorities again feit
confident enough to hold their ground.56
i Much space was devoted to explaining the general notions of democratie
l organization, such as how the elected officials were at all times responsible to
the general membership, voting procedures, a quorum, motions and resolu-
tions, and taking minutes. In the initial phase of promoting democratie
organizations, democracy meant populär participation. In order to stimulate
participation by ordinary people, specialization and individualism were to be
avoided. But when participation became an end in itself, it began to have a
paralyzing effect on populär action. "Are we all going democrazy?" asked a
contributor to Grassroots in May 1983: "Democracy is running wild within our
organisations. It is sweeping like a wind through all our sub-committees, leav-
ing us all exhausted. When we are about to make a decision, it rears its head
and reminds us that to be democratie, we have to ensure that more people par-
jp öcipate in making that decision. We cannot decide and act upon that decision
without further consultation. All members of our Organisation must be party
to the discussion. . . . But what does it matter? The struggle is still long. We
have all the time in the world. Don't we?"57
Responding to the criticism in its next edition, Grassroots basically stuck to
l the concept of general involvement, avoiding a division of labor. The charac-
teristics of democratie organization were explained in contrast to the way in
which a factory was run. Interestingly, the defining feature making a factory
"undemocratic" was not that the boss was the owner of the means of produc-
tion, but that the managers monopolized knowledge and insight. The man-
agers were the "thinkers" who planned, organized, and controlled the workers.
The other work was divided into specialized jobs, so the workers became
E familiär with only their particular part in the production process. "People at
the top of the factory have important information. They do not share it with
the workers. In any Organisation to make the right decisions all the information
f is needed." By contrast, in democratie organizations "all members are workers
and managers. Everyone has a say in planning, organising and controlling
what happens. AU share in the thinking and doing. Everyone in the Organisa-
tion makes the rules. . . . People learn as much as possible about running the
whole Organisation. People who have special information share it with others.
People are helped to get the skills so that they can do the whole job."58
The defining characteristic of democracy was populär participation, not
pluralism. In practice, the vision of populär participation proved an elusive
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ideal. In Gmssroots, as in many community organizations, the tone was set l
inteHectuals, leaving ordinary working people with a feeling of being excluc
A letter to the editor complained about too much intellectual talk at the <
roots meetings: "An unnecessary throwing around of big words. . . . It look
more like a University lecture than a grassroots meeting. Why don't they sp
in a way that people can understand."59
Did the Gmssroots stated objective to stimulate debate mean that attentie
could be paid to diverging views, conflicts of interests, or malpractices within j
progressive organizations? This was to prove a contentieus issue. Already inj
1980, organizer Leila Patel had raised the question of whether coverage cov.
be given to splinter organizations. If there were two women's organizationsl
active, or two civic associations operating in the same area, could Gmssroots^
write about both of them? Should tensions between trade unions and com-
munity organizations be exposed? Should tensions among the different unions
be exposed?60
At several AGMs pleas were heard for more debate in the paper. But debate
was easily seen as divisive. The rare examples of debates in the newspaper— "
one instance was the coverage of conflicting views on the visit by Senator
Edward Kennedy—were criticized at subsequent AGMs. Among themselves,
activists held many discussions on all kinds of issues, such as the merits of boy-
cotts or participation in the tricameral elections. But these debates were not
brought to the attention of the Gmssroots readers. "The level of political matu-
rity at the time was appalling. If you even suggested such a idea for a debate
in Gmssroots., you were likely to be branded a sell-out. So there were debates
among ourselves, but few in Grassroots."61
The extensive and sometimes bitter debates preceding the formation of the
UDF in the Western Cape were not covered in the pages of Gmssroots. Some-
times there was a hint of dissenting opinions, but no effort was made to
present the arguments. A conflict within CAHAC—one of the core organi-
zations in Grassroots—was treated cursorily on the letters page, without Gmss-
roots providing any further explanations. After much discussion, it was finally
agreed to publish part of a letter from three civic associations, announcing
their breakaway from CAHAC.62 The dissenting civics were in the camp of the
UDF's left-wing critics. They accused CAHAC of championing middle-class
interests with its demand that workers ought to have the right to buy their
houses. By contrast, the dissidents claimed to represent the interests of the
worker-tenants. Gmssroots readers were left in the dark about the wider ideo-
logical battle behind the civic conflict, although at the time both sides to the
conflict produced statements explaining their views.63
Whatever the merits of the dissidents' case, this conflict basically revolved
around the issue of alliance politics, which was central to the debate within
_.&i.~jsive organizations at the time. Although Gmssroots purported to have
; broad progressive movement as its constituency, it pointedly ignored the
öle debate in order not to "confuse" its readers. Significantly, all inter-
vees vividly remembered the affair, which must have been the subject of
«eh heated debate. "Gmssroots took its line from organizations. It followed
juie ANC line, or what people thought was the ANC line. So in the case of the
tivics which disaffiliated from CAHAC, their problems could not be discussed
jAecause those splitting away were to the left of the ANC.... There was a clear
ijpolitical line. We would ignore everything that was not the ANC line."64
^
%$tablishing an Alternative Hegemony
\
Ävoiding a high political profile was a fairly constant policy for Gmssroots in
:itS first three years, in order to avoid inviting state repression and frightening
^off readers. Political issues such as political funerals, trials, and raids on ANC
jjbases were covered only when they were tied to local or national organiza-
•tional efforts. If a campaign was launched to appeal for clemency for six ANC
men sentenced to death, Gmssroots would cover it. But if there was no organ-
ization involved in the issue, it was deemed not expedient to cover the story.65
:
 In the first three years of publication, Gmssroots dealt with local issues
involving rents, housing, and transportation, stressing the importance of
building organizations in the community and in the workplace to tackle prob-
• lems. It also addressed general matters such as inflation (explained as a con-
sequence of bosses making excessive profits), wages falling far short of the
poverty line, child labor, pensioners' problems, evictions of Africans from
squatter settlements and deportations to the Transkei, and "sports for the
oppressed." The advice pages provided information on health and nutrition,
growing vegetables, securing unemployment benefits, workers' compensation
for injuries at work, and pensions. Among the more political matters raised
were the implications of the constitutional proposals.
By 1983—the year of the birth of the UDF—staff began to question
whether the time had come for the paper to assume a more overtly political
profile. "Are we lagging behind the people? Should Gmssroots become more
'political' and less 'issue-oriented'?" The proposed change of direction meant
that the political content of the "lessons of struggles" needed to come out
more clearly, "linking present struggles around rent, higher wages and so more
directly to Apartheid and capitalism." Also questioned was the current orga-
nizational setup, implying that Gmssroots could not move at a quicker pace
than the organizations that made up Grassroots. In order to provide political
direction—in other words, to fulfill its vanguard role—the newspaper would
need to have a measure of independence from its affiliated organizations.66
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Beyond the battle for washing lines, a larger project loomed. To outsid
Gmssroots might have looked like a fringe publication of little consequence, l
in the mind of the core activists the alternative media were important we
in the battle for hegemony between two competing world views: the domiJ
nant view versus the people's view. This is clearly indicated in Leila Pate
speech at the Gmssroots AGM in March 1983. "We find ourselves in a positie
of two competing views of the world—a competition for the hearts and i
of the masses. That is, a dominant view as it is played out in the media of the*
status quo, and alternative media, which put forward a people's viewpoint <
the world and life in our society." In Patei's view, the state and capital;
closely intertwined in their joint efforts to instill a false consciousness in l
people. "Through the mass media, the state and its allies have a vital source ofj
control over the masses, politically, economically and ideologically. . . . And,|
I don't have to teil you how great their control is. For those of us who are|
organizing in communities, there are many nights that we have had
pete with Dallas and Night Rader for people at our meetings. The People's^
Press, and we see Grassroots as part of this, is the voice of 80 percent of the
silent majority."67 The task of the ideologically trained vanguard was to make
people aware that their troubles were not caused by fate, but by apartheid and
capitalism.
In attempting to establish a counter hegemony, the battle lines between
"us" and "them" needed to be clearly defined. "Them" included the govern-
ment, the bosses, and the mainstream media. "Their" propaganda was men-
dacious; "ours" was truthful:
Propaganda tries to make people think and act in a certain way. Not all propa-
ganda is lies. Government propaganda tries to get people to accept the system
as it is—racism, national oppression, sexism and capitalism exploitation. Propa-
ganda from the people however, has a very different message. It aims to get
people to support and join the struggle for a non-racial and democratie South
Africa where men and women are equals and where there is no exploitation. Our
propaganda and their propaganda is definitely not the same.68
With this emphasis on its propaganda mission, Grassroots served its readers a
radier monotonous menu. Within its core, there certainly was an awareness of
the dilemma. More practical minds üke Ryland Fisher, who had a background
in journalism, argued that the paper should become more lively in order to
keep in touch with ordinary people. Gmssroots was acquiring a reputation as
a "problems paper." People were well aware that they had problems; they
wanted to read a paper not only for their information and education but also
for entertainment and excitement. But the ideologues were not inclined to
make concessions to "false consciousness." The gap between activists and ordi-
lpsy people was a consistent feature in the history of Grassroots. "It was diffi-
llt to reconcile the politica! aims with sports stories and horse racing. . . .
itivists would criticize the 'gutter stories.' The activists won the day; in the
ud they were the only people reading the paper."69
'' Two elements occupied a central place in the construction of this counter
emony: Charterism and socialism. From the beginning, Grassroots had
peen dominated by Charterists, a number of whom were in favor of an open
pditorial policy, covering all kinds of issues of importance. But since the news-
»er came to be seen as a Charterist mouthpiece, organizations outside the
ngress fold did not bother to attend meetings or to submit news items. And
w«ce the non-Charterists did not take part in the more tedious work, such as
iüstribution, activists feit that if others did not put in any work, their activities
äid not merit coverage in the paper. This attitude became more pronounced
lifter the launch of the UDF. It was feit that coverage of activities outside the
ItlDF camp would involve promoting rival organizations.70 By the mid-i98os,
: Gmssroots chair frankly admitted that the paper was not serving as a plat-
|tu£m for anti-apartheid resistance in a broader sense: "It was always the policy
of Grassroots Publications to serve as a broad forum—to give expression to
^progressive politica! views prevailing in the oppressed community. It is clear
•that this policy was not implemented in practice."71 Although the problem was
acecognized, it was not being addressed. With "unity of the oppressed" under
Charterist direction as the overriding concern, there was littie room for diver-
gent views in the counter-hegemonie project.
^Building Allicmces: Colored Areas and Afncan Townships
l1 There was no ideological background to the rivalry between two progressive
l women's organizations, which for years bedeviled the UDF Western Cape.
Both Women's Front (WF) and the United Women's Organisation (UWO)
had adopted the Freedom Charter. The differences had to do with racial
; divides and with a sociocultural gap. WF was based in the townships, where
itwas seen as a revival of the Federation of South Afncan Women (FEDSAW),
I
an ANC-aligned women's organization in the 19505. UWO had an African
membership as well but included white and colored women, many of whom
were students or academies. From the point of view of the townships, these
were people from "the other side of the railways" with "branches in Cape
, Town, academie members, more resources, and also pushing some feminist
issues like rape."72 Other women's issues taken up by UWO included the legal
position of black women as minors, maternity leave, day-care centers, equal
pay for equal work, and the enforced use of contraceptives.
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Women's Front was a more traditionalist organization, dominated by <
ANC stalwarts from the 19505 for whom women's issues were of second
importance in the national liberation struggle. The emphasis was on comj
memorations, petitions, demonstrative funerals, and protest meetings.'
idea was that the people from exile and from jail would come back, take <
the leadership and teil us what to do. They would solve all problems. But wl
had to learn to think for ourselves. We could not always look back to i
I95OS."73 In contrast to the sober meetings of WF women, UWO meetinj
were often conducted in English and enlivened with all kinds of festivitie
music, and banners. Feminist discourse, emanatmg from the universitie
found its way into UWO but not into WF. Although WF had already in 198
called for a joint campaign involving civics, youth, and church groups agains||
the Koornhof Bills, it was initially not welcomed into the UDF. UWO l
already affiliated with the UDF and was represented on the UDF Region*
Executive. Only after an intervention from UDF Head Office was WF accep
as a UDF affiliate. But much bitterness remained between the two organiz«
tions. The division among the women affected other groups in the town-1
ships, notably youth. After much goading from UDF Head Office and even |
from the ANC in Lusaka, WF and UWO finally decided to merge in 1986.!
The younger women in the organizations then proved more flexible. After a j
difficult start, in which positions on the executive had to be parceled out I
equally between representatives of both organizations, the antagonism died {
down.
How did Gmssroots deal with this division within the ranks of its own con-1
stituency? It did not address the issue smce Women's Front had no access to •
the paper. UWO was represented on the Gmssroots board and provided the ;
input for stories on women's issues. "Women's Front," according to one of j
its leaders, "had no people with media skills, no resources. It did not go to the 1
press with its stories. . . . We feit that others were deliberately ignoring;
Women's Front and letting us die a natural death by starving us from j
resources. The Grassroots attitude was: 'if we don't write about them, then they:
don'texist.'"74
Grassroots focused exclusively on UWO, which was presented as the only
women's organization. The two African women who worked as the Grassroots \
township Organizers were both UWO members. Several interviewees indicated l
that the split between the women's organizations deeply affected township
politics, but the issue was completely ignored in Grassroots. The newspaper
identified with and depended on UWO. Within Women's Front, it was
believed that Johnny Issel was behind efforts to get WF to disband.
Similarly, Grassroots completely ignored the problems that accompanied the
formation of the Cape Youth Congress (CAYCO). The initiative to launch
5TCO came from the colored areas, where the formation of a regional youth
vement had been under discussion since 1981. Local youth groups were
Ifed in their own organizational problems, which had to do with the
fff-'X. of centralization in the proposed organization and with personality
pshes. This process did not involve the African townships. Before CAYCO's
tmching conference some contact had been made with youth in the town-
^ps, who responded that they were not yet ready to join. On the eve of the
ffCO launch in May 1983, African youth arrived in great numbers, claim-
^to represent eight CAYCO branches. Their arrival posed an acute problem.
p.he colored youth activists were not prepared for them and had met to dis-
pibute leadership positions among themselves. The African youth did not
?ant to put forward some candidates of their own to be included on the exec-
tóve; they demanded open elections. "It took a somewhat ugly turn, with col-
reds voting for coloreds and Africans for Africans."75 In its first two years,
AYCO was plagued by tensions along racial lines. These divisions lessened,
ld in 1984, an African youth, Roseberry Sonto, was elected CAYCO chair.
These were important learning expenences for movements trying to build
jKnOnracial organizations. Yet there is no mention of these developments in the
Rages of Grassroots. Although there could be some public mention of the con-
oversy surrounding the involvement of the white student organization
*,TJSAS (National Union of South African Students), the much deeper divi-
isions between colored and African youth were apparently unmentionable in
he alternative media.
l The third important component in the Grassroots project, the civics, expe-
I ïienced similar problems when attempting to organize across the racial divide.
[Bnitially, the emerging civic bodies in the African townships and the colored
jareas worked toward forming one umbrella structure, but in 1981 the civics
rof Langa, Nyanga, and Gugulethu went their own way. In 1982, two umbrella
: organizations were formed: the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA),
Iwhich united the civics in the African townships and a number of squatter set-
tiements, and the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC), which
had an initial membership of fourteen civics in colored areas. Both events
l' and subsequent activities by WCCA and CAHAC are duly covered in Gmss-
|; mots. But the unsuspecting reader found no clue as to the raison d'être of two
f umbrella bodies. "New Umbrella civic body," ran the headline over the story
p announcing the formation of the WCCA. But there was no indication that
its members came exclusively from African areas and no explanation for the
breakaway from CAHAC. From later interviews I gathered that the African
civics had advanced two reasons: they had a language problem at CAHAC
meetings, which were conducted in English and Afrikaans; and they had to
deal with different authorities since African and colored areas feil under dif-
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ferent administrations. Civic activists in CAHAC were unconvinced and i,
pected racist motivations on the part of the African civic leaders, who resene
colored domination of CAHAC.
The history of Gmssroots itself also provides a clear Illustration of the pr
lems encountered in attempts at bridging the divide between coloreds !«
Africans. Grassroots had originated as a colored iniüaüve without active involv
ment of Africans from the townships. It never became solidly rooted in thl
townships. "Numerous attempts to arrange meetings with people [from l
townships], to get community representatives to attend Grassroots gene
and news-gathering meetings, to be represented on our broad general boi
 s
and to build a strong distribution network in the townships had not proveä
very successful."76 After this frank admission, the analysis of this weak spot j
rather disappointing: "We believe diere could be many reasons for this, d
main one being the many problems in the townships."
The weak state of organization in the townships is often mentioned i.
explanation for the poor performance of Grassroots. But this was firmly denie
by Zollie Malindi, one time president of the UDF Western Cape, who believe
that organization in the townships was much stronger than in colored areasj:
"People in die townships are more politicized, because of pass laws and so oik
Coloreds had less problems. The government always differentiated betweea
coloreds and Africans. It is more difficult to organize coloreds; some are petty
bourgeois; they aspire to be like white people."77 Malindi believed that Gnup
roots was not widely read because it was not a township-based publication and|
because it lacked Xhosa speakers on its staff. Malindi and youth leader Rose- j
berry Sonto were mvolved with another publication, Township News, which*
was launched in the mid-ipSos. Township News was written in Xhosa and there-',
fore accessible to people with only a few years of primary education. It worked j
in cooperation with Grassroots, sometimes translating stories from Grassrootsi
and making use of its workshops for media skills. J
Some progress in gaining a foothold in the townships was reported after
the appointment of an African as township orgamzer in August 1982. By,
March 1983, circulation in the townships had reportedly increased from 200 ]
to 1,500 copies.78 A change in language policy was implemented in 1984, withj
more stories being written in Xhosa. But the secretanal report for the April
1985 AGM noted that sales in the townships had dropped from 2,000 to 750,
African participation in gathering the news and distributing die paper
remained poor. Grassroots was still seen as a colored paper. "When you went to
the Grassroots office, you did not see an African."79 News was not coming forth
from township-based organizations: the township Organizer had to go out to
gather news. The most concrete contribution of Grassroots to furthering inter-
racial contact was perhaps the collating and folding of the paper. Groups of
ath from the townships and colored areas were brought to the printer,
:re a party was held as diey folded the newspapers. Here colored young-
K*S learned African freedom songs and toyi-toyi dancing.
f l When she resigned in 1985, Hilda Ndude, the first township Organizer for
issroots, summed up her experience as "a hard one, with little assistance from
; [Grassroots] office and also little assistance from people in the town-
ps."80 She did not get along with die news and production staff, who in
n contended that she did not do her job. Her successor as township organ-
r was Velishwa Mhlawuli, who made the headlines when she survived an
assination attempt in 1988 in which she lost one eye. Her relationship with
i Grassroots staff was somewhat better. She believed that Grassroots became
re populär in the townships after 1985, when a Xhosa edition of the paper
s produced. "People now understood the paper better. They wanted to read
out their struggles and their victories in their own language."81 The Gmss-
>ts news Organizer was less convinced of the central importance of the lan-
age issue. He blamed the paper's poor performance in die townships on the
•wnship Organizers, who used their Grassroots salary and facilities to further
uieir other political interests, which centered mainly on the women's organi-
^satibn. The job was not assigned on the basis of any particular qualities. Orga-
ftizations in the townships named people who needed to be rewarded with a
Job because they had been detained, or diey had children and were in need of
hloney. If someone did not show up for weeks and went off to the Transkei
ï without offering any explanations, Grassroots had no possibility of sanctioning
the negligent worker. "You could not halve her salary, or dismiss her. That
(would upset die townships. We had a weak foothold in the townships, and we
fCOuld not jeopardize that."82
• Apart from the image problem of Grassroots as a colored paper, media were
apparendy not a priority for township activists, who relied more on word of
Hiouth to organize meetings, boycotts, or demonstrations. Township activists
did not believe that the paper was of much benefit to them, and after 1983, the
f UDF would absorb much of activists' energies.
^Building Aüiances: Community Organizations and Trade Unions
">• The first year of publication for Grassroots coincided with the high tide of
euphoria about joint worker-community action. The paper's editorial for
l December 1980 hailed the newly emerging alliance in glowing ternis: "The
l Fattis & Monis dispute, the supportive action which followed, not only
|| formed a landmark in the Trade Union movement, but shows a turning point
J. in the struggle of the mass of the suffering people in South Africa. Commu-
nity supportive action, as we have not seen for many years, has taught the
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oppressed a new form of struggle. Unity in action, the basis of the Fattis i
Monis episode, is the requirement for an unfree people to achieve their goal.*
But the 1980 experience had created unrealistic expectations about "
involvement of the unions in overüy political campaigns and commur_
struggles. An article written by the Food and Canning Workers Uniex
(FCWU) for Grassroots drew a sharp distinction between unions and comrmi
nity organizations, both in terms of constituency and leadership. "Whati
important is that the members of a trade union are workers, and that a unie
should be led by workers. A trade union brings together workers who ;
divided in so many different ways, because they are an oppressed class a..
share a common oppressor." Community organizations, on the other hand»!
"are open to workers and non-workers. In most cases the leadership of thesg
organisations are intellectuals or people with more education. At this pointj
Community organisations do not have a strong base of worker members. The!
workers who do participate do not always feel that they have a major part tol
play in such organisations." i
The FCWU contested the concept of a Community as a homogeneous body, J
clainiing that there could be no lasting alliance between workers' organizations •
and community organizations unless it is clearly understood that "there arei
class divisions among the oppressed." The article concluded with the statement J
that unions must be allowed to determine their own priorities.84 f
Class divisions within "the community" were indeed mostly ignored by \
Gmssroots. A story on the plight of domestic workers provided a rare glimpse \
of the class divisions within the community. The story denounced the appalling 1
conditions for domestic workers in the colored areas: presumably both the"
exploiters and the exploited were colored. There was no mention of race in
this article. It quoted an official from the Domestic Workers' Association, who;
accused employers of kidnapping practices. "So many times people go and!
fetch children on farms without telling their parents. Sometimes the children
go home pregnant and with no money. We feel we need to do something
about this. This is almost a daily problem."85 While this presumably is an >
example of "class oppression" within the colored community, there was also a
widespread practice among somewhat better-off colored households to hire
African domestics. But while Grassroots paid regulär attention to the plight of;
domestic workers, this aspect was never mentioned. '
Mindful of Lenin's scathing critique of the narrow "economism" of trade
unions, Grassroots was firmly on the side of the community organizations and
the "populär democratie struggle." When discussing the unity talks between
the independent trade unions—one of the unions' priorities that made
involvement in community struggles take second place -Gmssroots identified
f with the general position of community organizations, arguing that "a
TOW economie view must be criticised in the strongest terms. The strug-
: is not only between workers and bosses, it is also a fight against the state
r political power."86 To underline the point, the newspaper held up the shin-
£ example of SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions), which had
öncluded an alliance with the ANC in the 19505, thus extending its struggle
jeyond the workplace to the community. From the perspective of independ-
ï«ttt unions, SACTU's experience was a lesson to avoid: by allowing itself to be
pragged into all kinds of ANC campaigns, SACTU had hastened its own
Jdemise.
l' The relationship between community organizations, Grassroots., and the
itrade unions became more problematic with the formation of the UDF. The
| independent trade unions GWU, FCWU, and FOSATU (Federation of South
EÄfrican Trade Unions) decided against joining the Front but announced that
f they would support the campaign against the new constitution. That marked
• the end of the honeymoon with the independent trade unions. "For us, every-
•• body at that time who was not in line with the ANC was lumped in the camp
(of the detractors. Unity Movement, trade union people who insisted on inde-
pendent worker organization. . . . We saw them as opponents of the ANC.
l' The ANC was our holy cow; we had finally found a home."87
But tensions had already arisen before the formation of the UDF. As David
Lewis, former GWU secretary pointed out later, there were conflicting per-
ceptions of "communities." In the Grassroots concept, the community equaled
the workers, while unions were questioning whether worker interests really
coincided with community interests. Unions such as the GWU were at the
time much concerned with establishing "worker control" in the unions, while
community organizations were seen as organizations of activists. In commu-
öity organizations, there was "not much involvement of the rank and file.
, Unions were much more concerned with their membership, with the whole
tedious business of mandates, briefings, accountability of leadership. Activists
are concerned with 'leading the masses,' but they have only very fleeting con-
tact with people."88
Although civic activists and youth activists, when interviewed, were con-
' vinced of the importance of Gmssroots in the early phase of organization, Lewis
did not believe that the newspaper made any significant contribution to union
organization. Initially, GWU designated people to attend the news-gathering
meetings. "But it was a very cumbersome job . . ., it took most of your free
Saturday." Media were not a priority for the unions, and moreover, Grassroots
lacked crecübility. "People were not keen to get a copy. It never portrayed the
problems of organizations, it was very triumphalist. Also, we did not neces-
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sarily share the same interests. Unions then were working on national
Grassroots was much more parochial, focusing on local Community organ
tions." He questioned the validity of promoting unity by plastering over pru
lems: "The left media have never properly understood what was their j « j
For instance, when we had these difficult unity talks, the commercial medÉ
would cover all our disunity, exploiting the differences. But our own medM
did not cover the problems. Here we could have dealt with the problems an|
explained what were the issues. But the left media think it is their job i
smooth over the problems, leaving it for the commercial press to exploit l
disunity."
The lack of credibility was exacerbated by an image problem. Not only >
Grassroots seen as a colored paper that did not appeal to the GWU's larg
African membership, but it was also seen as a platform of the youth. GWwj|
main constituency was among hostel dwellers, who had been involved in bit-i
ter conflict with youth in 1976. The migrants, many of whom were quite COIK
servative, regarded the youth, and by implication Grassroots, with much
suspicion. GWU found participation in Grassroots too time-consuming anej
chose to stay clear of political quarrels between commumty organizations i
different ideological backgrounds. ä
In response to problems with news gathering, Grassroots decided in 1983 »j:
form "interest groups," notably a women's group and a labor group. News-
from the organizations in these fields was not forthcoming. Ideally, thesefj
interest groups would involve the organizations in these fields. That became j
the mode of Operation for the women's group that was formed by members :
of the United Women's Organisation. The labor group, however, did notj
include any trade union members, for the unions feit that they could not spare
their members for media activities.89
Grassroots kept battling with the issue. Ideological recipes prescribed a
working-class leadership, but in real life this proved elusive. Although the .
paper found a receptive audience among student youth, it did not manage to <
involve working youth. The skills required for producing a newspaper meant >
that it remained a preserve of well-educated people, in spite of continued i
efforts to spread skills more evenly. Training in media skills thus far focused on i
activists, stated the secretarial report in 1983. "We hope 1983 will see Grassroots -
equipping more working class people with the necessary skills to préparé them
to assume leadership positions in our association."90 Young workers would
have to produce the leadership needed "if we are to end racial oppression and
capitalist exploitation in our country." In 1985 Grassroots apparently began to l
despair that one paper could serve the divergent interests within the commu- J
mty: the Organizer proposed to investigate the possibility of a "young workers'
magazine to help raise the consciousness of this constituency."91
In this respect, the predicament of Grassroots resembles that of CAYCO,
ase basic constituency was high school students and students from post-
ondary institutions, with a sprinkling of young workers and unemployed
i. "The whole atmosphere would not attract young workers, because stu-
ftts dominated the discussion. And we were using English, the struggle lan-
, while many workers would speak Afrikaans. Oh yeah, we had endless
ssions about the leadership of the working class and the leadership of the
ïcan majority. But our leadership came from mostly middle-class areas,
i the more affluent families, university students. But we were involved in
jrking-class issues. 'Organizing the working youth' was always on our
nda, but it never got off the ground."92
^
\Grassroots in 1983-1985: Linking Up with National Struggles
l The launch of the UDF presented Grassroots with a new challenge. Linking
l issues to die struggle for national political power—a central tenet in UDF
f^Strategy—fitted eminently with the newspaper's editorial policy of drawing
lt<sat the poh'tical content of commumty issues. With its history as an organiza-
%tional tooi, it was natura! for Grassroots to see its task as building the UDF.
jlBeginning in 1983, the UDF occupied a prominent place in its pages. But it was
ly from 1985 onward that Grassroots fully became a mouthpiece of the UDF.
With a special issue covering the UDF's launch, Grassroots plunged enthu-
siastically into the campaign to build the UDF. The new constitution and the
tricameral system provided useful targets for Grassroots, since they could be
tackled from many angles. In the run-up campaign to the tricameral elections
in August 1984, many organizations came out in support of boycott calls. This
provided a good opportunity for broadening out, notably to include rehgious
organizations. Spokespeople on behalf of the Muslim Judicial Council called
for an election boycott, warning that those who would run for election would
automatically be expelled from the organization.93 Muslims also launched
their own organization, the Call of Islam, to mobilize against the constitution.
Christian-inspired resistance was more prominentiy featured in the Grassroots
rural editions in Afrikaans, as in the story on the UDF and the election boy-
cott in the Southern Cape. Here a colored oom (uncle) gives a religious moti-
vation for his refusal to vote: "I stood at the ballot box. I brought the bible
and the voting together: there was a gap. Then I brought the UDF and the
bible together; and there was contact. Then I walked past the ballot box."94
But once the elections were over, few efforts were made to relate to religious
sentiments.
For Grassroots as a Community paper, the UDF presented both a new chal-
lenge and a liability. "Before, we were fighting for high wages, low rents, equal
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education. Now we see how they are all part of the same struggle. As we!
how the new constitution will affect our daily lives, so our bread and bu
struggles have been united in a bigger struggle against the new constitu
and apartheid, against exploitation and oppression in all its forms."95 But h
should Grassroots relate to these highly politica! campaigns? This questiom
addressed at an assessment meeting in October 1983, where Grassroots secret«
Lynn Matthews hailed the new challenges but warned against getting coffl
pletely caught up in the politics of the UDF: "We know that the people in oq
communities stil! struggle because there is no work. There is no food and l
homes. In Crossroads today, people are calling for support in their fight for t
right to live and work where they choose. In Kewtown the maintenance fi|
continues, and in Beüville, Lotus River and Belhar the fight for electricity stffl
goes on. Grassroots cannot forget the day to day struggles of the people. It csm
not overlook their need to build strong democratie organisations."96
The rapid growth of die UDF also posed a dilemma for the local affiliaK
which feit that building die Front happened at the expense of consolidatie
their own still weak organizations. After the UDF anti-election campaigia
CAYCO reported a widespread feeling that the "UDF anti-election campaign
destroyed our Organisation as well as others and that we should never allowit
to happen again."97
For Gmssroots and die UDF Western Cape as a whole, diis strong focus osj
the constitution and die election boycott meant that coloreds were die main tart
get audience. Since the New Deal aimed at die incorporation of coloreds;
Indians, colored people needed to be dissuaded from voting. With diis offcn-i
sive against the constitution and the "dummy institutions" for coloreds, issues!
in the African townships took second place. Squatter struggles, a prominent i
feature of resistance in die Western Cape, also received scant coverage. Onty;
when open warfare—clearly instigated and promoted by die police—erupted;
between various factions in Crossroads and its satellite camps, did Grassrooül
begin to deal with the issue. The UDF in the Western Cape was equally aloof*
and largely ignorant of the politica! dynarnics in squatter communities.98
Widi die formation of the UDF, it was natura! for Gmssroots to widen its >
scope, but it is questionable whedier die newspaper could take the bulk of its 1
"grassroots" readership along. In going for "hard politics," it may have alien-i|
ated ordinary readers. Stories about national politica! issues tended to be fairly J
abstract, which prompted repeated calls for Grassroots to become more popu-
lär. "Were we appealing to an activist and student readership whilst leaving
others behind?"99 ;
The UDF in genera! experienced similar problems when launching soli-
darity campaigns with other parts of the country. UDF leaders fbund that
augh activists were readily able to identify with national political issues,
nary people in the community were unable or unwilling to make such a
pik. "Lots of people in the community say what has that [repression in die
ei] got to do widi us. . . . You have got to make die link . . . that has been
r hard."100
Although the UDF was based on highly local organizations, its meetings
are dominated by national politics. "The UDF did not strike a proper bal-
: between bread-and-butter issues and national politics. . . . Yes, civics did
He things like rents and tiiey were UDF affiliates. But when civic repre-
atives came to the meetings, they put on a different cap and talked poli-
s. The more they got sucked into national politics, the more they got out of
L widi their own constituency."101 This verdict by Jonadian de Vries is
l by Joe Marks, die 1983-85 vice-president of die UDF Western Cape,
i later became one of its most outspoken critics. Marks, a jovial gray-
ded vegetable vendor with a history of political involvement dating back
> die Coloured People's Congress and the South African Communist Party
l the 19505, was known for his propensity to deviate from die politically cor-
F reet line. Boasting about his working-class background and his daily contacts
ädi ordinary folks as a street vendor, hè was scornful of die activists who pre-
nded to "lead the masses." Marks believed that Grassroots lost its populär
- tppeal once it became caught up in "hard politics." After die launch of the
, hè commented,
Grassroots was no more the people's paper. It had become the instrument of a
political elite. When Grassroots was addressing bread-and-butter issues, rents,
electricity, refuse removal, street lights, then people saw it as their paper. . . . But
the people here, they get scared when they sixpolatiek. When they see Mandela's
portrait and Mbeki's portrait, they start shivering. Rents is an issue people want
to discuss, but they want to stay clear of politics. Our people want a nonpoliti-
cal paper. . . . What do people want to read about? That the rapist who got hold
of the neighbors' daughter is caught and that problems surrounding electricity
bills can be worked out. . . . The "People's Issues" is how to combat robbery, not
high poliücs. Surely, we would like people to be interested in a nonracial umtary
South Afhca, in discussions about economie policy. But unfortunately, the peo-
ple here don't give a damn.102
This, of course, was a recurrent problern in the Grassroots editorial policy.
Should the newspaper start from where the people are? Or, radier, should die
paper give direction, prefiguring where the people ought to be? Although
there were differences of opinion regarding means and methods, diere was
consensus on die basic direction among those producing die paper: Gmssroots
ought to préparé the way for die ANC in die Western Cape.
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Popularizinpi Charterism and Socialism
In the early phase of Gmssroots, promoting the ANC was done mostly inj
rectly—for example, by using slogans from the Freedom Charter su
"There shall be houses, security and comfort." With the launch of the l
Gmssroots and its core member organizations, such as CAHAC, assumedj
overtly Charterist profile. CAHAC adopted the Freedom Charter in 198
"a basis for the establishment of a just and democratie order in South Afiica?f
Gmssroots featured do-it-yourself instructions for producing ANC or ]
Mandela buttons.
Initially, the people who worked on Grassroots had reminded themsehi
periodically of the need to broaden out and to encourage debate, but then t
paper began to follow a clear-cut politica! line. What exactly was the ANC Üif
could be established by scrutinizing ANC publications, such as Oliver Tamb
annual New Year message on January 8. "In those days, you would not qu
tion the directives of the movement. That was the style of politics. We also l
to convince ourselves that the ANC was the best organization. In the proc
of convincing ourselves, we could not allow any doubts. So in the process i
ignored other organizations. The organization was 'correct at all times.''
explains the politica! purity. Very strong emotions were involved where l
ANC was concerned."104
The authoritative Interpretation of the ANC line came to be a major topil
of discussion. "Some of us, who had been abroad and who actually met AN(j
people, were aware that ANC people were also human and that the ANC ha
many problems. But you could not come home and teil that [to] the peopl<
here; they simply would not believe that. If you would disagree with some
thing the ANC did, you would only discuss that with very close friends wh
shared your politica! loyalties."105
But the strategy for Gmssroots was twofold: to establish Charterist hege
mony and to promote a workers' consciousness. What did it mean: The PeopfcJ
Shall Govern? That the ANC would take over the state? Or that the worke
were going to control the factories? Or both? In covering various eventsft
Gmssroots projected a "leading role of the worker" as the correct political linej
It ran features on worker leaders from the 19505 who were closely associated 1
with the ANC or SACTU, such as Oscar Mpetha, Liz Abrahams, or Dorothy 1
Zihlangu. In its extensive coverage of student affairs, it hammered the mes-
sage home that students could not go it alone: only worker-student alliances-i
could bring victory. Student organizations and student activists duly rehearsed;
the correct line: not they, but the workers were to lead to struggle. But "the line" i
could easily be appropriated to mean that the students—being of working-
class background—were after all the engine of the struggle.106
Promoting socialism on a more abstract level was easier than coming to
E with the much vaunted need for worker leadership of the struggle. Grvs-
Ibegan articulating "a more explicit indictment of capitalism and added
F
 kfrs' supplement that «tried to provide a vision of a new society and
dated the meaning of working-class leadership.»1- Unemployment, ns-
Jices recession, housing shortages, and inadequate health facdmes were
ifaely'blamed on the capitalist system. Recessions and ^ W"^
| stop only "if the workers decide what should be made and how much
i be made"108 The same message was trumpeted in glowmg portrayals
pocialism in other countries, with a clear preference for third-world mod-
iCuba was the example of a country in which there was no Unemployment,
1
 . Vorkers make the laws."109 The education Systems in Cuba and Mozam-
me were claimed to serve -the needs of all the people and espeoally the
Jrkers," while in South Africa "education only serves the need of the gov-
Sioientandthebosses."110
 f TTP.P ^Hv
! With more and more people being drawn into various fonds of UDF actiy-
r involvement in Grassroots declined, for the paper was no longer the only
Lressive game in town. Participation in the Saturday news-gathenng ses-
*£ which previously would attract sixty to seventy people, had dwindled to
Ihandful The initial idea of democratie newspaper production coUapsed, as
1
 tivist energy was now directed elsewhere.111 Declining populär participa-
a necessitated changes in the mode of Operation. Owm«ft was now being
Dduced just by staff members without the involvement of organizations.
tular problems were experienced with the distribution. The average arcu-
on dropped from twenty thousand in 1982 to seventeen thousand in 1983.
«w are we losing heart?" asked the secretarial report. «Many people say they
5 not use Grassroots as an organizational too^any longer, but does this mean
lat Grassroots hasno message to pass on?"112
&**** now had to compete with the UDF, a host of other orgamzaüons
Nat had sprung up, and the proliferating industry of service organization, such
docal adVice offices, legal aid bureaus, and other media organizations Idee the
Itoeen Training Project, where T-shirts and pamphlets were produced. The
Kvists at GrLoots were moving on to work in other organizanonswhde
& organizations were making people avaüable for training in media skdls.To
Ce Lot, Gmssroots had fallen victim to lts own success:
 tt had assis ed
IW member organizations in setting up their own newsletters, pamphlets
Uters, and media workshops. By mid-I984, newsletters wen;beingPr°^
Ry fifteen civics, thirty CAYCO branches, and mneteen branches of the United
a e bürden, coming on top of a host
; of otecommitmenl. "It is our task to identify why so many of our activists
s
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are reacting so negatively to the paper, to produce a winner again, and <
the enthusiasm and excitement for this paper that existed before."114 '.
doxically, another factor that inhibited participation was the ready availab
ity of foreign funding: "We became dependent, taking fünds for granted.Ml'|
Generally speaking, foreign funding proved a mixed blessing. Funds i
abroad sustained many useful activities, but they also created a new elite <
struggle entrepreneurs who were well versed in handling sponsors. Tensio
were heightened when factionalism became mixed with the competition i
funds. Access to funding could also fuel racial tensions. In the UDF gener
the treasurers were usually whites or Indians, as there were very few Afric
in the Front with bookkeeping skills. As repression mounted, finances had t
be handled with increasing secrecy, which again enhanced suspicions. Wit
the UDF, African areas routinely complained that they were starved
funds.116 Compared to many other organizations, Gmssroots was fortunateifl
having a loyal funding source that kept the fmancial lifeline going. Foreig
funding ensured the survival of Gmssroots, but the drawback may have beea|
decreasing populär participation.
Gmssroots in 1985-1988: Building Utopia
Until mid-1985, the Western Cape had been relatively quiescent. Of overal
thousand people detained nationwide in 1984, only seven were held in the;
Western Cape.117 After celebrating its successful election boycott campaign,J
the UDF feil into a vacuüm. For about a year, no central issue emerged aroundf
which the UDF could further its mobilization and organization efForts. The"
UDF never came to grips with the one obvious issue that could have been a;
focal point of resistance: squatter struggles. The period of 1985-88 witnessedl
the violent government destruction of the squatter communities of Crossroads|
and some other squatter camps, with the residents forced to relocate in the
vast new settlement of Khayelitsha. The women's and youth affiliates of the J
UDF made some attempts at organizing in squatter areas but had limited suc-J
cess. The UDF leadership had other priorities and little understanding of the*
dynamics of squatter politics. It failed to come to terms with the opportunis-
tic squatter leadership: Crossroads leader Johnson Ngxobongwana was col-
luding with the police in driving out his rivals while hè was officially stitt|
functioning as chair of the Western Cape Civic Association, a UDF affiliate.
In its endeavors to get a wide range of allies on board and to build a fol- ,<
lowing among the African population of the Western Cape, the UDF was not J
discerning in choosing its partners. When in May 1986 the battle between the j
government and the squatter camps was fmally lost after a series of raids by'
$gxobongwana's witdoeke vigilantes (who identified themselves with a piece
f white cloth tied around the head) on satellite squatter camps, the UDF
issed another opportunity by failing to reach out to the Africans who were
:cibly resettled in Khayelitsha. Whereas Crossroads had been celebrated as
; symbol of resistance and victory, Khayelitsha stood for defeat. The vast
,w township, which was to become home to more than three hundred
uousand Africans was not "recognized" by the UDF. UDF secretary Trevor
tfanuel later defended the neglect of Khayelitsha by comparing the victims of
: massive forced removals with scabs who take the place of workers on
i.a&: after supporting the strikers, one could not go on to organize the scabs,
ntil perhaps much later.118 But blaming the victims for a Situation in which
spiey had no choice amounted to adding insult to injury.
A renewed wave of protest in 1985 was sparked off not by local Western
Cape issues but by national politica! developments. The turning point in
ryouth militancy was the death of Matthew Goniwe and three other activists
'fom Cradock, which bore the hallmarks of a liquidation. The funeral of the
Cradock Four in July 1985 coincided with the declaration of a partial State of
; Emergency. From then on, youth took to the streets to fight the police.119 The
l wave of protest mounted rapidly, originating at the University of the Western
L Cape and then spreading to colored high schools. The school boycotts started
;ïa July 1985, lasted for most of the year, and in many high schools included a
boycott of exams. On 20 August, following the example of the Eastern Cape,
!
 a consumer boycott was launched in the Western Cape, coordinated by the
l Consumer Boycott Action Committee, which included non-UDF organiza-
~\ tions such as the Unity Movement, its aligned civic umbrella, the Federation
| of Cape Civic Associations (FCCA), and the Cape Action League (CAL).
l Meanwhile, a rent boycott spread through the African townships.
For the Cape Peninsula, the phase of overt repression began in July and
" August 1985, teaching a symbolic peak on 28 August, when police clamped
'•f down heavily to prevent a march to Pollsmoor Prison, which was called by UDF
patrons to demand the release of Nelson Mandela. On 26 October, the State of
Emergency was extended to the Western Cape and the Boland. It was lifted in
May 1986 and then reimposed on 12 June. The peak of populär insurrection in
;- the Cape Town area feil between August 1985 and June 1986, when the imposi-
* tion of a nationwide State of Emergency forced many activists into hiding.
Beaming a UDF Mouthpiece
In view of the origins of Gmssroots, it was natura! that the paper made itself
wülingly available as an organizing tooi for the UDF. The Gmssroots staff,
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although then operating in the context of a nationwide protest movement,|
tially kept formulating their own editorial policy: they decided on the pr' *
ties and on the most effective coverage. But beginning in 1985, the
leadership began to exercise direct control over the paper. In this phase, C~
roots became caught up in an insoluble dilemma: it became too radicaTj
much of its adult colored readership, but radicalized youth thought the ]
increasingly irrelevant.
"From 1985, we were at the beek and call of the UDE Then, when the l
almost disintegrated under repression, it left Gmssroots without direa
What was our role now?"120 Fahdiel Manuel, Gmssroots Organizer from ]
to 1991, believed that the newspaper missed its chance by not redefinin^
role. It drifted along with the tide of militancy, but it no longer provided i
direction. During the period of heightened politicization in 1985-86, Grass
missed the boat. If a more populär formula had been used, it would have L,
possible to reach people who were now prepared to know about politics.
Moreover, it became increasingly clear that "the people" were far fron
homogeneous bloc: militant youth surged ahead, with the unemploy
manning the barricades and the student leadership trying to provide soi
political and ideological guidance. But they left behind people like a re
life Mrs. Williams from Manenburg: ordinary people in colored areas ofi
became infuriated when they saw police beating up their children, but it t
not follow that they were turning in great numbers toward the ANC..
repression became harsher and resistance increasingly violent, many simf
became scared and preferred to stay out of politics.
The coverage of events in Gmssroots., reflecting the priorities of the UDI
largest constituency, focused on student struggles in secondary and posts
ondary institutions. Grassroots came out strongly in support of the school «u««.
exam boycotts. "You know why I am not going to write?" it quoted a boyfjj
cotting student, "because my friends were killed by the police and I cannot gÉ
on writing exams with a guilty conscience. I personally would feel like a t
tor." Boycotting exams was presented as the moral thing to do, without exam*
ining whether these boycotts indeed contributed to the weakening of the state.
No allowance was made for dissenting opinions. "All the organisations of thfi
people agree: we cannot write under these conditions. Exams are a small sac-J
rifice when so many of our brothers and sisters have been arrested, shot, kille
on our doorsteps."121
Another prominent topic was the consumer boycott, which began in
August 1985 and continued until January 1986. The boycott provided ample
opportunity to link stories on the Western Cape to developments in otherf
parts of South Africa and to evoke a sense of historica! continuity through ref-
erences to the boycott campaigns of the 19505 and 1979-80. The boycott was
... as a tactic empowering ordinary people. Gmssroots admitted that the
oat weakened considerably after the declaration of the State of Emergency
SOctober 1985, but "a significant number of people remained loyal to the
ott call and stuck to buying black." In the Western Cape, the consumer
t was not nearly as effective as in the more militant Eastern Cape.
usiderable attention was given to the radicalization of the Cape Muslims,
ning with the death of Imam Abdullah Haroon in detention in 1969, the
»™m population of the Cape had become increasingly politicized. In Sep-
bber 1985, the funeral of Ebrahim Carelse, who was killed as a result of
Ike action, drew an unprecedented crowd of mourners to Salt River, one of
; Cape Town suburbs. Police shot at the crowd, seriously wounding one
jWie mourners and incensing thousands of Muslims. A small group came for-
i, disarmed one policeman, and beat him to death. Emotions again ran
p»i in November 1985, when police entered the Park Road Mosque with
gir boots on. This incident marked a turning point in Muslim radicalism.
«Te police desecration of the mosque drove some Muslims to join the ANC.
" In this phase of populär insurrection, the generation gap widened. A youth
der recalled later how parents—especially mothers—would be quite sup-
tive when their own children were harassed, beaten up, or detained. But
: die youth in general were gripped by revolutionary fever, parents lived
Ifear.
The youth agenda in 1985 was: insurrection. And the youth took over; they did
not care about other considerations. We left the older people behind; we went
on to make revolution. Many civics collapsed when the leadership was detained.
Youth leadership went into hiding or was also detained. Organizations were not
very strong, but then the revolution does not wait for organizations to materi-
alize. It swept everything aside. Revolution has a dynamic of its own. You don't
sit back and evaluate. We were making a revolution; the others would follow.
We hardly slept, sometimes an hour in a school building.122
y this time, militant youth thought Gmssroots largely irrelevant. They no
ifonger dressed respectably to rake the paper into people's houses and engage
ïtesidents in discussions on rents or schools. They were more eager to learn
how to make the most effective use of firebombs and how to neutralize the
X'.
r effects of tear gas. Grassroots had become too militant for its adult readership;
|in colored areas such as the working-class town of MitchelTs Plain, Gmssroots
came to be perceived as "an 'African' paper, because it was so militant and
focusing on politics."123 One youth activist commented on this change:
In 1985-86, the UDF leadership began determining the content of the paper. We
became a UDF mouthpiece, making UDF pamphlets. [UDF Western Cape sec-
retary] Cheryl Carolus walked into our offices and told us what stories to write,
when to be on the streets, and so on. From then on we followed the line of the
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UDF, but we got more and more removed from the commumty. We assumecj
diat everybody shared the anger of us activists. We had these angry funerals, toyi-
toymg through the streets. It actually scared away a lot of the Community. Wa
called people comrade, but if you would say that to an ordinary worker, he'd
probably slap you and say that hè is not a communist. . . . The colored commu-*
nity is conservative. They could relate to civics, but not to barricades and stone-*|
throwing.124
This verdict is shared by Ryland Fisher, who during these years was
news Organizer for Gmssroots. During die peak of militancy, die staff lost si
of die Community they were supposedly serving and confused activist
sciousness widi populär consciousness. "That heavy high-profile political
put many people off. It became more an activist paper tiian a communi
paper. . . . You have to keep in mind die character of die Western Cape;
have to start from people's consciousness. Activists assumed diat ordinary
ple supported die ANC, violence, nonracialism, and all diat."125
The ANC assumed increasing prominence in the pages of Gmssroots.
first major front-page treatment came in March 1986, when Gmssroots open
widi the story of die funeral in Guguletu of seven young men who had be
killed in a shoot-out widi police. The funeral widi ANC and SACP banni
reportedly drew diirty to forth tiiousand people and was presented as a "
sive show of support" for die ANC.126 From dien on, Gmssroots continui
openly to popularize die ANC and its leaders.
The Utopian Phase: People's Power
"Power to the People" ran die bold caption over die center spread in die Feb|l
ruary 1986 issue of Gmssroots, and it was no longer talking about electricitd
Civics were now portrayed as organs of people's power, not as Community*
organizations lobbying for lower rents and a more convenient date to pay elec-1
tricity fees. Beyond die street batties emerged a vision of a new society. As aal
example of what die promised land would look like, Gmssroots described die'
co-op formed by dismissed Sarmcol workers in Natal: "The co-op is run dem-|
ocratically. The workers share all die profits according to what they need. Ancf|
all die workers togedier decide how the co-op will be run." The workers^
explained how they worked without bosses or supervisors. This example,,
Grassroots concluded, "is showing us how our factories can be in die future— |
when die workers control die factories and share equally in the profits. Co-ops
like this are a real way of building workers' power—and of building a new ;
South Africa."127 i
By diis time, it must have become obvious to the readers that this prom-
ised land could materialize only m a socialist order. This vision, of course,
Lpas by no means limited to Gmssroots. Speaking at die Gmssroots 1986 Annual
seral Meeting, COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) sec-
ary general Jay Naidoo spoke about building workers' power in die facto-
|es and in die communities. "The time for shouting socialist slogans is over.
f is time to implement a socialist programme."128 The struggle had advanced
~~m protest to challenge. In die activists' strategie perspective, die next phase
uld be die revolutionary takeover of power. People's power had to mani-
st itself in all aspects of life, including the media. "Building die People's press
t also building People's Power," was the message of Gmssroots organizer
ileem Badat at the same meeting: "Rejecting the structures of die Apartheid
jptate is no longer enough. It is now also necessary to replace die Apartheid
jStructures . . . witii democratie bodies which are well organised and have
ong support from the people. . . . The task of the People's Press is to chal-
P&nge die power of die ruling class media, to minimise its influence and even-
itaally take over state media and commercial newspapers, and use their
jjïistitutions to serve die interests of die people."129
l In die search for people's culture, break dancing and graffiti were portrayed
I as "a form of culture originated by die people tiiemselves, understood by tiiem
fand appreciated by them."130 This equation of activist youth culture with
jppeople's culture" sounds oddly out of tune, botii witii a colored working-
|,dass constituency and widi one of die shining examples of "people's power"
| that Grassroots held up for its readers: die Soviet Union, at the time more
\ known for its gerontocratie leadership dian for innovative cultural manifes-
I tations. Here "people's Sports" was hailed: "Sports in die socialist countries
l is not a privilege of die rieh elite, but is available to everybody.... Many more
!
 sports facilities are built to serve die working people. Sports is used to pro-
mote trust and friendship among nations. Sporting personalities are expected
to be an inspiration to the people and to play an important role in foreign pol-
icy. The Soviet sports system is radically different from that in the West and
itwould be a loss if people failed to learn its lessons."131
Cuba, Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Libya provided otlier beacons of
I hope. 'The country is governed in a very unusual way widi street committees,area committees, etc. up to national people's committees. People can changethe delegate to any committee at any stage and die delegates get paid in die
way MP's get paid because it is not a permanent job," reported Maulana Faried
Essack of die Call of Islam after a visit to Libya. He had observed tiiat all peo-
ple diere had houses and were united.132 The maulana saw only one problem
t with Libya: its support for the PAC (Pan Africanist Congress). But the work-
Jl ers' paradise could also be found closer to home: in Mozambique. Under die
caption "When work is no longer a bürden," a Mozambican explained worker
management: "Now all die workers togedier plan die production for die fac-
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tory.... Now, I am proud to be a worker. My work is no longer my burden-
it is my joy."133
A common feature of these countries held up as models of people's po\>,
is that they were ruled by authoritarian leaders who used populär mobilia
tion to stage demonstrations of mass support. The issue of how to recond
the imposed consensus with democratie ideals, such as freedom of opinion,i
not specifically addressed in Gmssroots. But the paper"s ideas of democracy wei
clearly in line with other UDF publications that were dismissive of libertaria
notions of democracy. Participation, not pluralism, is seen as the paramon
principle of democracy. Yet, when embarking on campaigns to muster int
national solidarity for the embattled alternative media in South Africa, ma
activists invoked precisely the libertarian notions of press freedom, "the rig,.„,
to differ." Was it simply a matter of tailoring the message to suit a gullible ovepj
seas audience? Or, rather, did it reflect the ambiguous nature of the UDF itsejfj
which managed to maintain a broad front by virtue of accommodating diver-
gent tendencies without having to make choices?
Following the ideological prescriptions, people's power ought to implyj
workers' power. In real life, student activists and radical academies were the j
most zealous advocates of people's power. Because the Gmssroots staffwas]
recruited from this same category, they enthusiastically joined the search for'!
Utopia. But even among students, enthusiasm for building people's power \
seemed limited to activists. Elections for the student representative council
(SRC) at the University of the Western Cape in early 1986—when revolution-
ary beliefs in the immediate coming of people's power were at a peak—showed
a surprisingly low turn out. Only 28 percent of the students cast their votes for;
this hard-won "organ of people's power," compared to 44 percent in 1984. In '
analyzing the disappointing poll, Gmssroots quoted a student leader who iden-
tifïed two reasons: while "student awareness" was high in 1984, students in
1986 feit somewhat demoralized, still feeling the scars of 1985 when their uni-
versity had been the focus of police repression. Secondly, the SRC had neg-
lected many UWC issues while focusing more on national political issues.134
Even at the level of university students, support apparently depended on the
capacity to deliver the goods. While the vanguard was preparing to storm the
Winter Palace, the troops were lagging behind, in contrast with Lenin's obser-
vation that the masses were surging forward while leadership was found
wanting.
Even more than Grassroots itself, the magazine New Em became the herald
of a socialist future. New Era's role as part of Grassroots Publications was to
provide a more theoretical Journal, which focused on socialist experiences else-
where in the world. New Em was launched in March 1986 to announce the
"Dawn of the New Era," as the first editorial explained. Resistance in South
„.„a, it stated, had entered "an exciting period in which we find new values
eing developed, a new person being created and collective democratie struc-
y being built. We are clearly well on the road to a new society."135 New Era
passed Gmssroots in its uncritical acclaims for the Soviet Union and other
st countries. When commemorating the Bolshevik revolution, it claimed
at the Soviet Union "today . . . is the leading force in a growing world
mmunity of socialist nations Socialism has reached a new phase of
velopment, and is preparing itself for the 2ist Century. 70 years after it first
:rged it has become an unshakeable System."136 A rüde awakening was in
,e: the countries of Eastern Europe, initially depicted as fulfffling the prom-
„.3 of the Freedom Charter, soon would be exposed as stagnant backwaters,
fridden with ethnic chauvinism. But only after February 1990 did New Em
Lnake a first attempt at reassessment. The March 1990 issue admonished its
l readers that "we cannot comfort ourselves with assertions about the inherent
'' superiority of socialism. If socialism is to revive itself in Eastern Europe, it
[ will have to redefine itself and buüd genuine democracy and economie effi-
ciency."137 But the editors were apparently still too overcome with shock to
^ offer any explanations for their turnabout.
Utopia did not lie exclusively beyond South Africa's borders: it was also to
be found in images of people's power in the townships. The May 1986 issue of
Grassroots reported on populär justice as an element of people's power. Peo-
ple's courts, claimed UDF education officer Raymond Suttner, do not punish
offenders but reeducate them. Punishment would be unfair since "crime is
because of apartheid," as Suttner quoted a Community leader. "We cannot pun-
ish someone for stealing because apartheid has made him poor and hungry,
and unconcerned about bis fellow human beings." People's courts, Suttner
explained, were different from the government's courts. 'They are created by
people's organisations, and are completely responsible to the people of the
Community. They cannot do anything that the people would not approve
of."138 Suttner did make a distinction between people's justice and kangaroo
courts run by youth who used intimidatory methods to win support for the
struggle. People's justice convinces people to support the struggle "because
they can see it is right." But there were no reports in Grassroots about the more
seedy side of populär justice. Many experiences with populär justice in the
African townships and squatter camps bore little resemblance to Suttner's
idyllic picture.139 People's courts were limited to the African townships; there
are no reports of populär justice in colored areas.
And yet, even at the height of intoxication about the new society about to
be born, a curious ambivalence remained. What was the struggle all about:
Was it a revolutionary seizure of power? Or was it, after all, simply a reformist
movement, demanding a rightful place in society for everyone? On the same
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page ofGrassroots where Suttner unfolded his vision of a new society based (
persuasion rather than coercion, another article criticized the new gove
plans for the installation of regional services councils, which would have i
form of African representation. This scheme, the article stated, feil short ^
"the people's demand for a share in government through one person i
vote."140 Here the demand was simply for a proper place in the system i
than a total overturning of the system. Similarly, while denying the legitir
of the government, UDF activists frequently turned to the courts to cha
a particular government decree. Commenting on the court ruling that ch
lenged certain measures under the State of Emergency, UDF Western Gap
secretary Trevor Manuel said: "We are beginning to win some victories.'
courts have shown that we have a right to exist."141 People's power deriviu
its legitimacy from rulings by the courts of the apartheid state was one oft
curious examples of the UDF's profoundly ambivalent nature.
Repression and Survival: The State of Emergency
"Frustration is probably the word that most typifies the experience of living i
South Africa today," stated the secretarial report to the Gmssroots AGM in j
1986.142 Behind the public exhilaration about the ascendancy toward people's
power sounded a note of despondency about declining participation and
increasing difficulties of keeping the paper going. The staffbelieved that theren
was still much demand for the paper, but organizational involvement in pro-
ducing and distributing the paper was declining. Member organizations were'J
reminded that building the "people's press" was not just the responsibility of',
the abready overburdened staff.
In the first half of 1985, the Gmssroots offices were raided twice by the secu- i
rity police. In the second half of 1985, staffmembers were repeatedly detained°
for some weeks. In October, the building housing the newspaper office burned <
down. Nevertheless, during 1985 the usual eleven issues were produced, with '
the print order doubling from twenty thousand copies in early 1985 to a record
forty thousand in December 1985. The annual report noted a tremendous
increase in the popularity of the paper, which it attributed in part to the fact
diat the last issues were distributed free. Under the State of Emergency, Grass-
roots continued to be distributed free, for selling the paper became increasingly
difficult. Financial self-sufficiency had become an even more remote ideal. As
repression mounted, the sponsors stopped urging for self-sufficiency.
When the nationwide State of Emergency was declared on 12 June 1986, it
became impossible to continue an aboveground Operation. The Gmssroots
office was closed temporarily when staffmembers went into hiding. Coordi-
nation became difficult, with meetings being held in cars and involving an
asional nightly encounter with some UDF leaders still at large. Publica-
.j was interrupted for six weeks. But once the staffhad adjusted to the new
nditions, Gmssroots was back on the streets again in August 1986. Apart
m the increasingly draconian press regulations, the survival of Gmssroots
s at stake because of the governmenfs threatened clampdown on foreign
inding in 1987.
Police searches, detentions, and harassment became a permanent leature ot
»orking for Gmssroots until 1990. With activists scattered all over, it was diffi-
llt to develop a coherent policy. The staff assumed that state brutality, rather
paan bread-and-butter issues, was now people's immediate concern. But in
Iteporting on repression, a publication that appeared at five-week (or more)
tttervals had obvious handicaps. For the daily accounts of street battles, police
»utality, detentions, and trials, the daily papers were more adequate vehicles.
3n this score, Gmssroots could not compete with the "commercial press." The
f£apc Times had gained the reputation among daily newspapers of providing
F the most thorough coverage of events under the State of Emergency. Gradu-
j al!y, the ANC and its leaders were also making their way into the mainstream
l press. With his interview with ANC president Oüver Tambo, recorded during
|aholiday visit to Britain, Café Times editor Tony Heard cleared the way for
' tbe rehabilitation of the ANC leadership in the mainstream media.143
Gmssroots in 1988-1990: A Prisoner of the Activists
: «We need to question what is wrong with our ability to organise on a mass
' level and challenge our whole style of work. We need to channel our activists
into organisations where the masses have always been based so that they can
organise more effectively."144 This assessment, drawn up at the end of 1988, is
indicative of the sense of loss of direction feit by the Gmssroots staff. Organi-
zations such as civics had all but collapsed. With the arrival of the new weekly
paper South on the Western Cape scène in 1987, Gmssroots was forced to rede-
fine its role. The result was a two-pronged policy: continuing to popularize
the ANC and reverting to the paper's original calling, covering local com-
munity issues. In view of the near collapse of community organizations,
rebuilding organizations was an obvious priority. But unlike in the early years,
Gmssroots no longer managed to muster community involvement. "From
1988-1990, Gmssroots's staff was lost, without direction," recalled Fahdiel
Manuel, who at the time worked as the Gmssroots organizer. "We became quite
despondent of working with organizations. We were mainly guided by the
staff assessments."145
In August 1987, the government introduced new emergency regulations
that allowed for a three-month closure of publications carrying "subversive
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lpropaganda." Previously the alternative media had been hit by detentions, baa-l
nings, long-drawn-out legal proceedings, and vanous other fbrms of harass-^
ment; now their very survival was at stake. In March 1988, New Nation wasl
closed down for three months, to be followed by South in May 1988 and b«
Grassroots and New Em in 1989. The common threat helped produce a united ï
response: representatives from a broad range of media and media organiza-i
tions in the Western Cape came together in May 1988 to launch the Save the j
Press Campaign, with the ubiquitous Johnny Issel in the strategie positionf
of treasurer. Anticipating a banning, the Grassroots staffbegan setting up a new;
publication to serve as a backup. A first trial issue of a four-page newsletter, the 1
Shteld, was produced in June 1988.
In February 1988, the government imposed restrictions on eighteen organ- <
izations, including the UDF, and further tightened the curbs on the media, l
With open political activities by extra-parliamentary groupings virtually out- '
lawed, community papers had obvious difficulties with their role of promot-'
ing organization. Moreover, there was an uncomfortable gap between the
aspirations of media activists and the mterests of the average reader. A read-
ership survey conducted by the new alternative weekly paper South in 1988 sug-
gested that "politics" was low on the list of reader preferences, especially in
certain relocated colored areas. In the African townships, the survey estab-
lished 80 percent support for the UDF with a concomitant interest in politics,
while in Mitchell's Plain the UDF registered only 20 percent support.
When Grassroots began reexamining its role in the changing circumstances
of the 19905, it came up with similar results. A feasibüity survey conducted in
1991 to explore the potential market for Grassroots in a new formula as a free
sheet, run on advertising revenue, found that people were interested in read-
ing a local paper, but it should feature a picture of the spring queen rather thaa
Nelson Mandela on the front page. The spring queen was a beauty queen,
elected annually as part of a spring festival of the textile workers—a prime
example of what media activists would have labeled a despicable specimen of
petty bourgeois gutter stories. In the Witwatersrand region, a Mandela picture
on the front page ensured that the paper would be sold out in a couple of
hours. Not so in the Western Cape: to celebrate Mandela's release in early
1990, the COSATU textile union SACTWU (South African Clothing and
Textile Workers' Union) produced a special issue of its newsletter, running a
five-page picture story on the ANC leader. It was distributed free by the union,
but union activists met with little interest: forty-five thousand of the sixty
thousand copies were returned to the union office.146
The Grassroots staffmembers were not unaware that the papers highly polit-
ical profile alienated the more conservative readership in the colored areas.
Circulation remained at around thirty thousand copies, of which eight thou-
sand copies, with pages inserted in Xhosa, went to the African townships. But
because copies were distributed free, it was unclear whether they actually
reached residents or kept piling up under people's beds. "We cover a-political
issues in a political way," noted the 1989 assessment. "We have a township
readership which is more politicised and a different culture. How do we cope
iwith this in that we also have a coloured readership. We must consult with
Organisation on these changes." However, in practice, "consulting organisa-
tions" meant consulting with a limited circle of activists.147
The AGM in August 1990 decided to suspend the publication of Grassroots
and to conduct a feasibility study for the paper to become a commercially run
free sheet. But although staff members now believed in a professional and
commercial Operation, other activists were less flexible in adjusting to the new
mood of the time. The once innovative way of producing a community paper
now worked as a brake: clinging to the collectivist models of the past blocked
new initiatives. The people's paper had become a prisoner of the activists.
Grassroots had outlived itself, as Fahdiel Manuel frankly acknowledged in an
assessment of the last years of Grassroots: "Basically, we were producing papers
because the funders wanted to see a paper being produced."148
This clash between the nostalgia for the heady days of the struggle and the
sober mood of the early 19905 was at the center of the Grassroots eleventh
Annual General Meeting in October 1991, where two options were on the
agenda: cease publication altogether or go commercial.149 "Why should we
change now, just because the people in Russia are changing?" asked CAHAC
chair Wilfred Rhodes. "We have to be wary of the capitalists." Privatization and
ammercMization might have been the new buzz words in Eastern Europe and
Russia, but why should these winds of change induce South Africans to seil out
the heritage of the 19805 to market forces? But this AGM itself reflected the
sobering reality of changing times. Gone were the days when the Grassroots
AGM was a major social event in progressive circles. Only some thirty-five
people turned up for this meeting in a bare community hall in Manenberg, a
colored working-class area on the Cape Flats. After waiting one and a half
hours in the vain hope that a sufficient number of people would arrive to
achieve a quorum, it was decided to carry on anyway. In spite of invitations
sent to the townships, no Africans attended.
Efforts to transform the "struggle paper" into a commercial free sheet never
took off. In 1992 it was decided to cease publication of Grassroots altogether.
Fading away through a series of ill-attended meetings was a rather inglorious
end for an experiment that in its heyday had captured the Imagination of many
supporters. Nevertheless, with more than ten years of effective life, Grassroots
had outlived all similar ventures elsewhere in South Africa. Having followed
Grassroots through its turbulent history, we can now attempt to draw up the
balance sheet.
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Ten Years äs an Organizing Tool: A Balance Sheet
February 1990 should have signaled the beginning of a new growth period»]
now that new space had been won for the alternative media, but it was thé]
start of a period of decline. Many alternative papers failed to develop a con-;
structively critical approach to the ANC and could not adapt to the changingl
conditions of the 19905. Most did not manage to make a qualitative leap frorn;
struggle paper to the wider world where politics was not the be-all and end-
all. Those papers that did, such as the Weekly Mail, did not suffer from a
decline in reader interest. The extreme dependency on foreign funding proved'
a mixed blessing. Donor charity for alternative media was drying up, as donors^
were reorienting their efforts toward development or education. With money:
and causes running out, demoralization crept into the alternative newsrooms.
The question of the raison d'être of Grassroots can now be examined with the
benefit of hindsight.
Building Organizations
The relationship between Community media and community organizations
was not as clear-cut as the Leninist recipe had promised. In the first stage of
organization building, Grassroots proved a useful tooi, providing Organizers
with a "foot in the door" to engage residents in a discussion. But once organ- '
izations got on their feet, Grassroots was increasingly feit as a bürden. As the
staff noted at the many assessment and evaluation meetings, the newspaper
was as strong as the organizations were. When the organizations collapsed in
the second half of the decade, Grassroots operated in a vacuüm.
Both Grassroots and the community organizations relied on a fairly limited
circle of activists, which suffered from "activist burnout" and from a lack of
talented new recruits. Moreover, many activists were students or recent grad-
uates, most of whom would sooner or later want to settle into paid jobs and
have some kind of a family life. Although student activists provided a useful
input in terms of skills, enthusiasm, and their access to the resources of uni-
versities and technikons (postsecondary institutions that pro vide professional
training), the heavy reliance on students had obvious drawbacks.
Short-term excitement did not usually result in sustained involvement. The
"new South Africa" was not going to be built on people's power, as activists
believed in the mid-i98os. Civics were revealed as weak structures that were
not equipped to evolve into organs of local government. With hindsight,
several key Grassroots activists shared the verdict of trade unionist David Lewis
that community organizations were basically organizations of activists. As one
Grassroots activists admitted: "Civics speaking 'on behalf of the people' were
run by ten to twelve people." Issues that captured the imagination of the
" activists were not necessarily the most pressing priorities in the communities.
• Joe Marks was openly scornful of the activists' obsession with politics: "The
• working class might die out because of AIDS, while the activists are discussing
workers' power."150
j The participatoty ideal behind the slogans of people's power was that peo-
s
 pie would take control over their own lives: "they were going to run the
schools, the factories, the towns, everything."151 But permanent participation
proved an elusive ideal. Grassroots tried to be responsive to the changing needs
of the time. After the initial emphasis on organization building, the paper
played more of a campaigning role, trying to tie local issues to the national lib-
eration struggle. But somewhere during the peak of populär mobilization in
the Western Cape, between August 1985 and June 1986, the paper became
increasingly irrelevant. Getting the paper onto the streets became an end in
itself, an act of defiance.
For many, student activists as well as a fair number of people with a working-
class background, Grassroots and the community organizations had neverthe-
less provided an important learning experience. People (although not "The
People") learned to stand up for themselves, to speak up, to conduct a meet-
ing, to take things into their own hands. Empowering something as amor-
phous as "a community" almost invariably means that the most ambitieus and
enterprising members of the community take advantage of the new possibili-
ties and in the process strengthen their own power base.
Because it failed to adopt a more populär appeal, Grassroots did not manage
to attract new recruits. There is a remarkable continuity in the core of people
who, in one way or another, were involved in the Grassroots project over the
decade. In this respect as well, the newspaper reflects the experience of the
UDF Western Cape as a whole. When interviewed in 1991, Saleem Badat, the
Grassroots organizer from 1983 to 1986 as well as one of its ideologues, drew
up a realistic balance sheet that seems valid for both Grassroots and the UDF
Western Cape:
The UDF had a veiy wide appeal. It reached into all kinds of corners where the
ANC had not had a basis. For example, the Western Cape, rural areas, a place
like Cradock. lts strong point was mobilization, but it was weak in terms of
organization. The UDF never built strong organizations. It was carried by
activists: that explains the high rate of activist burnout in South Africa.... A big
problem is that the politica! leadership in the Western Cape had not been repro-
duced. If you look at the people who are active now, they are mostly the same
people who were leading ten years ago. There was no middle layer which could
take over. It was a group of people in their mid-twenties, who are now in their
mid-thirties, who are basically still the political core here.152
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The unbanning of the ANC had a demobilizing effect, pointedly unde
the limitations of the participatory ethos. When the ANC leadership re,,
home, ordinary folks thought diat the struggle was over and that theyt
now sit back while die leaders sorted out the problems. "Being involveö
struggle is not a natural thing for human beings," as Gmssroots god
Johnny Issel had to conclude.153 Willie Simmers had a similar experk
Mitchell's Plain: "In colored areas, people wait for the 'new South.
come along. They don't realize that diey have to build it."154
Bridging the African-Colored Divide
How did Gmssroots, and the UDF Western Cape as whole, fare in the i_
at bridgmg the divide between Africans and coloreds by forging a cor
identity, either as "the oppressed" or as "workers"?
A common perception among activists was that bndging the Afrii
colored divide amounted to brmging coloreds into the ANC fold. On L
score, the 1994 election results present a clear failure. A large majority of «j
ored voters in the Western Cape voted for the National Party. But divisie
continued not only outside the Charterist fold but also within the
Western Cape.
Working for Grassroots brought colored activists into the African townst
for the first time. Folding the newspaper provided a meeting point for Afrk,
and colored youth. The Cape Youth Congress and, after the fusion, the Uoll
Women's Congress effectively managed to set up racially integrated orga
tions. But overall, the UDF Western Cape had been dominated by colc
When the ANC was set up in the Western Cape, Africans seized it as "t
organization. The first ANC executive elected at the regional Western '_„
Conference in 1990 was strongly dominated by Africans. The role of whites]
the ANC proved less contentieus than the old African-colored divide. AttL
next regional conference, in September 1991, ANC chair Nelson Mandel
made a personal intervention to redress the balance. He berated local A]
members for having voted an executive into office that was heavily domina
by Africans and thus not representative of the demographic composition q
the Western Cape. Mandela's intervention was difficult to tolerate for ma
seasoned local activists, both colored and African, for whom this line of arg,
ment smacked of the old arguments of apartheid ideologues. Whether or ne
Mandela's campaigning for colored candidates was the decisive factor, th*.
newly elected executive counted a fair number of prominent coloreds, includ-i
ing the new chair, Allan Boesak. l
The UDF, with Grassroots as one of its tools, did indeed manage to estab-j
lish an ANC presence among colored people in the Western Cape, but the
„ of that presence was limited. Moreover, class Unes to a large extent con-
ed to coincide with race. No amount of populist rhetoric could obscure
y&± that many colored working-class families in Mitchell's Plain were hir-
domestics from Khayalitsha. On the other hand, when African nationalist
pencies in the ANC began to overshadow the discourse of nonracialism,
•eds feit left in the cold, fearing that they would be left behind when the
would deliver jobs, housing, and education to "their people." In the
j. election campaign, the National Party indeed claimed the coloreds as
- people." The NP was also aided by the deep sense of religion among
ny colored people, who were antagonistic to the ANC because of its links
btheSACP.
l Some ANC leaders came to regret the dismantling of UDF structures in the
btern Cape. The demise of the UDF marked the revival of "colouredism,"
perejection of nonracial ideology in favor of colored identity. In the Western
fcpe, the ANC suffered a defeat worse than anticipated: in the provincial elec-
„.tons'of 1994, the National Party won 53 percent of the vote compared to a
Lere 33 percent for the ANC. Over 90 percent of the Africans, but only 27 per-
ait of coloreds, voted for the ANC.
At the time of my interviews in 1991, the consensus view on both sides of
« e African-colored divide seemed to be that progress had been made in the
P>F years, but that there was still a long way to go. Africans still perceived
; position of coloreds as ambivalent, sitting on the fence and hedging their
.«vts. "Some are petty bourgeois; they aspire to be like white people. Coloreds
faow are more progressive that they used to be, thanks to the UDF and
3SATU. Now when there is a stay-away, coloreds also stay way. . . . I think
e ANC is now accepted among coloreds, but you never know because they
n't sign up as members."155
Joe Marks agreed with this assessment: "In every colored man, woman, and
lild, there is the white person trying to break out. That is the legacy of slav-
ry. People have been freed of the chains on their wrists, but not yet of the
Jjehain in their head." Marks acknowledged that considerable progress had been
ftnade during the 19805: "If we started out at zero in 1980, then we have now
Lerhaps moved 40 percent.... The UDF was to unite our people across the
color üne . . . and the UDF has done a good job. Colored people now almost
accept blacks as human beings-as long as they stay in Gugulethu. They don't
want black people as their neighbors." He believed that there was still a long
ï way to go for nonracialism to be transformed into a living reality rather than
'l a theoretical concept. Meanwhile, "there is only one way for the ANC to
i draw a sizable colored vote, and that is by making clear that it is not a black
, »156organization.'
Gmssroots, along with other media, certainly contributed to popularizing
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the ANC in the colored areas. Although the ANC had been unmentionable^
the beginning of the 19805, ANC symbols and slogans had become cor
place toward the end of the decade. But Grassroots was not effective as ;
organizing tooi across the racial divide, and probably it could not have l
A large part of the African population, notably those in the squatter camj
was illiterate and thus beyond the reach of newspapers. Africans in the to\i
ships were generally poorly educated: educational Standards lagged be
those in the colored schools. Although the township edition of Grassroots T
Xhosa translations was an attempt to solve the language problem, it does i
appear to have been widely read. Nor could it contribute much to build
bridges with colored areas. To be effective as an organizing tooi, a paper ne
to address a more or less homogeneous constituency. Forging a "comm\]
of the oppressed" proved an unrealistic ambition for a community paper.'
success of the UDF media policy as a whole rested precisely on the oppositel
principle: targeting audiences meant addressing the intended audience on itsl
own terms, rather than subsuming them into an undifferentiated public.
Grassroots was far too militant and ideologically outspoken to appeal to an|
essentially conservative, church-going colored public. Like the youth move-;
ment in the Northern Transvaal, the newspaper was not only fighting the 1
apartheid state or the capitalists. It was as much a platform for young colored •
intellectuals who contested the authority of the conservative forces within the
colored community, such as the churches and the educational establishment.
Although it advocated community empowerment and worker leadership, the
paper, in fact, represented the newfound identity of students and graduates:
who asserted their place among the forces of change. Grassroots played a key
role in forging a community of young educated activists, which subsequently
became the backbone of the UDF Western Cape. lts gender composition was
more balanced than either the youth movement in the Northern Transvaal or
the civic in Kagiso. In this environment of students and graduates, women
encountered far fewer obstacles to participation. In Grassroots., men outnum-,
bered women, but women did have access to all influential positions. '
Especially in its early years, the attempts by the Grassroots staffto give "a
voice to the voiceless" proved important. After the bannings of the Black Con-
sciousness papers, Grassroots was the first dissident voice to make itself heard.
Later arrivals at the alternative scène were better, more professional papers,
but Grassroots played a pioneering role. However, by choosing to remain an
orthodox struggle paper on the fringe, it preserved its ideological purity but
missed the opportunity to develop a more populär appeal. The ideologues
kept a firm grip on the paper, thus preventing activists with a more practical
mind and more journalistic skills to implement the stated objective of Grass-
roots, which was "to start from where the people are." Whether it is false con-
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dousness or human nature, after a long working day many ordinär^ fofc pre-
-d to be distracted by the capitaüst seductions of the TV senes Dallas rather
lanbe educated on the workers'paradise in Mozamb.que. „
RehanaRossouw.Gr™* activist who moved on towork for the weekly
wspaper South, concluded that the pioneering role of Grassroots as an alter-
e paper made an unportant contribution to press freedom, although.„*
concept of independent media. «The legacy of Grassroots as a momh-
eis *at now many'orgaruzations think they can teil us [, e, South] what
to write»^ Whüe some Grassroots activists wallowed m past glones Rossouw
Lont of those who - without cUsownmg the past-had made a clear cho.ce
L favor of independent journaüsm. In the post-February 1990 penod, former
mggle journalists" found themselves caught in a «tricky balanang act
eïbèing^^
ade up her mind: South Africa needed truthtul journalists.
oZformer G,^ 0& workers, however, continued to regard theconcep
of independent media as a fraud. Those who clauned to be mdependent^
.have ulterior motives, believed Grassroots former township Organizer H.U*
1
 Ndude. When discussmg South's editorial policy of presenting vanous «de. of
;
 rae story, she became quite agitated: "Many of our progressie people don t
want to read it. What line are they toemg? . . . We want to know whidi mter-
° ls serving They write questionable stories and make ANC members
^ . ™South dauns 'wants to be independent from the ANC, *
eervrng other interests.^- She made it clear that those «other mter-
" could benone other than the mterests of the Nanonal Party, a, to
oversensitivitytoanykindofcriticism. ^^ipv
Part of the legacy of Grassroots, such as the utopian ™^<*%°^
power and the blind adoration of socialist models elsewhere, belongs to the
pal to the phase of populär mobilization. In style and contents Grassroots-was
so much the product of a particular youth culture that it could hardly have
made lasting imprint on L world
 V1ew of a broad section of people m the
Astern Cape But in a more pragmatic form, .deals of populär pamapaüon
have outlasted the utopian images of people's power.
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Conclusion
From Micro Level to Macro Level
THE THREE PRECEEDING CASE STUDIES have provided some insight i
the vast and at times bewildering diversity of local movements campaig
under the UDF banner. Among social movements, the UDF must surely l
unique in the heterogeneity of affiliates under its umbrella: from the Joha
nesburg Scooter Drivers' Association to the Northern Natal Darts Club, i
the Grail to the Pietermaritzburg Child Welfare Society and the Nationa
Medical and Dental Association. The three affiliates highlighted in this boe
represent the mainstream of UDF organizations: a youth movement, a civ
a Community paper. Yet even within this mainstream, the three stories rev
a striking diversity. We are now left with the task of linking these micro nar-'
ratives agam to the macro story. What is the common strand between thej
witch burrungs in Sekhukhuneland, the rent and bus boycotts in Kagiso,;
the utopian project of people's power as constructed by the Gmssroots activists?*!
And how do they fit into the overall story of the anti-apartheid struggle inside l
South Africa? What is the relevance of the theoretical perspectives that have |
been discussed in the first part of this book, as seen from the vantage pointf
of local studies? Which themes are missing in an histonography that is largely <
based on the macro story? One neglected element is the importance of religion
and other belief Systems as sources of legitimacy and motivation. Another
aspect that has received scant attention is the relationship between local strug-
gles and the wider anti-apartheid struggle: local agendas do not necessarily [
coincide with national objectives.
Secular and Spiritual Sources of Legitimacy
While religion has emerged as a central theme in the historiography of the
Zimbabwean wars of liberation, it is largely ignored in the academie literature
on the liberation struggle in South Africa.1 This subject remains confined to
the domain of theologians and is hardly explored by social scientists and his-
torians. Is this because of a conceptual gap between the macro and the micro
levels? How do localized narratives fit into the overall story?2
The master narrative features mainstream anti-apartheid resistance as a
modemizing force. But some of the micro narratives do not fit neatly in this
'erall story of the liberation struggle. The challenge inherent in this two-track
proach is to understand local struggles in their own terms, without losing
;ht of the dialectic?' interaction between macro and micro levels. The burn-
r of witches may at first sight seem very "traditional," but it was transformed
ito a thoroughly modern phenomenon by the use of urban innovations such
scar tires and by the generational reversal of roles. Sekhukhune youth justi-
their actions in struggle idiom, presenting the purge as their answer to the
TC call to make South Africa ungovernable. The absence of the spiritual
Rumension in the historiography of South African resistance may in part be
r doe to a failure to understand local struggles in their own terms. There is a rel-
ative abundance of local case studies of South African resistance history. But
jhese have mostly been undertaken as a function of the overall struggle, often
%ceking to draw "lessons of struggle" that can be applied at other times and
"places rather than as studies in their own right.
| But this oversight may also be due to a conceptual gap between academie
|discourse and the mental map of the actors. In the academie universe, both of
|; a liberal and of a Marxist variety, the analytical framework was thoroughly
• secular. But seen in the context of world history, this secular perspective is a
: minority view characteristic for elites in twentieth-Century Western societies.
?. In African societies, there is traditionally no dualistic world view that distin-
'° guishes between "secular" and "sacred" spheres. The forces of evil were not
confined to one of these spheres. They manifested themselves in the shape of
, apartheid, capitalism, sin, witches, and general disharmony. All aspects of life
are spheres of divine activity, explains the South African theologian Gabriel
l Setiloane. Salvation is when peace, order, and happiness are maintained in the
ij Community. He argues that the recorder of the history of African resistance in
South Africa, being Western, has missed an important point, namely "that the
^
African struggle all the way from Nxele (Makana) through Nongqawuse, the
formation of the ANC, which follows very closely on the rise of Ethiopianism
in the churches, Bullhoek, etc., is essentially a religieus inspired struggle."3
The argument that this dimension has been lost in the historiography
because of the Western antecedents of the recorders of history is not wholly
convincing. The historians of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle were by and
large white and Western. The religious dimension is not absent at the level of
the macro narrative. The nationalist and socialist discourse used by both the
i ANC and the UDF at the macro level was often strongly flavored by moral or
I spiritual arguments. At a conference in 1983 it was proposed that the UDF
declaration must be adapted into a prayer in order for it to have an appeal to
the church.4 The UDF has clearly benefited from its close relationship with
churches and religious leaders. Churches and clerics rendered moral legitimacy
to anti-apartheid resistance and provided the UDF with publicity, resources,
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protection, and advice. In the competition for legitimacy, this was an k
tant asset for the UDF vis-ä-vis the South African government. The state i
vulnerable to this type of attack, as it also based itself on religious fbundatje
But the importance of ecclesiastical patronage went beyond the utilitarian \
efits of rendering the UDF respectable (and thereby eligible for funding)!
home and abroad.
Supporting the UDF was presented as the "right and moral thing to i
This does not mean that morality was merely invoked as a tactical mane
For some strategists, the moral appeal may have been merely utilitarian, l
for many others the moral tones had a persuasive resonance. The UDF's j
ferred tactics provided ample opportunity for the expression of moral andsptf
itual appeals. Boycotts and nonparticipation had a significant symb
meaning: these campaigns were aimed at identifying and isolating the i
of evil. By manifesting their purity, their nonassociation with evil, boyc
forged moral bonds. They took part in the battle between good and evil. Sb
ing a sense of belonging, not only to a politica! Community but to a moE
Community as well, they knew both God and history were on their side.r
as Allan Boesak observed later, proved an important distinction between \
UDF years and the early 19905. He noted a widespread nostalgia for the l
years. "That was a period of mass involvement, a period when people took S
clear stand. That had a moral appeal. Now it is difficult to get used to con
promises. . . . Many people in the Western Cape now say that 'the mor
of politics has gone.' The 19805, that was 'clean politics,' morally upright, rd
compromises, with a clear goal."6
Clerics continued their attempts at restoring a moral Community by driyi
ing out the forces of evil. At a news briefing in November 1994, religious lead-|
ers stated that an envisaged truth commission could not alone deal with l
anger and fear permeating society. "It needs the touch of God," they sai&j
Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu said a "smoking out of demons" wa
planned. "They will bc services of exorcism. People will be splashed wktil
water."7 While engaging in spiritual cleansing, the churches would also call on J
communities to clear the streets of litter.
Religion therefore is part and parcel of the ideological baggage of the lib- ]
eration movement at a national level, although its historians tend to under-:j
estimate or ignore its importance. But it is at the local level where the pervasive Jj
presence of religious beliefs is most visible, both as a resource in the struggle i
for legitimacy and as a source of inspiration. At grassroots level, the UDF J
followers expressed their world view often simultaneously in both a socialist'
and religious idiom, as with the Young Christian Workers in Kagiso or the
Sekhukhune youth. Socialism and Christianity were not seen as contradktory
but as mutually reinforcing beliefs, as in Ntlokoa's diary and Chikane's auto-
TOpy. When, after several failed attempts, the bus boycott m Kagiso
dty took off, the civic leaders interpreted their success as a divine vmdica-
h- «God is on our sicL " The very same youth who opened the village meet-
I in Apel with "Viva proletarian internationalism" had played a prominent
m the witch-hunts. Christianity was not a source of inspiration for the
hukhune youth, as it was for the Kagiso leaders. Instead, the youth drew
L on local belief Systems and on orthodox Marxism to underpm their
RntiTrespect, there is a parallel with the Zimbabwe war, where ^ tisorcery
1
 aigns also upset the generational balance. Unlike the examples from Zim-
ve the alleged witches in Sekhukhuneland were not labeled sellouts: they
te not suspected of passing Information to the authorities. They were sim-
'f blamed for witchcraft.8 But in essence, this amounted to the same crime:
fee sellouts, witches were subverting the struggle from withrn.
Through the spirit mediums, the ancestors gave their blessmg tothe liber-
i struggle in Zimbabwe. Thus a revolutionary struggle could be accom-
„odated £ peasant society. Although the war thoroughly upset the pattern of
ocial relations, this experience could be digested in terms of local value sys-
fems. The guerrillas fought for the return of the ancestral lands.
§ Why was this road not open to the comrades in Sekhukhuneland? Why
Luid the BaPedi tradition of resistance against colonization and Bantustans
Et be tapped to legitimate a new cycle of revolt? Why could the dingaka m
1
 ekhukhuneland not be persuaded to give their blessing and their medione to
hè comrades? It seems L, for the elders in Sekhukhuneland, the memones
f the
 I95os for the most part functioned as a deterrent rather than an inspi-
rion Although ANC traditions were kept alive in a few households for most
Te' elder people involvement with the ANC spelled trouble. bannmgs,
I harassment, exclusion from job opportunities, unwanted attenüon from clnefs
"and police. With the youth, historical consciousness was apparendy not a source
of iTpiration. Moreover, youth and spiritual authorities did not^occupy the
l same positions as in Lan's famous Dande County m Zimbabwe. Sekhukhune
l youth wielded sjamboks, not guns: their means °f coeraon were less persua-
I Se than those of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) fighters. On
1
 er hand, spint mediums in Zimbabwe had preserved a considerable
of autonomy, while the dingaka in Sekhukhuneland were compro-
i mised bv their dependence on the chief.
1
 Tradition as a source of legitimacy was not absent: what was lacfang was
uman agency to mobilize this resource. The youth revolt erupted largely
pTnlSusly! ladong strategy and leadership andi unable to hnl,: «p-iththe
eLs. Generational consciousness became a much stronger ™**>*
l any sense of continuity with past resistance. In the first phase of youth
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lization, youth had turned to the dingaka with a request for medicines to makel
them mvulnerable and the demand to identify the culprits of witchcraft. Bu
in turning to the dingaka, the youth bypassed the elders and the chiefs.'
chiefs were so intrinsically part and parcel of the repressive status quo that it
was inconceivable to win them over to the side of liberation. In the village'1
hierarchy, the dingaka belonged to the chiePs entourage. They depended ofl
the chiefs, at whose request they performed certain rituals and from whoj%|
they needed to obtain certain permits. Therefore, the spiritual resources oft
dingaka were closed off to the youth. It was only when they had established i
that the dingaka could not or would not deliver that they turned to another '
powerful medicine: Leninism. Maurice Cornforth's much-thumbed trilogyl
held the promise of a new potent spiritual force that could guarantee invinci*
bility (if not invulnerability): "The Marxian doctrine is omnipotent because it
is true." Armed with this doctrine, one would be able to understand nature
and society—and would also be empowered to change them.
Marxism-Leninism was put to use as a secular religion. It held out the same
promise of ultimate victory as Christian religions. Cornforth promised an
omnipotent doctrine, but so did the Methodist Hymn Book.
When I am all renewed,
When I in Christ am formed again,
And witness, from all sin set free,
AU thtngs arepossible to me.9
Muti, Marx, and Methodism all held out the promise of omnipotent medicine
in the search for social harmony. African religious leaders of various denomi-
nations have emphasized that it is highly artifïcial to draw sharp distinctions
between traditional African religion and Christianity. The Association of
African Spiritual Churches in Johannesburg has lamented the labeling of
African religions as pagan superstitions. "All of this makes even less sense to
us when we observe that the culture and customs we read about in the Bible
is far closer to our culture and customs than to Western culture of the White
Churches."10
This search for social harmony has been described in the Kagiso story as the
quest for a moral Community. In the vision of Frank Chikane and the Young
Christian Workers, this would be the classless society compatible with the
ideals of the Kingdom of God. Countering divorce, mediating in domestic
conflict, combating crime, and fïghting the forces of evü were all elements in
the building of this moral Community. Like Gabriel Setiloane, Chikane under-
lines that the dualistic world view, in which the spiritual world is separated
from the social world, does not fit with the African world view. Not onlywere
the people of Kagiso involved in a battle against an oppressive state; they were,
: m Chikane's words, taking part in the "struggles between the forces of right-
• eousness (light) and unrighteousness (darkness)."11 The anticrime campaign,
J the cleanups, the social isolation of the police and the town councillors, all fit
iin with the endeavor to cleanse the township of evil forces. In Kagiso as m
f Sekhukhune, evil forces and spiritual power were agents with which to be
ireckoned. But in Kagiso, youth were not nearly as isolated as in Sekhukhune.
• Although the civic leadership worried about excesses on the part of the com-
t tsotsis, and the youth displayed impatience with the caution of the adults,
i rauch common ground remained. In Kagiso, religion was a shared resource
across the generational divide.
At first glance, religion was virtually absent from the ideological armory of
the Grassroots activists. But the egalitarian moral and political order, as envis-
aged by the Kagiso activists, resembles the participatory socialist Utopia upheld
j by the Grassroots staff. In the context of the Western Cape, appropriating
Christianity in the name of the struggle was a problematic option. Christian-
ity belonged to the colored elite of dominees and other petty bourgeois mem-
bers of the establishment. Those who did bring a religious legitimation to the
Struggle, such as Allan Boesak, came to be seen as ideological rivals by the
young Marasts who dominated both Grassroots and the UDF Regional Exec-
utive. In order to construct a counter hegemony, other ideological sources
needed to be tapped. Islam, in its militant third-world version, held out some
promise but never became a prominent theme in Grassroots columns because
it was not suited for broadening out beyond the Islamic constituency. As in
Sekhukhuneland, Marxism was used both as an analytical tooi and as a secu-
^ lar religion. Like the youth movement in the Northern Transvaal, Grassroots
activists isolated themselves by drawing on an ideology that was alien to the
world view of the wider Community.
Can the neglect of the religious dimension in the historiography be blamed
f on the Western bias of the recorders of history, as Setiloane believes? Are
exotic local belief Systems perhaps more mtriguing for Western researchers
than the seemingly well trodden patlis of Christianity?
Religious beliefs transcend the black-white divide between the makers of
history. What about the recorders of history? Terence Ranger and David Lan
have recorded the vital importance of religion in the Zimbabwe wars. But
l there is another school of writing on African revolution that vehemently
brands religious beliefs as impediments to liberation. These authors are not
white and Western, but black and angry. In his writings on anticolonial resist-
ance in Algeria, Franz Fanon spearheaded the onslaught on "superstitious
beliefs": 'And the youth of a colonised country, growing up in an atmosphere
of shot and fire, may well make a mock of, and does not hesitate to pour scorn
upon zombies of his ancestors, the horses with two heads, the dead who rise
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again, and the djinns who rush into your body while you yawn. The nattS
discovers reality and transforms it into the pattern of his customs, into 1
practice of violence and into his plan for freedom."12
Fanon's belief in moral regeneration through revolution, and in the ne,,
sity of revolutionary violence to liberate individuals and nations under colt«
nial rule, became the gospel for a school of writing on African revolution. BÏ
these Fanonesque notions of the liberating qualities of revolutionary violen?
are not prominent in the idiom of the mainstream resistance movement i.
South Africa. They are, however, not totally absent. Addressing the 1985 ANC
conference in Zambia, Oliver Tambo characterized the garnering as a "counci
of-war that planned the seizure of power by these masses, the penultimate coti*
viction that gave the order for us to take our country through the terrible bil
cleansing fires of revolutionary war to a condition of peace, democracy and t'
fulfillment of our people who have already suffered far too much and far l
long."13 But overall, these notions of the cleansing qualities of revolutior
war are more characteristic of the idiom of the PAC.
Ranger takes issue with Fanon and other authors and actors who hav„
maintained that religion is bound to prevent a guerrilla war from becomiag l
a people's war, or that it contradicts the modernizing mentality judged neces^
sary for the construction of a new society. Ranger argues the opposite: witbrl
out religious symbols and mediums, the guerriUa war might have had more!
difficulty in becoming a true people's war.14 ~J
The conceptual gap between the recorders and the makers of the South!
African liberation struggle cannot be explained by the skin color of the \
authors. Being white does not make one automatically insensitive to religious
or spiritual dimensions; being black is no guarantee for receptivity. Why then 'i
is the religious and moral dimension virtually lacking in the historiography?]
One possible explanation is the instrumentality of much of the academie writ-1
ing. Many authors aspired to go beyond a mere recording of history. Not only ^
were the actors becoming authors, as in the case of the alternative media, bur
in much of the historiography, the authors became actors. They were moti-
vated by the desire to prove certain pomts of ideology or strategy. For many,.
religion belonged to the realm of false consciousness. The prevailing race-class
paradigm left no space for other dimensions of the human expenence.
National Stntfföles and Local Agendas
The subject of "struggles within a revolution" is a common theme in much of
the literature on revolution. The "struggles within the struggle" can unfold
along lines of class or ideology, with various factions vying for dominance-
as, for example, with the nationalists, communists, and other left-wing group-
i in the ANC and the UDF. The Janus-faced nature of national liberation
les has also been a theme of several studies on Mau-Mau and FRELIMO
ffFrente de Liberta9ao de Mo9ambique), where it is argued that an internal
tevil war along class lines was being waged behind the broader nationalist
novement. Competition for dominance can unfold along ethnic unes, as with
and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union). Generational bat-
fttes come out clearly in much of the literature on the Zimbabwe war and also
l a revealing article by Colin Leys and John Saul on the Namibian liberation
Imovement SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organisation).15
The perspective from the micro level offers perhaps a better insight into the
lisubthemes behind the general theme of liberation struggles against colonial-
L or apartheid. The struggles of the 19805 in South Africa do not fit in the
icategories of classic guerrilla wars as in Zimbabwe or Mozambique. The
jSouth African struggle was characterized by widespread populär mobilization
interspersed with low-intensity guerrilla warfare. African liberation move-
ments generally identified the peasantry as having the most revolutionary
potential. But the ANC had shifted its focus from the countryside to the cities
with its strategie reappraisal in 1978-79. The main battlefield was in urban
South Africa—hence my choice for two urban case studies and one rural case
study. Even in the case of Sekhukhuneland, one can speak of rural struggles,
but hardly of peasant struggles. Behind the overall theme of the anti-apartheid
struggle, other battles were being waged. As in the case of Zimbabwe, these
struggles were fought along the lines of class, ethmcity, gender, and generation.
In Sekhukhuneland, there is an element of class antagonism in the mutual
hostihty between youth and business owners. The main targets of attacks and
extortion—the owners of bottle stores, beer halls, garages, and taxis—depended
on the Bantustan government for licenses and patronage. In Kagiso, the pic-
ture was more complex. On the one hand, businessmen depended on the dis-
credited town council for their licenses. On the other hand, business owners
had reason to resent the restrictions imposed on them by the apartheid state.
In the phase of the consumer boycott, local business gained a direct stake in
close cooperation with the civic, for the boycott of white-owned shops
resulted in an immediate increase in purchases within the township. In the
townships, the relationship between UDF activists and business owners was
characteristically opportunistic. Other divisions along the lines of class are
more diffuse. Gore activists were not exactly well-off, but neither did they
belong to the poorest section of the community. In terms of their educational
background, they ranked above average. For the marginalized in Kagiso town-
ship, the activities of the civic carried little attraction. Backyard tenants were
more vulnerable than council tenants and possessed little scope for collective
action. In spite of occasional contacts, hostel dwellers remained outsiders,
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without their own representation on the civic. Lumpen youth set their owjri
agenda, devising their own interpretation of the struggle that legitimated 1
hijacking of cars and the plundering of stores and delivery vehicles.
In the Western Cape, the staff of Gmssroots battled with class lines _.
largely coincided with the racial divide. The African township Organizers c
the staff were less educated, feit isolated, and were inclined to develop the^
own agenda. Most of the core staff had enjoyed at least some years of post-
secondary education, which resulted in a gap between the staff and their pre-
dominantly working-class constituency. The newspaper's agenda ostensibly j
coincided with the UDF program. But in sidelming the clergy and in advo- \
cating their own version of Utopia in which socialism and egalitarian partici-4
patory populism were happily married, the Gmssroots activists also movedn
beyond the UDF's primary goals. Moreover, socialism was used as a legit-
imizing ideology for a particular subculture of youth activism, which became
quite remote from the concerns of ordinary people. UDF activists in the West-
ern Cape failed to link up with the most marginalized part of Western Cape
society: the ever growing numbers of squatters.
Race or ethnicity does not emerge as a powerful force in shaping interna!
conflict in these case studies, except in the case of the Western Cape, where the
racial divide between coloreds and Africans remained an overriding concern
both during and after the UDF episode. Local agendas ostensibly coincided
with the national agenda of building broad multiracial fronts. But the efForts
were only partially successful. In Kagiso, which has a multiethnic population,
no ethnic cleavages emerged in the course of my research. In Sekhukhuneland,
with its fairly homogeneous ethnic composition, rivalry between villages
developed along clan lines.
Did the struggle provide new space for women's empowerment? The picture
emerging from the case studies is ambivalent. Girls were not totally absent
from youth organization in Sekhukhuneland, but this movement was strongly
dominated by male youth. Data are fragmentary and somewhat impression-
istic, but the prevailing impression is one of competition over women, not
of women's empowerment. One remarkable feature of the set of grievances
expressed by high school studente was that boys often complained about sexual
harassment suffered by the girls. This could indicate a manifestation of student
solidarity, but more often than not the boys were in fact voicing resentment
against their teachers, who were snatching the girls away from them. Boys
believed girls to be unreliable because they would allegedly be easily seduced
by teachers, policemen, and soldiere, either under threat or with the promise
of sweets or perfumes. In this competition with teachers and policemen, high
school students had little to offer in terms of material inducements. Their
weapon was coercion, as graphically illustrated in the "building soldiers" cam-
Ipaign. As in Zimbabwe, girls were forcibly removed from parental control;
* but unlike in Zimbabwe, there was no code against sexual intercourse. On the
f contrary, it was understood that one requirement of the struggle was to produce
jlrabies, an item that defmitely did not figure on the national agenda of the
t anti-apartheid struggle.
| Competition over female youth and control over women's fertility is a sub-
'< theme that was by no means confined to Sekhukhuneland only. It was reported
* that in 1986 young girls in Durban were told that African girls had to become
pregnant. "Every woman—married or not, at school or not—must be preg-
i nant by February... to replace the black people killed in the struggle last year."
* An informant said that comrades had threatened to search handbags for con-
traceptives.16 In their discussion on the role of women in the struggle, several
authors state that social norms and household chores militated against girls'
involvement, but that motherhood could be a mobilizing role. Both in actively
supporting their children and in mediating functions, mothers experienced a
politicization of their traditional role.17
This general observation makes sense in the context of Kagiso and the West-
ern Cape, but not in Sekhukhuneland. The struggle was not an empowering
experience for BaPedi mothers: they feared their children. Girls might have
feit attracted to the youth movement, which provided an escape from parental
control, but they played a subordinate role. Nevertheless, through the linkup
with the wider world, notions of women's liberation trickled down to
Sekhukhuneland. Kagiso offered the fairly unusual spectacle of a powerful
woman at the center of civic affaire. But since Sister Bernard Ncube was a nun,
she belonged to a different category of women, located outside the arena of
male competition. Otherwise, women did not play leading roles, although
KRO encouraged the involvement of women as mothers. Girls did participate
in youth organization, but to a lesser extent than boys. Women did have access
to the Kagiso Disciplinary Committee to present their complaints about
unruly children or irresponsible husbands. As with people's courts elsewhere,
the DC opposed Separation and encouraged reconciliation. As discussed in the
chapter on Kagiso, the envisaged new moral order was egalitarian in terms of
race and class, but not in terms of gender. The courts upheld the established
patriarchal norms in gender relations. Control over women emerges as a more
powerful theme than women's empowerment in the struggle years.
By contrast, women played an active part in Gmssroots, both on the staff and
in the network of volunteers. The nature of the project facilitated women's
involvement. The paper, particularly in its early years, dealt with bread-and-
butter issues of immediate relevance to women. Involvement in Gmssroots was
not a directly confrontational activity. The intellectual environment of the
Cape Peninsula, with its two universities, provided more space for women's
2p8
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involvement in a variety of roles. Women's issues, however, were not pa.,
larly prominent in Grassroots or the Western Cape UDF at large. Women'
protested against rising bread prices were welcome, but women who proteso
against rape, domestic violence, or sexual harassment on the campus were i
more contentious in UDF circles. This type of protest, after all, could
labeled "divisive" for it was not directed at the common enemy but at oppr
sive practices within the "people's camp."
Generation is clearly the most salient subtheme to emerge from all 1
case studies. In Sekhukhuneland and Kagiso as well as in the Western Gap
intergenerational battles were being waged behind the overall anti-apa
struggle. In Sekhukhuneland, the UDF constituency was limited to youth. ]
Kagiso the picture is more complex, as the civic managed to involve a bro:
section of the community. But youth had taken the initiative for the formatie
of KRO; youth were the enforcers of boycotts and the anticrime campaigi
They were both the main actors and the main victims, in terms of casualtiesJ
Grassroots proved an effective vehicle for youth to mount their revolt againsw
the colored establishment and to articulate their own hegemonie project. Ini
all three cases, local adaptations of Marxism-Leninism provided a legitimizingl
ideology for youth revolt. J
It should be noted, however, that youth is a problematic category.18 Thel
youth in the three case studies differed in age, educational background, gen- i
der mix, and class. The leading actors in Sekhukhuneland were male high j
school students. Coercive recruitment strategies meant that most of the villagej
youth joined willingly or unwillingly. Generational frictions were most pro- ;
nounced in the case of Sekhukhuneland, where the youth movement escalatedl
into a revolt against all authority: chiefs, dingaka, teachers, and parents. The ï
comrades in SEYO definitely feit themselves part of the wider liberation strug- <5
gle, but not only were they fighting for the liberation of Mandela—they were l
also fighting boredom. Once the ANC leaders returned from prison and exile
to take over the lead, new worries were expressed: Would the old men under-
stand that the youth of Apel were in urgent need of a disco? ;
In Kagiso, the leading actors were older than the Sekhukhune youth. They
belonged to the Soweto generation: at the start of the UDF episode they
 ;
were in their mid-twenties. They had left high school—with or without a
diploma—but maintained an interest in further education through formal or
informal channels. They were mostly unemployed or held activist-type jobs in
the YCW or the trade unions. The young men who stood at the origins of
KRO had learned the lessons of the Soweto revolt. Youth on their own could
not bring the System down. Therefore youth had to link up with the broader
community: in particular, with workers; in general, with parents. This lesson
had not yet been learned by the youth in the Northern Transvaal Bantustans,
Iwhere the Soweto revolt was not part of the collective memory. The street
ittoops who manned the barricades in Kagiso in the months of confrontation
iwere younger and more inexperienced. For lack of data, it is difficult to make
p breakdown of the youth on the street: both high school students and
lampen youth would seem to be included. If the generational divide was one
f major source of differentiation within the community, other subthemes
Itmerge behind the monolithic category of youth, as has been illustrated by the
fstory of the comtsotsis of the United Front in Kagiso. As in 1976 in Soweto,
the dividing line between those youth who went to school and those who did
f not could assume considerable importance. Similarly, the urban-rural divide
• cut across the category of youth. A major element in the attraction of the
Sekhukhune Youth Organisation was its rural roots: while COSAS was "a
! thing from town," SEYO was "our own Organisation."
Grassroots was largely the domain of students or former students with post-
secondary education, who had first cut their teeth in the school boycotts and
the community campaigns of 1980. lts volunteer network had, of course, a
\ wider scope; it relied largely on high school students or recent graduates.
Impoverishment is often cited as an incentive for youth to engage in resist-
ance.19 Indeed, many of the youth leadership came from poor families, but they
did not necessarily experience growing poverty. Some experienced improve-
ments in living Standards. More important than the level of poverty was a
sense of grievance and a determination to be better off than their parents.
Contributing to the sense of relative deprivation was a growing acquaintance
with the wider world through, for example, the mass media. Not all actors had
little prospect of employment. George Moiloa made a conscious decision to
quit his job in order to become secretary of KRO. Ryland Fisher gave up a
well-paying job when hè joined Grassroots. The struggle attracted numerous
people who could have found more profitable and less troublesome employ-
ment elsewhere. The street soldiers obviously had fewer options. But having
nothing to lose is not necessarily conducive to politica! radicalization. Those
who had a lot to lose—successful students—took high risks. Those who had
least to lose—migrants and squatters—were clinging more determinedly to
the little they had. The lumpen proletariat could be a recruiting ground for
street soldiers, but it could be equally fertile territory for the recruitment of
vigilantes or police informers.
Youth was the main constituency of the UDF, and in most of the UDF
campaigns, youth played a prominent role. But in doing so, young activists
also furthered their own agendas apart from the wider anti-apartheid struggle.
They wanted to break out of strongly hierarchical Systems; they went for
excitement and at times also more material rewards; they demanded access
to girlfriends; they rebelled against parents and teachers. The ANC had put
"l
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ungovernability on the national agenda; youth could adapt this directive i
carve out more space for themselves in local conditions.
When furthering their own agendas, youth movements could becomes
divisive element in the wider struggle. The phenomenon of youth sitting itn
judgment over elders in the people's courts was considered particularly obnoxl
ious. The vigilante phenomenon can to some extent be explained as a backlasbl
against the rule of the youth. Vigilantes sometimes had a class base, as townf
councillors and shopkeepers organized punitive expeditions to take revengc \
on their tormentors. But frequently vigilantes consisted of parents who were i
determined to teach the children a lesson. There were numerous cases of par-1
ents forcing their children with sticks or sjamboks into the schoolyard.20
In the intractable civil war in Natal, which in convenient shorthand is i
labeled the strife between UDF (or later ANC) and Inkatha, the front lines
were demarcated not only by political allegiances but also by generation, class,
and the urban-rural divide. Broadly, the "comrades" tended to be young, bet-
ter educated, and more town-oriented, while the Inkatha fighters were oider,
less educated, and more rural. These elements come out clearly in an account,
of the battles in the Durban township of KwaMashu, as told by a former com-
rade. KwaMashu was a township with UDF-affiliated youth organizations.
Their main enemies were the Inkatha impis, who invaded the township from
nearby shack settlements. When the youth organizations tried to enforce stay-
aways and consumer boycotts, these Inkatha men, firmly steeped in Zulu tra-
ditions, made it clear that they would "never let children teil them what to do"
and that they would take no nonsense on Inkatha's home turf. In August 1985,
Inkatha fighters moved in to "restore order" and to wipe out the youth organ-
izations. At the other side of the front line, township residents were required
to contribute at least one male member of the farnily for "military service" and
money for the purchase of weaponry and muti.21 Intergenerational friction
was a vital element in the hostel war, which broke out in 1990 throughout the
Trans vaal townships.
War situations cause disruptions that are not necessarily detrimental to
weaker groups. Women have often gained more space to expand their activi-
ties beyond the household sphere. During the war years, women kept the fac-
tories going in Britain, France, and the United States. The liberation wars in
Mozambique and Eritrea also provided new opportunities for women,
although the gains were not always Consolidated after independence. Young
men, bemg the main body of combatants, occupied positions of power and
authority that would not normally be held by them. Simüarly, in South Africa
local power relations shifted significantly during the years of struggle. To what
extent were these changes Consolidated after 1990? Here, it seems that women
»
:fared better than youth. The new South African constitution treats women
ï as equal citizens, rather than as legal minors. Since the 1994 elections, women
?are more numerous in government and parliament than ever before. But
j youth, as a SEYO activist remarked, has been "demobilized."
The ANC leadership advised the youth that it was time to go back to school
: and to work, to "fight, produce, and learn," while the "old men" would sort
. out the new order. But in many instances, schools were in chaos, money for
school fees and textbooks was lacking, and jobs were not available. Under the
circumstances, some youth continued fighting, although their battles were no
longer sanctioned by the liberation movement.
Structural Conditions and Human Agency
Why do revolutions happen? Because Structural conditions induce revolu-
tions? Or because people make revolutions happen?
Structural conditions in the three case studies are to some extent similar.
The economie crisis, high unemployment figures, the education crisis, and a
crisis of legitimacy with regard to local and national government were com-
mon features in Sekhukhuneland, Kagiso, and the Western Cape. An addi-
tional factor in the Northern Transvaal is the phenomenon of widespread
migrant labor. Absent is the housing crisis, which features prominently in Kag-
iso and the Western Cape. The inhabitants of Sekhukhuneland own their
houses. Mobilization around the issue of rents and service charges, which
proved such an effèctive focus in Kagiso and the Western Cape, was not on the
agenda in Sekhukhuneland. This meant that the option of linking school and
housing struggles—an effèctive way of forging alliances across the genera-
tional divide—was not available in Sekhukhuneland. In the townships, not
only did youth perceive housing struggles as a suitable topic to mobilize par-
ents, but they also had a direct stake in the matter. Raising rents affected the
capacity of the parents to pay school fees. Conversely, the school crisis forced
parents to pay attention to their children's grievances. Parents' involvement
became institutionalized with the formation of the National Education Crisis
Committee. In Sekhukhuneland, the school crisis served only to further alien-
ate youth and parents. In the absence of most of the breadwinners, the female
heads of household were not in a position to enter into a dialogue with the
students, who demanded among other requests the formation of teacher-
parent-student committees. Chiefs, who headed the school committees, were
not inclined to welcome women's participation; women themselves were too
shy to take the initiative. Parents and teachers generally feit that unruly youth
ought to be disciplined rather than accommodated. Issues of common con-
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cern around which broad alliances could be built were virtually lacking. Ofi
potential mobilizing issue with broad appeal was the grievances against i
chieftaincy. Occasionally, youth and migrant workers managed to combi
forces against corrupt and exploitative chiefs, but these alliances were mos
short-lived and not a widespread phenomenon.
Structural analysis, with its focus on material conditions, provides a i
essary but not sufficient explanation. In Kagiso, for example, living standa
and die township environment did not change significantly between 1984 £_,
1986. The transition from quiescence to revolt was not caused by a sudde
deterioration in material conditions but by human intervention, bodi fron
inside and outside Kagiso. The process of populär mobilization took off in«
genera! atmosphere of rising militancy throughout the country and of esca^
lating state repression. In December 1985, KRO managed for the first time to i
pull off a successful boycott campaign. But a crucial element in township s
rebellion was the direct experience of repression, harassment, and brutal force.
In other parts of the Northern Transvaal, similar conditions prevailed ass.
in Apel, the village that was one of the centers of youth rebellion. Yet, certaia l
parts remained quiet, while other remote rural areas became the scène of J
youth insurrection. Human agency is seen at work in the strategie planning of !
the students at Turfloop, who organized to set up youth movements in their l
home villages. The core activists of SEYO from Apel went around to establish
branches in other villages with the intention of stirring up rebellion. 'Tafelkop
exploded within a week after our visit," recalled the chair of SEYO's Apel
branch with obvious satisfaction.
Grassroots is a clear example of the explicit use of "human agency" to utilize
grievances about material deprivation as a tactic for populär mobilization»
Activists did not beüeve that material deprivation in itself would induce resist-
ance: people needed to be "conscientised" by a newspaper. An organizing tooi
was required to infuse bread-and-butter struggles with a new meaning. At die
same time, Grassroots illustrates the limitations of populär action based on
undifFerentiated concepts of Community. In order to be effective as an organ-
izing tooi, a paper needs to be geared to the conditions and the cultural iden-
tity of a specifïc target audience. But this was not feasible in the political
climate of the 19805; to produce a paper for a colored constituency would have
been deemed politically incorrect.
Human agency was crucial in focusing the direction of social change. Here,
the UDF played a vital role: it may not have controlled most of the develop-
ments, but it gave political and ideological meaning to a great variety of strug-
gles. Localized protests and bread-and-butter struggles became linked to an
overall attack on the apartheid state. The Front also played an integrative role.
, Highly regionalized and particularist organizations were molded into a truly
national movement: thus the UDF made a significant contribution to forging
a sense of national South African identity. However, its neglect of rural areas
resulted in a continued sense of marginalization in the Bantustans.
To what extent were UDF organizations able to provide tangible benefits
at the grassroots level? SEYO's capacity to deliver the goods was limited. It
i provided its own constituency with a sense of power and excitement, but this
was a fleeting experience. It was hardly equipped to address the most urgent
concerns in village communities: water shortages, unemployment, inadequate
health care, inferior education. Youth did interfere in one pressing Community
issue: the fear of witchcraft. Their handling of this matter, however, served
to heighten tensions rather than to promote social harmony. But for the
activists themselves, the link with the UDF was meaningful in that it gave
access to money (although in modest amounts), ideas, transportation, litera-
ture, propaganda material, lawyers, and hiding places.
KRO was less inclined to sloganeering and was better equipped to deal
with basic issues. It could build on accumulated organizational experience and
draw on a support network that provided legal assistance and limited financial
support. At times, the civic proved effective in halting or delaying rent
increases. lts anticrime campaign restored a sense of order and security to the
township. In the months of escalating repression, KRO leadership provided
residents with guidance and legal aid. lts legitimacy with residents rested to
a considerable extent on this capacity to deliver the goods, although its pos-
sibilities should not be overstated. lts role in establishing a degree of social
order was not without costs: it involved a considerable amount of coercion,
especially in the initial phase. But in KRO's case, it seems that the benefits out-
weighed the costs, in the eyes of ordinary township residents.
Grassroots proved effective as an organizing tooi in its early years, but it out-
lived its usefulness. The paper helped in die batdes for more washing unes and
a more convenient date for the payment of electricity bills. It was an effective
tooi in helping to form Community organizations, but it was less useful in sus-
taining them over the years. lts doublé agenda may have hindered its effec-
tiveness: for the media activists, addressing community issues was not an end
in itself. It was a means in the battle for national liberation and socialist trans-
formation. After a while, activists became bored with community issues and
eagerly seized the opportunity to highlight national politics and ideological
models. The paper proved inadequate in the period of street batdes and semi-
underground activities. It was not a suitable instrument to achieve one of its
main objectives: bridging the divide between Africans and coloreds. Toward
the end of the decade, Gmssroots had ceased to "deliver": it faded away.
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Inclusion and Exclusion: Redrawing the Boundaries
South Africa in the early 19905 was a land of paradox. As the boundaries oft
apartheid state were being wiped out, other borders were redefined or under-;
scored. As race and ethnicity were abandoned as official organizing princi-*
pies of the political system, ethnicity seemed to become a more potent force |
in black political life than before. The apartheid state had been built on
process of ethnic mobilization by Afrikaners. Now the mainstream of Afrikattrl
ers seemed ready to move toward an inclusive concept of nationhood. While*
the Africans prepared to enter the corridors of power, ethnic competitioö, *
within the black Opposition becarne more pronounced.
Now that apartheid was defeated, Indians and more strongly coloreds '
reasserted their interests and identities. They sensed a new vulnerability as s. 5
minority group in the new South Africa, trapped between the entrenched priv-'
ilege of whites and the new opportunities that would accrue mainly to Africans,
But the stärkest manifestation of ethnic mobilization was organized by Gatsha
Buthelezi, whose appeal to Zulu traditionalism held the negotiation process
to ransom until the eve of the 1994 elections. In a series of last-minute efforts,
all the main players on the national field, from Inkatha to Constand Viljoen's
Afrikaner Freedom Front, were ultimately incorporated in the political
process.
At one point, the ANC efforts to accornmodate a wide range of interests
within its own camp threatened to leave an important category of South
Africans in the cold. Chiefs, organized in CONTRALESA, insisted on the
preservation of their powers and privileges. In terms of African customary law,
women in rural areas were considered legal minors. Chiefs, fearing a reduc-
tion of their traditional jurisdiction, mounted Opposition to the proposed BUI
of Rights, which was based on the principle that all citizens are equal before
the law. This attempt to exclude African rural women—a sizable group of
South African citizens—from the equality that was now bestowed on all peo-
ple in the new South Africa caused much indignation in women's organiza-
tions. Spokespersons for rural women threatened an election boycott. In the
end, however, the new constitution and the Bill of Rights were inclusive of all
South African citizens. Officially, the only outsiders in the new South Africa
were illegal aliens. The process of incorporation seemed completed.
But at the micro level, different scenarios were being enacted, which at
times deviated significandy from the peace process at macro level. In the local
context, the violence had assumed its own dynamic. Some categories of South
Africans who had not been included in the UDF concept of "the people" fit-
ted seamlessly into the new South Africa: business and liberal whites were
among its most ardent supporters. It is on the local level that the marginalized
Conclusion M
and the outsiders in the new South Africa become most clearly visible: farm-
workers, migrants, rural communities, squatters, immigrants, and sections
i of the youth, now dubbed "the lost generation."
In mid-i99o, clashes between hostel dwellers and residents spread to town-
ships all over the Reef. In August 1990, the death toll exceeded five hundred
L in a period of ten days. The East Rand became an intractable maze of feuds
f involving township residents, Zulu migrants, taxi associations, and squatters.
The Vaal townships became a no-go area where youth gangs ruled supreme.
^ Tensions rose as township residents began to implement sharp increases in
"•• rents for backyard shacks. Land invasions by backyard tenants were a response
to housing shortages and to rising tensions with their landlords. Gigantic new
j squatter camps sprang up around the main cities, caused in part by the con-
* tinuing exodus from the Bantustans. But many squatters were not recent
arrivals on the urban scène; they emerged from backyards, had fled the hos-
| tels, or decided to live on their own rather than remain cramped with their rel-
f atives in the tiny matchbox houses. Processes of inclusion and exclusion at the
local level did not necessarily follow the logic of national negotiations. At the
: negotiating table, the former adversaries demonstrated a surprising agility in
\ the new game of consensus politics. But these years of hope were simultane-
ously an episode of despair, as violence reached unprecedented levels and
became more and more intractable. Political violence has been blamed on die
"third force" (a sinister network of military men, police, and right-wingers
bent on sabotaging the peace process) or on a complex of "third forces." There
? is convincing evidence that some of the violence was inspired and organized
by elements in the defense force and the police. But the fact remains that
[ countless recruits were available to fight the manifold battles. They apparendy
l sensed themselves excluded from the promises of the new South Africa.
f What Was It All About? The Race-Class Paradigm Revisited
J The different sets of agendas, the battles fought within "the community" along
f other than class Unes, the great variety of inspirations and aspirations demon-
strate that the race-class paradigm is too narrow to capture the diversity of
human experience. People were involved not only in their capacity as "blacks"
or "oppressed" but also as youth and parents, as men and women, as mod-
ernizers and traditionalists, as urban dwellers and rural folks, as upholders of
Christianity, Islam, or other religieus beliefs and ideologies. In short, people
have multiple identities. Which identity prevails at any particular moment is
situationally determined.
One new identity born in die struggles of the 19805 was a new broad South
African identity, which was carefully fostered by Nelson Mandela in the trän-
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Table 2
1994 election results in Sekhukhuneland, Krugersdorp, and the Western Ca|
Sekhukhuneland
projected numbers of voters
number of voters national elections
number of voters provincial elections
provincial results
PAC UPF ANC
1,638 585 137,477
national results
1,481 145,558
203,345
149,786
142,268
NP DP
828 67
715 126
IFP
65
52
Krugersdorp
projected number of voters
number of voters national elections
number of voters provincial elections
provincial results
PAC ANC NP
2,875 82,168 25,988
national results
2,554 81,232 31,541
Western Cape
projected number of voters
number of voters national elections
number of voters provincial elections
provincial results
PAC ANC NP
22,676 705,576 1,138,242
national results
21,353 714,271 1,195,633
146,686
130,916
131,411
DP IFP
2,923 3,518
1,945 3,213
2,405,919
2,151,843
2,148,456
DP IFP
141,970 7,445
88,804 2,566
PAC: Pan Africanist Congress
ANC: African National Congress
NP: National Party
DP: Democratie Party
IFP: Inkatha Freedom Party
UPF: United People's Front (a bantustan-based political party in Lebowa which only
contested the elections in the Northern Transvaal)
Source: Figures based on the national and provincial results released by the Election Administra-
tion Directorate, Independent Electoral Commission, on 26 May 1994. The projected number
of voters is given in a list added by the Department of Home Affairs.
Note: As there was no voters' registration, the projected numbers of voters are rather rough esti-
mates. Voters were free to vore in any polling station, provided they were in possession of one
of the authorized identity documents.
iKtbnal period up to, and beyond, the 1994 elections for the first representa-
f tive parliament in South African history (table 2). This South African iden-
I ßty was consummated in those impressive, unending queues in which voters
Iwaited long hours, sometimes even days, in front of the polling stations. It was
fatherapeutic exercise: for the first time, black and white, rieh and poor, par-
fócipated as equals in a common ritual.
• The elections were an organizational nightmare, a compromise of politi-
I cal horse-trading, and a straightforward miracle. It has become a truism to
l describe this extraordinary sequence of events, from the election days to Nelson
Mandela's Inauguration on the star-studded lawns of Union Buildings in Pre-
toria, as a miracle. The späte of indiscriminate bombings, the overheated polk-
i kal climate, and the widespread anxieties among both black and white South
l Africans on the eve of the elections gave way to a moment of trust and confi-
^ dence. The euphoric mood is well captured in the headlines about these his-
itoric events: "Savouring a victory for all South Africans"; "SA becomes a
! beacon of hope as President Mandela takes oath of office; We're on top of the
> world";22 "President Mandela sworn in for the whole of South Africa and the
world; 'Let freedom reign.'"23
But the term miracle was not only used as a metaphor. For numerous vot-
ers, the elections were truly a miracle, a supernatural phenomenon, a spiritual
experience. For once, the Volksblad in Bloemfontein captured the general mood
as its reporter went out to gather comments on this extraordinary event. As
befitting in the covering of a miracle, he turned, not to the politicians, but to
the religious leaders of various denominations. "What should have been a
politica! event has turned into a spiritual experience... . Black, white, brown,
and Indian South Africans are transformed-they have found each other."
Archbishop Tutu indeed believed that there could be no logical explanation
for these events: it could not have happened without divine Intervention.24
The new sense of being South African, of course, did not supplant mani-
festations of identity along such lines as race, class, ethnicity, generation, gen-
der, religion, language. This new identity was added to the range of identities
on which South Africans can draw. In paving the road for the unfolding of this
miracle, in averting the specter of a race war, and in molding a broad sense of
nationhood, the United Democratie Front-for all its faults-made a major
contribution.
lote on Methodology and Sources
HE RESEARCH FOR THis BOOK began in 1989, when I was employed by
African Studies Centre in Leiden, the Netherlands, to write a doctoral the-
|ös on the contemporary history of South Africa. I opted for the United
•'Democratie Front as the subject of my research because this fascinating move-
nient held out the promise of a multifaceted approach to the study of South
African society. When studying the UDF äs a national movement, one is
èxposed to the intricacies of "high politics." When exploring the social makeup
and motivations of the UDF's multifarious affiliates, one is introduced to the
complexities of politics at a grassroots level. I hoped that combining the per-
spectives of history from below with the broad outlines of mainstream history
Would contribute to my understanding of linkages between micro-level and
macro-level resistance politics.
Since I had previously worked äs a Journalist, it seemed natural to me that
this research should result not only in a thesis but also in book aimed at a more
genera! readership. I have therefore attempted to pursue three goals: to doc-
ument and analyze some aspects of South Africa's liberation struggle in the
19805, to write an accessible book, and to meet the requirements for a doctoral
thesis at the University of Leiden. Reconciling these goals was not as seif-
evident as it had seemed to me at the outset.
The first part of this book, notably chapter 2, summarizes various theoret-
ical concepts and the concomitant interpretations of the South African libera-
tion struggle. This is a much abridged and streamlined version of the first part
of the original thesis.
The main body of this book is part 2—chapters 3, 4, and 5—which look in
detail at three examples of local and locally inspired resistance. When I set out
to explore these case studies, my mental map was largely shaped by the para-
digms discussed in part i. The plan was to situate the case studies on this men-
tal map, pursuing the same themes when descending from the macro level to
the micro level. But the theoretical explorations undertaken in preparation for
the fieldwork yielded analytical concepts that at times seemed quite remote
from the living experiences of die actors at grassroots level.
The race-class paradigm, which is central to most of the academie literature,
and the related issue of alliance politics informed my queries as I went out to
explore die social base of die UDF in Sekhukhuneland, Kagiso, and the Cape
Peninsula. But once I had left the campus, this learned luggage did not take
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me very far. Somehow, the real people whom I met did not seem to fit in i
categories that made such impressive intellectual models. This was rather <L,
turbing, so at times I became annoyed with my informants. However forth»|
coming most people were, the issues remained elusive. What was even morel
disturbing was that, at first glance, everything seemed to fit perfectly welL j
Asked about their relationship with the workers' struggle, youth activists pro.
duced the politically correct answers. After all, they had digested much of thfe.
same literature, or popularized versions of it. And yet, the answers patiendy|
ofFered to my impatient queries somehow did not seem to explain much when«
I tried to make sense of the world around me. Why was it that these people ^
refused to fit into these learned paradigms? Didn't they know their place ifl«
history?
My frustration with my informants subsided when I finally persuaded•
myself to stop asking and to start listening. I abandoned my semistructured '
interviews and usually invited people to teil their particular story as they saW
fit. The case studies are largely of a narrative nature. I do not pretend that they l
make significant contributions to theory, but I do hope diat they contribute
something to our understanding of social movement processes at the micro,
level. What drove the youth leadership in Sekhukhuneland, the civic activists
in Kagiso, and the media workers in the Cape Peninsula? What was their
vision of a future society, and how did they think they would get there? How
did they become involved in the first place? How did they legitimate the
power that they had assumed in Opposition to the established patterns of
authority?
This is not to say that race and class are irrelevant concepts at either the
macro or micro level. But it does underline the observation made in the intro-
duction: people are not one- or two-dimensional actors, intelligible only in
terms of race or class, or at best in terms of race and class. Other dimensions
emerged in the course of my research: alliance politics could also be discussed
in terms of generation or gender, or in terms of the urban-rural divide. Next
to nationalism and socialism, religion and local belief Systems emerged as ide-
ological components that motivate and legitimize people's actions. "The peo-
ple" may be a one-dimensional entity, but real people have multiple identities.
This confrontation with the living world of real people was initially unsettling,
but later it feit as a relief. Real people proved much more interesting than the
one-dimensional actors in the theoretical models.
Fieldwork
Fieldwork for this study was conducted in two stages. After an orientation visit
to South Africa in January-February 1990,1 spent six months in Johannesburg
and the Northern Transvaal from mid-June to mid-December 1990. A second
phase of two months of fieldwork in September-November 1991 was con-
ducted in and around Cape Town and again in Johannesburg with visits to
Kagiso and another brief stay in Sekhukhuneland. Some information was col-
lected during earlier visits in 1984 and 1987, while I was working as a journal-
ist, and again at the time of the 1994 elections, when I returned to South
Africa for about one month.
A mine of information on the UDF is contained in the documentation of
politica! trials, ranging from trials against the national leadership (notably the
Pietermaritzburg Treason Trial and the Delmas Treason Trial) to a series of
court cases involving local activists. A collection of records of politica! trials
is kept in the Historica! and Literary Papers Section of the University of the
Witwatersrand. I have made extensive use of the Delmas Treason Trial collec-
tion, which contains documents up to mid-i985. Furthermore, I have consulted
collections with UDF material in the University of South Africa (UNISA) in
Pretoria, the South African Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg
(SAIRR), the African Studies Centre of the University of Cape Town, the
Mayibuye Centre of the University of the Western Cape (UWC), the Centre
for Adult and Continuing Education (CACE) at UWC, and the South African
History Archives (SAHA) in Johannesburg. SAHA, which concentrates on
collecting documents and memorabilia of liberation movements, social move-
ments, and trade unions in the 19805, was a particularly valuable store of infor-
mation. My archival research was concluded in 1991; I have not consulted the
material that continued to arrive in the SAHA office after 1991. This new mate-
rial includes, for example, the documentation kept by regional UDF offices.
The SAHA collection is now stored with the Historica! and Literary Papers at
the University of the Witwatersrand. In addition, the UDF Head Office in
Johannesburg has been very helpful in providing information. Many docu-
ments in offices and private houses, of course, were confiscated during police
raids in the 19805.
This documentation has been supplemented with a series of interviews with
key figures in the UDF national leadership. The case studies depend in vary-
ing degrees on a combination of published material, unpublished sources, and
interviews.
I have been particularly fortunate in the timing of this research. When the
research proposal was drawn up, the UDF was a restricted organization.
Prominent activists were either in detention or in hiding, or they had gone
into exile. My first visa request was turned down in August 1989. This proved
a blessing in disguise. My renewed request was finally granted in December
1989. Arriving in South Africa in January 1990,1 had the good fortune to wit-
ness the unbanning of the ANC, the UDF, and other movements and the
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release of Nelson Mandela. Detainees emerged from prison, refugees i
home, restrictions were lifted, documentation resurfaced in leaps and!
On my first visit to the SAHA office in Johannesburg, I found two ä
empty rooms. As the year progressed, the rooms filled up with a stead
of boxes with documents emerging from hiding places in garages and i
In this new open climate, informants could afford to be more fortho~
than would have been possible under the repressive conditions of the)
Sekhukhuneland
Sekhukhuneland was selected because it promised to be an interestir
of rural rebellion. Most of the UDF documents deal with urban areas.!
activists were generally not prolific writers. Minutes of meetings were l
kept. The massive outpouring of media was characteristic of the UDFifJ
major towns but was largely absent in rural areas where facilities were lar^
service organizations unheard of, and repression much harsher. Newsf
rarely paid much attention to developments in rural areas. The story of J
youth movement in Sekhukhuneland is therefore largely compiled on the l
of interviews. Reconstructing a chronological history proved more difficti
this case than in the two other cases. Many informants were not able to|
vide dates widi their stories: events were told in relation to some salient k
dent in people's personal experiences—for example, "before my detention"
"after my house was burnt down." Interviews were conducted with merat
of the Northern Transvaal Regional Executive in Pietersburg, Seshego, \
the University of the North in Mankweng, with youth activists in severai<j|
lages in Sekhukhuneland but mostly in the twin villages of Apel-GaNkoari
and with former youth activists from Sekhukhuneland who were living |
Johannesburg. I also consulted some teachers and ANC veterans in Sekhtf
huneland, but most of the interviews were with youth activists—that is, you
men in the age group of twenty to about thirty-five years. Most interne
were conducted in English, but occasionally some informants assisted as in1
preters. I was largely unsuccessful in my attempts to interview girls andyoa
women, who were much more reluctant and less fluent in English. As a resr
chapter 3, "From Confusion to Lusaka," is not so much a narrative of eve
as an attempt to capture an example of rural revolt as it was experienced l
young activists. During my visits to Sekhukhuneland I had the good for~"
to enjoy the hospitality of Mrs. Gertrude Nchabeleng, widow of the murd
UDF president. Her sons and daughters were most helpful in my endeavc
I am particularly indebted to Maurice Nchabeleng, who was a patiënt a
resourceful companion, both in the Northern Transvaal and in Johannesbutgl
M»
r
Bthe search for UDF affiïiates that can be regarded as fairly typical of main-
fceam UDF organizations, a civic association seemed an obvious choice. The
pcision to take a closer look at the civic association in Kagiso, the township
Jïjoining Krugersdorp, was largely inspired by the availability of source mate-
lal and the accessibility of the township. A first glance at the Krugersdorp
fcesidents Organisation (KRO) was obtained from an Oral History Project
idertaken by five students of Khanya College in Johannesburg. One of these
idents, George Moilea, served as secretary on the KRO executive from 1981
,ttil 1983. He has been very helpful in providing me with background infbr-
tttion on KRO and Kagiso. Next I found that there was a substantial amount
f documentation on KRO in the archives of the Historica! Papers section of
' ï University of the Witwatersrand. In early 1986, KRO had initiated legal
«.oceedings against the minister of law and order to obtain an interdict order-
ftgthe police to stop their harassment of Kagiso residents. Both parties in this
rial produced a sizable amount of evidence, ranging from affidavits and press
HJttings to minutes of meetings, notebooks, and the transcripts of phone con-
strsations by KRO leaders that had been tapped by the police. These trial doc-
uments provided much of the source material for this case study.
• A first attempt to supplement this source material with interviews with past
and present civic leaders in Kagiso had to be abandoned because of the out-
>reak of the "township war" in August 1990. Over forty Kagiso residents died
n a series of attacks by Inkatha fighters who had taken over one of the migrant
faostels as an operating base. In November 1990, when calm had returned, I
T! was able to interview several civic activists in Kagiso. Because of the security
ï Situation it was not feasible to actually live in Kagiso for some weeks, as had
l been my initial plan. Interviews were conducted in Kagiso and Johannesburg.
B During my second period of fieldwork in 1991,1 planned to continue this
r series of interviews. Meanwhile I found that I was not alone in my interest in
l, the history of the Krugersdorp Residents Organisation. Jeremy Seekings (now
,, at Cape Town University) had already written a conference paper on Kagiso
. that was largely based on the same source material. His doctoral thesis on the
t transition from quiescence to confrontation in the PWV (Pretoria-Witwaters-
: rand-Vereeniging) townships also contains much information on KRO and
Kagiso. He generously shared ideas and information. The chapter on Kagiso
owes much to these two publications.
A second series of interviews with KRO leaders was subsequently con-
ducted in November 1991 in Kagiso and Johannesburg, although new out-
breaks of politica! violence meant that appointments were frequently canceled
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or postponed. The portrait of KRO is inevitably incomplete. Not all the i
actors were available for interviews. With one exception—an interviewe
members of a rivaling civic—I have made no attempt to conduct inter
with residents who had not been KRO activists. One of the notable bla
spots is the experience of hostel dwellers in the mid-ipSos. In the period oft
research, the two hostels in Kagiso had been taken over by Inkatha. Most<
the original inmates had left the hostels, and in the limited time available 11
not able to tracé them.
There is a large gap for the period between May 1986 and 1989. During t
time the KRO leadership was in detention or banned from entering Kagis
However, the genera! impression is that due to heavy repression there was no
much civic activity during these years.
Gmssroots
One peculiar characteristic of the UDF was the creative use of a great variety :
of media. In the history of African liberation struggles, such a massive out-
pouring of publications is surely unparalleled and deserving of closer scrutiny.
The community newspaper Gmssroots in the Cape Peninsula was not just the
first of its kind; it was also the best documented alternative paper of the 19805.
The Gmssroots staff produced abundant documentation for its overseas sponsors, l
kept minutes of meetings, produced annual reports, and engaged in an almost l
incessant process of evaluation. Gmssroots's own documentation was rather scat-
tered, as the newspaper survived a fire, police raids, and a removal. But its main
and most loyal fmancial backer, the church-based NGO ICCO (Organisation
for Development Cooperation) in the Netherlands, neatiy kept both the files
and a nearly complete set of the newspapers from 1980 to 1990. Both ICCO
and Gmssroots have been most helpful in providing access to this documenta- , j
tion. I have indicated in the notes whether the documents cited were con-
sulted at ICCO or at the Gmssroots office in Athlone, which has since closed.
To supplement this documentation, I have interviewed media activists who
worked for Gmssroots and some civic and youth activists who used the paper
as an "organizing tooi" in their communities.
In all three case studies, most of the interviews were conducted with local
activists—more were with the local leadership than with the rank-and-file fol-
io wers. The experiences of the average "man and woman in the street"
remained outside the scope of my research. In some cases, informants asked
to remain anonymous. In a few instances, I have myself refrained from nam-
ing informants since the information provided by them might still be deemed
sensitive. In both cases, the notes simply refer to "interviews." When referring
to documents, the notes also indicate the depository. If no depository is men-
tioned, the documents are in the possession of the author.
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